From early sage philosophers to Leopold Senghor of Senegal and Steve Biko of South Africa, African thinking has challenged the way we think. As we enter a new millenium, the perspectives provided in this volume offer wise and refreshing alternatives to problems of self and society, culture, aesthetics, metaphysics and religion. Out of Africa always something new, and in these pages contemporary problems of cross-cultural cognition and post-coloniality are not only addressed, but also enacted. The reader witnesses the collision and (...) the coalescence of cultures in the writings of philosophers from Africa. (shrink)

The History of scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza is often called upon to support three theses: first, that Descartes had a dogmatic notion of systematic knowledge, and therefore of physics; second, that the hypothetical epistemology of physics which spread during the xviith century was the result of a general sceptical crisis; third, that this epistemology was more successful in England than in France. I reject these three theses: I point first to the tension in Descartes’ works between the ideal of (...) a completely certain science and a physics replete with hypotheses; further, I argue that the use of hypotheses by mechanical philosophers cannot be separated from their conception of physics; finally I show that, at the end of the xviith century, physicists in France as well as in England spoke through hypotheses and I examine different ways of explaining this shared practice. Richard H. Popkin’s book serves therefore as a starting point for insights into the general problem: to what extent and for what reasons some propositions in physics have been presented as hypotheses in the xviith century? (shrink)

The conception of “prospective potency” was defined by its author H.Driesch as “the sum of the possible modes of development of a given part of the embryo”. However, in the language of science the word “potency” usually means “power”, not “possibility”. Therefore this conception from the beginning possessed a certain ambiguity, that it retained up to the present. The distinction of “active” and “passive” potency, introduced by Roux, has found no general acceptance. It appeared necessary to submit the conception (...) of “potency” to a profound analysis. In the first place it is shown, that the ambiguity of this conception vanishes, if we understand by the word “potency” those fundamental properties of the embryonic material, that are responsible for its various developmental possibilities. We can distinguish among these properties the “reactive powers”, by which the embryonic material reacts to inductive stimulations, and its own “developmental tendencies”. These faculties only differ by their strength; a “reactive power” may change into a “tendency”, when its intensity increases during development; conversely, a “tendency” may change into a mere “reactive power” by a decrease of its strength. The determination of the material results from the conflict of its tendencies. The inductive actions interfere by strengthening or weakening different tendencies, and by activating new tendencies by reinforcement of the “reactive powers” of the embryonic material.La conception de „prospektive Potenz” fut définie par son auteur H.Driesch comme „l'ensemble des modes de développement possibles d'une certaine partie de l'embryon”. Cependant, le, mot „Potenz” dans le langage de la science répond plutôt à la „puissance” qu'à la „possibilité”. De là résulte, que cette conception dès son origine avait une certaine ambiguïté, qui se fait sentir jusqu'à présent. La distinction entre „potentialité active” et „potentialité passive”, proposée par Roux, n'est pas acceptée généralement. Il se trouvait nécessaire, que la conception de „Potenz” fût soumise à une. analyse profonde. D'abord il est démontré, que l'ambiguïté de cette conception disparaît, si on entend par le mot „Potenz” les propriétés fondamentales du matériel embryonnaire, qui sont à la base de ses diverses possibilités de développement. On peut distinguer parmi ces propriétés les „pouvoirs réactifs”, en vertu desquels le matériel embryonnaire répond à des inductions morphogénétiques, et les „tendances propres” du matériel. Ils ne diffèrent que par leur intensité; un „pouvoir réactif” peut se changer en „tendance” par suite d'un renforcement au cours du développement, une „tendance” peut se changer en „pouvoir réactif” par une diminution d'intensité. La détermination du matériel se réalise par une „lutte” entre les tendances. Les actions inductives influent sur cette lutte en renforçant ou en diminuant l'intensité des diverses tendances, et en activant de nouvelles tendances par le renforcement de „pouvoirs réactifs”. (shrink)

The conception of “prospective potency” was defined by its author H.Driesch as “the sum of the possible modes of development of a given part of the embryo”. However, in the language of science the word “potency” usually means “power”, not “possibility”. Therefore this conception from the beginning possessed a certain ambiguity, that it retained up to the present. The distinction of “active” and “passive” potency, introduced by Roux, has found no general acceptance. It appeared necessary to submit the conception (...) of “potency” to a profound analysis. In the first place it is shown, that the ambiguity of this conception vanishes, if we understand by the word “potency” those fundamental properties of the embryonic material, that are responsible for its various developmental possibilities. We can distinguish among these properties the “reactive powers”, by which the embryonic material reacts to inductive stimulations, and its own “developmental tendencies”. These faculties only differ by their strength; a “reactive power” may change into a “tendency”, when its intensity increases during development; conversely, a “tendency” may change into a mere “reactive power” by a decrease of its strength. The determination of the material results from the conflict of its tendencies. The inductive actions interfere by strengthening or weakening different tendencies, and by activating new tendencies by reinforcement of the “reactive powers” of the embryonic material. (shrink)

Le but de cet ouvrage est de démontrer, à travers une reconstruction rationnelle des étapes historiques fondatrices de l'embryologie expérimentale, l'importance des concepts de préformation et d'épigenèse aux origines de cette discipline. L'analyse porte sur trois périodes charnières de l'histoire de l'embryologie : (1) la réforme mécaniste et darwinienne de l'embryologie descriptive par Ernst Haeckel (1866); (2) l'avènement d'une physiologie réductionniste du développement menée par Wilhelm His (1874); (3) la création d'une "mécanique du développement" par Wilhelm Roux (1885) et (...) les interprétations néo-darwinienne (A. Weismann), néo-vitaliste (H. Driesch) et organiciste (O. Hertwig) de ses résultats les plus significatifs (1888-1908). J'y défends qu'une logique de la découverte structurait ces développements, où les modèles mécaniques d'explication devaient constamment être renouvelés lorsque leur examen empirique engendrait la découverte de phénomènes épigénétiques inédits. L'étude réalisée traite d'un enjeu fondamental de la philosophie des sciences : le rapport entre la rationalité scientifique et la découverte. Elle offre aussi un éclairage sur une question très actuelle de la philosophie de la biologie, soit les transformations de la notion d'épigenèse en rapport avec les théories épigénétiques contemporaines. La méthodologie adoptée s'inscrit dans la tradition de l'épistémologie historique, consacrée à l'étude du développement des structures du savoir scientifique. Cette tâche exige l'analyse historique de diverses sources documentaires; mais un éclairage théorique constitué tant de modèles provenant de la philosophie des sciences que de connaissances scientifiques demeure indispensable. Ici le modèle d'Imre Lakatos, centré sur la notion de programme de recherche, est entre autres privilégié."--provided by publisher. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION TO ASPECTS OF FACE PROCESSING: TEN QUESTIONS IN NEED OF ANSWERS. HD Ellis 1. INTRODUCTION These proceedings of the first international ...

In several works on modality, G. H. von Wright presents tree structures to explain possible worlds. Worlds that might have developed from an earlier world are possible relative to it. Actually possible worlds are possible relative to the world as it actually was at some point. Many logically consistent worlds are not actually possible. Transitions from node to node in a tree structure are probabilistic. Probabilities are often more useful than similarities between worlds in treating counterfactual conditionals.

Humans are neophile, curious, and explorative animals with impressive capabilities for creative problem-solving. I discuss some of the ultimate roots behind human creativity while reviewing two books on creativity and problem-solving. To E. O. Wilson, the driv­ing force behind creativity is our instinctive love of novelty, and creativity’s ultimate goal is “self-understanding.” I elaborate on and question this assumption. The theories of inclu­sive fitness and group selection are discussed, with Wilson in favor of the latter. Finally, the theory of gene-culture (...) coevolution is introduced as fundamental to the unity of science and the humanities and to closing the gap between these two cultures. Eagleman and Brandt’s volume is more of an entertaining history of design and human inventiveness than a study in creativity as such. We hear about the three main operations of creative process: bending, blending, and breaking, and these operations are the primary means by which all ideas evolve, according to the authors. (shrink)

Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm, -1641--Criticism and interpretation. ; Islamic philosophy.

Islamic philosophy; Hanbalites; doctrines; creation (Islam); early works to 1800.

H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr.; Medicine, Philosophy, and Theology: Christian Bioethics Reconsidered, Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical Morali.

First published in 1962, Freedom and History expresses a deep concern about freedom and the way it is imperilled by misunderstandings. Professor Lewis examines works of T.H. Green and compares Green with Locke and Rousseau.

Philosophical Investigations, EarlyView.

Criticism and interpretation of Zawāhir al-ḥikam by Ḥasan ibn ʻAbd al-Razzāq Lāhījī, 1635 or 1636-1709 or 1710; Islamic philosophy - Early works to 1800; Shīʻah - Doctrines - Early works to 1800.

Selected response items and constructed response items are often found in the same test. Conventional psychometric models for these two types of items typically focus on using the scores for correctness of the responses. Recent research suggests, however, that more information may be available from the CR items than just scores for correctness. In this study, we describe an approach in which a statistical topic model along with a diagnostic classification model was applied to a mixed item format formative test (...) of English and Language Arts. The DCM was used to estimate students’ mastery status of reading skills. These mastery statuses were then included in a topic model as covariates to predict students’ use of each of the latent topics in their written answers to a CR item. This approach enabled investigation of the effects of mastery status of reading skills on writing patterns. Results indicated that one of the skills, Integration of Knowledge and Ideas, helped detect and explain students’ writing patterns with respect to students’ use of individual topics. (shrink)

Although recent cognitive science and traditional phenomenology has placed great importance on first-person descriptions, exactly what this entails goes undefined. I will seek to answer what's involved in phenomenological description, with reference to Husserl. I define phenomenological description according to its genus and differentia. I compare description in the natural sciences with description in phenomenology. I discuss how the basic particulars for Husserlian phenomenological description stem from the intentional relation -- particularly the distinction between noesis and noema. I discuss the (...) pivotal role of reflection in phenomenological description. I further argue that a phenomenological description is more than a statement which utilizes the 'I-[verb]' template. The final section analyses the difficulties inherent in describing intersubjectivity and argues these difficulties may have influenced Husserl's early, descriptive account of this topic. (shrink)

Popper’s view of scientific activity appears to take its social and communitarian features largely for granted. Rather than making this inter-subjectivity the basic problematic in his work, he wanted to move beyond language without, however, foreclosing the possibility that communication may often be a source of confusion in research and related scientific activity. Popper feared that the study of science, no less than scientific activity itself, may be led astray by an overly reflexive approach and focus. There are aspects of (...) his views on this matter which bear a considerable resemblance to Bacon, even though Popper is clearly a Cartesian deductivist rather than a Baconian inductivist, for reasons that become apparent in The Logic of Scientific Discovery. According to Popper, no such practice or method of discovery exists, either in science or anywhere else. (shrink)