Resource constraints in developing countries compel policy makers to ration the provision of healthcare services. This article examines one such set of Guidelines: A patient dialysing in the state sector in South Africa may not refuse renal transplantation when a kidney becomes available. Refusal of transplantation can lead to exclusion from the state-funded dialysis programme. This Guideline is legally acceptable as related to Constitutional stipulations which allow for rationing healthcare resources in South Africa. Evaluating the ethical merit of the Guideline, (...) and exploring the ethical dilemma it poses, proves a more complex task. We examine the actions of healthcare professionals as constrained by the Guideline. From a best interests framework, we argue that in these circumstances directing patient decision making is not necessarily unethical or unacceptably paternalistic. We then scrutinise the guideline itself through several different ethical ‘lenses’. Here, we argue that bioethics does not provide a definitive answer as to the moral merit of rationing dialysis under these circumstances, however it can be considered just in this context. We conclude by examining a potential pitfall of the Guideline: Unwilling transplant recipients may not comply with immunosuppressive medication, which raises questions for policies based on resource management and rationing. (shrink)

How does thinking in terms of truth contribute to our knowledge of the world? Moreover, what might the answers to this question tell us about truth itself? The aim of this paper is to canvas several roles of the truth concept for first-order inquiry (that is, inquiry into extra-linguistic and extra-mental reality) and then relate these answers to the ongoing inflationism-deflationism debate. I argue that the deflationary conception of truth is more versatile than is often appreciated, but there is nonetheless (...) one role that is uniquely inflationary. I call this role ‘representing semantic determinants’. In short, I argue that inflationism permits substantive explanations of the truth-conditional semantic facts and that such explanations can occasionally play a role in investigating certain first-order claims. (shrink)

The topic of my dissertation is selfhood. I aim to explain what a self is such that it can sometimes succeed and other times fail at thinking and acting autonomously. I open by considering a failure of autonomy to which I return throughout the dissertation. The failure is that of self-deception. I show that in common cases of self-deception the self-deceived individual fails, due to a motive on his part, to be able to explain the cause of some belief or (...) action of his. There are several philosophical projects that arise when one reflects on this failure. They are presented by the following questions: what are our minds like, such that this failure is possible? For what should we criticize the self-deceived individual, given that he has a motivated lack of self-knowledge but does not know he is so motivated? Is the self-deceived individual epistemically criticizable for lacking explanatory self-knowledge in a way that he is not criticizable for lacking knowledge that would help him explain another's thoughts and actions? By answering these questions I provide an account of the rational unity that goes missing in self-deception and in the related phenomenon of epistemic akrasia. This unity can—and I argue, should—be present in bodily action as well. When a person acts without this unity, he acts in a weak-willed, akratic way. I provide an account of this disunity, which, when added to my account of the disunity of self-deception, reveals the rational unity of an autonomous agent, the rational unity of the self. (shrink)

Do perceptual states necessarily constitute evidence epistemically supporting corresponding perceptual beliefs? Susanna Schellenberg thinks so. She argues that perceptual states, veridical or not, necessarily provide (or constitute) a kind of evidence (for the existence of the truth-maker) supporting corresponding perceptual beliefs. She uses “phenomenal evidence” as a label for this kind of evidence and calls her argument “The Phenomenal Evidence Argument.” Having introduced her project, we offer a reconstruction of Schellenberg’s argument. A key premise has it that, necessarily, for items (...) with a function, fulfillment of the function (the good case) is explanatorily and metaphysically prior to function failure (the bad case). We suggest that the etiological theory of functions renders this key premise plausible. However, Schellenberg rejects the etiological theory of functions and likewise the idea that the epistemic or warranting force of perceptual states is grounded in their being reliably linked to veridical perception. But then what supports the key premise? Schellenberg argues that accurate perception is a part of the nature of perceptual capacities because the nature of perceptual capacities is explained in terms of their function, and their function is to represent accurately. We suggest that Schellenberg is committed to an understanding of priority which doesn’t require any actual good cases—just possible ones. This reading, we argue, is too weak to support the key premise. Given Schellenberg’s commitments, it is not necessarily the case that perceptual states are evidence for a corresponding perceptual belief. Before concluding we discuss an overgeneralization objection. (shrink)

Might design education be, at its heart, a form of occupational therapy? This is the question that this article grapples with, taking László Moholy-Nagy’s repurposing of the Bauhaus pedagogy for use with disabled veterans as its starting point. In exploring his work at the School of Design in Chicago (as well as an uncharacteristically activist period at the Museum of Modern Art in New York, which instituted a Veterans Art Center), this article seeks out the shared foundations of rehabilitory thought (...) and the underpinnings of the Bauhaus Vorkurs by taking stock of Moholy-Nagy’s long-standing engagement with the field of psychotechnics. (shrink)

In Contradiction advocates and defends the view that there are true contradictions (dialetheism), a view that flies in the face of orthodoxy in Western philosophy since Aristotle. The book has been at the center of the controversies surrounding dialetheism ever since its first publication in1987. This second edition of the book substantially expands upon the original in various ways, and also contains the author's reflections on developments over the last two decades. Further aspects of dialetheism are discussed in the companion (...) volume, Doubt Truth to be a Liar, also published byOxford University Press in 2006. (shrink)

According to our folk theory of lying, liars leak observable cues of their insincerity, observable cues that make it easy to catch a liar in real time. Various prominent social epistemologists rely on the correctness of our folk theory as empirically well-confirmed when building their normative accounts of the epistemology of testimony. Deception detection research in communication studies, however, has shown that our folk-theory is mistaken. It is not empirically well-confirmed but empirically refuted. Michaelian (2010) and Shieber (2012) have already (...) discussed some of this literature and its relevance for epistemology, especially for the most worked out reliance on our folk theory by Elizabeth Fricker (1994, 2016, 2017a, 2024). Fricker (2016) raises a reasonable objection to their presentations of the research: is the research ecologically valid? Do the experiments in the lab carry over to real life? This chapter conveys the methodology of the research, defends its ecological validity, and addresses further research on the nature and frequency of lies in ordinary life. Social epistemologists stand to gain from understanding the nuts and bolts of deception detection research and its findings. The chapter concludes with a detailed examination of Fricker’s relilance on folk theory in her “local reductionist” epistemology of testimony. Further areas of research relevant to social epistemology are listed. (shrink)

The manuscript notes described and trascribed below are unique: they show Bacon in the very act of originating, selecting and developing materials for the natural-philosophical projects of the crucial last years of his life. Many of the notes are drafts of material later incorporated in published texts—notably the Sylva Sylvarum . Examination of the drafts indicates that the Sylva is not a hotch-potch of plagiarized scraps. Bacon took great pains, acknowledged borrowings and drew heavily on his own extensive experimental and (...) observational work. The drafts also show that much of the material was used to display the explanatory power of his ambitious speculative philosophy. Preoccupation with the speculative philosophy is also evidenced in the notes which have no counterpart in the published works. Among these notes is a passage on the size of the universe, the motion of the fixed stars and the hypothesis of the earth's diurnal rotation. In that passage Bacon struggled with threats to his unswervingly geostatic conception of the universe. (shrink)

Platonic myth meets American noir in this haunting series of philosophical images, from gigantic ferris wheels to offshore drilling rigs. It has been said that Plato, Nietzsche, and Giordano Bruno gave us the three great mythical presentations of serious philosophy in the West. They have spawned few imitators, as philosophers have generally drifted toward a dry, scholarly tone that has become the yardstick of professional respectability. In this book, Graham Harman tries to restore myth to its central place in (...) the discipline. In Chapter One, the narrator considers the motion of a Ferris wheel of many miles in diameter, which generates disasters and other events in its endless revolutions. In Chapter Two, he moves from the Chesapeake Bay to the depths of Hell, where he observes the show trial of pre-Socratic thinkers. In Chapter Three, the narrator encounters a battered steam calliope in India that may summon tsunamis, solar flares, and other catastrophic forces. In Chapter Four, he tries to explain reports of a ghostly boat in Japanese waters. In Chapter Five, he discusses causation on an offshore drilling platform. And in Chapter Six, amidst a deadly Paris hailstorm, he proposes a theory of objects without relations. (shrink)

Saul Kripke’s work on the semantics of non-normal modal logics introduced the idea of non-normal worlds, worlds where certain connectives behave differently from the way in which they behave in the worlds of normal modal logics. Such worlds may be thought of as impossible worlds, though Kripke did not, himself, talk of them in this way. Since Kripke’s invention, the notion of an impossible world has undergone much fruitful development and application. Impossible worlds may be of different kinds—or maybe different (...) degrees of impossibility; and these worlds have found application in many areas where hyperintensionality appears to play a significant role: intentional mental states, counterfactuals, meaning, property theory, to name but a few areas. But what, exactly, is an impossible world? How is it best to characterise the notion? To date, the notion is used more by example than by definition. In this paper I will investigate the question, and propose a general characterisation, suitable for all standard purposes and tastes. (shrink)

This article begins by addressing a critique of my book Immaterialism by the archaeologists Þóra Pétursdóttirr and Bjørnar Olsen in their 2018 article “Theory Adrift.” As they see it, I restrict myself in Immaterialism to available historical documentation on the Dutch East India Company (VOC), and they wonder how my account might have changed if I had discussed more typical archaeological examples instead: wrecked and sunken ships, released ballast, deserted harbors, distributed goods, and derelict fortresses. In response, I argue that (...) my account was not therefore non-archaeological, since ruins are the topic of archaeology only by accident: the real subject of the discipline is what Marshall McLuhan describes as “cold media,” in the sense that they are low in information. McLuhan’s distinction between hot and cold media is shown to be surprisingly analogous to Aristotle’s difference between continua and discrete substances, and some consequences are drawn from this analogy. (shrink)

Recent decades have seen attacks on philosophy as an irrelevant field of inquiry when compared with science. In this book, Graham McFee defends the claims of philosophy against attempts to minimize either philosophy’s possibility or its importance by deploying a contrast with what Wittgenstein characterized as the “dazzling ideal” of science. This ‘dazzling ideal’ incorporates both the imagined completeness of scientific explanation—whereby completing its project would leave nothing unexplained—and the exceptionless character of the associated conception of causality. On such (...) a scientistic world-view, what need is there for philosophy? In his defense of philosophy, McFee shows that rejecting such scientism is not automatically anti-scientific, and that it permits granting to natural science its own truth-generating power. Further, McFee argues for contextualism in the project of philosophy, and sets aside the pervasive requirement for exceptionless generalizations while relating his account to interconnections between the concepts of person, substance, agency, and causation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hegel's Century: Alienation and Recognition in a Time of Revolution by Jon StewartClay GrahamJon Stewart. Hegel's Century: Alienation and Recognition in a Time of Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. Pp. xi + 338. Hardback, $39.99.Hegel's Century serves as (yet another) important contribution in Jon Stewart's ever-expanding research in nineteenth-century philosophy. The central premise of this monograph explores Hegel's pan-European legacy and argues that Hegelian concepts are fundamental (...) for understanding major philosophical themes of the era, especially on the European continent. Dominant among these themes are alienation and recognition, particularly their adaptation to political philosophy and religious criticism. Stewart develops his theses via a series of chapters dedicated to individual thinkers: Heine, Feuerbach, Bauer, Marx, Kierkegaard, Dostoyevsky, Bakunin, and Engels. In each case, the concepts of alienation and recognition are teased out of primary texts and connected to, and contrasted with, their Hegelian origin. While scholars of nineteenth-century philosophy may find some value in re-envisioning the development of continental thought through Stewart's narrative [End Page 330] (especially insofar as it challenges unfortunate caricatures of the history of ideas), the target audiences of Hegel's Century are advanced students of philosophy and the general public of interested persons. Though this approach has its shortcomings, it is nevertheless a valuable addition to the literature. Not only does Stewart tell a compelling story about the trajectory of nineteenth-century philosophy, but he also connects this conceptual evolution to shifts in political, economic, literary, and religious history. As such, Hegel's Century is best thought of as a gateway text for students and autodidacts fascinated by the philosophical bases for a century of upheaval and revolution.Following a general introduction, Stewart divides the book into three parts, each more substantive than the last. His introduction does the necessary legwork detailing the purpose, audience, and strategy of the book. Its most philosophically interesting aspect is the outline of seven ideas Stewart hopes will reform the reception of nineteenth-century philosophy in the modern classroom. Philosophical exposition begins in part 1, which consists of two chapters wherein Stewart details those aspects of Hegel's philosophy that will be most thoroughly thematized throughout the book. These ideas are largely sourced from specific portions of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, and Lectures on the Philosophy of History. Chapter 1 focuses on Hegel's view of alienation in the Phenomenology, especially the (in)famous section on the master and bondsman. In chapter 2, Stewart explains Hegel's conception of Christianity and the nature of divinity. Stewart maintains that as a result of dense prose and conceptual rigor, Hegel's religious views were open to myriad ambiguous interpretations. When Stewart turns to "first-generation" thinkers, namely, those who attended Hegel's lectures in Berlin and were a direct part of the intoxicating intellectual atmosphere that spread therein, questions concerning the essence of Christianity (as Feuerbach's magnum opus suggests) are front and center. Stewart's cursory account of Hegel's theory of Christianity serves adequately as the background for contextualizing this intellectual drama.In part 2, three of these "first-generation" thinkers are given their own chapters: Heine (chapter 3), Feuerbach (chapter 4), and Bauer (chapter 5). In each case, the chapter starts with a short intellectual biography focusing on the formative role Hegel played in the thinker's development. This is followed by a sustained discussion of a few central texts and interspersed analyses of how Hegel's influence is felt therein. Stewart's discussion often shows the ambivalence with which each of these thinkers handled their Hegelian inheritance. Though the specifics differ, each of these three thinkers took Hegelian theory to a more radical limit than Hegel himself did. The chapters on Heine and Bauer—figures usually overlooked in survey courses—are admirable introductions for the interested neophyte.In part 3, Stewart shows Hegel's tentacles extending throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, notwithstanding the Hegelians' difficulty in acquiring academic posts. The political and religious radicalism of first-generation critics bleeds into the formative development of the so-called "second generation" of thinkers: Marx... (shrink)

Provides a philosophical and critical analysis of F.A. Hayek's version of Classical Liberalism. Highlighting weaknesses of the agnostic, evolutionary ethics that Hayek, a recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics, considers foundational to his free-market system, the study explores alternative moral foundations within Christian ethics.

Religion is more than a matter of worshipping a deity or spirit. For many people, religion pervades every part of their lives and is not separated off into some purely private and personal realm. Religion is integral to many people's relationship with the wider world, an aspect of their dwelling among other beings - both human and other-than-human - and something manifested in the everyday world of eating food, having sex and fearing strangers. Food, Sex and Strangers offers alternative ways (...) of thinking about what religion involves and how we might better understand it. Drawing on studies of contemporary religions, especially among indigenous peoples, the book argues that religion serves to maintain and enhance human relationships in and with the larger-than-human world. Fundamentally, religion can be better understood through the ways we negotiate our lives than in affirmations of belief - and it is best seen when people engage in intimate acts with themselves and others. (shrink)

The study of sport is characterised by its inter-disciplinarity, with researchers drawing on apparently incompatible research traditions and ethical benchmarks in the natural sciences and the social sciences, depending on their area of specialisation. In this groundbreaking study, Graham McFee argues that sound high-level research into sport requires a sound rationale for one’s methodological choices, and that such a rationale requires an understanding of the connection between the practicalities of researching sport and the philosophical assumptions which underpin them. By (...) examining touchstone principles in research methodology, such as the contested ‘gold standard’ of voluntary informed consent in the natural sciences and the postmodern denial of ‘truth’ in the social sciences, McFee demonstrates that epistemology and ethics are inextricably linked. Drawing on a wide range of examples, from the laboratory to the sports field, McFee explores the concepts of ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’ in sports research and makes a powerful case for a philosophical deepening of our approach to method and methodology in sport. This book is important reading for all advanced students and researchers working in sport, exercise and related disciplines. (shrink)

Buddhism and Marxism may seem unlikely bedfellows, since they come from such different times and places, and appear to address such different concerns. But the two have at least this much in common: both say that life, as we find it, is unsatisfactory; both have a diagnosis of why this is; and both offer the hope of making it better. In this paper, I argue that aspects of each complement aspects of the other. In particular, Buddhism provides a stable ethical (...) base that Marxism always lacked; and Marxism provides a sophisticated political philosophy, which Buddhism never had. I will explain those aspects of each of the two on which I wish to draw, and then explain how they are complementary. (shrink)

Jacob Vernet (1698-1789) was the most important and influential Genevan pastor of his day, successively holding the posts of Professor of Belles-Lettres (1739) and of Theology (1756) at the city's Acad mie. A 'liberal' theologian, he had personal contacts with several of the leading philosophes, all of which turned sour after a time. This book describes Vernet's contacts with Montesquieu, d'Alembert, Voltaire and Rousseau. It also investigates a charge made repeatedly by his enemies, namely that he was a hypocrite who (...) disguised his real beliefs. Vernet's religious and philosophical opinions are thus reviewed as expressed in his major works, Trait de la v rite de la religion chr tienne, Instruction chr tienne and Lettres critiques d'un voyageur anglais. The connection between Vernet's ideas and the social and political situation in his native Geneva is also studied in depth. The pastor's relations with Montesquieu have often been seen as a cause for congratulation, for he edited the first edition of De l'Esprit des lois, but a close reading of Montesquieu's correspondence shows that this episode was far from being an unqualified success. Similarly, Vernet's contacts with Rousseau give pause for thought: the relevant evidence that he was on occasion somewhat devious in his dealings with the great author is reviewed comprehensively. Particular attention is given to Vernet's relations with Voltaire. In 1760 the pastor was vilified in the second of the Dialogues chr tiens, accused of greed and dishonesty. But did Voltaire actually write the second Dialogue? If not, who did? These intriguing questions are discussed in detail, special attention being given to Vernet's own essays of self-justification, the Lettre Monsieur le Premier Sindic(1760) and M moire Mr. le Premier Sindic (1766, both of which are reproduced in appendices. Jacob Vernet's long life and many works give a fascinating insight into the problems and inconsistencies of liberal Protestantism during the various stages of the Enlightenment. (shrink)

Judicial independence is generally understood as requiring that judges must be insulated from political life. The central claim of this work is that far from standing apart from the political realm, judicial independence is a product of it. It is defined and protected through interactions between judges and politicians. In short, judicial independence is a political achievement. This is the main conclusion of a three-year research project on the major changes introduced by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, and the consequences (...) for judicial independence and accountability. The authors interviewed over 150 judges, politicians, civil servants and practitioners to understand the day-to-day processes of negotiation and interaction between politicians and judges. They conclude that the greatest threat to judicial independence in future may lie not from politicians actively seeking to undermine the courts, but rather from their increasing disengagement from the justice system and the judiciary. (shrink)

Graham Haydon; Educational Relevance: A Slogan Examined, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 7, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 223–238, https://doi.org/10.1.

This the final volume of a five volume edited work on the history 0f western philosophy of religion. It contains chapters on James, Bergson, Dewey, Whitehead, Hartshorne, Russell, Scheler, Buber, Maritain, Jaspers, Tillich, Barth, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Levinas, Weil, Ayer, Alston, Hick, Daly, Derrida, Plantinga, and Swinburne.

The basic claims of the chapter are, first, that mental disorders are not best understood as types of brain disorder, even though mental disorders are based in the brain. And, second, that the difference between the two sorts of disorders can be illuminated by the sorts of treatment or therapy that may work for the one type but not for the other type. In the discussion some of the diagnostic implications and difficulties associated with these two basic claims are outlined.

Mathematical pluralism is the view that there is an irreducible plurality of pure mathematical structures, each with their own internal logics; and that qua pure mathematical structures they are all equally legitimate. Mathematical pluralism is a relatively new position on the philosophical landscape. This Element provides an introduction to the position.

In this chapter we theoretically analyse the most prominent emotional states that derive from postmodernity, and which, exacerbated by the Covid pandemic, affect individuals and societies. When differentiating emotions in their social aspect as either isolating or binding, it becomes apparent that isolating emotional states such as fear, mistrust and loneliness have been especially intense in this sociocultural situation. Due to their isolating character, they negatively affect social cohesion. We propose that the social fabric can be strengthened through relationships of (...) civic friendship, because this is based on the development of binding emotions (trust, empathy, care for well-being, and compassion, which are other-oriented emotions), as well as consisting of a bond of reciprocal good will between citizens. Without forgetting that, under certain conditions, it can also be a risk for social cohesion, civic friendship brings consistency to society, not only because of the kinds of binding emotions that it involves, but also because, being based on other-oriented emotions, it protects emotional rationality from emotionalism. (shrink)

Within the Cognitive Science of Religion, Justin Barrett has proposed that humans possess a hyperactive agency detection device that was selected for in our evolutionary past because ‘over detecting’ (as opposed to ‘under detecting’) the existence of a predator conferred a survival advantage. Within the Intelligent Design debate, William Dembski has proposed the law of small probability, which states that specified events of small probability do not occur by chance. Within the Fine-Tuning debate, John Leslie has asserted a tidiness principle (...) such that, if we can think of a good explanation for some state of affairs, then an explanation is needed for that state of affairs. In this paper I examine similarities between these three proposals and suggest that they can all be explained with reference to the existence of an explanation attribution module in the human mind. The forgoing analysis is considered with reference to a contrast between classical rationality and what Gerd Gigerenzer and others have called ecological rationality. (shrink)

A poetic visual meditation on creativity and the nature of imagination and experience.