Henrik Hansemann, Star-Trek-Experte und früherer Chefredakteur des deutschen Fanportals Treknews.de, sucht und findet Antworten auf Fragen der Logik, Ethik und Moral, die sich im Star-Trek-Universum stellen - immer fundiert und durchweg unterhaltsam. In "Die Philosophie bei Star Trek" werden zum Beispiel folgende Fragen beleuchtet: - Kann es irdische Existenzen zwischen den Sternen überhaupt geben? - Welche Auswirkungen hat das Leben im Enterprise-Universum auf die menschliche Gesundheit und auf die moderne Medizinethik? - Ist Beamen tatsächlich möglich und was würde beim Beamen (...) mit der Seele geschehen? - Wie geht Star Trek mit den Themen Tod, Jenseits und Auferstehung um? - Welche philosophischen Überlegungen stecken hinter der ethnischen und linguistischen Vielfalt des Star-Trek-Universums und wo sind die Grenzen des Universalübersetzers? - Wie realistisch sind die in Star Trek gezeigten technologischen Erfindungen und welche Fragen ergeben sich daraus für unser Verständnis von uns selbst - vom Menschen und seinem Wesen? - Ist eine vermenschlichte Maschine überhaupt noch eine Maschine? - Was ist das Q-Kontinuum und warum hilft es der Besatzung der "Enterprise" in Notsituationen? "Die Philosophie bei Star Trek" beleuchtet auf spannende und humorvolle Weise die Fernsehserien und zahlreichen Kinofilme rund um Kirk, Spock & Co. (shrink)

Recent philosophical inquiry into the relations thought to metaphysically structure the world has largely focused on the notion of metaphysical grounding, whereas previously analytic metaphysicians tended to talk in terms of ontological dependence. This raises the question of how metaphysical grounding and ontological dependence relate to one another. In this article, I sketch a picture of grounding as a form of metaphysically substantive sufficient condition and ontological dependence as a form of metaphysically substantive necessary condition, anchored in widely accepted principles (...) for how these relations work. As a case study, I apply this picture to Jack Casey's recent attempt to reduce ontological dependence to a special case of grounding. I argue that Casey's account fails and I show how the picture of grounding and ontological dependence presented here helps us diagnose where the account goes wrong, as well as how it makes sense of the phenomena Casey's account struggles with without having to resort to any ad hoc maneuvers. Thinking of grounding as a form of metaphysically substantive sufficient condition and ontological dependence as a form of metaphysically substantive necessary condition is thus shown to help sharpen our understanding of these phenomena and provide minimal constraints on any purported reductive account of one of the phenomena in terms of the other. (shrink)

In this book, Henrik Lagerlund offers students, researchers, and advanced general readers the first complete history of what is perhaps the most famous of all philosophical problems: skepticism. As the first of its kind, the book traces the influence of philosophical skepticism from its roots in the Hellenistic schools of Phyrronism and the Middle Academy up to its impact inside and outside of philosophy today. Along the way, it covers skepticism during the Latin, Arabic, and Greek Middle Ages and during (...) the Renaissance before moving on to cover Descartes's methodological skepticism and Pierre Bayle's super-skepticism in the seventeenth century. In the eighteenth century, it deals with Humean skepticism and the anti-skepticism of Reid and Kant, taking care to also include reflections on the connections between idealism and skepticism. The book covers similar themes in a chapter on G.E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein, and then ends its historical overview with a chapter on skepticism in contemporary philosophy. In the final chapter, Lagerlund captures some of skepticism's impact outside of philosophy, highlighting its relation to issues like the replication crisis in science and knowledge resistance. (shrink)

This book presents the first study of the development of the theory of modal syllogistic in the Middle Ages.

Recent metaphysics has seen a surge of interest in grounding—a relation of non-causal determination underlying a distinctive kind of explanation common in philosophy. In this article, I investigate the connection between grounding and another phenomenon of great interest to metaphysics: ontological dependence. There are interesting parallels between the two phenomena: for example, both are commonly invoked through the use of “dependence” terminology, and there is a great deal of overlap in the motivations typically appealed to when introducing them. I approach (...) the question of the relationship between grounding and ontological dependence through an investigation of their modal connections. I argue, firstly, that on the common assumption that grounding is factive, it can be shown that no known variety of rigid ontological dependence is either necessary or sufficient for grounding. I also offer some suggestions in support of the claim that this generalizes to every possible form of rigid ontological dependence. I then broaden the discussion by considering a non-factive conception of grounding, as well as by looking at forms of generic ontological dependence. I argue that there is at least one form of rigid ontological dependence that is sufficient for non-factive grounding, and that a form of generic dependence may be necessary both for factive and non-factive grounding. However, justifying even these fairly weak modal connections between grounding and ontological dependence turns out to require some quite specific and substantive assumptions about the two phenomena that have only rarely been discussed. (shrink)

Any theory of explanation must account for the explanatory successes of statistical scientific theories. This should not be done by endorsing determinism. These considerations have been taken as sufficient ground for rejecting the demand on explanations to be deductive. The arguments for doing so, in Coffa (1974) and Salmon (1977, 1984, 1988), are, however, not persuasive. Deductivism is a viable position. Considering that doubts can be raised against the explanatory validity of probabilistic causal relations and the intuitive plausibility of deductivism, (...) it is also a recommendable position, though elaboration is needed in accounting for some of the uses of statistical theories in explanations. (shrink)

Many democratic theorists hold that when a decision is collectively made in the right kind of way, in accordance with the right procedure, it is permissible to enforce it. They deny that there are further requirements on the type of reasons that can permissibly be used to justify laws and policies. In this paper, I argue that democratic theorists are mistaken about this. So-called public reason requirements follow from commitments that most of them already hold. Drawing on the democratic ideal (...) of civic equality, I show that it can successfully explain why political decision-making must have the right sort of procedure-independent justification. However, contra standard accounts of public reason, I argue that laws and policies need to be justified with convergence accessible, not shared, reasons. Public reasons are those that are accessible in light of evaluative standards shared by all, or in light of every citizen’s private evaluative standards. Since this will make the set of public reasons wider, it makes the theory more palatable to sceptics while retaining the framework’s justificatory potential. (shrink)

A set of moral problems known as The Trolley Dilemmas was presented to 3000 randomly selected inhabitants of the USA, Russia and China. It is shown that Chinese are significantly less prone to support utility-maximizing alternatives, as compared to the US and Russian respondents. A number of possible explanations, as well as methodological issues pertaining to the field of surveying moral judgment and moral disagreement, are discussed.

This chapter examines the role of investors, and asks whether they may be able to affect positively international public health. It is often said that most investors primarily take a short-term profit perspective. This chapter introduces the role of universal ownership by large fund managers (mutual funds, retirement funds, and sovereign wealth funds) around the world. Ethics and long-term self-interest can here work together as an engine for positive social change.

The emerging concept of systems medicine (or ‘P4 medicine’—predictive, preventive, personalized and participatory) is at the vanguard of the post-genomic movement towards ‘precision medicine’. It is the medical application of systems biology, the biological study of wholes. Of particular interest, P4 systems medicine is currently promised as a revolutionary new biomedical approach that is holistic rather than reductionist. This article analyzes its concept of holism, both with regard to methods and conceptualization of health and disease. Rather than representing a medical (...) holism associated with basic humanistic ideas, we find a technoscientific holism resulting from altered technological and theoretical circumstances in biology. We argue that this holism, which is aimed at disease prevention and health optimization, points towards an expanded form of medicalization, which we call ‘holistic medicalization’: Each person’s whole life process is defined in biomedical, technoscientific terms as quantifiable and controllable and underlain a regime of medical control that is holistic in that it is all-encompassing. It is directed at all levels of functioning, from the molecular to the social, continual throughout life and aimed at managing the whole continuum from cure of disease to optimization of health. We argue that this medicalization is a very concrete materialization of a broader trend in medicine and society, which we call ‘the medicalization of health and life itself’. We explicate this holistic medicalization, discuss potential harms and conclude by calling for preventive measures aimed at avoiding eventual harmful effects of overmedicalization in systems medicine (quaternary prevention). (shrink)

Pragmatism gained considerable attention in bioethical discussions in the early 21st century. However, some dimensions and contributions of pragmatism to bioethics remain underexplored in both research and practice. It is argued that pragmatism can make a distinctive contribution to bioethics through its concept, developed by Charles S. Peirce and John Dewey, that ethical issues can be resolved through experimental inquiry. Dewey’s proposal that policies can be confirmed or disconfirmed through experimentation is developed by comparing it to the confirmation of scientific (...) hypotheses, with a focus on the objection that the consequences of following a moral view or policy do not provide guidance on choosing among competing ethical perspectives. As confirmation of scientific hypotheses typically relies on evidence gathered from observation, the possibility of ethically relevant observation is then explored based on Peirce’s views on feelings as emotional interpretants. Finally, the connection between Dewey’s experimental ethics and democracy is outlined and compared to unfettered ethical progressivism. (shrink)

This volume distinguishes between two main traditions in the philosophy of science - the aristotelian, with its stress on explanation in terms of purpose and intentionality, and the galilean, which takes causal explanation as primary. It then traces the complex history of these competing traditions as they are manifested in such movements as positivism, idealism, Marxism and contemporary linguistic analysis. Hempels's theory of scientific explanation, the claims of cybernetics the rise of an analytic philosophy of action and the revival of (...) hermenuetics are all discussed. The volume also deals with causal explanation, intentionality and teleological explanation, and explanation in history and the social sciences. The author concludes that explanation of human actions cannot be reduced to simple causality, and discusses the implications of this conclusion for the disciplines of history and sociology. (shrink)

Quand, en 1936, le philosophe du droit et professeur de droit danois Alf Ross a publié un hommage à la Théorie pure du droit de Hans Kelsen dans un journal scandinave de science juridique, il s'associait à un mouvement de plus en plus présent dans la philosophie du droit européenne, qui était très critique à l'égard du « droit naturel ». Cependant, en même temps, il élaborait une critique significative de la théorie de Kelsen, qui a permis de conforter la (...) place de Ross lui-même en tant qu'imp.. (shrink)

This article argues that an ethic applying the technology assessment (TA)-method is only feasible as a risk ethic, since the consequences of technical action are ambivalent and uncertain. It first distinguishes possible strategies of justification for a risk ethic, that is (a) deontological, (b) teleological and (c) procedural approaches. On the basis of the critique of both (a) and (b), a central problem for the integration of discourse ethics in the TA-method is highlighted by reverting to a game theory modeling: (...) As it turns out, mechanisms of self-selection undermine the representativity of discourses and thus its legitimation. In view of this dilemma, the article pledges for a complementary approach selectively integrating (a)-(c) into a “provisional moral”. (shrink)

This volume provides the first English translation of all the known correspondence to and from Søren Kierkegaard, including a number of his letters in draft form and papers pertaining to his life and death. These fascinating documents offer new access to the character and lifework of the gifted philosopher, theologian, and psychologist. Kierkegaard speaks often and openly about his desire to correspond, and the resulting desire to write for a greater audience. He consciously recognizes letter-writing as an opportunity to practice (...) composition. Unlike most correspondence, Kierkegaard's letters expressly "do not require a reply"--he insists on this as a principle, while he clearly and earnestly yearns for a response to his efforts. Among his other principles are purposefulness, directness, and the equality of a letter to a visit with a friend. Perhaps more than anything else in print, Kierkegaard's Letters and Documents reveal his love affair with the written word. (shrink)

Wittgensteins Grammatikbegriff ist eigentümlich weit gefasst, das heißt er beinhaltet nicht nur die Regeln für die Anordnung von Wörtern, sondern letztlich alles, was zur Bedeutung eines Begriffes beiträgt. Wittgenstein sieht Grammatik als gleichermaßen mit Willkürlichem und mit Nicht-Willkürlichem verwandt an, wobei der Willkür durch die menschliche Natur und soziale Praktiken Grenzen gesetzt sind. Dieses Buch untersucht genau diese Grenzen mit den Mitteln und Ergebnissen der neuesten linguistischen und kognitionswissenschaftlichen Forschung näher, um die zunächst recht spekulativ anmutenden Argumente Wittgensteins für die (...) Möglichkeit alternativer Grammatiken in Bereichen wie den Farben, der Arithmetik u.a. zu prüfen und über deren Ergebnisse Rückschlüsse zu ziehen auf Grammatiken allgemein und deren Willkürlichkeit. (shrink)

It is argued that the emergence of controversial views in discussions of theoretical medicine and bioethics is best explained by the assumption of moral realism within those discursive practices. Neither of the main alternatives of realism in contemporary meta-ethics — moral expressivism and anti-realism — can account for the rise of controversies in the bioethical debate. This argument draws from the contemporary expressivist or anti-representationalist pragmatism as advanced by Richard Rorty and Huw Price, as well as the pragmatist scientific realism (...) and fallibilism of the founder of pragmatism, Charles S. Peirce. In accordance with the fallibilist view, it is proposed that presenting controversial positions may serve epistemic purposes within bioethical debates, providing opportunities for inquiry by pointing towards problems to be solved and arguments and evidence for and against to be put forward. (shrink)

: It is argued that in many cases surrogate mothers are exploited when they participate in altruistic surrogacy arrangements, since their altruistic personality structure is not in the relevant sense "their own." The question of whether paternalistic interference is justified in these cases is discussed. Such interference seems to be acceptable on condition that the person interfering is someone belonging to the woman's intimate sphere.

By analyzing the meaning of time I argue, without endorsing operationalism, that time is necessarily related to physical systems which can serve as clocks. This leads to a version of relationism about time which entails that there is no time 'before' the universe. Three notions of metaphysical 'time' (associated, respectively, with time as a mathematical concept, substantivalism, and modal relationism) which might support the idea of time 'before' the universe are discussed. I argue that there are no good reasons to (...) believe that metaphysical 'time' can be identified with what we ordinarily call time. I also briefly review and criticize the idea of time 'before' the big bang, associated with some recent speculative models in modern cosmology, and I argue that if the big bang model is a (roughly) correct description of our universe, then the best current answer to the question in the title is that time did have a beginning. (shrink)

This is a review of contemporary philosophical discussions of population policies. The focus is on normative justification, and the main question is whether population policies can be ethically justified. Although few analytical philosophers have directly addressed this question – it has been discussed more in other academic fields – many arguments and considerations can be placed in the analytical philosophical discourse. This article offers a comprehensive review and analysis of ethically relevant aspects of population policies evaluated on the basis of (...) the main ethical theories. This analysis is preceded by a brief historical contextualisation of when and how population policies became ethically contentious and how this relates to philosophical debates in environmental ethics, population ethics and political philosophy. The article also includes a conceptual analysis of population policies in which the empirical intricacies around individual fertility decisions are sorted out and the different ways in which they can be affected are categorised in a taxonomy which highlight the most relevant ethical aspects of population policies. The ethical analysis shows that while population policies can be justified on the basis of most ethical theories, it all depends on what prior assumptions are made about what is at stake. (shrink)

_This paper will explore two strands of Vilhjálmur Árnason’s extensive body of work: his analysis of dialogue ethics within medical ethics and his analysis of ethics in the Icelandic sagas. The central thesis is that combining these two strands, bioethics and literary analysis, can provide valuable insights to further the discussion of ethics among citizens in multicultural communities. _ _Vilhjálmur’s 1 analysis of the Icelandic sagas shows that the sagas have a specific value foundation, specific virtues as well as narrative (...) in how to present the ethical aspects. In the field of bioethics, he has developed the study of dialogue ethics in several aspects, such as between patient and professional, in interdisciplinary research, and in public deliberation. By integrating insights from historic literary studies with contemporary bioethical research we gain an interesting platform for a discussion on Western assumptions of what constitutes a good dialogue. One of the core aspects in dialogue ethics is how to develop the procedure for a fair, open-minded, and oppression-free discussion in ethical issues. Vilhjálmur’s contributions are summarized here, but could they also be extended beyond the Icelandic and Western horizon?_ _I will compare his ethical framework to a recent parallel discussion on the claims of indigenous peoples for a fair dialogue. That is, a dialogue that must be inclusive with a carefulness about deciding the foundation of inherent values and the procedure of how to perform the dialogue. Finally, I draw conclusions on what dialogue ethics will gain from this explorative work._ _Keywords: _dialogue ethics, one health approaches, Indigenous peoples, bioethics, interdisciplinarity, ethics in the Icelandic sagas, medical ethics, literary analysis, multicultural communities. (shrink)

The connection between emotions and ethical views or ethical inquiry has been considered intimate by a number of philosophers. Based on Peirce’s discussion on the emotional interpretants in MS 318, I will suggest that such interpretants could be exploited in ethical inquiry. I will first argue, drawing on T. L. Short’s interpretation of Peirce, that there are final emotional interpretants, and such emotional interpretants actually formed (or dynamical) can be more or less appropriate concerning the sign’s (dynamical) objects. I will (...) then explore the prospect that emotional interpretants could be harnessed for the particular cognitive purpose of ethical inquiry, concluding that normative judgments based on feelings could serve as its observational part. (shrink)

This article explores the concept of metaphysically opaque grounding, a largely neglected form of metaphysical grounding that challenges the commonly held assumptions that grounding is an especially intimate and powerful connection between facts and that it is necessarily connected with the essences of things. I provide a definition of opaque grounding, identify some interesting philosophical views that are committed to it, and explore some consequences for the general theory of grounding. Finally, I briefly address some natural initial doubts about opaque (...) grounding and find them unwarranted. The upshot is that the notion deserves more attention than it has previously received. (shrink)

Joint attention is an early-emerging and uniquely human capacity that lies at the foundation of many other capacities of humans, such as language and the understanding of other minds. In this article, I summarize what developmentalists and philosophers have come to find out about joint attention, and I end by stating that two problems or questions of joint attention require additional research: 1) the relation between joint attention and the skills for dyadic sharing or affect exchange in young infants, and (...) 2) the evolution of joint attention. (shrink)

Why is democracy good, or preferable to other systems of governance and political decision-making? Democracy has been argued to incorporate or promote central values, such as equality or freedom. On the other hand, many contemporary defenses of democracy have relied on arguments that attempt to show that democracy promotes or enables some second-order good, such as the validity, justification or legitimacy of political decision-making. Recent decades have seen the rise of epistemic arguments for democracy that belong to this latter type. (...) For example, David Estlund has proposed that democracy is epistemically preferable among the societal arrangements that could be acceptable to all citizens. In turn... (shrink)

This study examined 4-year-olds’ problem-solving under different social conditions. Children had to use water in order to extract a buoyant object from a narrow tube. When faced with the problem ‘cold’ without cues, nearly all children were unsuccessful. But when a solution-suggesting video was pedagogically delivered prior to the task, most children succeeded. Showing children the same video in a non-pedagogical manner did not lift their performance above baseline and was less effective than framing it pedagogically. The findings support ideas (...) central to natural pedagogy, 148–153, 2009). They also challenge the Cultural Intelligence hypothesis, according to which only humans’ social, but not their physical, cognition differs qualitatively from that of great apes. A more radical, transformative variant of the Cultural Intelligence hypothesis is suggested according to which humans’ physical cognition is shaped by their social nature and must therefore be recognized as equally distinctive as their social cognition. (shrink)

This thesis explores whether the three standard value relations, “better than”, “worse than” and “equally as good”, exhaust the possibilities in which things can relate with respect to their value. Or more precisely, whether there are examples in which one of these relations is not instantiated. There are cases in which it is not obvious that one of these relations does obtain; these are referred to as “hard cases of comparison”. These hard cases of comparison become interesting, since if it (...) not the case that the standard three value relations obtains in these cases then the three standard relations do not exhaust the possibility of instantiated value relations. It is argued that for some of the hard cases of comparison, the standard relations determinately obtain. For some it is indeterminate, due to vagueness, which of the three relations obtains, but it is determinate that one of them obtains. Thereafter it is argued that the influential Collapsing Argument fails in ruling out other accounts of the hard cases of comparison. Since one cannot depend on the Collapsing Argument in order to conclude that all items are related by the standard three relations, the investigation continues. It is argued that none of the hard cases of comparison are cases of incomparability. Furthermore, none of them are cases of a fourth basic positive value relation such as “parity”. Consequently, for all the hard cases of comparison one of the standard value relations holds, although sometimes we do not know which one and sometimes it is indeterminate which one holds. This means that there is no reason to assume that one of the standard three value relations does not hold between items we are comparing. This is followed by a brief discussion about the normative consequences of this result. The thesis ends with four different appendices in which related topics are discussed. (shrink)

Ecosystems, the human brain, ant colonies, and economic networks are all complex systems displaying collective behaviour, or emergence, beyond the sum of their parts. Complexity science is the systematic investigation of these emergent phenomena, and stretches across disciplines, from physics and mathematics, to biological and social sciences. This introductory textbook provides detailed coverage of this rapidly growing field, accommodating readers from a variety of backgrounds, and with varying levels of mathematical skill. Part I presents the underlying principles of complexity science, (...) to ensure students have a solid understanding of the conceptual framework. The second part introduces the key mathematical tools central to complexity science, gradually developing the mathematical formalism, with more advanced material provided in boxes. A broad range of end of chapter problems and extended projects offer opportunities for homework assignments and student research projects, with solutions available to instructors online. Key terms are highlighted in bold and listed in a glossary for easy reference, while annotated reading lists offer the option for extended reading and research. (shrink)

A number of single- and dual-process theories provide competing explanations as to how reasoners evaluate conditional arguments. Some of these theories are typically linked to different instructions—namely deductive and inductive instructions. To assess whether responses under both instructions can be explained by a single process, or if they reflect two modes of conditional reasoning, we re-analysed four experiments that used both deductive and inductive instructions for conditional inference tasks. Our re-analysis provided evidence consistent with a single process. In two new (...) experiments we established a double dissociation of deductive and inductive instructions when validity and plausibility of conditional problems were pitted against each other. This indicates that at least two processes contribute to conditional reasoning. We conclude that single-process theories of conditional reasoning cannot explain the observed results. Theories that postulate at least two processes are needed to account for our findings. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Das Mittelalter Jahrgang: 22 Heft: 2 Seiten: 351-371.