Using the work of Józef Bocheski as apositive example, this paper sets out the casefor a balanced use of historical knowledge indoing analytic philosophy. Between the twoextremes of relativizing historicism, whichdenies absolute truth, and arrogant scientism,which denies any constructive role for thehistory of ideas in philosophy, lies a viamedia in which historical reflection onconcepts and their history is placed at theservice of the system of cognitive philosophy.Knowledge of the history of philosophy, whilenot a (...) sine qua non, can empower analyticphilosophy to push forward to new and moresatisfactory solutions to old and new problems.Examples are adduced from Bocheski's oeuvreand from the author's own experience. (shrink)

_Analytic Philosophy: An Interpretive History_ explores the ways interpretation (of key figures, factions, texts, etc.) has shaped the analytic tradition, from Frege to Dummet. It offers 17 chapters, written especially for this volume by an international cast of leading scholars. Some chapters are devoted to large, thematic issues like the relationship between analytic philosophy and other philosophical traditions such as British Idealism and phenomenology, while other chapters are tied to more fine-grained topics or to individual philosophers, (...) like Moore and Russell on philosophical method or the history of interpretations of Wittgenstein’s _Tractatus_. Throughout, the focus is on interpretations that are crucial to the origin, development, and persistence of the analytic tradition. (shrink)

In recent years, even some of its own practitioners have accused analytic philosophy of lacking historical awareness. My aim is to show that analytic philosophy and history are not such a mismatch after all. Against the objection that analytic philosophers have unduly ignored the past I argue that for the most part they only resist strong versions of historicism, and for good reasons. The history of philosophy is not the whole of (...) class='Hi'>philosophy, as extreme historicists maintain, nor is it indispensable to substantive philosophizing, as mainline historicists have it, it is merely advantageous (pragmatic historicism). Against the objection that analytic histories of philosophy are inevitably anachronistic I argue that it is possible to approach past texts with a view to substantive issues and in a critical spirit (contrary to historicist relativism and to misguided interpretations of the principle of charity). Indeed, such an analytic approach makes not just for better philosophy but also for better history. (shrink)

In recent years, even some of its own practitioners have accused analytic philosophy of lacking historical awareness. My aim is to show that analytic philosophy and history are not such a mismatch after all. Against the objection that analytic philosophers have unduly ignored the past I argue that for the most part they only resist strong versions of historicism, and for good reasons. The history of philosophy is not the whole of (...) class='Hi'>philosophy, as extreme historicists maintain, nor is it indispensable to substantive philosophizing, as mainline historicists have it, it is merely advantageous (pragmatic historicism). Against the objection that analytic histories of philosophy are inevitably anachronistic I argue that it is possible to approach past texts with a view to substantive issues and in a critical spirit (contrary to historicist relativism and to misguided interpretations of the principle of charity). Indeed, such an analytic approach makes not just for better philosophy but also for better history. (shrink)

Finland is internationally known as one of the leading centers of twentieth century analytic philosophy. This volume offers for the first time an overall survey of the Finnish analytic school. The rise of this trend is illustrated by original articles of Edward Westermarck, Eino Kaila, Georg Henrik von Wright, and Jaakko Hintikka. Contributions of Finnish philosophers are then systematically discussed in the fields of logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, history of philosophy, (...) ethics and social philosophy. Metaphilosophical reflections on the nature of philosophy are highlighted by the Finnish dialogue between analytic philosophy, phenomenology, pragmatism, and critical theory. (shrink)

This book is a devastating and anomalous critique of analytic philosophy. It is devastating, because of its detailed exposition of analytic philosophy as a failed project. It is anomalous, because the exposition involves writing a detailed history of the analytic movement, an activity that analysts have scrupulously avoided. According to Capaldi, while analytic philosophy pretends to express a timeless explanation about everything, the movement has always sought to justify its existence by ultimate (...) appeal to a progressive historical account, and rests on the presumption that science is the final historical form of a timeless truth, thereby subsuming the history of…. (shrink)

An exciting trend in current analytic philosophy is the emergence of several topics that draw their inspiration partly from the work of Rudolf Carnap, a leading figure in the Vienna Circle. Approaches such as deflationary metaontology, conceptual engineering, logical pluralism, and related views on the normativity of logic are seen to have Carnapian roots; however, these topics are quite foreign to the once-prevalent but rather narrow reading of Carnap that derives from W. V. Quine’s and others’ appraisal of (...) him in the 1950s and 1960s. -/- The case of Carnap raises questions about the potential narrowness of our understanding of the Vienna Circle in general. While the reappraisal of the history of the Vienna Circle has been ongoing since the early 1980s, the more recent developments in analytic philosophy suggest that there might be even more interesting yet previously unnoticed views pertinent to present-day concerns. -/- This Special Issue collects such novel perspectives on the Vienna Circle. The covered topics range from rereadings of the doctrines of the members of the Vienna Circle, such as Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, and Moritz Schlick, but also less well known figures, including its female members or sympathizers. We look for constructive connections between the Vienna Circle and different philosophical traditions as well as new perspectives on various thematic questions, such as the development of contemporary logic and unity of science. (shrink)

This book aims to explain the decline of the later Wittgensteinian tradition in analytic philosophy during the second half of the twentieth century. Throughout the 1950s, Oxford was the center of analytic philosophy and Wittgenstein – the later Wittgenstein – the most influential contemporary thinker within that philosophical tradition. Wittgenstein's methods and ideas were widely accepted, with everything seeming to point to the Wittgensteinian paradigm having a similar impact on the philosophical scenes of all English speaking (...) countries. However, this was not to be the case. By the 1980s, albeit still important, Wittgenstein was considered as a somewhat marginal thinker. What occurred within the history of analytic philosophy to produce such a decline? -/- This book expertly traces the early reception of Wittgenstein in the United States, the shift in the humanities to a tradition rooted in the natural sciences, and the economic crisis of the mid-1970s, to revealthe factors that contributed to the eventual hostility towards the later Wittgensteinian tradition. (shrink)

This contribution describes some of the relations between early analytic philosophy in Cambridge and philosophy in Austria: Stout’s early approval of the writings of Brentano and his students; the high opinion in Cambridge of the Austrian way of doing philosophy. It also outlines two Austrian versions of ideas which were to be very important in early Cambridge philosophy: Husserl on definite descriptions and Meinong on structural similarities.

In this paper we shall open a perspective from which the relatedness between the early analytic philosophy and Husserl’s phenomenology is so close that we can call the two programs with one name: “rigorous philosophy”, or “theory of forms”. Moreover, we shall show that the close relatedness between the two most influential philosophical movements of the 20th century has its roots in their common history. At the end of the paper we shall try to answer the (...) question why being rather related at the beginning, their ways parted in the subsequent years. (shrink)

Fourteen essays ranging over issues in political philosophy, philosophy of language, theory of reference, aesthetics, philosophy of history, philosophical psychology, metaethics, "Foundations of Knowledge", "Wittgenstein and Austin". The final essay, "The Possibility of a Dialogue," by I. Mézáros, is a rather pessimistic post mortem on the "Cahiers de Royaumont", the proceedings of a 1959 conference on analytical philosophy held between the men of Oxford and some continental philosophers. From the perspective of continental philosophy, Mézáros (...) is denying the possibility of a meaningful dialogue until analytical philosophers extensively broaden their horizons and methods. A reading of the essays in this volume painfully bears out Mézáros judgment, though the issue of whether or how analytical philosophers ought to mend their ways is not as easily decided as Mézáros seems to indicate.—E. A. R. (shrink)

The task of interpreting the Holy Scriptures has been a daunting enterprise throughout the history of the Church. This article explores how analytic philosophy could be promising in biblical interpretation. Notwithstanding the suspicion related to analytic philosophy, this article argues that analytic philosophy could creatively aid the interpretation of the Holy Scripture. My interest is in how its focus on coherence and clarity of description could add force to making sense of the truth (...) claims of the Bible. I argue that when used creatively, analytic philosophy holds excellent prospects for biblical interpretation, especially in distinguishing between the presupposition of the message of a Bible text and the presupposition of the interpreter. Contribution: The article argues that the omission of the Hebrew Bible from academic discussion in fields like political philosophy or psychology and mainstream philosophy because it is considered a product of revelation that must not be approached using reasoning is a false dichotomy because, in the Scriptures, we find God inviting us to reasoning. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.1 (2001) 161-163 [Access article in PDF] Avrum Stroll. Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. Pp. ii + 302. Cloth, $32.50. Analytic philosophy has entered the history of philosophy since the greatest twentieth-century philosophers of that tradition are dead or retired. It is appropriate then to have a book that clearly (...) and accurately explains the main theories and identifies its character. Avrum Stroll has written such a book, and more. He explains and evaluates where analytic philosophy is today and speculates about where it might go from here.Reserving the first and last chapters for discussion later, I will begin with the seven intervening ones: 2. "Philosophical Logic," 3. "Logical Positivism and the Tractatus," 4. "G. E. Moore: A Ton of Bricks," 5. "Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy: 'The Stream of Life,'" 6. "Ryle and Austin: the Golden Age of Oxford Philosophy," 7. "W. V. O. Quine," and 8."Direct Reference Theories." Chapter 2 deals mostly with Frege and Russell, and Chapter 8 deals mostly with Kripke and Putnam. As the titles and contents indicate, Stroll inclines to a great man understanding of philosophical history, a sensible [End Page 161] approach given the consensus that four or five philosophers have dominated analytic philosophy in the last century, with another four or five being especially talented.Among his expositions of the various philosophical "isms," such as logical atomism and positivism, Stroll intersperses biographical matters that give the book rhythm—he demolishes the widespread idea popularized by Ray Monk that Wittgenstein was anti-Semitic—and charm—he quotes a letter that Wittgenstein wrote to Moore shortly after learning that a certain piece of work could not count as his bachelor's thesis at Cambridge: Dear Moore: Your letter annoyed me. When I wrote Logik I didn't consult the Regulations, and therefore I think it would only be fair if you gave me my degree without consulting them so much either!... If I am not worth you making an exception for me even in some STUPID details then I may as well go to HELL directly... (pp. 91-2). In Chapter One, "The Solera System," Stroll lays out the controlling analogy of his book. The system refers to a way of making sherry. A quantity of wine, drawn from the oldest and best barrel, is replaced by the same quantity drawn from the next oldest, and so one for each successive barrel. The old wine improves the new, and the new refreshes the old. Likewise, "old philosophy has the power to educate and improve new philosophy," according to Stroll. He then continues: "And new philosophy not only preserves the quality and character of old philosophy but has the capacity to refresh it" (246).Also in Chapter One, Stroll observes that "philosophy is essentially a humanistic activity" (3). As such philosophy is tied to its history in a way that science is not. I would put his underlying point differently. Philosophy is humanistic because its problems are timeless and universal; these include what it is to exist, what it is to be conscious, what causation is, and what is the good life. Further, its solutions rarely hang on technical devices.But something has been amiss. Most of the theories distinctive of analytic philosophy, from the theory of descriptions, to modal logic, the causal theory of names, and functionalism, seem to approach these problems obliquely. Also, some of the most respected analytic theories are 'evasion' theories. Eschewing the need to give a substantive account of relations, analytic philosophers hold that relations are n-tuples of objects, which themselves are reducible to unordered sets of objects. Notwithstanding its formal adequacy, the substantive issue seems to be left begging. Loving, causing, being taller than, and being the square of are all relations, but is it illuminating to treat all of them in the same way? Moderating his normal optimism, Stroll says, "I wonder whether the very conception of the role of philosophy has not changed recently. It strikes me that the classical problems that the solera model presupposes are... (shrink)

In this collection of recent and unpublished essays, leading analytic philosopher Scott Soames traces milestones in his field from its beginnings in Britain and Germany in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, through its subsequent growth in the United States, up to its present as the world's most vigorous philosophical tradition. The central essay chronicles how analytic philosophy developed in the United States out of American pragmatism, the impact of European visitors and immigrants, the midcentury transformation (...) of the Harvard philosophy department, and the rapid spread of the analytic approach that followed. Another essay explains the methodology guiding analytic philosophy, from the logicism of Frege and Russell through Wittgenstein's linguistic turn and Carnap's vision of replacing metaphysics with philosophy of science. Further essays review advances in logic and the philosophy of mathematics that laid the foundation for a rigorous, scientific study of language, meaning, and information. Other essays discuss W.V.O. Quine, David K. Lewis, Saul Kripke, the Frege-Russell analysis of quantification, Russell's attempt to eliminate sets with his "no class theory," and the Quine-Carnap dispute over meaning and ontology. The collection then turns to topics at the frontier of philosophy of language. The final essays, combining philosophy of language and law, advance a sophisticated originalist theory of interpretation and apply it to U.S. constitutional rulings about due process. (shrink)

In trying to answer the question What is analytic philosophy? I shall follow two methodological principles. (i) The first was suggested by Peter Hacker and reads: ‘Any characterisation of “analytic philosophy” which excludes Moore, Russell and the later Wittgenstein, as well as the leading figures of post War analytic philosophy [for us these are John Wisdom, Ryle, Austin, Strawson and Dummett], must surely be rejected.’ (Hacker 1996a, p. 247) The correct definition of analytic (...) philosophy must cohere with the philosophy of its generally recognized founding fathers. (ii) Any characterisation of ‘analytic philosophy’ which was massively represented in the history of philosophy in the past, must be rejected too. To be sure, Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein, and later also Ryle, Austin and their friends, were doing a type of philosophy which they consciously understood as new—it was intrinsically New Philosophy. The problem was only that this newness was difficult to identify and define. (shrink)

The past few decades have seen considerable interest in the history of analytic philosophy. As this field has developed, complex and provocative questions have emerged about the very nature of analytic philosophy, challenging long- standing assumptions and spawning new research paradigms. In this outstanding collection an international team of contributors examine these questions and contribute to these debates, exploring the idea of analysis, the essence and status of logic, the nature of the proposition and its (...) linguistic expression, the logical act of judgment, the distinction between external and internal relations, the possibility of category mistakes, and the demarcation of sense from nonsense. Several of the chapters shed light on the interconnections between Wittgenstein and other figures within that tradition, including Frege, Russell, Ramsey, and Ryle. Other chapters examine the interaction between analytic philosophers and members of other philosophical traditions, including Frege and Weierstrass, Wittgenstein and Schopenhauer, Wittgenstein and Bradley, Russell and the North American Pragmatists, Russell and the Neo-Kantians, Wittgenstein and Heidegger, and Heidegger and Ryle. Among the specific topics explored are Russell’s conception of the judging subject, Wittgenstein’s discussion of rule-following, Frege’s conception of the logical categories, and Wittgenstein’s conception of nonsense. The volume also includes a book review by Gilbert Ryle – collected and published non-anonymously here for the first time – which sheds important light on the reception of Frege’s philosophy in the analytic tradition. Early Analytic Philosophy: Origins and Transformations will be of great interest to those studying and researching the history of twentieth-century philosophy, contemporary analytic philosophy, and the philosophy of language and logic. (shrink)

The paper provides an overview of the most fundamental ideas representing analytic philosophy throughout its history from the beginning of 20th century up to now. The history of analytic philosophy is divided into two stages – the early and the contemporary ones. The main distinguishing features of early analytic philosophy are using mathematical logic as a tool of stating and solving philosophical problems, and critical attitude toward ‘metaphysics’, i.e., traditional and contemporary non- (...) class='Hi'>analytic philosophical theories. The genesis of analytic philosophy was closely related to the revolution in logic that led to the rise of mathematical logic, and it is no coincidence that some founders of analytic tradition (first of all Frege, Russell, and Carnap) were also prominent logicians. (But there were also authors and schools within early analytic philosophy whose researches were based on less formal tools such as classical logic and linguistic methods of analysis of language. Ordinary language philosophy is an example of this type of philosophy.) Using the new logic as a philosophical tool led to a huge number of new ideas and generated a new type of philosophical criticism that was implemented in a number of projects of ‘overcoming metaphysics’. These features constituted the methodological and thematic profile of early analytic philosophy. As opposed to the later, contemporary analytic philosophy cannot be characterized by a prevailing method or a set of main research topic. Its characteristic features are rather of historical, institutional, and stylistic nature. In the paper, early analytic philosophy is represented by Frege, Russell, early Wittgenstein, Vienna Circle (Schlick, Carnap etc.), and ordinary language philosophy (later Wittgenstein, Ryle, Austin, and Searle). Contemporary analytic philosophy is represented by Quine, and direct reference theory in philosophy of language (Kripke, Donnellan, Kaplan, and Putnam). (shrink)

During the last 25 years, a large number of publications on the history of analytic philosophy have appeared, significantly more than in the preceding period. As most of these works are by analytically trained authors, it is tempting to speak of a 'historical turn' in analytic philosophy. The present volume constitutes both a contribution to this body of work and a reflection on what is, or might be, achieved in it. The twelve new essays, by (...) an international group of contributors, range from case studies on individual philosophers through discussions of broader themes in the history of analytic philosophy to related methodological reflections. (shrink)

Over the last several decades, Richard Rorty has developed a compelling metaphilosophical theory on the history of analytic philosophy. On this telling, analytic philosophy was atavistic from the outset, a forlorn attempt to reinstate scheme/content distinctions. Rather than asking whether our claims "correspond" to some nonhuman, eternal way the world is, we should ask about their pragmatic utility. On Rorty's account, analytic philosophy terminates in pragmatism. In this paper, I argue against this assessment (...) of the fate of our tradition. More specifically, I argue against Rorty's indictment of the notion of correspondence truth. My aim is to show that correspondence truth, in providing an indispensable background for the intelligibility of pragmatism, is not the needless dogma that Rorty takes it to be. Rorty's pragmatism, I thus argue, fails to be a freestanding doctrine. (shrink)

This paper shows that during the first half of the 1960s The Journal of Philosophy quickly moved from publishing work in diverse philosophical traditions to, essentially, only publishing analytic philosophy. Further, the changes at the journal are shown, with the help of previous work on the journals Mind and The Philosophical Review, to be part of a pattern involving generalist philosophy journals in Britain and America during the period 1925-1969. The pattern is one in which journals (...) controlled by analytic philosophers systematically promote a form of critical philosophy and marginalise rival approaches to philosophy. This pattern, it is argued, helps to explain the growing dominance of analytic philosophy during the twentieth century and allows characterising this form of philosophy as, at least during 1925-1969, a sectarian form of critical philosophy. (shrink)

I discuss the way in which the cleavage between the Continental and the Anglo-American philosophies originated, the images of both philosophical worlds, the converging rediscoveries from the Seventies, as well as recent ecumenical or anti-ecumenical strategies. I argue that pragmatism provides an important counterinstance to both the familiar self-images and to fashionable ecumenical or anti-ecumenical strategies. My conclusions are: Continental philosophy does not exist; less obviously, also analytic philosophy does not exist, or does not exist any longer (...) as a current or a paradigm; what does exist is, on the one hand, philosophy of language and, on the other, philosophy of mind, that is, two disciplines; the dissolution of analytic philosophy as a school has been extremely fruitful, precisely in so far as it has left room for disciplines and research programmes; what is left, of the Anglo-American/Continental cleavage is primarily differences in styles, depending partly on intellectual traditions, partly owing to sociology, history, institutional frameworks; these differences should not be blurred by rash ecumenical; besides, theoretical differences are alive as ever, but within both camps; finally, there is indeed a lag in the appropriation of intellectual techniques by most schools of ‘Continental’ philosophy, and this should be overcome through appropriation of what the best ‘analytic’ philosophers have produced. (shrink)

In this book, Michael Potter offers a fresh and compelling portrait of the birth and first several decades of analytic philosophy, one of the most important periods in philosophy’s long history. He focuses on the period between the publication of Gottlob Frege’s _Begriffsschrift _in 1879 and Frank Ramsey’s death in 1930. Potter--one of the most influential writers on late 19 th and early 20 th century philosophy--presents a deep but accessible account of the break with (...) Absolute Idealism and Neo-Kantianism, specifically, and more generally with many of the metaphysical preoccupations of philosophy’s preceding history. Potter’s focus is on philosophical logic and philosophy of mathematics, but he also relies heavily on important issues in metaphysics and meta-ethics to complete his story. The book provides an essential starting point for any student or philosopher attempting to understand Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Ramsey as well as their interactions and their intellectual milieux. It will also be of interest to a great many philosophers today who want to illuminate the problems they work on by better knowing their origins. KEY FEATURES: 1. Discusses the interconnections of Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein—founding thinkers in the history of analytic philosophy—and also brings the neglected Frank Ramsey into this conversation, providing a unique focus and depth to an introductory text 2. Increases the general awareness of the importance of the history of analytic philosophy for today’s non-historical debates, giving the book appeal in all areas of analytic philosophy 3. Written by one of the most influential philosophers of logic and writers in the history of analytic philosophy 4. Written for upper-level undergraduates, guaranteeing widespread accessibility 5. Includes coverage of topics and issues neglected in competing publications, including Russell’s _Principles_, solipsism in the _Tractatus_, and the contributions of Frank Ramsey 6. Emphasizes the chronological development of authors’ views so as to provide a better understanding of their motivation. (shrink)

분석철학은 오랫동안 철학사와 불편한 관계를 형성해왔다. 분석철학자들은 종종 철학사를 경멸하거나 무시한다. 분석철학자들은 흔히 철학과 철학사를 구별하고, 진정한 철학을 하는 데에는 철학사가 필요 없다고 주장한다. 반면에 철학사가 관점에서 볼 때 분석철학은 철학사에 종속적인 것으로 보일 수 있다. 분석철학은 그 자체가 역사적 전통인데, 이 전통은 그저 어쩌다 지금 지배적 전통이 되었을 뿐이다. 따라서 철학사가 관점에서 보면, 분석철학도 철학사에 의존할 수밖에 없다.BR 이 논문은 분석철학과 철학사의 이른바 이러한 긴장이 가짜임을 밝히고, 철학사가 분석철학을 하는 데 유용한 도구일 수 있으며, 분석철학도 철학사에 기여할 수 있다고 (...) 주장한다. 그러나 그 전에 역사배격증이라는 비난을 초래한 분석철학의 일반적 분위기를 살피고, 역사배격의 근거로 작용한 논증들을 살핀다. 그런 다음 철학과 철학사의 관계에 대한 역사주의자들의 견해를 소개하는데, 글로크(H.-J. Glock)에 따르면, 이 역사주의는 세 가지 유형, 즉 본래적 역사주의, 도구적 역사주의, 약한 역사주의로 분류된다. 이 중에서 글로크는 본래적 역사주의와 도구적 역사주의를 거부하고, 약한 역사주의를 제시한다. 필자는 본래적 역사주의와 도구적 역사주의에 대한 글로크의 비판을 승인하지만, 그의 약한 역사주의 보다는 좀 더 강한 형태의 역사주의가 필요하다고 주장할 것이다. 결론적으로 필자는 실제적 차원에서 철학을 하는 데 철학사가 반드시 필요하며, 분석철학과 철학사의 관계도 대립이나 긴장이라기보다는 상호보완적 관계에 있다고 주장할 것이다. (shrink)

R.G. Collingwood is not normally associated with analytic philosophy, neither negatively nor positively. He neither regarded himself, nor was regarded by his contemporaries and their successors, as an analytical philosopher. However, the story is more interestingly complex than this, both because Collingwood is one of the few pre-analytics in the UK who continues to be of interest to current analytical philosophers, especially in relation to the philosophy of art and history and his conception of metaphysics, and (...) because he mounted a critique of analytical philosophy in the years of its emergence. (shrink)

Analytic philosophy has traditionally been little concerned with the history of philosophy, including that of analytic philosophy itself. But in recent years the study of the early period of the analytic tradition has become an active and lively branch of Anglo-American philosophy. Early Analytic Philosophy, a collection of papers presented in honor of professor Leonard Linsky at the University of Chicago in April 1992, is an example of this. The contributors, (...) many of them leading scholars in the field of early analytic philosophy, approach the thought of the founders of the analytic tradition in its own right and with a keen eye to how it differs from much of contemporary analytic philosophy. Many of the papers challenge received interpretations and propose alternative readings. (shrink)

This comprehensive anthology offers influential works of philosophy written in the last 125 years in Northern and Central Europe and in the United States'durable contributions that have shaped the contemporary philosophical landscape in English-speaking countries. Substantial yet readable selections represent leading American pragmatists, the early Cambridge analysts, members of the Vienna Circle, the so-called "ordinary language" philosophers, along with recent analytic and post-analytic philosophers.

There are nine chapters: Chapter 1 introduces an analogy between philosophy and sherry-making to show that the historical tradition flavors the new analytic one. It then takes note of the difficulty of any general definition of analytic philosophy, and thus introduces the book’s methodology: examining the positions of some notable analytic philosophers so that the reader can grasp the family resemblance concept of analytic philosophy. Chapter 2 deals primarily with the role of Russell’s (...) logic, touching on ideal languages, definite descriptions, Frege and the problem of identity, and logical atomism. Chapter 3, “Logical Positivism and the Tractatus,” curiously devotes fifteen pages to Russell before turning to its eponymous topic, the Tractatus, and to Carnap. Chapter 4 is devoted to Moore, chapter 5 to the later Wittgenstein, chapter 6 to Ryle and Austin, chapter 7 to Quine, chapter 8 to direct reference theories. The concluding ninth chapter evaluates the contribution of analytic philosophy; argues that Wittgenstein alone will be history’s great philosopher of the century; considers briefly some current trends, identity theory and functionalism; and finally predicts that philosophy will continue to play an important role in the humanities in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

In this book—the first large-scale survey of the complex relationship between Hegel’s idealism and Anglo-American analytic philosophy—Tom Rockmore argues that analytic philosophy has consistently misread and misappropriated Hegel. According to Rockmore, the first generation of British analytic philosophers to engage Hegel possessed a limited understanding of his philosophy and of idealism. Succeeding generations continued to misinterpret him, and recent analytic thinkers have turned Hegel into a pragmatist by ignoring his idealism. Rockmore explains why (...) this has happened, defends Hegel’s idealism, and points out the ways that Hegel is a key figure for analytic concerns, focusing in particular on the fact that he and analytic philosophers both share an interest in the problem of knowledge. (shrink)

Early Analytic Philosophy: An Inclusive Reader With Commentary contains the most important readings in the development of the analytic tradition in philosophy. Featuring primary source material accompanied by introductions and commentaries, it brings together work by thinkers at the origins of the tradition. Beginning in the 1890s with F.H. Bradley and ending in the 1950s with W.V.O Quine, each chapter includes readings from a particular thinker or movement. Background information and further reading recommendations appear alongside discussion (...) of the main ideas in the readings. Covering well-known figures such as Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein and G.E. Moore, this reader also highlights the central role of neglected figures, such as E.E. Constance Jones and her logical writings, and L. Susan Stebbing's work on analysis and scientific discourse. (shrink)

This paper summarizes the evolution of analytic philosophy in Taiwan, examines its impact within and beyond academia, and discusses the future of the discipline. The roots of modern philosophy in Taiwan can be traced back to the Japanese colonial era, and analytic philosophy was introduced to the country in the late 1940s when many intellectuals in China moved to Taiwan. However, massive curbs were imposed on philosophy during Chiang Kai-shek’s dictatorship, and the discipline began (...) to thrive again only after Taiwan’s democratization in the late 1980s. Nonetheless, since its introduction in the colonial era, modern philosophy has made significant contributions in Taiwan, encouraging interdisciplinary engagements, advancing civic education, and promoting the spirit of democracy and political liberation. Philosophy has played a key role in Taiwan’s remarkable transformation from an island colonized for hundreds of years to a country that recognizes democracy, freedom, and human rights. The themes of anti-colonialism and anti-domination seen in the works of modern Taiwanese philosophers not only reflect the discipline’s political and historical underpinnings but also signal how Taiwanese philosophy can acquire a distinct identity, despite being influenced by many other philosophical traditions. While still at a nascent stage, Taiwanese philosophy has the potential to join forces with other philosophical traditions in advancing the vision of decolonizing philosophy. (shrink)

What if, instead of a scandal, Jacques Derrida had been accepted by the community of analytic philosophers? My prediction is that little-known philosophers would make points like some which I have made: counterexamples to his claims. There is a different reaction to the question which I consider though, according to which these skills do not just transfer from topic to topic and would not be “activated” by Derrida’s philosophy.