Enhancer detectors are DNA constructs which, when introduced into a eukaryotic genome, respond to nearby genomic transcriptional regulatory elements by means of a reporter gene, revealing the expression pattern of genes in their vicinity. Recent experiments in Drosophila suggest that enhancer detection is a powerful method to identify genes that are expressed in the nervous system. Since enhancer detectors allow a rapid molecular and genetic characterization of genes in their vicinity, the method will greatly facilitate the study of neural development (...) and behavior. (shrink)

After a brief explanation of my approach, this paper questions the foundations of a phenomenological theory of law, deploying the argument in three steps.In a first step I reconstruct the connection between Anspruchand Anrecht as developed in Waldenfels’ paradigm of responsiveness. Can law be characterised as an order that is able to ‘respond’ in this specific sense?The second step confronts the radical perspective of a phenomenology of the alien with the question of order. Can a theory of order characterise law (...) as ‘just,’ given that modern positive law is explicitly contained in and founded on itself? In a third step I review the boundaries of law. Would a phenomenology of law acknowledge law as a dimension that – inside the boundaries of law as order – is structurally able to react to the alien and to respond to alien appeals? The overall answer to these questions will be negative.A phenomenology of the alien will not surmount the boundaries inherent to the legal order as order – which push- es the question of justice to the outer limits of the law. The question of the alien, then, does not refer to questions within law; rather, it refers to the problem of juridification or to the sacrifices to be made to obtain access to rights. Decisive is the step into the realm of law, not a certain rule or a decision within thatrealm.If one is to pursue the phenomenological viewpoint of the alien and the dual theme of Anspruch and Antwort, legal phenomena should be considered from the problem of order – in a critical vein to be sure. (shrink)

Regarding the question of “theory”, the paper takes the perspective of creation, i. e. of producing texts that exhibit theoretical qualities and that in this sense both do justice to a – certainly complex – “function” of philosophical theory and also “work” as theory (namely in a sustainable way, and perhaps also beyond the current scientific orthodoxies) and can thus be received in the long line of the philosophically relevant reading canon. On the one hand, it is proposed to take (...) the project character of philosophical theory seriously. On the other hand, the conditions for the success of philosophical (theoretical) prose have to be looked at carefully. In addition to scholarship and a critical concern with and deep knowledge of discourse, literary qualities are also relevant. There is interplay between time-bound – i. e. historically changing – requirements and a paradoxically persistent style of philosophizing that proceeds despite the plurality of canonical references. “Philosophy”, of course, is not something timeless; it remains something provincial on an intercultural scale and, in principle, something that can be lost. (shrink)

The paper examines four key concepts of digital and AI ethics, which make normative (“ought”) claims: “transparency,” “explainability,”“interpretability,” and “trust.” The idea is that with the help of these concepts, digital transformation should be “responsibly” shaped, and there is even an aspiration to establish an independent digital ethics. The analysis in this paper questions approaches of this type. It elaborates differences between the tradition of philosophical appeals to responsibility and the digital-ethical buzzwords. The concept of responsibility may be a vague (...) concept and have traits of a mere moral-ethical signalling. However, its digital-ethical lookalikes are not even normative; they stand for technical quality criteria or product features of a descriptive nature. The phrase “digital ethics” is used misleadingly to suggest the existence of an ethical dimension. (shrink)

El ensayo es una mirada revisionista del famoso artículo de James Agee “La época más grande de la comedia” –centrándose en Buster Keaton y Charlie Chaplin, “los autores de la comedia cinematográfica” de la década de 1920–. Por más que Chaplin fuese considerado el gigante de la época, la literatura del momento mostraba que Keaton no solo era considerado una figura popular, sino también más culta (cf. mi próximo libro: Buster Keaton en su propio tiempo, McFarland Press). En cambio, en (...) los estudios actuales Keaton es considerado ya en la misma categoría que Chaplin. Mientras que la comedia inspirada por Chaplin se considera por siempre intemporal, Keaton nos parece ahora que habla para el día de hoy. Al menos durante esta década, Chaplin abraza el corazón humanista emocional de un pasado al estilo de Dickens, mientras que Keaton reflexiona sobre el existencialismo cerebral de un Camus o de un Beckett. La vida es confusa, pero para Chaplin, el arte es lo que consigue enderezarla, al menos durante noventa minutos. El mensaje o el recordatorio de Keaton es que la vida es un caos… una áspera “película” que finalmente termina. O, como Kafka observó, “el significado de la vida es que termina”. Verdaderamente dos perspectivas para reflexionar. (shrink)

In the historical, literary, and philosophical history of concepts, large-scale concepts or, more precisely, »Kollektivsingulare« [collective singular concepts] – as Koselleck described them with considerable effect on the practice of social history – are regarded as metaphysical, ideological, or at least as simplifications. The essay does not deny that this is justified, but with a certain melancholy it pleads for a careful archiving and also for the ongoing use of the terms in question including their multifaceted historical semantology. This even (...) applies to the term »Geist.« To reject this concept cannot really mean replacing it or – more drastically – erasing it altogether. (shrink)

Background Contemporary societies are rife with moral disagreement, resulting in recalcitrant disputes on matters of public policy. In the context of ongoing bioethical controversies, are uncompromising attitudes rooted in beliefs about the nature of moral truth?Methods To answer this question, we conducted both exploratory and confirmatory studies, with both a convenience and a nationally representative sample (total N = 1501), investigating the link between people’s beliefs about moral truth (their metaethics) and their beliefs about moral value (their normative ethics).Results Across (...) various bioethical issues (e.g., medically-assisted death, vaccine hesitancy, surrogacy, mandatory organ conscription, or genetically modified crops), consequentialist attitudes were associated with weaker beliefs in an objective moral truth. This association was not explained by domain-general reflectivity, theism, personality, normative uncertainty, or subjective knowledge.Conclusions We find a robust link between the way people characterize prescriptive disagreements and their sensibility to consequences. In addition, both societal consensus and personal conviction contribute to objectivist beliefs, but these effects appear to be asymmetric, i.e., stronger for opposition than for approval. (shrink)

A rigorous and wide-ranging discussion of the most ballyhooed emotion of all--and its surprising role in making us who we are. With Robert Solomon, Verna Gehring, and John Loughney.

The paper presents the philosophy of the French philosopher Michel Serres, with an accent on his working method and unusual methodology. Starting from the thesis that the empiricist trait of Serres? philosophy remains underexposed if one simply receives his work as that of a structuralist epistemologist, Serres? monograph The Five Senses is then discussed in more detail. Here we see both a radical empiricism all his own and a closeness to phenomenology. Nevertheless, perception and language are not opposed to each (...) other in Serres. Rather, his radical thinking of a world-relatedness of the bodily senses and an equally consistent understanding of a sensuality of language - and also of philosophical prose - are closely intertwined. (shrink)

This paper examines hart's model (1967) of the retributive theory. section i criticizes the model for not answering all the main questions to which a theory of punishment should be addressed, as hart alleges it does. section ii criticizes the model for its omission of the concept of desert. section iii criticizes attempts by card (1973) and by von hirsch (1976) to provide new ways of proportioning punitive severity to criminal injury. section iv discusses the idea of retribution in justifying (...) aim and criticizes the theory of fingarette (1977). the conclusion is that the new retributivists have not solved the problems inherent to older versions of the theory. (shrink)

This collection of essays, Global Bioethics: The Collapse of Consensus, deals with the issue of the repeated failure of attempts to derive a universal set of ...

Despite worries about the fairness of lotteries or the sources of the human psyche’s strong attraction to them, Americans have made lotteries a part of their civic lives. The popularity of gaming does not, however, gainsay the unease many Americans feel about state sponsorship of lotteries. The debates that surrounded the introduction of lotteries remain to this day, but the arguments are tired and the camps deadlocked. One camp argues that a lottery is simply a properly randomized drawing that determines (...) who among a freely chosen group of participants shall be awarded all or some of the monetary contributions of the group. These proponents suggest that the randomness of the drawing and the autonomy of the participants render the lottery fair and sponsorship by the state unobjectionable. Opponents of state-supported gambling argue, by contrast, that states market lotteries by making inappropriate emotional appeals and by supplying information of dubious veracity. Consequently, so this group argues, lotteries must be judged as unfair gaming devices and state support viewed as improper. I shall show that both camps have fundamentally misunderstood the problem. Evaluating whether state lotteries are sales or swindles relies neither on an analysis of subjective attitudes nor on an examination of purely procedural aspects of play. Correct analysis depends on a determination of what lotteries are. That is, there is a difference between claiming what a lottery does and what it claims to be, between how it works and what it is. If a lottery is claimed to be something that it is not, then regardless of what one gets for one’s money, one has been swindled. I will show that performing an ontological examination of the state-supported lottery reveals it to be a swindle. I conclude by suggesting that some of the confusion regarding the legitimacy of the state-sponsored lottery stems from misunderstandings of several tenets of liberalism. It is these misunderstandings that at times are employed to justify lotteries. (shrink)

This paper presents a unified framework that explains and extends the already successful applications of the Leibniz operator, the Suszko operator, and the Tarski operator in recent developments in abstract algebraic logic. To this end, we refine Czelakowski’s notion of an S-compatibility operator, and introduce the notion of coherent family of S-compatibility operators, for a sentential logic S. The notion of coherence is a restricted property of commutativity with inverse images by surjective homomorphisms, which is satisfied by both the Leibniz (...) and the Suszko operators. We generalize several constructions and results already existing for the mentioned operators; in particular, the well-known classes of algebras associated with a logic through each of them, and the notions of full generalized model of a logic and a special kind of S-filters. We obtain a General Correspondence Theorem, extending the well-known one from the theory of protoalgebraic logics to arbitrary logics and to more general operators, and strengthening its formulation. We apply the general results to the Leibniz and the Suszko operators, and obtain several characterizations of the main classes of logics in the Leibniz hierarchy by the form of their full generalized models, by old and new properties of the Leibniz operator, and by the behaviour of the Suszko operator. Some of these characterizations complete or extend known ones, for some classes in the hierarchy, thus offering an integrated approach to the Leibniz hierarchy that uncovers some new, nice symmetries. (shrink)

The essays in this volume apply philosophical analysis to address three kinds of questions: What are the implications of genetic science for our understanding of nature? What might it influence in our conception of human nature? What challenges does genetic science pose for specific issues of private conduct or public policy?

Name der Zeitschrift: Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft und Ethik Jahrgang: 20 Heft: 1 Seiten: 143-162.

The spread of new information and communications technologies during the past two decades has helped reshape civic associations, political communities, and global relations. In the midst of the information revolution, we find that the speed of this technology-driven change has outpaced our understanding of its social and ethical effects. The moral dimensions of this new technology and its effects on social bonds need to be questioned and scrutinized: Should the Internet be understood as a new form of public space and (...) a source of public good? What are we to make of hackers? Does the Internet strengthen or weaken community? In The Internet in Public Life, essayists confront these and other important questions. This timely and necessary volume makes clear the need for a broader conversation about the effects of the Internet, and the questions raised by these seven essays highlight some of the most pressing issues at hand. (shrink)

Boredom, like pain, is a subjective experience, but while the sources of pain can be either internal or external to the subject, the causes of boredom are always external. Understanding boredom as a reaction to external influences requires inquiries into the subjective awareness of boredom and into the social and cultural conditions giving rise to boredom. After briefly investigating these areas, I suggest that in the past boredom was seen as a necessary ingredient to creative inspiration and self‐understanding, and as (...) a contributor to autonomy in judgment and taste. I argue for a new form of boredom seen only with recent advances in information technology. Increasingly, individuals spend their work hours involved in electronic mail and on‐line information interaction. The attempt to match the speed and capacity of information technology results in restricted modes of behaviour and cognitive saturation. As a consequence, one is aware of one’s boredom but no cognitive capacity remains to consider realms outside the immediate moment. I conclude with the suggestion that the boredom that accompanies involvement in information technology produces a self‐identity crafted by technological intervention and fashion, yields the false autonomy of a manipulated consumer, and invites superficial social relations. (shrink)

We elaborate on the approach to syllogistic reasoning based on “case identification” (Stenning & Oberlander, 1995; Stenning & Yule, 1997). It is shown that this can be viewed as the formalisation of a method of proof that dates back to Aristotle, namely proof by exposition ( ecthesis ), and that there are traces of this method in the strategies described by a number of psychologists, from St rring (1908) to the present day. We hypothesised that by rendering individual cases explicit (...) in the premises, the chance that reasoners would engage in a proof by exposition would be enhanced, and thus performance improved. To do so, we used syllogisms with singular premises (e.g., this X is Y ). This resulted in a uniform increase in performance as compared to performance on the associated standard syllogisms. These results cannot be explained by the main theories of syllogistic reasoning in their current state. (shrink)

Recent discussions of civil disobedience show the world of scholarship and public affairs in disarray. Not only is there considerable disagreement over how civil disobedience is to be justified, there is hardly less disagreement over what civil disobedience is. Can it be violent, or must it be nonviolent, in intention and in outcome? Can civil disorder be a special case of mass civil disobedience? Must civil disobedience proceed within the framework of the existing politico-legal system or may it be revolutionary (...) in intention? Could it be anarchistic? Should the authorities endeavor to prosecute and punish the civil disobedient as though he were a common criminal? Is disobedience which results in no punishment of the disobedient not civil disobedience after all? Because of disagreements over the answers to these questions, the description of an act as an act of civil disobedience is likely to be ambiguous and controversial not only for the general public and the government but even in some cases for the protesters themselves. Confusion rooted in honest misunderstanding is compounded by bad faith, by basic disagreements over the ideal and the actual relations between the individual and the state, and by obscurity in the facts surrounding the intentions of the protesters and the consequences of their acts. (shrink)

L’étude scientifique du comportement animal s’est en partie développée en réaction à des excès « anthropomorphiques», où l’observateur projetait chez l’animal une forme de psychologie populaire. En conséquence, le langage théorique des représentations mentales a été largement proscrit de l’éthologie pendant une bonne partie du xxe siècle. Même si la méthodologie du behaviorisme – centrée sur l’observation et la mesure du comportement – constitue toujours la règle, l’avènement de la révolution cognitive, les études de terrain de longue durée sur des (...) populations animales dans leurs conditions naturelles, ainsi qu’un intérêt accru pour la cognition physique et sociale, ont replacé le cadre théorique des représentations mentales au premier plan. L’intérêt porté aux représentations mentales vient en partie de la capacité qu’ont certaines espèces à catégoriser, réaliser des inférences ou prendre des décisions flexibles qui vont au-delà du simple flux perceptif. Enfin, l’étude du rôle causal des modèles mentaux chez les animaux a été largement enrichie par des considérations écologiques et évolutives sur l’espèce animale en question. (shrink)

Se plantea la cuestión de los lazos entre la teoría ética y las ciencias empíricas del comportamiento. En particular a modo de estudios de caso se pasa revista a la relevancia de ciertos descubrimientos sobre el comportamiento en la formulación de teorías sobre la virtud, el carácter o la voluntad. Desde ahí se pretende esbozar un procedimiento general de cambio progresivo y parcial de términos teóricos, descriptivos y normativos, de la teoría ética por nuevos términos apoyados en el aumento de (...) nuestro conocimiento. (shrink)

Recent work using the idea of truthmaking to articulate the doctrine of divine simplicity has not paid enough attention to truthbearers. I address this issue by challenging the assumption that God’s simplicity needs to be conceived as an all-or-nothing matter. For it is possible to distinguish between a weak and a strong version of divine simplicity, and there are reasons regarding truthbearers that provide reason to uphold, at most, the weak version. The weak version of divine simplicity articulated here has (...) some similarities with the view of God advocated by Modified Theistic Activists, but it has important differences as well. (shrink)

The possibility of artificial intelligence is usually discussed by philosophers as a problem about artificial thought: can an artificial system think? The production of intelligence in an artificial system would, however, give rise to an intelligent artificial being: an artificial thinker. As such, there is another, less explored way of discussing the possibility of artificial intelligence: can there be an artificial thinker? This is the problem of artificial thinkers (Olson 2018). In this essay, I discuss this problem. To do so, (...) first, I present the problem of artificial thinkers and discuss how best to interpret it (section §1). Then, I discuss the three main views on the metaphysical nature of artificial thinkers: the hardware view, according to which artificial thinkers are intelligent artificial systems; the software view, according to which artificial thinkers are types or copies of programs for artificial intelligence; and finally, the CPU perspective, according to which artificial thinkers are intelligent spatial parts of artificial systems (section §2). All of these views have problems regarding their conception of the persistence conditions of artificial thinkers. Even so, I conclude, artificial thinkers are best conceived as functional artificial systems. (shrink)