Almost all the existing modern systems of Ethics deal with formal definitions, and at bottom repeat more or less the same thing about them in slightly different words. In this work these are a side issue, and therefore are treated briefly. Their treatment in Section I is based upon the author's theoretical works the Theory of Order and the Theory of Reality, but will be intelligible to those who are not acquainted with those works. The chief concern is moral teaching (...) - that is, the practical element. (shrink)

Using electromagnetic levitation in combination with the oscillating drop technique and drop calorimeter method, the surface tensions and specific heats of undercooled liquid Co-10 wt% Mo, Co-26.3 wt% Mo, and Co-37.6 wt% Mo alloys were measured. The containerless state during levitation produces substantial undercoolings up to 223 K , 213 K and 110 K respectively for these three alloys. In their respective undercooling ranges, the surface tensions were determined to be 1895 m 0.31, 1932 m 0.33, and 1989 m 0.34 (...) mN m m 1 . According to the Butler equation, the surface tensions of these three Co-Mo alloys were also calculated, and the results agree well with the experimental data. The specific heats of these three alloys are determined to be 41.85, 43.75 and 44.92 J mol m 1 K m 1 . Based on the determined surface tensions and specific heats, the changes in thermodynamics functions such as enthalpy, entropy and Gibbs free energy are predicted. Furthermore, the crystal nucleation, dendrite growth and Marangoni convection of undercooled Co-Mo alloys are investigated in the light of these measured thermophysical properties. (shrink)

Hope is hard to characterise because of the exceptional diversity of its applications, to the point that one may wonder whether there is continuity between ordinary cases of hope and what is often called 'hope against hope'. In this paper, I shall follow the relatively small but growing literature on hope and examine propositional hopes, i.e. hopes of the form 'hoping that p', with a particular focus on recent work by Philip Pettit and Adrienne Martin. I shall do this first (...) by identifying a significant difficulty encountered by what has become known as the 'orthodox definition'. The OD defines hope by means of two necessary and sufficient conditions: A hopes that p if and only if A desires that p and A assigns to p a degree of probability between 0 and 1. On this definition, to hope is to desire an outcome we deem neither certain nor impossible. Note that the relevant probability assignment is subjective: the OD allows, for example, that children can hope for Father Christmas to visit them on Christmas Eve. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the relation between phenomenology and anthropology by placing Foucault?s first published piece, Introduction to Binswanger?s?Dream and Existence? in dialectical tension with The Order of Things. I argue that the early work, which so far hasn?t received much critical attention, is of particular interest because while OT is notoriously critical of anthropological confusions in general, and of?Man? as an empirico-transcendental double in particular, IB views?existential anthropology? as a unique opportunity to establish a new and fruitful relation (...) between transcendental forms and empirical contents. This is because IB focuses on a specific object,?Menschsein?, which is neither the transcendental subject nor an empirical being. Thus for the young Foucault existential anthropology occupies a fertile methodological middle ground between transcendental approaches and empirical forms of analysis. I first interpret anthropology in the light of phenomenology and defend the view that Menschsein is neither a transcendental structure nor a concrete particular, but as the instantiation of the first in the second. I argue that for anthropology to yield the full theoretical benefits Foucault claims for it, the particular cases of Menschsein examined in existential analysis have to be regarded as exemplary. I then read phenomenology back in the light of anthropology and examine how, for Foucault, the analysis of Menschsein in dreams benefits fundamental ontology by affording us a clearer view of some of the main existentiale than the focus on everyday waking experience in Being and Time. Finally, I turn to the limits and difficulties of this early position and my reading of it, and to their consequences for Foucault?s later view. (shrink)

Most commentators assume that the affirmation of life can be defined univocally, as an act the success of which can be assessed by means of the test of the eternal return in GS341; and, that the affirmation of life is synonymous with what Nietzsche calls amor fati, and thus singlehandedly encapsulates Nietzsche’s ethical ideal. I take issue with both assumptions and develop an alternative view. I argue that for Nietzsche there are two ways to affirm life ethically. The first is (...) unreflective and piecemeal. I propose a substantive modification to Bernard Reginster’s procedural approach by suggesting that life is affirmed each time an agent seeks to overcome, and succeeds in overcoming, resistance in the pursuit of a first order desire expressive of love for life – the last clause being mine. I further argue that even with this added clause this first form cannot defeat what Reginster calls the ‘normative core of nihilism’, namely the experiencing of suffering as an objection to life. I identify in Nietzsche’s later work a second form of ethical life affirmation: a holistic, ecstatic act, a Dionysian blessing which ‘calls good’ life as a whole and thus redeems it by making it fully desirable on erotic grounds. Yet even in its two ethical forms the affirmation of life does not suffice to define Nietzsche’s ethical ideal. The very perspective of life affirmation is limited because it remains beholden to the very framework Nietzsche sought to escape: the Christian overarching concern for redemption and preoccupation with theodicic narratives. By contrast, I argue that amor fati, as agapic love of life, affords Nietzsche with a distinct resource to go beyond theodicic prospects and examine its relation to the erotic love of life, which is at the core of both forms of ethical life affirmation. I offer a pluralistic reading of GS341, not simply as a test of life affirmation, but as articulating Nietzsche’s two ethical ideals, amor fati on the one hand, and the affirmation of life in both its forms, on the other. (shrink)

The commercialization of ‘big science’ is in full swing, leading to situations in which the ethical principles of academia are beginning to be compromised. This is exemplified by the profitable business of genetic ancestry testing. The goals of this sort of ‘big science’ are not necessarily in any way novel, however. In particular, large genotyping projects have a certain start‐up time when their design is frozen in, so that the projects often lag behind the development of genetic knowledge. On the (...) other hand, extremely provisional knowledge about potential disease markers is being rapidly turned into questionable ‘tests’, purporting to determine risk factors for complex disorders, by private companies that are eager to get their share of a profitable market of the future. The flow of money generated by such concerns looks likely to erode traditional research operations and small‐scale projects, which risk becoming pebbles on the ‘big science’ landscape. BioEssays 30:1246–1251, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

We comment on the proposition “that lower temperatures and especially greater seasonal variation in temperature call for individuals and societies to adopt … a greater degree of self-control” (Van Lange et al., sect. 3, para. 4) for which we cannot find empirical support in a large data set with data-driven analyses. After providing greater nuance in our theoretical review, we suggest that Van Lange et al. revisit their model with an eye toward the social determinants of self-control.

Ns2 is an open-source communications network simulator primarily used in research and teaching. Ns2 provides substantial support for simulation of TCP, routing, and multicast protocols over wired and wireless networks. Although Ns2 is a widely used powerful simulator, it lacks a way to measure networks that are used to assess reliability and performance metrics and it does not analyse the trace files it produces. The data obtained from the simulations are not straightforward to analyse. Ns2 is still unable to provide (...) any data analysis statistics or graphics as requested. Moreover, the analysis of the Ns2 trace file using any software scripts requires further steps by a developer to do data processing and then produce graphical outputs. Lack of standardisation of tools means that results from different users may not be strictly comparable. There are alternative tools; however, most of them are not standalone applications, requiring some additional libraries. Also, they lack a user-friendly interface. This article presents the architecture and development considerations for the NsGTFA tool, which intends to simplify the management and enable the statistical analysis of trace files generated during network simulations. NsGTFA runs under Windows and has a friendly graphical user interface. This tool is a very fast standalone application implemented in VC++, taking as input an Ns2 trace file. It can output two-dimensional and 3D graphs or data sets, whatever the trace file format. It is also possible to specify the output of standard network performance metrics. NsGTFA satisfies most user needs. There is no complex installation process, and no external libraries are needed. (shrink)

Wittgenstein übernimmt im Tractatus das Zusammenhangsprinzip von Frege und formuliert die Doktrin von der Priorität des Satzes vor seinen Teilen, den Wörtern. Dies ist die frühste Formulierung kontextualistischen Denkens bei Wittgenstein. In der Spätphilosophie wird das "Sprachspiel" zur sinnkonstituierenden Einheit sprachlicher Kommunikation und damit zum Inbegriff kontextualistischen Denkens beim späten Wittgenstein. Eine Untersuchung der zentralen Begriffe von Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie offenbart starke Verwandtschaft zu Schapps Begriff der "Geschichten". G. Bateson führt den Terminus "Geschichte" in jenem Schappschen Sinne als Prinzip des geistigen (...) Prozesses der Informationsgewinnung bzw. Sinnkonstitution ein. Damit läßt sich über Schapps Phänomenologie der Geschichten eine Brücke von Wittgenstein zu Bateson schlagen und eine bislang unbemerkte Affinität zwischen beiden Denkern aufzeigen. Umgekehrt werden mit dem von Bateson geprägten Begriff der Transkontextualität Phänomene beschreibbar, die Wittgenstein bei der Diskussion mathematischer bzw. logischer Paradoxien behandelt. Demnach sind solche Paradoxien transkontextuelle Phänomene, die in ihrem Sinn unterbestimmt sind, ähnlich dem transkontextuellen Verhalten, das sinnbestimmende Kontexte (Sprachspiele) transzendiert und außerhalb solcher Kontexte als verrückt erscheint. (shrink)

Wittgenstein übernimmt im Tractatus das Zusammenhangsprinzip von Frege und formuliert die Doktrin von der Priorität des Satzes vor seinen Teilen, den Wörtern. Dies ist die frühste Formulierung kontextualistischen Denkens bei Wittgenstein. In der Spätphilosophie wird das "Sprachspiel" zur sinnkonstituierenden Einheit sprachlicher Kommunikation und damit zum Inbegriff kontextualistischen Denkens beim späten Wittgenstein. Eine Untersuchung der zentralen Begriffe von Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie offenbart starke Verwandtschaft zu Schapps Begriff der "Geschichten". G. Bateson führt den Terminus "Geschichte" in jenem Schappschen Sinne als Prinzip des geistigen (...) Prozesses der Informationsgewinnung bzw. Sinnkonstitution ein. Damit läßt sich über Schapps Phänomenologie der Geschichten eine Brücke von Wittgenstein zu Bateson schlagen und eine bislang unbemerkte Affinität zwischen beiden Denkern aufzeigen. Umgekehrt werden mit dem von Bateson geprägten Begriff der Transkontextualität Phänomene beschreibbar, die Wittgenstein bei der Diskussion mathematischer bzw. logischer Paradoxien behandelt. Demnach sind solche Paradoxien transkontextuelle Phänomene, die in ihrem Sinn unterbestimmt sind, ähnlich dem transkontextuellen Verhalten, das sinnbestimmende Kontexte (Sprachspiele) transzendiert und außerhalb solcher Kontexte als verrückt erscheint. (shrink)

What Heidegger means by “freedom” in Being and Time is somewhat mysterious: while the notion crops up repeatedly in the book, there is no dedicated section or study, and the concept is repeatedly connected to a new and opaque idea – that of the “choice to choose oneself.” Yet the specificity of Being and Time’s approach to freedom becomes apparent when the book is compared to other texts of the same period, in particular The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, The Fundamental (...) Concepts of Metaphysics, The Essence of Grounds, and The Essence of Freedom. Although there are some differences, the definition of freedom that can be found there identifies it with “existence” or “transcendence,” Dasein’s ek-static opening onto the world. Thus “being in the world must also be primordially bound up with or derived from the basic feature of Dasein’s existence, freedom… Dasein’s transcendence and freedom are identical! Freedom provides itself with intrinsic possibility: a being is, as free, necessarily in itself transcending” (GA 26: 238; Heidegger’s italics). Note the apodictic modality of the claim: it is not simply the case that Dasein, as transcending, is free. Anything that has the structure of being in the world must be free: freedom is co-extensive with Dasein. Yet Dasein is often pictured in Being and Time as anything but free: it “ensnares itself” (268), is “lost” (264), “alienated” (178), and needs to be “liberated” (264, 303). Thus comparison between Being and Time and other texts on freedom yields an important paradox: although by definition it transcends toward the world, the Dasein of Division I is deprived of freedom. It must be free, and yet phenomenological analysis shows that it is not free. To understand the specific meaning of freedom in Being and Time, one has to square this circle. (shrink)

Validity of dynamic temporal reasoning is semantically characterized for English and Dutch aspectual adverbs in Discourse Representation Theory. This dynamic perspective determines how the content needs to be revised and what information is preserved across updates, when the order of premises is considered relevant. Resetting contextual parameters relies on modelling the basic aspectual polarity transitions and temporal reasoning extensionally. For intensional aspectual adverbials the speaker’s attitudes regarding past alternatives to and possible continuations of the current state come into play. Additional (...) considerations are offered for generalizing this system to the full logical space for linguistic universals, lexicalized quite differently in Dutch and English. (shrink)