Dear Professor Heller . . . Your paper had started out superbly. It was a great aesthetic and cognitive pleasure to follow you as you guided us through the intellectual history of the main idea of Kleist's essay, from Plato through the biblical Fall of Man, to Schiller, and Kierkegaard, and Kafka. Indeed the perceptive listener's experience was so satisfying that his disappointment was doubled when he came to realize that all this erudition and beauty had been displayed only in (...) order to serve as a contrast-providing background for the sharp delineation of a reductionistic explanation which you consider to be characteristic of psychoanalysis: the interpretation of the disturbance of man's naive, unselfconscious pre-Fall state as nothing more than a portrayal of sexual impotence—the reduction of a deep existential preoccupation to a case of phimosis. I am certain that the relief I felt when you then took up Freud's demonological-neurosis paper was not an idiosyncratic response on my part but an experience shared by many open-minded listeners in your psychoanalytic audience. Let us, therefore, disregard the "text" of your sermon and consider the substantial questions that you raised after you turned to Freud; these are to my mind the most central ones that you undertook to examine in your—despite its disappointing aspects—splendid address to us. Put into my own words, your most important question was this: What is the purpose of the psychoanalyst's efforts outside the clinical setting, in particular when his contributions take the form of a pathography? That is, To what end do analysts study the psychopathology of the creators of great works? I, too, have asked myself this question, and since you read my old essay "Beyond the Bounds of the Basic Rule" , you know some of my answers. But important basic questions are hardly ever answered once and for all; and I will, therefore, under the impact of your lecture, respond as if I had heard the question for the first time. Heinz Kohut, M.D., is Professorial Lecturer in Psychiatry at the University of Chicago and a teacher and training analyst at the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis. His works include The Restoration of the Self, The Analysis of the Self: A Systematic Approach to the Psychoanalytic Treatment of Narcissistic Personality Disorders—which has appeared in German, French, and Italian translations—, The Restoration of the Self and collection of his essays, Scientific Empathy and Empathic Science. His "A Reply to Margret Schaefer"" was published in the Spring 1978 issue of Critical Inquiry. See also: "Psychoanalysis and the Marionette Theater: Interpretation is Not Depreciation" by Margret Schaefer in Vol. 5, No. 1. (shrink)

I will return to the second point in a different context later; at this moment I will discuss only the issue raised by my pointing up the fact that the essay in question was written by someone in Professor Heller's field. What motivated me to make the statement was not my belief that the use of psychoanalysis in the interpretation of art should be restricted to certified psychoanalysts—indeed, I have always been a staunch advocate of the opposite view. My motive (...) for this, I assumed harmless, and not, of course, irrelevant, indiscretion was that I wanted to show that Professor Heller's critique of psychoanalysis was not broadly based, that his representative example was a piece that happened to have crossed his way, that he was not using the work of an established writer in the field that he was condemning. My statement that your essay is an unacceptable text in a sermon preaching against applied analysis is unrelated to the value of your article. Even if in the future it should turn out that your essay—as far as I know your first contribution to applied psychoanalysis—was the forerunner of a significant oeuvre that would put you into the class of the great contributors of psychoanalytic interpretations of literature, it is at this point not an acceptable text for a sermon against our field. Heinz Kohut, M.D., is Professorial Lecturer in Psychiatry at the University of Chicago, teacher and training analyst at the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis, and author of many influential works on the psychology of the self. His works include The Restoration of the Self, The Analysis of the Self: A Systematic Approach to the Psychoanalytic Treatment of Narcissistic Personality Disorders - which has appeared in German, French, and Italian translations - and a collection of his essays, Scientific Empathy and Empathic Science. His "Psychoanalysis and the Interpretation of Literature: A Correspondence with Erich Heller" was published in the Spring 1978 issue of Critical Inquiry. (shrink)

In The Tragedy of the Self, Gary F. Greif attributes social violence and individual isolation to a contemporary neglect of a fundamental human need for support that only human culture and interaction can promote and reinforce. Greif bases this interpretation on the works of Heinz Kohut, a psychoanalyst who by degrees transformed Freud's theory of the instincts into a theory of the self. Kohut maintains that every individual fundamentally requires continual human support in order to live with (...) confidence and hope. Greif introduces Kohut's understanding of the nature, development, and disintegration of the self, analyzes modern and contemporary assumptions regarding the individualistic, anti-social nature of humans, and concludes that contemporary societal assumptions regarding the acceptance of individualism reflect and perpetuate a tragic human condition. Greif argues that the inability of the self to experience a human, fulfilling life is a tragedy intensified by a century of economic and cultural forces promoting social antagonism. A unique and stimulating book, The Tragedy of the Self will appeal to professionals in psychoanalytic psychology, self-psychology, and philosophy as well as academics and students in the Humanities and Social Sciences. (shrink)

Le bref texte que Paul Ricœur consacre en 1986 à la psychanalyse développée par Heinz Kohut révèle une réinterprétation phénoménologique à la fois du contenu et des fonctions de l'empathie, au total considérée comme un véritable outil à l'œuvre dans l'herméneutique du soi. La vision kohutienne de la constitution du soi et du processus thérapeutique analytique produit une espèce de “dé-sentimentalisation” de l'empathie, en soulignant le rôle crucial du transfert intersubjectif, fort à distance de la théorie (freudienne) solipsiste (...) de l'ego. The short text published in 1986 by Paul Ricoeur about Heinz Kohut's psychoanalysis of the self reveals a phenomenological reinterpretation of the content and the functions of empathy, finally considered as an effective tool of the hermeneutics of the self. Kohut's model of constitution of the self and of the therapeutic analytical process produces a kind of “de-sentimentalization” of empathy, pointing to the crucial role of intersubjective transfer, far from a (Freudian) solipsistic theory of the ego. (shrink)

This paper uses Victor Turner's recent discussion of liminal and liminoid forms of communitas to criticize psychoanalytic praxis, both theory and therapy. In so doing it argues that Turner's distinction can be sharpened by assimilating it to the Marxist concept of commoditization. Heinz Kohut's analysis of narcissism can be supplemented by considering how self‐esteem, like other forms of behavior, is ritualized, particularly in the mother‐child matrix. We can account for the recent increase in narcissistic disorders, in part, by (...) noting how liminal forms of communitas have given way to liminoid forms. Liminoid forms of communitas, like that established in the analytic relationship, secure self‐esteem less adequately than do liminal forms. (shrink)

Dobrze dobrany tytuł książki spełnia dwa wymagania: zwraca uwagę na jej tematykę i czyni to w taki sposób, że zachęca czytelnika do sięgnięcia po nią. Jakby temu przecząc, Tapken rozpoczyna swoją pracę następująco: „'Der notwendige Andere' - zgadzam się, tytuł jest bardzo ogólny, niezbyt sprecyzowany, a nawet niejasny. O jakim drugim jest w ogóle mowa? W jaki sposób jest drugi konieczny?'. Dla mnie osobiście ten tytuł jest ważny i interesujący. Dlaczego? Wiąże się to bowiem z bogactwem znaczeniowym języka niemieckiego i (...) polskiego. W niemieckim: „Not" - znaczy tyle co: konieczność, potrzeba, ale również: bieda, nędza, kłopot; „Wende" - znaczy zaś: zmiana, zwrot, przełom. Przymiotnik: „notwendig", mówi o konieczności drugiego, o jego potrzebie. Już starożytni wiedzieli, że człowiek potrzebuje drugiego, aby stać się człowiekiem. Być człowiekiem znaczy: być dla drugiego i z drugim. W tym też sensie drugi jest konieczny dla człowieka, ponieważ umożliwia mu bycie, wybawia z nędzy samotności, wyprowadza z biedy samozagłady. Samotność jest w podwójny sposób zabójcza dla człowieka, ona godzi w jego istoty i jego istnienie. Tyle o konieczności, o nieodzowności, potrzebie drugiego w naszym ludzkim życiu. (shrink)

Heinz Kohut was arguably the most influential modern day psychoanalyst. Because current interest in Kohut's work has focused so completely on self psychology, however, certain aspects of Kohut's thinking, in particular his nonreductive synthesis of Freudian theory, are in danger of being lost. Prior to his development of self psychology, Kohut was a legendary teacher of Freudian theory at the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis. In this volume, Philip Rubovits-Seitz presents Kohut's previously unavailable lectures from (...) his course on psychoanalytic psychology along with an illuminating summary statement on Freudian theory jointly written by Kohut and Rubovits-Seitz. Rubovits-Seitz continues with his own insightful analysis of Kohut's distinctive approach to Freudian theory. And he concludes by arguing persuasively why Kohut's later contributions should best be viewed as a continuation, rather than an abandonment, of this early vision. _Kohut's Freudian Vision _not only repairs an outstanding tear in received psychoanalytic history but also challenges self psychologists and contemporary Freudian psychoanalysts alike to renewed reflection. (shrink)

Narcissism continues to be an important topic of research, with a great deal of ongoing empirical work in social and personality psychology. But there are theoretical issues that have received less attention recently, including those that relate to the foundational theories of the psychoanalytic tradition. As the first step in a larger project of reevaluation, this article offers a critical review of Freud and Heinz Kohut’s theories of narcissism. Centered on a theoretical reconstruction, it clarifies several significant – (...) and often underspecified – features of each account. I also explore the continuities and discontinuities between these two closely related systems. Most notably, both Freud and Kohut lacked fully developed accounts of primary narcissism and the relevant instinctual drives. At the same time, Kohut’s theory expanded upon Freud’s in innovative ways, particularly with its emphasis on a secondary line of narcissistic development that has positive, transformative features. In the final section, however, I introduce a speculative reading that describes theoretical prefigurations of these features in elements of Freud’s structural theory. (shrink)

Other people figure in our experience of the world; they strike us as unique and gen- uinely other. This paper explores whether a Husserlian account of empathy as the way in which we constitute an intersubjective world can account for the uniqueness and otherness of other people in our experience. I contend that it can’t. I begin by explicating Husserl’s theory of empathy, paying particular attention to the reduction to a purely egoic sphere and the steps that ostensibly permit a (...) subject to re-inhabit a world of others from out of this sphere. In querying Husserl’s theory, I consider a series of problems, raised by Zhida Luo, concerning the apparent centrality of bod- ily similarity in empathy. I sketch Luo’s solution, which involves a shift to tactile similarity. While it makes for a better theory of empathy, this solution isn’t sufficient to make room for the givenness of another person not originally predicated on simi- larity. To clarify what’s at issue here, I turn to the Husserlian pictures of empathy presented by Heinz Kohut and Edith Stein. I conclude with a remark about what might be required, given the inability of Husserlian empathy to make room for the experience of others as singular and other, for a picture of our phenomenal life to have a shape that accounts for the coexistence of empathy to others who are like oneself and hospitality to others as genuine others. (shrink)

When the late Heinz Kohut defined psychoanalysis as the science of empathy and introspection, he sparked a debate that has animated psychoanalytic discourse ever since. What is the relationship of empathy to psychoanalysis? Is it a constituent of analytical technique, an integral aspect of the therapeutic action of analysis, or simply a metaphor for a mode of observation better understood via ‘classical’ theory and terminology? The dialogue about empathy, which is really a dialogue about the nature of the (...) analytic process, continues in this two-volume set, originally published in 1984. In Volume I, several illuminating attempts to define empathy are followed by Kohut’s essay, ‘Introspection, Empathy, and the Semicircle of Mental Health.’ Kohut’s paper, in turn, ushers in a series of original contributions on ‘Empathy as a Perspective in Psychoanalysis.’ The volume ends with five papers which strive to demarcate an empathic approach to various areas of artistic endeavour, including the appreciation of visual art. Volume II continues the dialogue with a series of developmental studies which explore the role of empathy in early child care at the same time as they chart the emergence of the young child’s capacity to empathize. In the concluding section, ‘Empathy in Psychoanalytic Work,’ contributors and discussants return to the arena of technique. They not only theorize about empathy in relation to analytic understanding and communication, but address issues of nosology, considering how the empathic vantage point may be utilized in the treatment of patients with borderline and schizophrenic pathology. In their critical attention to the many dimensions of empathy – philosophical, developmental, therapeutic, artistic – the contributors collectively bear witness to the fact that Kohut has helped to shape new questions, but not set limits to the search for answers. The product of their efforts is an anatomical exploration of a topic whose relevance for psychoanalysis and psychotherapy is only beginning to be understood. (shrink)

This paper offers a psychobiographical study of the connection between the life and work of Heije Faber , the internationally best known Dutch psychologist of religion. Initially, Faber studied theology, qualifying in philosophy of religion; in later years, he studied psychology . As a politically active pastor, he had to hide from the Nazi-occupation of The Netherlands during World War II. In 1970 he became the first professor of the psychology of religion at a Dutch theological faculty. Faber was interested (...) in a psychoanalytic approach to religion, by the end of his life particularly in selfpsychology as developed by Heinz Kohut. There is a curious contradiction in his work: although Faber employs several types of psychology in his autobiography to interpret aspects of his own development, he neglects the Kohutian psychology that he had himself helped to introduce to The Netherlands. This article tries to solve the paradox and suggests some psychological hypotheses as to the relationship of Faber psychodynamics and his contribution to psychology. (shrink)

Best known for his contributions to the development of contemporary intersubjectivity theory, Bernard Brandchaft has dedicated a career to the advancement of psychoanalytic theory and practice. Continually searching for a theoretical viewpoint that would satisfactorily explain the clinical phenomena he was encountering, his curiosity eventually led him to the work of Heinz Kohut and the then-emerging school of self psychology. However, seemingly always one step ahead of the crowd, Brandchaft constantly reformulated his ideas about and investigations into the (...) intersubjective nature of human experiences. Many of the chapters in this volume have never before been published. Together, they articulate the evolution of Brandchaft's thinking along the road toward an emancipatory psychoanalysis. Moreover, commentary from Shelley Doctors and Dorienne Sorter – in addition to Bernard Brandchaft himself – examines the clinical implications of the theoretical shifts that he advocated and provides a contemporary context for the case material and conclusions each paper presents. These theoretical shifts, both clear and subtle, are thereby elucidated to form the grand narrative of a truly visionary psychoanalytic thinker. (shrink)

This article elaborates a claim, first introduced by Wilhelm Dilthey, that metaphysics represents an illusory flight from the tragedy of human finitude. Metaphysics, of which psychoanalytic metapsychologies are a form, transforms the unbearable fragility and transience of all things human into an enduring, permanent, changeless reality, an illusory world of eternal truths. Three “clinical cases” illustrate this thesis in the work and lives of a philosopher and two psychoanalytic theorists: Friedrich Nietzsche and his metaphysical doctrine of the eternal return of (...) the same, Sigmund Freud and his dual instinct theory, and Heinz Kohut and his theoretical language of the self. It is contended that the best safeguard against the pitfalls of metaphysical illusion lies in a shared commitment to reflection on the constitutive contexts of all our theoretical ideas. (shrink)

What is hermeneutics? -- The suffering stranger and the hermeneutics of trust -- Sandor Ferenczi : the analyst of last resort and the hermeneutics of trauma -- Frieda Fromm-Reichmann : incommunicable loneliness -- D.W. Winnicott : humanitarian without sentimentality -- Heinz Kohut : glimpsing the hidden suffering -- Bernard Brandchaft : liberating the incarcerated spirit.

Sufism and Psychoanalysis have the potential to create a synergy of Eastern spiritual traditions and Western psychological frameworks. This paper examines the similarities and differences between Sufism and psychoanalytic self-psychology, particularly of Heinz Kohut, and emphasizes the mutual appreciation of psychoanalytical self-psychology approaches and patients’ religious beliefs, demonstrating that they are not in opposition and can work in harmony. The data was collected through literature reviews and documentation study. The results reveal that Sufi practices such as dhikr (remembrance (...) of God) and spiritual guidance from a sheik are equally self-psychological concepts, equipped with empathy and self-object transference, capable of producing a more complete and culturally sensitive therapeutic encounter. It was also revealed that such a mental health environment can be created in which the spiritual and cultural dimensions of diverse patient populations can be recognized. A blend of Sufi and psychoanalytical values can lead to innovative, culturally sensitive, and effective mental health interventions to enhance the understanding of the spiritual heritage of Islam and address individuals' psychological and spiritual needs. This study’s implications lie in the fact that it encourages concerns of cross-cultural psychoanalysis by providing a blending platform to understand Islamic spirituality as well as western psychological theories and practices. Future studies may further explore the role of such a cross-cultural psychoanalysis to understand various healthcare practices across inter-disciplinary faiths and communities. (shrink)

The tenth volume in the Progress in Self Psychology series begins with four timely assessments of the selfobject concept, followed by a section of clinical papers that span the topics of homosexuality, alter ego countertransference, hypnosis, trauma, dream theory, and intersubjective approaches to conjoint therapy. Section III, "A Dialogue of Self Psychology," offers Merton Gill's astute appreciation of "Heinz Kohut's Self Psychology," followed by commentaries by Leider and Stolorow and Gill's reply. The concluding section offers Stolorow and Atwood's (...) "The Myth of the Isolated Mind," followed by discussions by Gehrie and the Shanes. A forum for the kind of spirited, productive exchanges that have long found a home within the self-psychological community, _A Decade of Progress_ builds on the past in responding to the theoretical and clinical challenges of the present. (shrink)

The Moral Self addresses the question of how morality enters into our lives. Pauline Chazan draws upon psychology, r ral philosophy and literary interpretation to rebut the view that morality's role is to limit desire and control self-love. Perserving the ancients' connection between what is good for the self and what is morally good, Chazan argues that a certain kind of care for the self is central to moral agency. Her intriguing argument begins with a critical examination of the views (...) of Hume, Rousseau and Hegel. The constructive part of the book takes a more unusual turn by synthesising the work on the analyst Heinz Kohut and Aristotle into Chazan's own positive account, which is then illustrated by the use of Russian literature. (shrink)

The oceanic feeling -- The psyche's unitive trends -- Otto Rank's will therapy -- Erich Fromm's humanistic psychoanalysis -- The mystical in art and culture : Milner, Winnicott, and Ehrenzweig -- D.W. Winnicott's analysis of the self -- The cosmic narcissism of Heinz Kohut -- Hans W. Loewald and psychic integration -- Wilfred R. Bion's transformations of O -- James Grotstein and the transcendent position -- The personal monism of Neville Symington -- The ecstasies of Michael Eigen.

Originally published in 1983 _Reflections on Self Psychology_ records the development of a powerful initiative to alter psychoanalytic theory and practice, and an evaluative questioning of this initiative. It presents a dialogue that developed at the Boston Symposium of 1980 between vigorous proponents of self psychology, equally energetic critics, and many participants between these polar positions. This book attempts to capture within its pages not only the content of what was presented, explored, and evaluated in Boston, but also a sense (...) of the people, about 1,000 strong, who exchanged their ideas on and off the podium – and the remarkable spirit of open inquiry that invigorated these proceedings. The book, as was the meeting, is organized to explore four subjects: the development of the self: infant research; the implications of self psychology for psychoanalytic practice; self psychology and psychotherapy; and the implications of self psychology for psychoanalytic theory. The final section of the book is devoted to an essay by Heinz Kohut that provides an integrated response to the issues and criticisms raised in the course of the symposium. This essay while based on extemporaneous responses by Kohut during different phases of the meeting, is, in its written version, a cohesive, carefully revised, and edited statement prepared in the mellowing period following the meeting and before Kohut’s untimely death. (shrink)

The premier volume in the _Progress in Self Psychology_ Series was completed two years after Heinz Kohut's death in 1981. Hence, this volume has a unique status in the history of self psychology: it bears the imprint of Kohut while charting a course of theoretical and clinical growth in the post-Kohut era. Biographical reminiscences about Kohut and commentaries on Kohut's "The Self-Psychological Approach to Defense and Resistance" [chapter seven of _How Does Analysis Cure?_] are (...) juxtaposed with a section of self-psychological reassessments of interpretations. Clinical papers cover the selfobject transferences, patient compliance, and the "self-pity response", while theoretical contributions present ideas of Stolorow, Bacal, White, and Detrick that are foundational to their subsequent writings. This volume helped to shape the theoretical and clinical agenda of self psychology in the decades following Kohut's death. (shrink)

To stress the subjectivity of the analyst is to accept the centrality of countertransference in the analytic relationship. Psychoanalysts have long recognized the importance of transference in the analytic setting—that is, the analysand's way of relating to the analyst in terms of his strong, ambivalent unconscious feelings for earlier figures , a process whose successful resolution constitutes the psychoanalystic "cure." But, since the patient's transference is only experienced by the analyst through his countertransference responses, recent theorists have come to emphasize (...) the importance of countertransference in psychoanalysis. In what Otto Kernberg calls its "totalistic" definition, countertransference refers to "the total emotional reaction of the psychoanalyst to the patient in the treatment situation."1 It is, therefore, a source of both empathic understanding and defensive misunderstanding, of distortion and insight. Hans Loewald remarks: "Since a psychoanalytic investigation can be carried out only by a human mind, we cannot conceive of one in which the analyst's [counter] transference and resistance are not the warp and woof of his activity."2 · 1. Otto Kernberg, Borderline Conditions and Pathological Narcissism , p. 49. · 2. Hans Loewald, "Psychoanalytic Theory and the Psychoanalytic Process," The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 25 : 56. Cf. Heinz Kohut, "Introspection, Empathy, and Psychoanalysis," Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 7 : 459-83. For a clear discussion of the background of the countertransference concept in Freud, see Humberto Nagera, et. al., Basic Psychoanalytic Concepts on Metapsychology, Conflicts, Anxiety and Other Subjects , pp. 200-206. Two surveys of the literature on the topic are particularly useful: Douglas Orr, "Transference and Countertransference: A Historical Survey," Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 2 : 621-70, and Kernberg, pp. 49-66. Arthur F. Marotti, associate professor of English at Wayne State University, has written a number of essays on Ben Jonson, John Donne, Thomas Middleton, and Edmund Spenser. He is completing a book-length social-historical and psychoanalytic study of Donne's poetry and a book on Jonson; some of the theoretical assumptions behind both projects are discussed in this article. See also: "Psychoanalysis and the Marionette Theater: Interpretation is Not Depreciation" in Vol. 5, No. 1. (shrink)

This paper endeavours to move Axel Honneth's recognition-theoretic reconstruction of psychoanalysis beyond its existing focus on the perspective of Winnicott. To this end, it places Honneth into conversation with several non-Winnicottian approaches to the phenomena of insecure attachment and narcissistic vulnerability: the attachment theory of John Bowlby and Mary Ainsworth, the self psychological perspective of Heinz Kohut, and a more recent intersubjectivist psychoanalytic paradigm set forth by Robert Stolorow, George Atwood, Bernard Brandchaft, and Donna Orange. Similar to Honneth, (...) these authors seek to lay bare the maladaptive genetic circumstances under which the psyche becomes alienated from its capacity for self-realization and its ability to engage in healthful intersubjective endeavours. However, with respect to our primary affective relationships, their accounts of pathogenesis depart from Honneth's, focusing not just on overt physical abuse and negligence, but also on other, seemingly more mund.. (shrink)

This collection of "comparisons and contrasts" explores Heinz Kohut's self psychology in relation to a wide-ranging group of modern thinkers, both inside and outside of analysis. Separate sections analyze self psychology alongside Freud and the first generation of psychoanalytic dissidents; British object relations theorists; and contemporary theorists like Kernberg, Mahler, Lacan, and Masterson.

In _Conceptual Issues in Psychoanalysis_, John Gedo's mastery of Freudian theory and broad historical consciousness subserve a new goal: an understanding of "dissidence" in psychoanalysis. Gedo launches his inquiry by reflecting expansively on recent assessments of Freud's character. His acute remarks on the intellectual and personal agendas that inform the portraits of Freud offered by Frank Sulloway, Jeffrey Masson, and Peter Swales pave the way for his own definition of psychoanalysis in historical context. Then, in topical studies on Sandor Ferenczi, (...) Melanie Klein, and Heinz Kohut, he explicates the commonalities that bind together three generations of dissidents, each of whom undertook to supplant the edifice of hypotheses erected by Freud with alternative theories. Interspersed with these essays are quite insightful studies of Lou Andreas-Salome and David Rapaport, whom Gedo sees as "epistemological referees" attempting to reconcile viewpoints unique to their generations. In the second part of the book, Gedo argue that analysis now has the opportunity to move beyond this pattern of dissidence followed by mediation by drawing on observational research about infancy and early childhood to validate or refute its clinical hypotheses. In these chapters, Gedo offers critical commentary on recent efforts to extrapolate from infant research to the psychoanalytic theory of development. Only then does he offer his own measured estimation of the "legacy of infancy and the technique of psychoanalysis." This review of "the challenge of scientific method" as it bears on analysis culminates in concluding chapters that probe the status of analysis as a hermeneutic discipline and the contribution of analysis to "vocabularies of moral deliberation.". (shrink)

Freud seems to have been torn between a literary and a scientific model for his enterprises. On the one hand he stresses the scientific nature of his researches to an extent which makes the suspicious reader wonder whether he protests too much. On the other hand it is well known that he regarded many writers, though predominantly Shakespeare, as anticipating his findings on the unconscious. In one famous passage in the Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis he places his discovery of the (...) unconscious on a par with the discoveries of Darwin and Copernicus in their effect upon man's picture of himself. He is justified, of course, and if we add Marx to this triumvirate we add a figure even closer to Freud in claiming a scientific status for his work, a scientific status which is, to the uncommitted, dubious. Theodore Mischel argues that Freud increasingly construes neurotic behaviour upon the model of ordinary intentional behaviour and, though he continued to show interest in the view that the unconscious impulses which are repressed are physiological in nature, this ideal of a reduction of the psychological to the physiological became a less active ingredient in his published work as his collaboration with Fliess receded into the past. So although he may have paid lip service to some form of psycho-physical identity, believing that mental phenomena are ultimately no more or less than physical happenings in the neurones of the brain, in mature Freud this seems to have been an idly spinning wheel. Roy Schafer has recently pointed out that many of Freud's followers use the concepts of natural science , whilst simultaneously retaining traces of anthropomorphism in their metapsychology. For instance Heinz Hartmann emphasizes the concept of a ‘higher organizing function’ which resists formulation in the mechanistic metapsychology he favours. Similar difficulties obtrude in the work of Waelder and Kohut. The significance of these conflicts leads Schafer to frame basic Freudian insights in terms of the theory of action, stressing the manner in which an action may be described in differing ways and thus allowing us to present the fact that a patient's behaviour may both tell and not tell us of his deepest anxieties. Yet curiously Schafer denies that freedom plays any part in his account whereas we would have expected a concept so central to agency to have an equally central role in any recasting of psycho-analysis in terms of the theory of action. (shrink)

The present volume contains 14 contributions presented at a colloquium on "Structure and Approximation in Physical Theories" held at Osnabruck in June 1980. The articles are presented in the revised form written after the colloquium and hence also take account of the results of the discussion at the colloquium. It is a striking feature that the problem of approximation in physical theories has only recently found some attention in the philosophy of science, although the working physicist is con stantly confronted (...) with those questions. No interesting theory of exact science exactly fits its experimental data; almost every relation between different theories is an approximate one. There fore an adequate reconstruction of physical theories must take into account and conceptualize the moment of approximation. The majority of the articles in this book is centered around this subject. There are at least two elaborate, 'structuralistic' approaches to the formalization of physical theories in which the aspect of approximation has been incorporated: the approach due to P. Suppes, J. Sneed, W. Stegmuller ("S-approach") and the approach of G. Lud wig and his co-workers ("L-approach"). The articles in this book correspondingly fall into three classes: presentation, elaboration and critique of the L-approach [Hartkamper/Schmidt, Ludwig, Neumann, Werner, Schmidt, Mayr, Kamiah, Majer, Grafe] or of the S-approach [Moulines, Balzer, Cooke], and articles referring to both approaches or concerned with related matters [Scheibe, Pfarr, Castrigiano]. Of course, this is only a rough classification and each article must be appraised in its own right. (shrink)