Johannes von Kries’s Spielraum-theory is regarded as one of the most important philosophical contributions of the nineteenth century to an objective interpretation of probability. This paper aims at a critical and contextual analysis of von Kries’s approach: It is contextual insofar as it reconstructs the Spielraum-theory in the historical setting that formed his scientific and philosophical outlook. It is critical insofar as it unfolds systematic tensions and inconsistencies which are rooted in this context, especially in the grave change of mechanism (...) which took place in the late nineteenth century. In this regard, the paper focuses on von Kries’s understanding of natural laws and nomological knowledge in relation to his concept of objective probability. While the formal approach of the Spielraum-theory—as far as developed by von Kries—seems sound, his epistemological claims with respect to nomological knowledge sustain classical mechanism and are hence difficult to substantiate from the point of view of modern science. (shrink)

Reasoning about change is a central issue in research on human and robot planning. We study an approach to reasoning about action and change in a dynamic logic setting and provide a solution to problems which are related to the Frame problem. Unlike most work on the frame problem the logic described in this paper is monotonic. It (implicitly) allows for the occurrence of actions of multiple agents by introducing non-stationary notions of waiting and test. The need to state a (...) large number of frame axioms is alleviated by introducing a concept of chronological preservation to dynamic logic. As a side effect, this concept permits the encoding of temporal properties in a natural way. We compare the relative merits of our approach and non-monotonic approaches as regards different aspects of the frame problem. Technically, we show that the resulting extended systems of propositional dynamic logic preserve (weak) completeness, finite model property and decidability. (shrink)

That reality, and in particular the (dynamic) objects of signs, are independent of our thoughts or other representations is a crucial thesis of Peirce’s realism. On the other hand, his semiotics implies the claim that all reality and all real objects are real for us only because of the signs we use. Do these two claims contradict, even exclude, each other? I will argue that both Peirce’s metaphysics and his semiotics provide a natural via media: a structural account of the (...) openness of processes, featuring transitive relations, connects process ontology implicit in his evolutionary metaphysics and the relational, quasi-inferential features embodied in interpretational sequences of signs. It is shown that Peirce’s notion of a sign, its normative role and his account of the directional force of objects implies a sort of logical causality that supports the unity of objects. In this way sign sequences are able to relate flexibly sign use with contextually specified independent objects. That is to say, relational properties of object-oriented chains of interpretations provide sign users with a flexible, fallibilistic instrument able to capture by contingent identity relations (teridentity) of the identity of objects in changing situations. (shrink)

Introducing the perplexed reader to a philosophy requires both a comprehensive understanding of the philosophy in question and a rigorous simplifying strategy. But clarity and accessibility come at a price: one has to cut down on complicated and perhaps unresolved lines of thought and arguments, stratifying the development of theoretical positions into a coherent and accessible narrative. This review will address both the success of this book as an introduction and, rather unjustly, those more complex topics that have been left (...) out and might be of interest to readers of this journal.First of all, let me say that Cornelis de Waal’s Peirce: A Guide for the Pexplexed is a very good introduction to Peirce’s.. (shrink)

In the history of mathematics and natural philosophy Jacobi's contribution to theoretical mechanics is known as a part of the higher calculus in the tradition of Lagrange: accepted as mathematically important, it was denied to have any substantial physical or philosophical relevance. His last lectures on analytical mechanics, given in 1847–1848, three years before his death, and not yet published, show this view to be no longer tenable. These lectures are the most detailed and genuine source on Jacobi's views concerning (...) the foundations of mechanics. In particular, his criticism of the principles of mechanics is unprecedented for its time and anticipates some of Poincaré's views, published about fifty years later. The prehistory of Jacobi's Analytical Mechanics, a description of its content in general and an outline of his criticism, are presented in this paper. (shrink)

The topics discussed in this book are important to South Africans as they search for a new identity in a so-called secular community. A useful reader for academics and lay-people alike, this study empowers one to make up one's own mind with regard to ethical issues and related Biblical guidelines.