In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE PLACE OF RENE GIRARD IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY Guy Vanheeswijck University ofAntwerp and ofLeuven Iwould like to start by quoting a text which is likely to be recognized by everyone, who is even on a superficial level familiar with the work of René Girard: Desire that bears on a natural object is only human to the extent that it is mediated by the desire of another bearing on (...) the same object: it is human to desire what others desire, because they desire it. Thus an object that is perfectly useless from a biological point of view (such as a medal, or the enemy's flag) can be desired because it is the object of other desires. Such a human desire, and human reality as it differs from animal reality, is only created by the action that satisfies such desires. Human history is the history of desires that are desired [Désirs désirés]. Undoubtedly, these could be words written by Girard. However, they are not. These words are quoted from the famous lectures given by Alexandre Kojève on Hegel's Phänomenologie des Geistes at the Ecole pratique des hautes études between 1933 and 1939. They were followed by what would become the crème ofpost-war French philosophy: Raymond Aron, Georges Bataille, Alexandre Koyré, Pierre Klossowski, Jacques Lacan, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre.' Kojève's interpretation ofHegel has, as generally known, become the point ofreference to the post-war twentieth ' Although Sartre himselfcould not attend the lectures (at that time he taught philosophy in Le Havre en Laon), he must have heard from it by way of Aron or Merleau-Ponty. 96Guy Vanheeswijck century philosophy in France. Before 1930 the word "dialectic" was burdened with an odium of sin, after 1930 it became a word—thanks to Kojève —radiant with prestige. Before 1930 there had been no talk of an Hegelian school whatsoever in France, after 1930 the situation changed so drastically that Merleau-Ponty was able to write these often quoted lines in 1946: Hegel is at the origin of everything that has been great in philosophy for over a century; for example Marxism, Nietzsche, phenomenology and German existentialism, psychoanalysis. He inaugurates the attempt to explore the irrational and to integrate it within a wider rationality that remains the philosophical task of our century. (Sens et non-sens 109-110) Half a century later, these words have lost their self-evident character. While the generation of French thinkers between 1930 and 1960 stresses its dependence on Hegel, the generation after 1960 heavily reacts against him. In 1970 Michel Foucault gave his inaugural speech at the Collège de France. On behalf of his generation he testified to a generalized antiHegelianism at that moment: "Our entire epoch, whether through logic or epistemology, whether through Marx or Nietzsche, seeks to evade Hegel's Imperium [échapper à Hegel] (L'Ordre du discours 74). Obviously, René Girard belongs to the second generation, which, on the one hand, embroiders on the theme ofdesire, borrowed from Kojève's interpretation ofHegel, but, on the other, in its search for answers precisely wishes to get rid of Hegel. But, is it correct to call René Girard a philosopher? His schooling was that of an historian. In 1947 he graduated in Paris as an archivistepal éographe at the Ecole de Chartres: his thesis was "La vie privée à Avignon dans la seconde moitié du XVe siècle." Three years later—in the meantime he had emigrated to the United States—he received his Ph.D. at the faculty of history of the University of Indiana. The topic of his dissertation was "American opinion ofFrance, 1940-1943." However, he has never worked as a professional historian. He owes his reputation first and foremost to his literary analyses, subsequently to his research in anthropology, finally to his exegesis ofthe Bible. Time and again, Girard has expressed his preference for literature to both humanities and philosophy. Human behavior is, in his view, much less elucidated by the conceptual structures of discursive philosophy than by the evocative force of a Greek tragedy, the Biblical passion story or a modern novel. One might retort that René Girard... (shrink)

In his reply, Guido Vanheeswijck expresses his agreement to the central ‘hunch’ of Mendus’ article with regard to the status of the political standard narrative about the liberal view on the relation between religion and violence. However, taking some distance from Mendus, he tries to make it clear that the relation between violence and religion is obvious, but not inevitable and that the tensions between religion and modernity – couched in a terminological contrast between enchantment and disenchantment – are (...) palpable indeed but not inescapable. (shrink)

Charles Taylor’s monumental book A Secular Age has been extensively discussed, criticized, and worked on. This volume, by contrast, explores ways of working with Taylor’s book, especially its potentials and limits for individual research projects. Due to its wide reception, it has initiated a truly interdisciplinary object of study; with essays drawn from various research fields, this volume fosters substantial conversation across disciplines.

In 1988, the Polish philosopher Leszek Kołakowski published his essay Metaphysical Horror, conceived as a philosophical and historical interpretation of the vicissitudes of metaphysics in Western philosophy. At the same time, Kołakowski's attempt to map out the history of that metaphysical horror was a way to escape from it. Put differently, he traced the evolution of metaphysical horror—from metaphysics to antimetaphysics—in Western philosophy while simultaneously pleading for the preservation of metaphysics, be it in a very specific shape. To clarify Kołakowski's (...) idiosyncratic position regarding the status of metaphysics, the author's exposition falls into two parts, each in three steps. In the first part, mainly drawing upon a textual analysis of Metaphysical Horror, Kołakowski's portrayal of the evolution of Western metaphysics toward its marginalization in contemporary philosophy is summarized. Subsequently, his own concept of hermeneutical metaphysics in relation to the everlasting importance of man's metaphysical need for the Absolute is presented. In the second part, set up as an exercise in intellectual history, Kołakowski's concept of hermeneutical metaphysics is situated against the double background of his Oxford environment and of that of an Eastern-European ally regarding the vicissitudes of the metaphysical tradition. The conclusion is double. First, this twofold background makes it clear why his hermeneutical metaphysics is at the same time a historical metaphysics and a moral ontology, dependent on man's everlasting metaphysical need for the Absolute. Second, it clarifies why his hermeneutical metaphysics takes a unique position in contemporary philosophy, different from the current concept of analytic metaphysics, on the one hand, and from the present-day concept of post-metaphysics in Continental philosophy, on the other. (shrink)

This article focuses on the completely neglected relation between Collingwood and Heidegger's concepts of metaphysics by highlighting their respective reactions to Alfred J. Ayer and Rudolf Carnap. In his article “The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language” from 1931, Carnap exposed the metaphysical statements, used by Heidegger in his inaugural lecture What is Metaphysics?, as pseudo-statements. Three years later, Ayer published the article “Demonstration of the Impossibility of Metaphysics”.In the late 1930s, Ayer's position was attacked by Collingwood in (...) An Essay on Metaphysics. In the British debate, the tables of the German debate were thus turned. Whereas the analytic philosopher Carnap reacted against the metaphysician Heidegger, the metaphysician Collingwood reacted against the analytic philosopher Ayer. Accordingly, a correct understanding and evaluation of the relation between Collingwood's and Heidegger's concepts of metaphysics are dependent on knowledge of their respective reactions to Ayer and Carnap.Three steps are taken. First, the discussion between Carnap and Heidegger is presented. Second, the friction between Ayer and Collingwood is outlined. In the final section, the similarities and differences between Collingwood and Heidegger's concepts of metaphysics are explored and situated within their divergent views on the Western history of philosophy. (shrink)

Although the philosophical ideas of the English philosopher Robin George Collingwood on history and art have often been compared with those of the German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey, an in-depth comparison between their concepts of metaphysics was never made. Therefore, the focus in this article is on both authors’ concepts of metaphysics. It is shown that, despite the undeniable affinity, their views of the status of metaphysics differ substantially. Both Dilthey and Collingwood focus on an inherent antinomy in the project of (...) metaphysics. On the one hand, there is the inescapable relativity of all time-bound ways of thinking and their results; on the other, there is the metaphysical search for objective and generally accepted knowledge of reality as a whole. For Dilthey, the awareness of its historical character reveals the impossibility for metaphysics to provide a foundation for natural and human sciences alike. Collingwood’s aim, by contrast, is to safeguard the possibility of metaphysics as a historical science to supply an enduring foundation of natural and human sciences. To clarify this radical difference with regard to the role of metaphysics, I make three steps. First, I situate Dilthey’s critique of metaphysics within the context of his work in order to present his ‘solution’ of the metaphysical antinomy. Second, I focus on the role of Collingwood’s reform of metaphysics and his ‘solution’ of the metaphysical antinomy. Finally, I relate the different status of their views of metaphysics to their divergent interpretations of human finitude. (shrink)

when r. g. collingwood began to write his autobiography in 1938, he was only 49 years old, still very young for drawing up a final balance. Only three years earlier, he had been appointed to the prestigious Waynflete Chair of Metaphysical Philosophy in Oxford. By then, Collingwood was already severely ill and he knew that he only had a few more years to live. Therefore, he did not only present his past evolution in his autobiography; his attention rather went to (...) those subjects for which he feared there was not enough time left to elaborate. The project that in his mind deserved the most attention was the defence of the possibility of a contemporary metaphysics. Less than one year later, Collingwood elaborated this .. (shrink)

‘As in a view from afar’. Vondel’s epistemological objections to Spinoza’s circle From a philosophical and theological stance, Spinoza and Vondel are traditionally portrayed as downright antipodes. Whereas Spinoza is seen as a pre-eminent representative of ‘radical Enlightenment’, Vondel is generally considered as a rather reactionary author who does not fit at all in this radical version of Enlightenment. The central aim of this article is to modify this generally agreed perception. On the basis of recent historical research in the (...) relation between the circle of Spinoza and Vondel, the affinities between both authors can be brought to the fore, in particular when looking at their writings on the relation between politics and religion. The gap between their views becomes only apparent when their respective views of God are at stake: there is an undeniable contrast between Spinoza’s naturalist pantheism and Vondel’s classic theism. In order to understand that very difference, the focus will be laid on two writings, conceived in more or less the same period: Vondel’s philosophical-theological poem Bespieghelingen van Godt en Godsdienst and Spinoza’s Verhandeling over de verbetering van het verstand (Treatise on the Emendation of Understanding). The central difference between the two authors in these writings relates to their methodological approach of existential questions about God and salvation, in particular to their dissent concerning the epistemological role of the geometrical method and the specific role of language. One of the hypotheses I propound in this respect is that Vondel’s relation to Lodewijk Meyer has been of utmost importance in order to explain their different methodological positions. Finally, I indicate the topical relevance of this methodological difference for contemporary philosophical reflection. (shrink)

This book explores R.G. Collingwood's concept of metaphysics. It traces the evolution of Collingwood's thought on metaphysics through his published work, posthumously published manuscripts, and recently discovered course notes. From 1933 to 1936, Collingwood's thought shifted considerably from the more orthodox Hegelian treatment of metaphysics as the study of the general nature of reality, to the more 'historicist' study of absolute presuppositions. This radical-conversion-hypothesis has been for a long time the single most important issue in the interpretation of Collingwood's philosophy. (...) This book provides a fresh reappraisal of his thinking on metaphysics during these crucial years. It argues that objective idealism is the key to unraveling the true scope of Collingwood's metaphysics. This theory takes a mid-position between mainstream interpretations in the secondary literature and forms the background to many of Collingwood's key ideas regarding metaphysics, the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of history. The book also compares Collingwood's concept of metaphysics to that of his predecessors, contemporaries, and followers. The second part of the book focuses in detail on the similarities and differences between Collingwood's metaphysics and, in chronological order, the views on metaphysics of Dilthey, Whitehead, Ayer, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Berlin, Kolakowski, Strawson, and Taylor. Collingwood's Metaphysics will be of interest to scholars and graduate students interested in Collingwood's philosophy, 20th-century philosophy, and metaphysics. (shrink)

The Ambiguity of ‘Post-Secular’ and ‘Post-Metaphysical’ Stories: On the Place of Religion and Deep Commitments in a Secular Society Words are always important, all over the world. On October 15, 1989, Vaclav Havel underlined their utmost importance in his acceptance speech of the Peace Prize of the German Booksellers Association, entitled ‘A Word about Words’. But he gave us at once a warning: ‘The same word can be humble at one moment and arrogant the next. And a humble word can (...) be transformed easily and imperceptibly into an arrogant one, whereas it is a difficult and protracted process to transform an arrogant word into one that is humble.’ In this essay, my intention is to focus on two words, ‘post-secular’ and ‘post-metaphysical’, as coined by Jürgen Habermas. I would like to raise the question whether they are still humble words or whether they are already surreptitiously transformed into arrogant ones. Undoubtedly, Habermas sees the words ‘post-secular’ and ‘post-metaphysical’ as intertwined and he originally framed them as humble expressions of a balanced position. But both words are poly-interpretable. They can be humble at one moment and arrogant the next. Since words are never innocent and their interpretation determines which view on the role of world-views, including religions, will prevail in contemporary society, a painstaking interpretation of both words is important. Mainly inspired by Charles Taylor’s approach, I will trace the consequences of divergent interpretations of these two words as to the role of religious (part I) and metaphysical arguments or ‘deep commitments’ (part II) in the current debate on the place of religion in the public sphere. I will suggest that the controversy around the interpretation of both words is not only due to different epistemological premises, but to divergent political stances as well (part III). Finally, I will claim that achieving mutual respect and tolerance in this regard is less amenable to the neutrality of procedural rationality than to the imaginative force of subtle words (part IV). (shrink)

A number of articles have highlighted the resemblances between Collingwood’s and Wittgenstein’s positions in the domains of philosophy of language, anthropology, and logic. The introduction of this essay recalls some aspects of these resem­blan­ces. However, the main difference between the two philosophers con­sists in their attitudes toward metap­hysics. Whereas Wittgenstein’s thesis in On Certainty is that “I know” does not tolerate metaphysical emphasis, Collingwood claims in An Essay on Metaphysics that it is the specific task of metaphysics to articulate our (...) basic presuppositions in their historical transformations. That difference has been noted, but never really examined. Moreover, the majority of Collingwood scholars see no reason why his historical study of basic presuppositions should usurp the name of metaphysics and, therefore, reject the term as an unfortunately chosen one. The main purpose of this essay is to explain why Collingwood’s term “metaphysics” is not so idiosyncratic as it is supposed to be and in what sense his metaphysics differs from Wittgenstein’s approach. (shrink)

Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.

Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.

‘Faith and knowledge’ in Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie. On the Role of Philosophy in Post-Secular Society This article focuses on three aspects that might clarify the quintessence of Habermas’ position regarding the relation between faith and knowledge in his book, Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie. First, a concise overview is given of the role of this specific theme in Habermas’ oeuvre as a whole (from his earliest to his later writings), that may help to illuminate why his so-called shift (...) with regard to the relation between faith and knowledge is in need of modification. Subsequently, the question is raised as to the possible role philosophy may still play for Habermas in the contemporary climate of so-called post-secular thought. Finally, some critical remarks are formulated concerning his genealogical reconstruction, in particular his treatment of respectively the axial period, the double face of nominalism and the specific status of a philosophical, conceptual translation of religious contents. (shrink)

Emphasising the cultural, historical and sociological aspects of reason – aspects that were not considered neither by Kant nor by Garve – in his Metakritik über den Purismum der Vernunft , Johann Georg Hamann has not only become the ‘founding father’ of the romantic Sturm und Drang. He has inaugurated a specific kind of criticism as well that will gradually leave its mark upon the philosophical scene from the end of the nineteenth century up till now. In this article, I (...) would like to focus upon the influence that was exerted by Hamann’s metacritique on the Anglo-Saxon philosophy of culture, as it becomes obvious in the work of, among others, R.G. Collingwood, Isaiah Berlin and Charles Taylor. (shrink)

Abstract Is `History Man', Fred Inglis' biography on R.G. Collingwood a successful biography? Inglis' explicit ambition is to portray the concrete figure Collingwood by abducting him from what he calls the vacuum-packed academic world of scholars. But the best biographers look for a balanced equilibrium between rendering philosophical ideas and dramatizing a philosopher's life. Put another way, they evoke the interweaving of a philosopher's thought with the vicissitudes of his life. Despite the unmistakable qualities of this biography, Fred Inglis did (...) not fully succeed in finding that very balance, mainly due to a lack of philosophical background. While Oxford University Press with the new edition of his works and manuscripts is thoroughly reorienting the traditional view of Collingwood, Inglis' fluently written but rather biased portrayal does no full justice to the heart of his fascinating philosophy and personality. (shrink)

In On the Genealogy of Morality Nietzsche exposes christianity as the product of the slave morality and its resentment. Nietzsche’s exposure provoked different reactions. In Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen from 1913 Max Scheler shows, in contrast to Nietzsche, that the quintessence of christian ethics does not arise from resentment. More interesting than Scheler’s rebuttal of Nietzsche is the reaction from the French-American thinker René Girard . Girard does not only criticize Nietzsche’s analysis, but goes as well into the (...) both paradoxal and crucial point that resentment is, on the one hand, intertwined with christian culture and, on the other, is at odds with christian inspiration. I would like to present Girard’s rebuttal of Nietzsche in two steps. First, I outline the background of Girard’s view on the relation between myth and christianity, taking his interpretation of the function of the scapegoat mechanism in premodern mythical religions as a starting-point. According to Girard, christianity functions as the exposure of premodern mythical religions, rejecting as it does the foundational role of the scapegoat mechanism as a means of canalising violence, inherent to mimetic desire. It is not christianity’s intent to canalize violence by means of limited violence , but precisely to expose violence. By making obvious that christianity did not succeed in doing this – by giving a philosophical analysis of the role of christianity in Western culture Girard shows that christianity has succeeded only in wounding violence, not in eliminating it and, as a consequence, has cleared the way for resentment – he is able to demonstrate that resentment is the child of christianity, not its father. Subsequently I outline Girard’s view on the role of mimetic desire in modern culture. Instead of canalizing mimetic desire by means of the scapegoat mechanism, modern Western culture unchains mimetic desire by means of the free market principle of competition. External mediation, which is typical of premodern mythical-religious cultures, is now being replaced by internal mediation, which is guided by economic principles. As such, resentment is going to determine modern culture from within. Hence, christianity will, as an integral part of modern culture, be likely to fall a prey to this resentment. Finally, I conclude by going into the challenge christianity, squeezed as it were between religious claims on the one hand and modern presuppositions on the other, has to cope with: how can it overcome resentment, of which it undoubtedly bears the fruits and which it simultaneously radically rejects? (shrink)

Both in An Autobiography and in An Essay on Metaphysics R.G. Collingwood defines the study of metaphysics as primarily at any time an attempt to discover the absolute presuppositions of thinking and secondarily as an attempt to discover the corresponding absolute presuppositions of other peoples and other times, and to follow the historical process by which one set of presuppositions has turned into another. In addition, he states that the distinction between what is true and what is false does not (...) apply to them. The objection often raised against this definition is that it has nothing to do with metaphysics in the traditional sense and that it only refers to a history of ideas. In this article I try to show the link between Collingwood's apparently idiosyncratic definition of metaphysics and the traditional one. I, therefore, have to sketch the background against which Collingwood's concept of metaphysics and the peculiar terminology he makes use of must be interpreted. This reconstruction of the original background is necessary in order to make clear what Collingwood means by his project of a „reformed metaphysics" as a historical inquiry into the absolute presuppositions of human thinking about reality. (shrink)

Many critics observe a methodological flaw in Taylor’s work. They claim that there is an alleged discrepancy between Taylor’s historical approach on the one hand and his defense of fullness in term...

Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.

The latest book by Louis Dupré, The Quest of the Absolute, is the third and final volume of a trilogy on the intellectual history of modernity. It follows Passage to Modernity (1993) and The Enlightenment and the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Culture (2004). Elegant writing and remarkable erudition go hand in hand with a deep insight into the objectives, achievements and deadlocks of the Romantic movement. It is not possible to look into the overwhelming variety of issues and figures that (...) come to the fore in this book and the trilogy as a whole; instead, this article focuses on Dupré’s central claim as to the development and significance of modern Western culture, starting from a specific question that time and again recurs as a key motive throughout the three volumes of his trilogy: are we postmodern or late modern? Dupré’s answer that we are dwellers of a late modern era rather than inhabitants of a postmodern age is dependent on his definition of modernity as a still ongoing ‘event that has transformed the relation between the cosmos, its transcendent source, and its human interpreter’. Since we are still standing in the midst of the event of modernity, shaped by the evolutionary process of and the strains and tensions within and between its three waves (humanism, Enlightenment, romanticism), Dupré underlines the necessity to move from hermeneutic to ontological questions. He even explicitly pleads for the rediscovery of a symbolic religious language in a tentative search for its ontological dimension and for a source of significance beyond the realm of human mind. The main question, however, is whether contemporary Western man is still capable of such a rediscovery. (shrink)

Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.

RÉSUMÉ: R. G. Collingwood a-t-il rejeté, après 1933, l’existence de problèmes éternels en philosophie? En me référant à son œuvre complète, je voudrais montrer que cette question doit recevoir une réponse négative. J’essaie d’expliquer, d’abord, pourquoi Collingwood recourt, dans An Autobiography et An Essay on Metaphysics, à une terminologie un peu curieuse et même parfois trompeuse, qui a donné prise à l’interprétation selon laquelle le der-nier Collingwood répudiait l’existence de problèmes éternels en philosophie. Deuxiè-mement, mon intention est de rendre manifeste (...) que pour Collingwood — qui se considérait luimême, au milieu des années trente, comme un «idéaliste objectif» — les questions philosophiques sont à la fois historiques et éternelles. (shrink)