The mystical part of Reitzenstein′s interpretation of the song in Theocritus′s first idyll has not been generally accepted;it is somewhat surprising to find a new interpretation of the legend of Daphnis, and a new explanation of the genesis of pastoral poetry, introduced by the statement, referring to Reitzenstein: ‘ Nicht zu kiihn war er, sondern noch nicht kiihn genug.’ Starting from Reitzenstein′s contention that the pastoral was developed from a cult-song, Fries elaborates the theory that Daphnis is a Greek Krishna; (...) that the maiden of Theocritus′s first idyll is the counterpart of the heroine of the Song of Songs; that astral mythology, Oriental in origin, supplies the clue to Theocritus′s handling of the legend. On the basis of this and other material Fries constructs further theories affecting the development of other literary types than the pastoral, and leads us ultimately to a novel interpretation of the Phaeacian episode in the Odyssey. (shrink)

Cognitive science is experiencing a pragmatic turn away from the traditional representation-centered framework toward a view that focuses on understanding cognition as "enactive." This enactive view holds that cognition does not produce models of the world but rather subserves action as it is grounded in sensorimotor skills. In this volume, experts from cognitive science, neuroscience, psychology, robotics, and philosophy of mind assess the foundations and implications of a novel action-oriented view of cognition. Their contributions and supporting experimental evidence show that (...) an enactive approach to cognitive science enables strong conceptual advances, and the chapters explore key concepts for this new model of cognition. The contributors discuss the implications of an enactive approach for cognitive development; action-oriented models of cognitive processing; action-oriented understandings of consciousness and experience; and the accompanying paradigm shifts in the fields of philosophy, brain science, robotics, and psychology. ContributorsMoshe Bar, Lawrence W. Barsalov, Olaf Blanke, Jeannette Bohg, Martin V. Butz, Peter F. Dominey, Andreas K. Engel, Judith M. Ford, Karl J. Friston, Chris D. Frith, Shaun Gallagher, Antonia Hamilton, Tobias Heed, Cecilia Heyes, Elisabeth Hill, Matej Hoffmann, Jakob Hohwy, Bernhard Hommel, Atsushi Iriki, Pierre Jacob, Henrik Jörntell, Jürgen Jost, James Kilner, Günther Knoblich, Peter König, Danica Kragic, Miriam Kyselo, Alexander Maye, Marek McGann, Richard Menary, Thomas Metzinger, Ezequiel Morsella, Saskia Nagel, Kevin J. O'Regan, Pierre-Yves Oudeyer, Giovanni Pezzulo, Tony J. Prescott, Wolfgang Prinz, Friedemann Pulvermüller, Robert Rupert, Marti Sanchez-Fibla, Andrew Schwartz, Anil K. Seth, Vicky Southgate, Antonella Tramacere, John K. Tsotsos, Paul F. M. J. Verschure, Gabriella Vigliocco, Gottfried Vosgerau. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 65.1 (2004) 155-157 [Access article in PDF] In Memoriam John F. Callahan John Francis Callahan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy and Classics at Georgetown University, died 14 July 2003 after open-heart surgery performed 6 June and was buried with full military honors 17 September at Arlington National Cemetery. His funeral Mass at the Old Post Chapel was concelebrated by his old friend and former (...) colleague, Father Edward W. Bodnar, S.J., who had also concelebrated a memorial Mass in the Jesuit Chapel at Georgetown 5 August.John served on the Board of Editors and the Board of Directors of the Journal of the History of Ideas from 1970 until his death and was Vice-President from 1985. Throughout thirty-three years, during which he never missed a meeting until the last, he devoted unstinted time and energy to the affairs of the Journal, rigorously scrutinizing every problem, from matters of editorial policy through changes in leadership, location, and membership on the Editorial Board to proposals for expenditures and questions of format and style. He was a meticulous reader of manuscripts and applied the most stringent standards to his consideration of both content and modes of expression. No mistake in Greek typography escaped his vigilance. He brought to the annual meetings a distinctive elegance and an unusual sense of collegiality that derived both from his devotion to the Journal itself and from his long friendship with some of the older members of the Board, such as Paul Kristeller and Richard McKeon.John was a life member of the American Philological Association (since 1940) and served with distinction from 1976 to 1986 as its delegate to the International Federation of Classical Studies (FIEC), attending its meetings in Budapest and Helsinki. A scholar of exceptionally wide-ranging interests, he was best known for his studies of the concept of time in ancient philosophy and his critical edition of Gregory of Nyssa, De oratione dominica et De beatitudinibus, which he completed at Dumbarton Oaks after he retired from Georgetown.Born in Chicago 13 May 1912, he began the study of Greek and Latin at St. Ignatius Prep, where he was also introduced to opera, a lifelong passion, by one of his Jesuit teachers. He received the A.B. in 1933 and the A.M. in 1934 from Loyola University, Chicago, which on Founder's Day, 1965, honored him with an award for distinguished contributions to classical scholarship. He received the Ph.D. in 1940 from the University of Chicago, where he studied with Richard McKeon and Werner Jaeger, the two principal, very different influences on his approach to philosophy and philology. Henry Prescott and Carl Darling Buck were two other members of that fabulous generation of classical scholars at Chicago who made a lasting impression on him. His interest in Plautus, Greek and Roman linguistics, and comparative grammar continued throughout his life, contributing to what a former colleague at Dumbarton Oaks has described as an uncanny ability to penetrate beneath the surface of the classical languages, to "peer into their deep structure."John was a Teaching Fellow at the University of Chicago, 1936-37, Instructor at Loyola University, 1937-40, Visiting Instructor, Harvard University, 1940-41, Assistant Professor, Loyola University, 1941-43, Associate Professor and Professor of Classics and Philosophy, Georgetown University, from 1946 until he retired in 1978, and Project Director at Dumbarton Oaks, Harvard University, 1977-86. He served in the United States Navy from 1943 to 1946, working in Naval Communications. He rarely [End Page 155] spoke of his part in breaking the Japanese code, but often referred to such comrades in arms as Sam Atkins and Richmond Lattimore, who like him returned to teaching as soon as World War II was over.John's teaching was enriched by his research, which was supported by a notable succession of fellowships, from the Rockefeller Foundation in 1947, the Ford Foundation for the Advancement of Education, 1953-54, the Fulbright Commission, 1953-55, the Guggenheim Foundation, 1958-59, and the National Endowment for the Humanities, 1967. He... (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Huw Price’s widely read “Truth as Convenient Friction” overstates the onerousness, and underrates the utility, of the ontological commitments involved in Charles S. Peirce’s version of the pragmatist account of truth. This argument comes in three parts. First, I briefly explain Peirce’s view of truth, and relate it to his account of assertion. Next, I articulate what I take Price’s grievance against Peirce’s view to be, and suggest that this criticism misses the target. Finally, (...) I argue that Peirce’s version of the pragmatist account of truth has greater explanatory power than the narrowly linguistic version put forward by Price, such that even the ontology-averse should accept it. (shrink)

In our current social landscape, moral questions—about economic disparity, disadvantaging biases, and scarcity—are rightly receiving attention with a sense of urgency. This book argues that classical pragmatism offers a compelling and useful account of our engagement with moral life. The key arguments are first, that a broader reading of the pragmatist tradition than is usually attempted within the context of ethical theory is necessary; and second, that this broad reading offers resources that enable us to move forward in contemporary debates (...) about truth and principles in moral life. The first argument is made by demonstrating that there is an arc of theoretical unity that stretches from two key founders of pragmatism—Charles Sanders Peirce and William James—through the work of John Dewey and Clarence Irving Lewis. The second argument is made by engaging with contemporary debates concerning the truth-status of the judgments and assertions made in ordinary moral discourse, as well as the role and nature of moral principles. _Toward a Pragmatist Metaethics_ will be of interest to scholars of American philosophy, American intellectual history, and moral and political theorists, as well as anyone interested in the contours and demands of shared moral discourse. (shrink)

Bluhm et al. (2023) identify invasiveness as a genus with multiple species: a treatment protocol or intervention can be invasive along physical, emotional, or lifestyle dimensions. They also identi...

This paper1 aims to develop a model of practitioner narrative competence specifically for mental health care. I begin by considering the status of narratives as a form of evidence. Following Rita Charon and Cheryl Misak, I claim that there is no distinction to be made between evidence-based medicine and narrative medicine. I then explore Charon’s model of practitioner narrative competence, and suggest that it can be fruitfully adapted for mental health care contexts, a project for which I employ Jennifer Radden (...) and John Z. Sadler’s psychiatric ethics. This project brings together two independently promising accounts to develop what I refer to as the adapted model of... (shrink)

Hempeler et al. (2024) argue that earlier attempts to model coercive treatment pressures fail to do justice to the fundamental power imbalance in mental healthcare. On their view, we must take seri...

This paper presents core features of the virtue ethics of American philosopher Ella Lyman Cabot. It offers an articulation of her position in Everyday Ethics (1906), and argues that Cabot's account has the resources to respond to a critique leveled against her mentor, Josiah Royce—namely, that a virtue ethics organized around loyalty is too easily corrupted by loyalty to bad causes. In addition to its importance to a full picture of the pragmatist tradition in moral philosophy, engagement with Cabot's work (...) is critical to an accurate grasp of the virtue ethics revival of the 20th century. (shrink)

Examining Scepticism and Animal Faith (SAF) together with the work of Descartes—first, in terms of structure, style, and substance; and second, in terms of method and purpose—supports a rethinking of Santayana’s philosophical project, supporting the notion that his primary aim was not epistemological but fundamentally moral. Considering the contrasting characters of Cartesian and Santayanan scepticism suggests that Descartes is not so much a foil but an inspiration for Santayana in attempting to order the mind as a sort of personal improvement.

Abstract:This piece offers a reflection on James Liszka's book, Charles Peirece on Ethics, Esthetics, and the Normative Sciences. I consider Liszka's approach to Peirce's writings, especially the Minute Logic and "Evolutionary Love", and explore his extension of Peirce's ethical thought. I conclude that Liszka's work in this volume shows us what reasonableness as self-correction might require of us, and suggests ways in which we can take up the work of the normative sciences.

How is Nietzsche’s genealogy of morality relevant to his revaluation of values? I consider and reject three accounts: contingency accounts, pedigree accounts, and unmasking accounts. I then propose an alternative account. On this view, Nietzsche provides a ‘deconstructive genealogy’ that indicates whether and where we should expect to find unity in our current moral practices. Moreover, Nietzsche’s history contributes to a critique of contemporary morality because it reveals that morality is unlikely to have the kind of unity required by many (...) of its defenders. After explaining and defending this account of genealogical critique in GM, I show how it can be generalized to domains besides morality. (shrink)

The existence of evil is often held to pose philosophical problems only for theists. I argue that the existence of evil gives rise to a philosophical problem which confronts theist and atheist alike. The problem is constituted by the following claims: (1) Successful human beings (i.e., those meeting their basic prudential interests) are committed to a good-enough world; (2) the actual world is not a good-enough world (i.e., sufficient evil exists). It follows that human beings must either (3a) maintain a (...) state of epistemic ignorance regarding the nature of the actual world or (3b) abandon their basic prudential interests. Theists resolve this problem by rejecting (2), only to confront the problem of evil as it is traditionally understood. Successful atheists also reject (2), but without adequate grounds for doing so. (shrink)

On the standard view, pessimism is a philosophically intractable topic. Against the standard view, I hold that pessimism is a stance, or compound of attitudes, commitments and intentions. This stance is marked by certain beliefs—first and foremost, that the bad prevails over the good—which are subject to an important qualifying condition: they are always about outcomes and states of affairs in which one is personally invested. This serves to distinguish pessimism from other views with which it is routinely conflated— including (...) skepticism and nihilism—and to allow for the extent to which pessimism necessarily involves more than the intellectual endorsement of a doctrine. (shrink)

I argue that manipulationist theories of causation fail as accounts of causal structure, and thereby as theories of “actual causation” and causal explanation. I focus on two kinds of problem cases, which I call “Perceived Abnormality Cases” and “Ontological Dependence Cases.” The cases illustrate that basic facts about social systems—that individuals are sensitive to perceived abnormal conditions and that certain actions metaphysically depend on institutional rules—pose a challenge for manipulationist theories and for counterfactual theories more generally. I then show how (...) law-based accounts of causal structure can answer such challenges. The moral of the story is that the basic manipulationist idea that our interest in causal structure is driven by our interest in manipulating our environment faces decisive problems in a central domain of application, the social sciences. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In On the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche sets out to answer the question of the value of morality by looking at the conditions under which it developed. However, there is a puzzle about why historical investigation should be required for assessing our moral practices, especially if the defining features of those practices have changed over time. The puzzle is that if morality is “historical,” then the features that will be revealed by historical investigation are ones that—ex hypothesi—are unlikely to (...) characterize it now. And if these features do not characterize morality now, then why should a critique of morality need to take them into account? I argue that the solution to the puzzle is that history reveals that morality is a particular kind of entity, which I call a “historical individual.” I then provide an account of why it should matter for our evaluation of morality that it is an entity of this kind. (shrink)

While the topic of assertion has recently received a fresh wave of interest from Peirce scholars, to this point no systematic account of Peirce’s view of assertion has been attempted. We think that this is a lacuna that ought to be filled. Doing so will help make better sense of Peirce’s pragmatism; further, what is hidden amongst various fragments is a robust pragmatist theory of assertion with unique characteristics that may have significant contemporary value. Here we aim to uncover this (...) theory, and to show that assertion for Peirce is not a mere corollary of pragmatic conceptions of truth, judgement, and belief, but is rather a central aspect of his philosophy. (shrink)

Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

Much work in history, anthropology, sociology, and political science has a narrative form — the events described are emplotted into stories. A number of recent critics of narrative have argued that the story form is a poor vehicle for social scientific explanation, as it often misleads us about the causal structure of the social world. Defenders of narrative typically claim that such criticisms miss the point of narrative. Even if narrative is not the best means for providing us with causal (...) information, it can provide us with information about something else of importance such as the events' “meanings” or others' experiences. I reject such defenses of narrative, but I then offer a novel defense in their place. On the view I defend, narratives increase our understanding of the social world not by giving us some kind of special information about the social world but rather by cuing certain kinds of responses to it. I tie this conception of the epistemic function of narrative to the political role that narrative can play in correcting failures of interpersonal recognition and promoting structural change. (shrink)

In addition to being a founder of American pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce was a scientist and an empiricist. A core aspect of his thoroughgoing empiricism was a mindset that treats all attitudes as revisable. His fallibilism seems to require us to constantly seek out new information, and to not be content holding any beliefs uncritically. At the same time, Peirce often states that common sense has an important role to play in both scientific and vital inquiry, and that there cannot (...) be any “direct profit in going behind common sense.” Our question is the following: alongside a scientific mindset and a commitment to the method of inquiry, where does common sense fit in? Peirce does at times directly address common sense; however, those explicit engagements are relatively infrequent. In this paper, we argue that getting a firm grip on the role of common sense in Peirce’s philosophy requires a three-pronged investigation, targeting his treatment of common sense alongside his more numerous remarks on intuition and instinct. By excavating and developing Peirce’s concepts of instinct and intuition, we show that his respect for common sense coheres with his insistence on the methodological superiority of inquiry. We conclude that Peirce shows us the way to a distinctive epistemic position balancing fallibilism and anti-scepticism, a pragmatist common sense position of considerable interest for contemporary epistemology given current interest in the relation of intuition and reason. (shrink)

It is a truism that our current common sense morality is the product of a complicated historical development. Whether and in what way classic questions of moral philosophy need to be informed by this history is, however, a matter of controversy.Some recent work in meta-ethics has taken the broad contours of morality’s history as important for answering questions about the existence of moral facts and the justifications of our beliefs about such facts. For instance, moral diversity and the history of (...) moral disagreement have been cited as reasons to believe there are no objective moral facts. The absence of moral facts is—according to such arguments—the best explanation of the intractability of such disagreement.1 .. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this article, I consider how Nietzsche's history of morality in On the Genealogy of Morality is relevant to his critique of morality. I argue that, on Nietzsche's view, morality's history is a guide to whether and where we should expect to find coherence in our current moral practice. It helps us “structure our interpretation” of morality. History is relevant to critique because it reveals that morality is unlikely to have the kind of coherence required by many of its (...) defenders. After defending this account of how Nietzsche's historical claims are relevant to his critique, I use the account to explain why Nietzsche's genealogy mixes fact and fiction. (shrink)

Philosophers do not have a reputation for being pragmatic. When offered a chance to avoid execution, Socrates used his window of escape to deliver a series.

Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality (GM) is often interpreted as providing a debunking argument of some kind. I consider different versions of such arguments and suggest that they face important challenges. Moving beyond debunking interpretations of GM, I consider Nietzsche’s claim that his genealogy should be used to assess the “value” of moral values. After explaining how to understand this claim, I consider different ways that history might be used to assess the value of beliefs, practices, and institutions. The (...) upshot is a general account of genealogy beyond debunking. (shrink)

This new collection of essays on John Dewey’s ethical theory, edited by Roberto Frega and Steven Levine, achieves a helpful balance of breadth and depth. Taking the 1932 Ethics as its primary focus gives the volume a natural unity. Their editorial design is highly ambitious, and brings together established scholars and new voices to deliver a landmark collaboration in Dewey scholarship. This book review, by contrast, is modest. I aim to illuminate in a general way the arc of the book, (...) and alo... (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to articulate and defend a new imperative, Auschwitz survivor Charlotte Delbo’s 'Il faut donner à voir': “They must be made to see.” Assuming the ‘they’ in Delbo’s imperative is ‘us’ gives rise to three questions: (1) what must we see? (2) can we see it? and (3) why is it that we must? I maintain that what we must see is the reality of evil; that we are by and large unwilling, and often unable, to (...) see the reality of evil; and that if there is to be comprehension of—to say nothing of justice for—the survivors of evil, we nonetheless must. (shrink)

There has been much recent work in philosophy of science on idealization – the way inaccurate representations can be used to understand a target system. My dissertation concerns a particular sort of idealization that is familiar but often overlooked: rational reconstruction. Rational reconstructions are “cleaned-up” – more coherent and accurate – versions of an individual’s or a group’s attitudes. They are the kind of idealized model that facilitates a crucial aim of the interpretive sciences, the understanding of another’s point of (...) view. I provide an account of rational reconstruction and argue that such an account can help us make sense of many intellectual projects in the humanities and the interpretive social sciences. I then argue that this account can also be used to resolve a problem in democratic theory: how deliberative institutions can facilitate understanding and discursive engagement with “inchoate” points of view. A theory of rational reconstruction thus elucidates an important way that the humanities and interpretive social sciences can be politically significant. (shrink)

We are told that we live in a scientific world. All about us are the fruits of scientific research, and the products of scientific industry. But, in spite of this transformation of our material surroundings, scientific thought, or the scientific method as such, has had no effect upon the everyday thought and behaviour of our people. To be sure, along with the scientific gadgets a few scientific truths have been disseminated. They know the earth is round and moves about the (...) sun; they could know that bacteria cause disease and that they are themselves descended from less articulate forms of animal life. Even when such conclusions are accepted, it is on the basis of authority with no understanding as to how they arose and on what basis they stand. For the large majority, science has merely acquired a cloak of respectability; it is a stronger magic than that of our forebears, and our modern alchemy is known as a powerful though mysterious source of pecuniary profit. (shrink)

Dr. Garrett Johnson received a call from the Texas Department of Criminal Justice asking if he would be interested in filling prescriptions for pentobarbital. Suddenly he faced a controversial issue - providing a drug used for the lethal injection of convicted criminals. Apparently big pharma was discontinuing the manufacture and sale of drugs used for human executions - primarily due to mounting pressure from death penalty activists and shareholders, legal appeals by inmates, media reports of botched lethal injections, etc. Texas (...) saw the solution by using small local compounding pharmacies that were less visible to the public. Should Garrett fill this lucrative order knowing how the State would use the drugs? The case presents the ethical and strategic issues that Garrett faces - having just graduated and started his own compounding pharmacy - in making this decision. (shrink)

Are there any business decisions that do not have an ethical dimension? Who decides that a decision is unethical? What impact does ethics have in today’s business environment? The case focuses on the development of Hawaii’s first public-private venture capital fund by three very different entities: the State of Hawaii economic development corporation; a US mainland-based private equity investment firm; and a partnership of two serial entrepreneurs. The case uses a progressive disclosure format so students only read and analyze the (...) actions and ethical issues that occur at a specific point in time: creation of the venture capital fund; selection of startups to be included in the fund’s investment portfolio; and public reaction to decisions and actions by the fund. The case frames the issues confronted at each point as ethical dilemmas. Analysis includes answering questions and formulating recommendations or solutions to each dilemma. (shrink)

Hypotrichous ciliates extensively process genomic DNA during their life cycle. Processing occurs after cell mating, beginning with multiple rounds of DNA replication to form polytene chromosomes. Thousands of transposonlike elements are then excised from the chromosomes and destroyed, and thousands of short, internal eliminated sequences (IESs) are excised from coding and noncoding parts of genes and destroyed. IES removal from a gene is accompanied by splicing of the remaining chromosomal DNA segments to form a transcriptionally competent gene. For some genes (...) these DNA segments are in a scrambled order and are ligated into a genetically correct order at the time of IES removal. Next the polytene chromosomes are cut up band‐by‐band and all genes are excised from the chromosomes as short, linear molecules averaging 2.2 kbp (in Oxytricha nova). Gene excision is accompanied by destruction of all nongenic DNA, which, together with the transposonlike elements and IESs, accounts for ∼95% of the total sequence complexity of the genome in O. nova. Telomeric sequences are added to the excised gene‐sized DNA molecules. Finally, the gene‐sized molecules are replicated several times to form the macronucleus of the organism. (shrink)

I aim to revive pessimism as a topic of discussion in the Anglo-American philosophical tradition. Toward that end, I defend a theory of pessimism designed to (a) locate pessimism within the existing Anglo-American philosophical literature and (b) to account for the epistemic and prudential conditions under which pessimism can be warranted. I argue for three theses: (1) that pessimism is a stance premised on a belief that the bad prevails over the good; (2) that pessimism is not necessarily the product (...) of an emotional problem, a character defect, or unjustifiable metaphysical assumptions; and (3) that pessimism can be prudentially appropriate and — perhaps most controversially — is often epistemically warranted. (shrink)