The main problem in making sense of Mitsein as an aspect of Dasein in Being and Time concerns the sense in which individual Dasein is an ‘I’, given that it can be either an ‘anyone-self’ or an ‘authentic self’. Though it is clear that the anyone-self relates directly to das Man, the relation of the authentic self to others is debatable. In this paper, I reexamine the relations between self and others by making sense of the referent of each mode (...) of selfhood, with special attention to the problem of explaining the relations between the two. The problem, I claim, can be solved by bringing into relief a certain conception of mereology (theory of parthood relations) that underlies Heidegger’s arguments. As I will demonstrate, Heidegger uses a mereological terminology that appropriates Husserl’s logic of parts and wholes from the Logical Investigations. In view of this, I suggest understanding individual Dasein, both qua anyone-self and qua authentic self, as a moment, i.e. a dependent part of an open-ended whole. The apparent gap between anyone-self and authentic self can be better understood as a shift of focus between two different aspects of being the same type of dependent part of a whole. (shrink)

In this paper we examine the notion of impersonality (das Man) presented in Heidegger's Being and Time. Taking as interpretative guideline the analysis of a comparison made by Heidegger between the das Man and the concept of ens realissimum, we maintain that the impersonality has a central ontological function within the program of the fundamental ontology. Like the concept of ens realissimum in the ontoteological tradition, which played the rolle of ground of determination for things in generall, the impersonal manner (...) of being represents the elemental source of all inteligibility. The parallel between the notions of impersonality and ens realissimum enables then a grasping of the social nature of the projection of being by the human understanding of being. (shrink)

Dos preguntas articulan las reflexiones contenidas en el presente trabajo: ¿Cuál es el sentido de nuestra vida? y ¿qué sentidos produce el psicoanálisis? La yuxtaposición de ambos interrogantes no debe darnos la idea de que la respuesta a una sirve de fundamento a la otra. La vecindad tiene por objetivo aquí mostrar cómo el psicoanálisis elabora sentidos. La primera pregunta ha sido considerada por algunos como una pregunta sin respuesta. Sin embargo consideramos que la posibilidad de una respuesta depende (...) del contexto filosófico desde el cual se la plantea y lo que se entiende por sentido. ¿Qué tipo de ontología es la que hace posible esta pregunta? Este trabajo se propone hacer una contribución a la elaboración de tal ontología la cual se presentará fundamentalmente como una ontología social, no como regional sino entendida como filosofía primera. Para ello tomaremos como base las ontologías sociales que a partir de Heidegger y, apartándose de él, desarrollaron Jean-Luc Nancy (2006) y McGuire y Tuchanska (2000). Realizaremos un estudio comparativo entre estas ontologías y las ontologías científicas para mostrar la necesidad de una ontología filosófica que nos permita abordar la cuestión del sentido. En base a esta ontología abordaremos la posibilidad de responder a estas preguntas en los discursos de las teorías psicoanalítica de Freud y de Winnicott. (shrink)

Some of the most important contributions over the past two decades to understanding Heidegger's thought have been made by philosophers writing in English and sharing the broad perspective of analytic – or, perhaps better, “post-analytic” – philosophy. With Heidegger's Temporal Idealism, William Blattner has moved this approach several important steps forward. Like others in this recent movement, he interprets Heidegger not so much in the terms of existentialism or post-structuralism, as in those of the later Wittgenstein, classical American pragmatism, and (...) neo-pragmatism. Also like other Anglo-American interpretations of Heidegger, Blattner's (1.) focuses primarily on the Sein und Zeit era; (2.) tends to steer away from Heidegger's analysis of authenticity and toward his analysis of Dasein's everydayness; (3.) accords an especially large role to Being-with (Mitsein) and the They (das Man) in the constitution of everyday meaning; and (4.) is particularly concerned with developing a view of the foundation of “mind” and scientific knowledge in the practical abilities of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. Given the obvious centrality of time in SZ, it is surprising that there have been relatively few concerted attempts to critically explicate Heidegger's view of it. Blattner's book fills this gap by focusing on Heidegger's interpretation of Dasein's “originary temporality”, as explicated in Division Two of SZ. (shrink)

The overall aim of this project is to provide an explanation of Dasein that takes into account both Dasein's social and individual characters as well as both Division I and II of Being and Time. Chapter 1 provides an exposition of the existentialia of Dasein which illustrate the difference between Heidegger's characterization of human beings as Dasein and the traditional Cartesian epistemic subject. Chapter 2 analyzes the roles of das Man and Mitsein, the existential structures that are key in explaining (...) Dasein's social character. Furthermore, this chapter provides an account of what the individual character of Dasein amounts to, given that Dasein is an entity that has both das Man and Mitsein as part of its existential make-up. Chapter 3 concentrates on the important notion of authenticity or what Heidegger calls resoluteness. It addresses Heidegger's puzzling claims that authentic Being-one's-Self is a modification of das Man and that the das Man self is an existentiell modification of the authentic self. Lastly, Chapter 4 studies the role that the notion of choice plays in Heidegger's existential analytic as well as the relationship that an authentic Dasein has to history. ;In conclusion, this work shows that recent interpretations which portray Dasein as a being that is primarily social and that is completely defined by the norms of its community do not do justice to the fact that Dasein has an individual character which is a key element in its ontological make-up as well as in its ontic involvements, more specifically, in the ways in which, as authentic, it can appropriate the history of its community. In the end, we are left with a picture in which Dasein cannot be seen as wholly dominated by its sociality or as completely individualistic, but as an entity whose existential structure involves a social as well as an individual character, both of which contribute to its being-in-the-world. (shrink)

Heidegger's discussion of das Man (often translated as "the 'They'") in Being and Time is notoriously inconsistent, and raises a number of interpretative issues that have been debated in the secondary literature. This paper offers two arguments that aim to make for a consistent and charitable reading of das Man. First, unlike Dasein, das Man's way of being is not existence: das Man lacks Dasein's particularity (it offers only general norms, and cannot address Dasein's unique situation), unity (das Man is (...) not a unified set of norms, but rather an often inconsistent one) and distinctness (the boundary that fixes the concept of das Man is fuzzy). Second, this paper proposes that we read das Man as standing in contrast with Abständigkeit, or distantiality. Das Man is the socially constituted set of norms that we necessarily belong to, and distantiality is the equally inescapable difference that sets us apart from others. Together, they provide a framework within which Dasein is constituted by norms without inhibiting the possibility of authentic existence. (shrink)

El presente artículo desarrolla un análisis del mundo político, con el cual se busca mostrar que éste se desprende de la caracterización fenomenológica de la existencia humana como "apertura" al mundo En este sentido, el autor critica la ceguera de Husserl y Heidegger ante el mundo político, aunque también denuncia la valoración tradicional de lo político como "inauténtico". Para tal efecto, el autor explica el sentido de la distinción fenomenológica entre existencia auténtica e inauténtica, lo cual le permite sustentar la (...) tesis de que la apertura humana al mundo se hace posible mediante un estado de ánimo. A partir de los presupuestos ganados en esa primera parte, se intenta mostrar que el acceso al mundo político tiene lugar gracias al conflicto de opiniones, por el cual el hombre cobra conciencia de las múltiples posibilidades de acción que se ofrecen en los asuntos públicos. A continuación, el autor explica qué tipo de experiencia realiza el hombre cuando se abre al mundo político y procede a esclarecer la importancia de éste para la existencia auténtica. Finalmente, le da una mirada a la amenaza del totalitarismo en la época actual, con lo cual intenta confirmar la relevancia de la pregunta por la relación entre existencia auténtica y mundo político. (shrink)

In their debate over my interpretation of Heidegger's account of das Man in Being and Time, Frederick Olafson and Taylor Carman agree that Heidegger's various characterizations of das Man are inconsistent. Olafson champions an existentialist/ontic account of das Man as a distorted mode of being?with. Carman defends a Wittgensteinian/ontological account of das Man as Heidegger's name for the social norms that make possible everyday intelligibility. For Olafson, then, das Man is a privative mode of Dasein, while for Carman it makes (...) up an important aspect of Dasein's positive constitution. Neither interpreter takes seriously the other's account, though both acknowledge both readings are possible. How should one choose between these two interpretations? I suggest that we choose the interpretation that identifies the phenomenon the work is examining, gives the most internally consistent account of that phenomenon, and shows the compatibility of this account with the rest of the work. (shrink)

O horizonte da pergunta pela vida, em Heidegger, se dá no limite da compreensão da existência humana. Vida, para o filósofo, não é sinônimo de existência. Nosso artigo busca apresentar uma interpretação positiva possível desde essa caracterização negativa. Nesse intuito, evidenciamos, num primeiro momento, como a compreensão de si como ser-no-mundo, norteia e delimita a compreensão que o ser-aí tem dos animais e da vida (por extensão). Desde o conceito de mundo, apresentamos de modo resumido, num segundo momento, alguns pontos (...) da interpretação heideggeriana das investigações biológicas sobre a vida, em Os conceitos fundamentais da metafísica. Em um terceiro momento destacamos o modo como, para Heidegger, a originariedade da questão da vida provém do seu manter se no horizonte de compreensão da nossa própria existência como questão, em oposição à uma interpretação da vida como algo simplesmente dado. Por fim, concluímos que a vida não se encerra, não tem fim, nos limites apresentados, mas que justamente se abre, é abertura; e como questão está sempre aberta e exige sempre, a cada vez, novas respostas. Palavras-chave: Heidegger, vida, existência, mundo, questão. (shrink)

Embora saibamos que, nos passos iniciais do itinerário do pensamento de Heidegger, não haja um tratamento formal do conceito de natureza, existe, contudo, uma interpretação crítica do conceito naturalista do ser, pertencente à tradição metafísica, que o filósofo quer ultrapassar em direção a uma outra perspectiva de pensamento, guiada por uma fenomenologia hermenêutica e nascida do caráter humano de ser do homem, isto é, das condições ontológico-fácticas de sua existência. O presente artigo procura indicar o contraponto entre esses dois modos (...) de interpretação do ser, o natural e o humano, acompanhando os passos mais significativos dados pelo jovem Heidegger entre 1907, época de seu despertar para a filosofia, e meados dos anos 20, ocasião de suas pesquisas sobre o cristianismo primitivo e sobre escritos práticos sobre Aristóteles.Despite we know that there is not a formal treatment of nature′s concept in the initial steps of Heidegger′s thought, there is, although, a critical interpretation of the naturalist concept of Being, concerning to metaphysical tradition, which the philosopher wants go beyond to another perspective of thought. That perspective is guided by a hermeneutic phenomenology and born from human character of being of man, that is, from ontological and factical conditions of your existence. The present paper intends to indicate the counterpoint between these two ways of the interpretation of Being, the natural and the human, following the more expressive steps given by young Heidegger between 1907, age of his awakening to philosophy, and the early twenties, time of his researches about primal Christianity and Aristotle′s practical writings. (shrink)

The research is devoted to the historical and philosophical analysis of the work of the Kyrgyz humanist writer of the Soviet period, Chingiz Aitmatov, whose early work is characterised as a fascination with the “Soul of Faust.” (Spirit of Faust) The result of this was the writer's earlier works, where he fervently perceives the ideas of progress, socialism, and enlightenment, in other words, the main ideas of the modern era. Later, under the huge influence of Russian classical literature, as well (...) as active study of traditional Kyrgyz culture, epic “Manas”, he spoke on such fundamental metaphysical topics as people, personality, fate, morality, humanism, etc., thereby trying to get rid of the “Soul of Faust” (Spirit of Faust) with its straightforwardness, its propensity for the infinite settlement of everything. So the writer gradually asserted himself more and more as a traditional humanist. But despite these attempts, the writer still retained some ambivalence: on the one hand, he acted as a staunch critic of modernity, faceless technology and on the other, he perceived the modernization process as an objective development of history that needs to be perceived and comprehended. The results of the writer's later ideas are new concepts such as “Mankurt” and “Ixrod” usually used to describe the consciousness of a person who became possible at the junction of modernity with tradition. To a certain extent, these concepts are identical to the idea of “Das Man” by M. Heidegger. (shrink)

This chapter offers a reinterpretation of Heidegger’s conception of the social world in order to overcome the tension between its conflicting positive and negative characterisations in Being and Time. Rejecting a purely positive or a purely negative reading of das Man, the chapter follows Stephen Mulhall in carving out a middle ground between the two. The chapter takes seriously Heidegger’s claim that it is possible for das Man to undergo an authentic transformation, exploring how best to conceive of this idea. (...) It is argued that the authentic transformation of das Man and the everyday way of being it engenders, is most productively understood with reference to Dasein’s relation to das Man and the way Dasein grasps the world as meaningful. Through this reading it is shown how both an authentic and an inauthentic mode of everydayness can be accommodated. The chapter concludes with an examination of the consequences of this interpretation, arguing for the critical and political potential of authenticity as an attentive and engaged mode of being-in-the-world. (shrink)

Current interpretations of Heidegger's notion of das Man are caught in a dilemma: either they cannot accommodate the ontological status Heidegger accords it or they cannot explain his negative evaluation of it, in which it is treated as ontic. This paper uses Simmel's agonistic account of human sociality to integrate the ontological and the ontic, indeed perjorative aspects of Heidegger's account. Section I introduces the general problem, breaks the exclusive link of Heidegger's account to Kierkegaard and delineates the general form (...) of a solution. Section II then sketches Simmel's conception of sociology and sociality. Section III determines what Heidegger is trying to do in Chapter Four of Division I in Being and Time in order to formulate a strictly ontological account of das Man. Section IV uses Simmel's account of sociality to build into this ontological account an inherent tendency to display the negative features Heidegger ascribes to das Man. In conclusion, section V points to how the proposed account of das Man intimates the character of fundamental ontology as nascently a form of critical theory. It also explains the extent to which Heidegger's perjorative characterisations of das Man and the Man-selbst are legitimate. (shrink)

In Sein und Zeit , Heidegger claims that (1) das Man is an 'existential' i.e. a necessary feature of Dasein's Being; and (2) Dasein need not always exist in the mode of the Man -self, but can also be eigentlich , which I translate as 'self-owningly'. These apparently contradictory statements have prompted a debate between Hubert Dreyfus, who recommends abandoning (2), and Frederick Olafson, who favors jettisoning (1). I offer an interpretation of the structure of Dasein's Being compatible with both (...) (1) and (2), thus resolving the Dreyfus-Olafson debate. Central to this resolution is the distinction between das Man and the Man -self. Das Man is one of three existential 'horizons', or fields of possibilities; the other two horizons are the world and death. At any time, Dasein encounters entities in one of two basic modes: either by 'expressly seizing' possibilities of the horizon, or by occluding these possibilities. These modes are 'existenti ell ', i.e. features of Dasein's Being that are possible, but not essential. Self-ownership and the Man -self are the two basic existentiell modes of being oneself, i.e. projecting everyday possibilities of oneself appropriated from the horizon of das Man . What differentiates these two modes is the stance one takes to the possibility of death, the existential horizon of being oneself. (shrink)

RESUMO Este ensaio examina algumas possibilidades de diálogo da filosofia heideggeriana e o tema trágico. Concentramo-nos especialmente em três aspectos: a finitude humana, o conceito de angústia e o questionamento da estrutura de domínio prevalecente na técnica moderna. Como buscamos evidenciar, o gesto trágico fundamental não é o da violência que instaura, ou do aniquilamento que imagina desmentir todo o sentido, mas do movimento humano finito que segue nas bordas da existência, sem nunca intuir o quadro completo da sua vida. (...) ABSTRACT This essay deals with some possibilities of the dialogue between Heideggerian philosophy and the question of the tragic. We focused mainly on three features: the human finitude, the concept of anxiety, and the questioning of the prevailing control structure in modern technology. We insisted on that the fundamental tragic act relates not to violence it inaugurates, or to annihilation, which imagines removal of all sense, but to the finite human movement, which follows the margins of existence, without grasping the full picture of his life. (shrink)

In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger claims that (1) das Man is an 'existential' i.e. a necessary feature of Dasein's Being; and (2) Dasein need not always exist in the mode of the Man-self, but can also be eigentlich, which I translate as 'self-owningly'. These apparently contradictory statements have prompted a debate between Hubert Dreyfus, who recommends abandoning (2), and Frederick Olafson, who favors jettisoning (1). I offer an interpretation of the structure of Dasein's Being compatible with both (1) and (2), (...) thus resolving the Dreyfus-Olafson debate. Central to this resolution is the distinction between das Man and the Man-self. Das Man is one of three existential 'horizons', or fields of possibilities; the other two horizons are the world and death. At any time, Dasein encounters entities in one of two basic modes: either by 'expressly seizing' possibilities of the horizon, or by occluding these possibilities. These modes are 'existentiell', i.e. features of Dasein's Being that are possible, but not essential. Self-ownership and the Man-self are the two basic existentiell modes of being oneself, i.e. projecting everyday possibilities of oneself appropriated from the horizon of das Man. What differentiates these two modes is the stance one takes to the possibility of death, the existential horizon of being oneself. (shrink)

When Nietzsche asks in his Second Untimely Consideration about the benefits and disadvantages of history for life, he assumes - as Heidegger shows in his interpretation of this work in the seminar in the winter semester of 1938/39 - an ambiguous concept of life. "Life" here means, on the one hand, beings as a whole as all-life and, on the other hand, in an emphatic sense, human life. Against this background, Nietzsche compares man's historical relationship to the past with the (...) animal's relationship to the present. The benchmark here is life in the broader sense, by which the significance of history for human life is to be assessed.But - that is the basic question that Heidegger then asks: Can history be reckoned with life as such in this way? Who or what is man? Is he - as Nietzsche later says - the "as yet unidentified animal" who can both enhance and elevate as well as weaken his life through the various types of history (monumental, antiquarian, critical)? Or isn't he rather the being that "relates" to life through remembering and forgetting, precisely because he is not (only) as an animal rationale a "predator" looking for limitless increase in power and life, but a being that is deeply in the truth of being, and in which "life" in its ambiguity as world, human being, nature, ie as "beings as a whole" is first historically disclosed? As Heidegger suggests, this question is of central importance, not least for the historical examination of the "will to power" of the late Nietzsche. [Publisher's synopsis]. (shrink)

Entre Mead e Heidegger: a interioridade desdobrada e a formaçâo humana Resumo: O artigo visa aproximar a abordagem da psicologia social de Mead e a perspectiva fenomenológico-existencial de Martin Heidegger da noção de interioridade desdobrada. Tal aproximação permite sustentar que há uma radical e inseparável reciprocidade entre homem/mulher e mundo. A radicalidade de tal reciprocidade suplanta a dicotomia interioridade e exterioridade, reaproximando o corpo do tempo, lugar mesmo da abertura existencial humana. Apresenta-se a noção de “self” como processo e a (...) mente como resposta comportamental interativa com vistas a relacioná-la ao modo de ser-no-mundo. Também, uma breve incursão à psicologia de viés fenomenológico-existencial, buscando articular o interacionismo de Mead e a analítica existencial de Heidegger e suas implicações para o campo da formação humana.Palavras-chave: Self. Dasein. Interioridade desdobrada. Formação humana Between Mead and Heidegger: the unfolded interiority and the human formation: The article aims to approximate Mead's approach to social psychology and Martin Heidegger's phenomenological-existential perspective to the notion of unfolded interiority. Such an approach allows us to maintain that there is a radical and inseparable reciprocity between man / woman and the world. The radicality of such reciprocity supersedes the dichotomy interiority and exteriority, bringing the body of time closer together, the very place of human existential openness. The notion of “self” as a process and the mind as an interactive behavioral response is presented in order to relate it to the way of being in the world. Also, a brief foray into existential-phenomenological psychology, seeking to articulate Mead's interactionism and Heidegger's existential analytics and their implications for the field of human formationKeywords: Self. Dasein. Unfolded interiority. Human Formation. Entre Mead y Heidegger: la interioridad desarrollada y la formación humana Resumen: El artículo tiene como objetivo aproximar el enfoque de Mead a la psicología social y la perspectiva fenomenológica-existencial de Martin Heidegger a la noción desplegada de interioridad. Tal enfoque nos permite mantener que existe una reciprocidad radical e inseparable entre el hombre / mujer y el mundo. La radicalidad de tal reciprocidad suplanta la dicotomía de interioridad y exterioridad, devolviendo al cuerpo al tiempo, el lugar de la apertura existencial humana. La noción de "yo" se presenta como un proceso y la mente como una respuesta interactiva de comportamiento para relacionarlo con la forma de ser-en-el-mundo. Además, una breve incursión en la psicología del sesgo fenomenológico-existencial, buscando articular el interaccionismo de Mead y el análisis existencial de Heidegger y sus implicaciones para el campo de la formación humana.Palabras clave: auto. Dasein Interioridad desplegada. Formación humana Data de registro: 27/07/2020Data de aceite: 08/12/2020. (shrink)

As palavras que se seguem constituem uma tentativa de explorar os diversos sentidos que revestem a figura do «com» [mit], tal como surge configurada ao longo dos §§ 25–27 de Sein und Zeit 2 . Escutaremos atentamente aquilo que Heidegger tem a dizer a respeito da necessária determinação do ser-no-mundo [in-der-Welt-sein] como ser-com [Mitsein] e veremos, depois, em que medida a sua analítica existencial faz (ou não) depender a constituição do ser-si-mesmo [Selbstsein] da figura do outro. Por último, e em (...) jeito de conclusão, tentaremos mostrar como Heidegger articula a interrogação pela ipseidade ou pelo «quem?» [Wer?] do ser-aí quotidiano [alltägliche Dasein], com uma breve reflexão acerca da inautenticidade [Uneigentlichkeit] fáctica em que o mesmo muitas vezes parece soçobrar. Será então, estamos em crer, o momento apropriado para debatermos o significado da controversa noção heideggeriana de «eles» [das Man], aproveitando também o ensejo para lançarmos a questão relativa à responsabilidade (ética?) do Dasein. Metodologicamente, contornaremos (sempre que possível) os tradicionais comentários a respeito das infinitas modalidades alternativas de tradução do jargão filosófico heideggeriano. (shrink)

Uno de los fenomenólogos de la nueva generación que sigue la línea de Husserl, Heidegger, Marion y Lévinas es Richard Kearney. Este filósofo irlandés, católico, propone una cuarta reducción fenomenológica, esto es, volver al eschaton enraizado en la existencia cotidiana: encontrar la voz y el rostro de lo más alto en lo más bajo. Es como la realización de aquella idea heideggeriana de que “Sólo aquello del mundo que es de poca monta llegará alguna vez a ser cosa.” . En (...) el lenguaje cotidiano, en la vida diaria, se encuentra una posibilidad de superar el escepticismo, la indiferencia y el hastío del mundo vuelto consumo y del hombre convertido en pieza del mercado. En el encuentro cara a cara se da la posibilidad de una revelación que hace de la relación con el otro, y especialmente con el extranjero, un maravillarse y nos implemente una duda, una sospecha y una desconfianza. (shrink)

In Being and Time, Heidegger presented the finitude of human existence from the concepts of being towards death and anticipatory resoluteness. By interpreting human existence as existential possibility, it becomes possible to properly understand existential death as distinct from death in the vital sense. In view of the projective characteristic of understanding, Heidegger shows that projection into possibilities is always subject to risk and failure, since what sustains the “existential” aspect of existential possibility is projection in it. In this sense, (...) the objective of this article is to present and discuss the concepts of death, existential possibility and finitude existence based on the interpretative thesis that Heidegger’s elaboration of the existential concept of death is independent of the common and mundane sense of death, presented through the concept of demise, based on the thesis proposed by Heidegger that death is the possibility of the impossibility of existence in general. (shrink)

Resumo: Este artigo busca problematizar, a partir da discussão teórica com Judith Butler (2001; 2019) e Emmanuel Lévinas (1982; 1988), algumas questões sobre gêneros, sexualidades e educação, a fim de demonstrar o impacto da LGBTfobia na sociedade, visto que fere a alteridade do Outro, um Outro que não pode ser englobado pela norma. Parte-se do pressuposto de que a escola é um espaço de reiteração da heterocisnormatividade, o que pode ser verificado, por meio do Relatório da Associação Brasileira de Lésbicas, (...) Gays, Bissexuais, Travestis, Transexuais e Intersexos (ABGLT, 2016), bem como de casos de LGBTfobia ocorridos em escolas brasileiras de diferentes regiões, nos últimos anos. Diante disso, objetivo desta escrita é analisar como a sexualidade normativa como única possibilidade de manifestação fere a alteridade humana, o que é reproduzido e reforçado também no espaço escolar. Uma escola que pretende ser para todas as pessoas, passa também pelo acolhimento das diferentes existências. Palavras-chave: Gêneros; Sexualidades; Educação; Heterocisnormatividade; Diferença. Gender, sexuality and education: Reflections about school as a producer and reproducer of heterocisnormativity Abstract: This article has the purpose of problematizing, from Judith Butler (2001; 20019) and Emmanuel Lévinas (1982; 1988) studies, questions about gender, sexuality and educacion, with the purpose of showing the impact of LGBTphobia in the Society, since they hurt the otherness of the other, another one who can not be encompassed by the normal standards. It is assumed that the school is a space that reproduces the heterocisnormativity standards accepted society, which can be verified by Associação Brasileira de Lésbicas, Gays, Bissexuais, Travestis, Transsexuais e Intersexos (ABGLT, 2016), as well as cases of LGBTphobia that occurred in Brazilian schools, from different regions, in recent years. Given this, the objective of this writing is to analyze how normative sexuality as the only possibility of manifestation harms human otherness, which is also reproduced and reinforced in the school space. A school that aims to be for everyone also involves welcoming different existences. Keywords: Gender; Sexualit; Educacion; Heterocisnormativity; Differences. Género, sexualidades y educación: Reflexiones sobre la escuela como productora y reproductora de heterocisnormatividad Resumen: Este artículo propone problematizar, a partir de Judith Butler (2001; 2019) y Emmanuel Lévinas (1982; 1988), questiones sobre gênero, sexualidad y educación, com la finalidad de demostrar el impacto de LGBTfobia en la sociedad, visto que pega la alteridad del otro, un otro que no puede ser englobado por la norma. Parte de la idea supuesta de que la escuela es un espacio de reiteración de heterocisnormatividad, según verificación del Relatório de la Associação Brasileña de Lésbicas, Gays, Bissexualess, Travestis, Transexuales y Intersexos (ABGLT, 2016), así como casos de LGBTfobia ocurridos en escuelas brasileñas, de diferentes regiones, en los últimos años. Ante esto, el objetivo de este escrito es analizar cómo la sexualidad normativa como única posibilidad de manifestación perjudica la alteridad humana, que también se reproduce y refuerza en el espacio escolar. Una escuela que pretende ser para todos implica también acoger existencias diferentes. Palabras clave: Género; Sexualidade; Educación; Heterocisnormatividad; Diferencia. Data de registro: 09/07/2024 Data de aceite: 30/10/2024. (shrink)

The study consists of a phenomenological reflection on the essence of man based on the meaning of his discourse in the era of technique. Considering the history of metaphysics at its end, in which all saying and thinking are commanded by information technologies, one wonders about the situation of language, understood as the pronouncement of human existence. Based on Heidegger's phenomenology and, particularly, on the notion of discourse as a fundamental structure made explicit by Sein und Zeit's existential ontology, it (...) is demonstrated that the focus of the discussion is not simply to question the instrumental use and technological application of language. Rather, the key for elaborating the interrelationship between discourse and technique is to capture the sense by which the contemporary man discourses his existence-in-the-world, transitioning from an original way of saying and understanding himself to one in which he and his world are governed by a challenging and provocative power of realness in his reality. It is shown that, to guarantee this contemporary man’s position with the entities, it is necessary for the technique to be a meaning to pronounce its existence, providing the meaning of being-device for the existence and its own possibilities, as well as for the mundane things. At the same time, it is clarified that, since the realization of human existence is guided by this meaning and challenging power represented by the technique, the instrumentalization of languages and their reduction to a communication system managed by information technologies, among other consequences, are required. (shrink)

La comprensión burguesa de la vida implica alargarla todo lo que se pueda, y posponer y olvidar la muerte. La muerte es para Heidegger la posibilidad más auténtica de la existencia humana. Esto significa que el ser humano existe para morir. El hambre de inmortalidad de Unamuno, su «querer vivir», solo se entiende desde el «tener que morir». La conciencia de esto último es precisamente el sentimiento trágico de la vida que expone Unamuno. La muerte total y radical supone (...) la ausencia de sentido. El hambre de inmortalidad equivale a la pasión por ser, es decir, a una lucha por el sentido de la existencia. La nada nos está esperando, pero Unamuno llama al ser humano a que haga de la muerte una injusticia. Defiende una moral de la esperanza merecida, según la cual el ser humano debe actuar de manera que no merezca morir. Este es el pesimismo creativo que nos da esperanza. La esperanza merecida que supone la pasión por ser es el único fundamento de sentido de la vida humana. Merecer la eternidad y el sentido, no hay otra forma de experimentar la eternidad y el sentido. (shrink)

: Heidegger describes Dasein as subject to a constant pressure to bring its intentional performances into agreement with those of its peers and thence with a generic description of ‘what one [das Man] does’, called Dasein's conformism. I argue that extant accounts of this pressure, which appeal to the essential social embeddedness of intentional performance, fail to account for both the scope and modal force of the demand to act as one does. I propose that we can better understand the (...) role of das Man in Heidegger's account of intentional agency by exploiting a structural similarity between ‘Dasein’ and the familiar notion of epistemic capacity, or a power of knowledge. The result is an account that locates the source of das Man's authority not in our social nature but in our shared aspiration to ontological understanding. (shrink)

Esse artigo tem por objetivo elaborar uma análise da questão da subjetividade em Heidegger como principal estrutura do mundo moderno. Para tanto, trataremos das principais características que configuram a época moderna e como essas características apresentam, como elemento comum e determinante, o critério de verdade. Discutiremos como a concepção de verdade foi gestada na metafísica clássica e consolidada com a ciência moderna, a partir da subjetividade técnico-científica. As principais obras estudadas para construir nosso percurso discursivo são: “O tempo da imagem (...) do mundo” (2012); Meditação (2010); A Questão da Técnica (2008); Sobre a essência da verdade (1983). O estudo dessas obras foi apoiado por alguns comentadores que referenciamos no decorrer do texto. A análise dessas obras nos permitiu intercruzar algumas reflexões de Heidegger acerca da construção e desdobramento das estruturas do mundo moderno e, consequentemente, compreender a atuação imperiosa do ser humano sobre a natureza. Nesse sentido, esse artigo procura contribuir para compreendermos o processo de edificação do mundo moderno e, consequentemente, pensarmos alternativas possíveis de reestruturação de suas bases, e, portanto, novas formas de atuar sobre o mundo. Formas essas, que não sejam apenas pelo viés da exploração e dominação, mas através de uma interação mais autêntica, empática e respeitosa com os diversos modos de existência. (shrink)

Resumo: Partindo do pressuposto que o Ser é notavelmente o escopo de toda a filosofia de Heidegger, este artigo procura indicar traços pontuais daquela que foi considerada o maior labor intelectual de sua vida: Ser e Tempo. Com o intuito de explorar o projeto da analítica existencial, Heidegger lança mão de dois conceitos, o de manualidade e circunvisão . Trata-se de explicitar, a partir desses conceitos contidos na obra Ser e Tempo a contribuição original do filósofo para o diagnóstico crítico (...) da modernidade e para posteriores aprofundamentos filosóficos sobre a técnica moderna. Por fim, a comunicação indicará à luz da discussão realizada a partir das reflexões de Heidegger, uma alternativa possível para outro modo de lidar com a técnica, não desprezando sua importância para as modificações e desenvolvimento do homem e da natureza, mas tampouco absolutizando o modo como a técnica modifica a interação do homem com o mundo em que habita.: Based on the assumption that Being is notably the scope of the whole philosophy of Heidegger, this article seeks to show occasional traces of what was considered the greatest intellectual labor of his life: Being and Time. In order to exploit the project's existential analytic, Heidegger makes use of two concepts, and to manualidade circumvision. It is explicit from these concepts contained in the book Being and Time the original contribution of the philosopher to the critical diagnosis of modernity and subsequent philosophical insights about the modern technique. Finally, the Notice indicates in the light of the discussion held from the reflections of Heidegger, a possible alternative to otherwise deal with the technique, not disregarding its importance to the changes and development of man and nature, but neither the absolutizando how the technique modifies the interaction of man and the world he inhabits. Keywords : Heidegger; being; modern technique. (shrink)

To address the question of the nature and function of conventions, this essay explores a possible systematic link between Heidegger’s hermeneutical phenomenology and Foucault’s historical ontology. It argues that these analyses establish, contra to the cognitivist interpretation, dominant then and now, that conventions are properly understood not as “common knowledge” nor even as “jointly accepted beliefs” —that they are not, at least at their most fundamental layer, cognitive states at all—but are instead bodily dispositions that are forged by historically shifting (...) entwinements of practices of power and forms of knowledge. (shrink)

Man is an open existence, exposed to mortality and free towards the coming that is revealed to him in the lightening flash of language. Free towards, and endowed with the ever new possibility of beginning, the mortal is endowed with the gift of language that remains beyond his death: here alone lies redemption for the mortals. It is this affirmative question of the coming time that is pursued in this work: it occurs as and in a configuration of questions, not (...) constituting a system: question of mortality and temporality, the flash of language that reveals man - beyond any predication - his finitude, the opening where man finds himself to welcome the coming, and finally redemption in the coming itself in the existential attunement of hope. This article attempts, reading the works of Schelling, Heidegger and Benjamin, to think the gift of language as redemptive, beyond any appropriation, in the face of evil whose possibility is given to the mortal alone. (shrink)

Partindo do presuposto de que Heidegger foi o autor que mais influenciou a obra de Hans-Georg Gadamer, o presente artigo visa esclarecer os contornos desta influência, analisando alguns dos principais temas do pensamento gadameriano, a saber: a historicidade da existência humana, a reabilitação da categoria do preconceito, a arte, a linguagem e a verdade. Mostra ainda como a orientação humanista de Gadamer constitui o principal ponto de divergência relativamente a Heidegger. Defende, por conseguinte, que a hermenêutica filosófica de Gadamer pode (...) ser interpretada como uma apropriação humanista do pensamento heideggeriano. /// Taking for granted that Heidegger was the author that most deeply influenced Gadamer's work, the present article aims at a clarification of such influence by examining some of the key themes of Gadamer's thought: the historicity of human existence, the rehabilitation of prejudice, as well as the reflection on art, language, and truth. The article explains thus how Gadamer's humanism constitutes the main point of divergence from Heidegger. It claims, moreover, that Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics can be considered a humanistic appropriation of Heidegger's thought. (shrink)

Presenta las microagencias colectivas que engendran formas de resistir los estándares establecidos, forjando nuevas formas de (re)existir y “ver, oír, pensar” en las escuelas, problematizando: ¿Cómo crean posibilidades las vidas cotidianas escolares, insertadas en una lucha micropolítica, con diferentes intensidades e impulsos de vida? Sostiene que la vida escolar diaria contribuye a los movimientos de lucha y resistencia a través de la creación de otros modos de (re)existencia.

Este texto trata do conceito de existência a partir do pensamento fenomenológico, ontológico-fundamental e ontológico-histórico, de Heidegger. De início, trata do conceito metafísico de existência e de sua transformação na época da consumação da metafísica, especialmente em Kierkegaard. A consumação da metafísica apela por outro princípio do pensar. “Ser e Tempo” inaugura a tentativa de operar uma passagem para este outro princípio. O empenho do pensamento se volta então para a tarefa de pensar a diferença ontológica e de considerar a (...) existência humana à luz de sua referência para com o ser enquanto diferença ontológica. Daí surge um novo conceito de existência: como insistência extática na verdade do ser. (shrink)

This article aims to make a philosophical interpretation of the phenomenon of stress based on Heidegger’s thought. Firstly, I present a general review of the scientific concept of stress as well as the main theories about it. Secondly, the concept of stress in Heidegger’s thought is analyzed and I propose to understand it as a load or requests that are directed to the Dasein in its openness to the entities of the world. Finally, this shows that the approach to the (...) phenomenon of stress from Heidegger’s phenomenological-existential perspective allows us to overcome the causal and physiological explanations that do not consider stress as a fundamental way of being typical of human beings in so far as they are a Dasein. (shrink)

This essay attempts to think anew the relationship of pain with finitude and language. If man is that finite, mortal being whose being is essentially linguistic and being-in-communication, where language is not seen as mere attribute, property, or instrumental means of appropriation, then language cannot be understood in its cognitive disposal as categorical grasp of the “entities presently given,” but must be understood in a more originary manner as opening of the coming into presence, as the event of this coming (...) itself. If a certain dominant ontology, in its innermost ground, understands pain as the very grounding work of logos, then it is necessary to open up the closure of this logos of metaphysics to another, more originary experience of pain in relation to mortality that dispropriates us beforehand, and thereby grants us language itself as gift and promise which welcomes the incalculable event of the “not yet.” This essay reads Heidegger, Schelling and Benjamin to think of the promise of this redemptive, messianic language in relation to an originary finitude, outside the metaphysics of subjectivity, insofar as this metaphysics subsumes language to its cognitive disposal, to its categorical grasp of entities’ “given present.”. (shrink)

The philosophy developed by Sartre is the philosophy of freedom. This is confirmed by his work, whether in literary or theatrical texts, in political interventions and even in travel reports; but it is in technical works that this concern is even more evident: Sartre sustains that his philosophy must fulfill three tasks, of which the first – and most important – is the metaphysical liberation of men and women. Being and Nothingness fulfills precisely this task; it is against Kant and (...) distancing itself from Husserl and Heidegger that, first, freedom reveals itself as phenomenological truth: I am freedom; second, against all determinism, whether of externality, such as History (situation, class, etc.), or of interiority, such as Ego (transcendental Self, character, etc.), Sartre shows that freedom is also the foundation of History and the beginning of every individual adventure (life story, Psyche), both expressions of the same genesis: the singularity of freedom, self-sustaining process of being-in-the-world, is the only source of what man is and, consequently, of everything that can come to Being. Phenomenological ontology is the foundational work of the philosophy of freedom. (shrink)

Resumo: Este artigo aborda a relevância da ocupação de si no processo de formação ética do sujeito e discute as possibilidades de seu uso para a educação. Recobra-se, para tanto, a genealogia da história da noção de cuidado, da parresia e da ética da amizade, retratadas no curso Hermenêutica do Sujeito ministrado por Michel Foucault. Objetiva-se problematizar, com isso, os aspectos moralizantes da pedagogia moderna e evidenciar uma dimensão ética da amizade e estética da existência, as quais foram abandonadas na (...) educação escolar. Buscam-se pensar em que medida essa dimensão pode ser recuperada como uma espécie de esquiva à racionalidade econômica e ao empreendimento de si, presentes nas práticas escolares contemporâneas, indicando algumas pistas sobre as questões éticas e políticas que incidem sobre as referidas práticas, no presente. Esse movimento possibilitará sinalizar para uma face psicagógica esboçada na antiguidade greco-romana, mas que fora abandonada em seu desenvolvimento moderno. Ao se enfatizar essa dimensão psicagógica e o papel que o outro ocupa, nessa relação, destaca-se a necessidade de certa ociosidade (Skholé) e encontro afetivo (Philia) do discípulo com o mestre, indagando-se sobre as adversidades tanto daquela vacância quanto dessa erótica, para se pensar nos desafios atuais da educação escolar. Palavras-chave: cuidado de si; formação ética do sujeito; educação escolar; Foucault. On the Foucauldian ethics of care, the subject and education: interpretive drifts 40 years after Hermeneutics of the Subject Abstract: This article analyzes the relevance of self-care in the subject's ethical formation process and discusses the possibilities of its use for education. For this purpose, we recover the genealogy of the history of the notion of care, parrhesia and the ethics of friendship, portrayed in the Hermeneutics of the Subject course taught by Michel Foucault. We aim to problematize with this the moralizing aspects of modern pedagogy and to highlight an ethical dimension of friendship and aesthetics of existence that were abandoned in school education. We seek to think to what extent this dimension can be recovered as a kind of evasion of economic rationality and the self-enterprise in contemporary school practices, indicating some clues about the ethical and political issues that affect these practices in the present. This movement will allow us to point to a psychogogical face outlined in Greco-Roman Antiquity, but which had been abandoned in its modern development. By emphasizing this psycagogical dimension and the role that the other occupies in this relationship, we highlight the need for a certain idleness (Skholé) and an affective encounter (Philia) of the disciple with the master, asking us about the adversities of both that vacancy and this erotic to think in the current challenges of school education. Keywords: self of care; ethical formation of the subject; schooling; Foucault. Sobre la ética foucauldiana del cuidado, el sujeto y la educación: derivas interpretativas 40 años después de la Hermenéutica del Sujeto Resumen: Este artículo analiza la relevancia de la ocupación de sí mismo en el proceso de formación ética del sujeto y discute las posibilidades de su uso para la educación. Para ello, recuperamos la genealogía de la historia de la noción de cuidado, la parresía y la ética de la amistad, retratada en el curso de Hermenéutica del Sujeto impartido por Michel Foucault. Pretendemos con eso problematizar los aspectos moralizantes de la pedagogía moderna y resaltar una dimensión ética de la amistad y estética de la existencia que fueron abandonadas en la educación escolar. Buscamos pensar en qué medida esta dimensión puede ser recuperada como una vía de escape a la racionalidad económica y el emprendimiento del yo en las prácticas escolares contemporáneas, indicando algunas pistas sobre las cuestiones éticas y políticas que afectan a estas prácticas en el presente. Este movimiento nos permitirá señalar un rostro psicagógico esbozado en la antigüedad grecorromana, pero que había sido abandonado en su desarrollo moderno. Al enfatizar esta dimensión psicogógica y el papel que el otro ocupa en esta relación, destacamos la necesidad de una cierta ociosidad (Skholé) y un encuentro afectivo (Philia) del discípulo con el maestro, preguntándonos por las adversidades de ambos esa vacancia y esta erótica para pensar en los desafíos actuales de la educación escolar. Palabras-clave: cuidado de sí; formación ética del sujeto; enseñanza; Foucault. Data de registro: 10/07/2022 Data de aceite: 13/12/2022. (shrink)

Why is man religious? To this fundamental question Paul Tillich and Xavier Zubiri respond similarly. However, they did not know each other personally and apparently neitherread the works of the other. The coincidence in their positions is without a doubt owing tothe influence that Martin Heidegger exercised on their thought. First, both defend themethod of correlation, according to which it is not possible to give answers to questionsthat nobody asks. Second, every question is born of a previous human experience thatmakes (...) it possible and that gives it meaning. Granting this, in the case of the questionabout God, what is that previous experience? For Tillich it is nothing other than that “thedimension of depth” in which we are confronted with “that which concerns us unconditionally,” whether we call it “God” or not. For Zubiri, this fundamental experience stems fromthe fact of “religation to a power of the real which is ultimate, possibilitating, and impelling.” From this fundamental experience is born the concern for the ultimate ground of ourexistence and the possible answers, which are none other that the diverse religions thatthere have been throughout history, including other apparently irreligious forms of life suchas atheism, agnosticism and the present-day indifference to religion.¿Por qué es religioso el hombre? A esta pregunta fundamental responden de maneraparecida Paul Tillich y Xavier Zubiri. Sin embargo, no se conocieron personalmente y alparecer ninguno leyó las obras del otro. La coincidencia en sus planteamientos se debensin duda a la influencia que M. Heidegger ejerció sobre el pensamiento de ambos. En primer lugar, los dos defienden el método de la correlación, según el cual no se pueden ofrecerrespuestas a preguntas que nadie se hace. Y, en segundo lugar, toda pregunta nace deuna previa experiencia humana que la hace posible y le da sentido. Esto supuesto, en elcaso de la pregunta por Dios, ¿cuál es esa previa experiencia? Para Paul Tillich no es otraque “la dimensión profunda” en la que nos encontramos enfrentados a “aquello que nosconcierne incondicionalmente,” lo llamémoslo o no Dios. Para Zubiri dicha experiencia fundamental tiene lugar en el hecho de la “religación al poder último, posibilitante e impelentede lo real”. De esta experiencia fundamental nace la preocupación por el fundamento último de nuestra existencia y las posibles respuestas, que no son otras que la diversas religiones que en la historia han sido e incuso otras formas de vida al parecer irreligiosas comoel ateísmo, el agnosticismo y la indiferencia actual. (shrink)

O presente trabalho se propõe a refletir acerca do sofrimento emergido em meio à grave crise sanitária instalada pela pandemia do novo coronavírus (SARS-COV-2), considerando as mudanças nas dinâmicas de vida da população como a adoção de medidas de distanciamento social, quarentena, uso de máscaras, dentre outras contingências que transformaram o cotidiano e o ritmo das existências contemporâneas. O crescente número de casos e mortes, as modificações nas rotinas de casa, trabalho e relações sociais vêm repercutindo na saúde mental das (...) pessoas e desencadeando vários sofrimentos, expressos nas queixas que chegam diariamente aos serviços de acolhimento psicológico.Considerando, assim, a experiência de escuta clínica das pessoas em sofrimento neste período, com o objetivo de refletir sobre os modos de vida e sofrimento que se desvelam em meio ao contexto pandêmico, recorremos ao pensamento do filósofo alemão Martin Heidegger para pensar o tédio e a técnica moderna como os sentidos e afetos que caracterizam e afinam as existências contemporâneas; bem como as suas repercussões nas experiências de sofrimento que se revelam em meio aos novos modos de existência assumidos durante a pandemia de covid-19. (shrink)

This article discusses the limits of the modern conception of Science arising from the fracture established between scientific and philosophical knowledge. For a long time, Sciences remained apart from ontological reflections due to the presumed abyss between Science and Philosophy. At this core, the work begins by describing the problem of knowledge in Modernity to demonstrate its ontological impertinence through the adoption of the phenomenological framework mobilized by Martin Heidegger. Modern Sciences, because they are based on the Cartesian scientific model (...) and worldview, read reality as external data, so that the experience inherent to the world experience was not considered. We then start from the interpretation that the primary cause of this negligence lies in the path of gnosiological reduction of ontology. For Sciences to contemplate human experience, it is essential to uncover its inescapable ontological foundation. Philosophical thinking, along this path, plays a fundamental role in the (re)construction of Sciences, as it seeks the causes and principles of knowledge of reality. For this purpose, the topic of worldliness of the world was chosen, according to Heidegger's reading, capable of being discussed through the necessary foray into ontology. The phenomenological opening of the sphere of experience, contained in the notion of worldliness as it presupposes the understanding of the surrounding world, makes it possible to resize the way of conceiving Sciences. (shrink)

Bis heute hält die Politische Philosophie an dem staatsphilosophischen Diktum einer in viele Staaten zerfallenden Welt fest, die stets Formen der Ausgrenzung und der Trennung hervorbringt. Ralf Rother thematisiert hingegen die Dekonstruktion des Politischen als eine Repolitisierung des politischen Denkens, indem er sich einer Diskussion um Heideggers Terminus »Mitsein« widmet, die von Levinas, Blanchot, Nancy und Derrida initiiert wurde. Im Fokus dieser Debatte steht die Frage: Wie ist ein Zusammenleben derjenigen möglich, die unter Rückgriff auf Hobbes'sche und Schmitt'sche Positionen - (...) z.B. aufgrund unterschiedlicher Herkunft oder Feindschaft - als nicht zusammengehörig verstanden werden? (shrink)

En este trabajo propongo que la experiencia estética del trap posee una capacidad influencial que se realiza a través de la narrativa de la acción que ofrece el fearless speech. Este discurso se da desde un modo de existencia inferior y es capaz de contar la verdad de la realidad del sujeto. Dicha acción implica reconfigurar el mundo a través de la narrativa que parte desde un llegar a ser o becoming. Esta reconfiguración a su vez supone la reconfiguración de (...) las posibilidades de acción reales del sujeto que es posible a través de la creación de la obra en el mundo y la experiencia estética de la obra. Esto implica una estética existencial de la resistencia que parte del cuidado de uno mismo y las acciones en el mundo que se establecen con relación a otros. Propongo que es en este último punto en el que convergen algunos planteamientos de Paul Ricoeur, Michel Foucault y Martin Heidegger. (shrink)

O propósito deste artigo é o de evidenciar de que forma a afirmação de ser ser-para-a-morte de Heidegger pode ser entendido como condição de possibilidade para a responsabilização do desejo conforme formulado pela psicanálise lacaniana. Primeiro, descreve-se a estrutura do Dasein heideggeriano, bem como seus existenciais. Em seguida, analisa-se o uso e o sentido da noção de desejo em Lacan. Tanto numa existência autêntica, quanto num final de análise, onde o sujeito sabe lidar com suas perdas, diante da angústia, ele (...) assume um papel de protagonista de sua existência e consegue se responsabilizar pelo seu desejo. A análise, nesse sentido, serve como uma ferramenta que possibilita o sujeito lidar com este sofrimento decorrente da falta, deste nada que falou Heidegger. Evidentemente que a análise não objetiva eliminar esta falta ontológica, mas tão somente desconstruir os fantasmas que o sujeito construiu para afastar o que lhe é mais próprio, constitutivo de sua estrutura ontológica, qual seja, sua finitude. Portanto, tanto para Heidegger, por meio da afirmação da angústia frente à morte, quanto para Lacan, onde o sujeito assumiu a tragédia de sua existência – no final de análise –, é a afirmação da finitude que possibilita a responsabilização do desejo, de ser autêntico ou, se preferir, sujeito. (shrink)

O presente artigo tem como objetivo mostrar a leitura heideggeriana da filosofia de Edmund Husserl a partir do tema da intuição categorial desenvolvida por este último e os seus desdobramentos na própria obra de Heidegger. Defendemos a hipótese de que ao retirar a consciência da sua abordagem tradicional, isto é, ao livrá-la do psicologismo, Husserl impulsiona Heidegger na inauguração da sua fenomenologia hermenêutica, pois a consciência deixa de ser tratada como um objeto natural e tem o seu caráter ideal destacado. (...) Desse modo, afirmamos que Heidegger, radicalizando, constrói uma interrogação que desloca o objeto da fenomenologia do campo da consciência para a existência, deixando a teoria do conhecimento, na qual se inseria Husserl, indo em direção de uma ontologia. Para tal, percorreremos por alguns conceitos centrais das Investigações Lógicas, passando em seguida para a análise dos poucos fragmentos onde Heidegger explicita a sua relação com a obra husserliana. (shrink)

SÍNTESE - Em consonância com o método fenomenológico- hermenêutico traçado por Martin Heidegger em Sein und Zeit, a expressão prático-auto-referencial "eu sou" [sum] deve anteceder toda predicação sobre o humano ser/estar-aí-no-mundo. A este pertence a culpa/ dívida [Schuld] enquanto sentir-se/compreender-se e confessar-se como ser-culpado/devedor [Schuldigsein]. "Sou culpado por" resulta da junção de "sou responsável por" com o "não" implícito na idéia de falta. O responder ativo-projetivo do ser-aí [Dasein] por seu ter-queser está marcado, prévia e ontologicamente, pela impossibilidade de autofundação (...) e pela possibilidade, sempre iminente, de não--ser/estaraí- no mundo; e, no plano ôntico, está permeado pela necessária restrição de possibilidades de ação e pelo inelutável retraimento a possibilidades alternativas. O texto explicita algumas potencialidades de incidência corretiva deste conceito ontológico-existencial de culpa sobre a autocompreensão do homem contemporâneo. (shrink)

Das Ereignis stellt ein bedeutsames Thema der gegenwartigen Philosophie dar. Wir alle kennen Ereignisse - sie ereignen sich mit uns. Doch was ist das Ereignis? Was kennzeichnet es, wie ereignet es sich? Wie ist es denkerisch zu beschreiben? Es stellt sich heraus, dass die Ereignisse genau das sind, wovon man nicht fragen kann, was sie sind, wie sie sind und wie man sie denken kann. So verfolgt das Buch in der Philosophie Martin Heideggers, Emmanuel Levinas und Jean-Luc Marions drei - (...) mit Jacques Derridas Worten: "wahnsinnige" - Versuche, das Undenkbare zu denken. (shrink)

El presente texto aborda el parágrafo 36 de los Aportes a la filosofía de Martin Heidegger, para desde este exponer una vía de comprensión de esta obra en torno al lenguaje filosófico-poético, vía que llevaría a considerar el pensamiento del filósofo como una posibilidad de un proyecto pensante que no asumiría el lenguaje como mero medio de enunciación del ente, como instrumento de la razón, sino que lo piense como modo de darse el Ser mismo. En este sentido, se (...) piensa al lenguaje como silenciamiento (Erschweigung) y, al pensarlo de esta manera, se presenta como modo en el que el ente se decide y el hombre se ajusta a su esencia. El texto toma como reflexión la inflexión hecha por Heidegger con respecto al pensar y al poetizar como ámbitos en los que el lenguaje se da como posibilidad de escucha, pero también de dicción. En esta última se juega el todo del ente, como se mencionará al final, al considerar algunas palabras de Nietzsche, que el mismo Heidegger piensa. (shrink)