Hume's Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Psychology, edited by Philip A. Reed and Rico Vitz, is a collection of 14 essays intended to explore fruitful connections between David Hume's theory of the passions and ethics and contemporary experimental and cognitive psychology. Although recent moral philosophers have become interested in psychological discoveries in order to refine their normative approach to morality by means of a better empirical understanding of the workings of the mind, this trend has been (...) typically developed by Aristotelian scholarship. Hence, the purpose of this volume is to "fill a gap in the literature" by introducing Hume as a powerful interlocutor in the field of moral psychology, and... (shrink)

In this concluding chapter to Hume’s Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Psychology, I identify and briefly discuss a series of questions that are particularly suggestive for promising avenues of future research. These questions concern six topics: (1) the nature of virtue, (2) the nature and role of sympathy, (3) the nature of moral development and moral education, (4) the nature and role of various passions, (5) the nature of moral motivation, and (6) the relationship between Hume’s (...) ‘science of man’ and contemporary cognitive science. (shrink)

Recent work at the intersection of moral philosophy and the philosophy of psychology has dealt mostly with Aristotelian virtue ethics. The dearth of scholarship that engages with Hume’s moral philosophy, however, is both noticeable and peculiar. Hume's Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Psychology demonstrates how Hume’s moral philosophy comports with recent work from the empirical sciences and moral psychology. It shows how contemporary work in virtue ethics has much stronger similarities (...) to the metaphysically thin conception of human nature that Hume developed, rather than the metaphysically thick conception of human nature that Aristotle espoused. It also reveals how contemporary work in moral motivation and moral epistemology has strong affinities with themes in Hume’s sympathetic sentimentalism. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Hume's position in ethics, which is based on his empiricist theory of the mind, is best known for asserting four theses: (1) Reason alone cannot be a motive to the will, but rather is the slave of the passions (see Section 3) (2) Moral distinctions are not derived from reason (see Section 4). (3) Moral distinctions are derived from the moral sentiments: feelings of approval (esteem, praise) and disapproval (blame) felt by spectators who contemplate a character (...) trait or action (see Section 7). (4) While some virtues and vices are natural (see Section 13), others, including justice, are artificial (see Section 9). There is heated debate about what Hume intends by each of these theses and how he argues for them. He articulates and defends them within the broader context of his metaethics and his ethic of virtue and vice. Hume's main ethical writings are Book 3 of his Treatise of Human Nature, Of Morals (which builds on Book 2, Of the Passions), his Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, and some of his Essays. In part the moral Enquiry simply recasts central ideas from the moral part of the Treatise in a more accessible style; but there are important differences. The ethical positions and arguments of the Treatise are set out below, noting where the moral Enquiry agrees; differences between the Enquiry and the Treatise are discussed afterwards. (shrink)

In this paper, I show how reading Hume’s moral philosophy in light of seminal works by nineteenth- and twentieth-century African American authors can provide resources for developing a richer and more intentionally relational conception of sympathy. I begin by identifying two phenomena to which African American intellectuals like Booker T. Washington, W. E. B. Du Bois, and Anna Julia Cooper refer with the term “sympathy.” For ease of reference, I label these phenomena “sympathetic commitment” and “sympathetic understanding,” respectively. (...) I then show that there are concepts in Hume’s moral philosophy that refer to similar phenomena and suggest that Hume scholars can draw on these concepts to develop an enriched and distinctively Humean sense of sympathy. (shrink)

This book explores Hume's concern with the destructiveness of religious factions and his efforts to develop, in his moral philosophy, a solution to factional conflict. Sympathy and the related capacity to enter into foreign points of view are crucial to the neutralization of religious zeal and the naturalization of ethics. Jennifer Herdt suggests that Hume's preoccupation with religious faction is the key which reveals the unity of his varied philosophical, aesthetic, political and historical works.

The article analyses the reception of Hume’s moral philosophy in the lectures and manuscripts of Edmund Husserl and in the published lectures of Franz Brentano, on which Husserl originally based his views. I first present the reasons that led Brentano to appreciate Hume’s sentimentalist background in moral philosophy and to criticize Hume’s relativism. I then show how Husserl, following the critique of psychologism in his Logical Investigations, builds on this starting point and attempts to show a (...) possible contradictory nature of Hume’s moral relativism. Finally, I consider whether Hume’s doctrine contains phenomenological insights that Husserl overlooks. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:JOHN PASSMORE AND HUME'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY1 A quarter century ago, the message undergraduates absorbed about David Hume was as an extremely favourable one. He was the great precursor of logical empiricism and so his philosophy, at least in its main lines, must be nearer the mark than that of any other of the great names. Hume had discovered the right view of causation. He had exposed (...) and banished school metaphysics. He had rightly drawn attention to the problem of induction. He had discovered the isought gap and revealed the practical impotence of reason in the face of the passions. But for his weight problem, he could have walked on water. Those were the circumstances in which I first read John Passmore's book on Hume. Because he was plainly not, like many of Hume's critics, an apologist for Thomism or any of Hegel's offspring, his work could not be dismissed on the grounds of parti pris. It was 2 a shock, therefore, to find him, in Hume's Intentions, presenting an image of Hume a considerable distance this side of idolatry. Passmore's critical and, for its time, boldly unfashionable appraisal is to be admired, taken to heart, and extended. Hume's Intentions concentrates on Hume's philosophy of the understanding. It takes up strands of that philosophy and points to their inherent implausibility and mutual incompatibility. Yet these problems also vitiate other parts of Hume's position. In this paper I attempt to introduce the Passmorian method of reasoning into what are nowadays the moral subjects. Let me remind you of the structure of Passmore's book: it does not mount a consecutive argument so much as take up, tease out, and display one or other leading element in the Humean philosophy. Thus we have chapters on Hume as an enthusiast for the 110. moral (that is, human, or social) sciences, as a critic of traditional Aristotelian logic, as a developer of more suitable methods for scientific advance, as a positivist, a phenomenalist, an associationist theoretician in psychology, and a sceptic. We learn as we read that in these respects Hume is not consistent. Principles which he espouses, principally negative and sceptical principles, lead to conclusions too extreme to suit his major purposes. Accordingly, they must not be pressed to their proper conclusions. Hume's philosophy of the study must be abandoned rather than actually taken seriously. Thus, for example: in methodology, Hume insists that reason cannot yield results in the contingent and fallible natural and human sciences. This should lead him to the view that any scientific hypothesis which goes beyond immediate experience is, so far as reason goes, as good, or as bad, as any other. But he recoils from this, distinguishing sensible men from the foolish and superstitious on the basis of the regularity and consistency of the experiences on which the wise rely. Yet as Passmore points out, on Hume's principles, the preference for regularity and consistency cannot be more than a prejudice. Prejudices do not admit of any genuinely rational defence. There is real substance to the superiority claimed for the wise. Again, consider Hume's positivism. He offers a beguilingly short way with nonsense, especially learned and theological nonsense. School metaphysics and superstition (i.e. Christianity) are to be banished by the use of the impressions and ideas test: When you come upon a word whose meaning you would discover, ask if it refers to an impression or an idea. If to an impression, well and good, its meaning is to be found in present experience. If to an idea, ask from which impression (or impressions) the idea did (or could) Ill, derive. If you cannot find any suitable impressions, the idea is chimerical, and is to be excised from thought as a pathological intruder. This procedure produces most satisfactorily negative results when it comes to the Trinity and the sacraments, or essence, inherence, substantial form, and such metaphysical extravagances. Unhappily the very same procedure, the impressions and ideas test, also wrecks the foundations of Hume's own thought. As Passmore makes sure we remember, the test robs Hume of the resources with which to account for substance and... (shrink)

This dissertation examines the evolution of David Hume's ethics, focusing on moral judgment, moral motivation and ethical normativity. In chapter one, I argue that previous scholars have missed a crucial distinction between two different sympathetic processes at work in the Treatise. The first sympathetic process, "particular sympathy" is analogous to ordinary empathy and variable in just the way empathy is, but a second, non-variable process, "extensive sympathy" is the source of our moral sentiments. In chapter two, (...) I give an account of Hume's understanding of ethical normativity in the Treatise, arguing that he holds that society, our intimate relationships, and even our ability to be actively concerned with our long-term interests all depend on our adopting extensive sympathy as a standard by which to regulate our character and our passions. The view of moral motivation which then emerges is one on which our moral sentiments play the role of redirecting our natural passions and desires. ;In chapters three and four, I consider the second Enquiry, arguing that what had changed by the time of that work was not primarily the doctrine of Hume's ethics, but his view of the project of writing moral philosophy. In the Treatise, Hume seeks to explain and justify moral standards and judgments, while in the second Enquiry Hume also seeks to inspire people to regulate their lives by those standards and judgments. Only if we are alert to Hume's project in the second Enquiry will we at last resolve debates over whether Hume abandoned the doctrine of sympathy by the time of that work. Similarly, we need to understand the project of that work if we are to understand the section therein on our "interested obligation to virtue," and the appendix to that work called, "A Dialogue." ;In concluding, I place Hume against the map of contemporary ethics, arguing that philosophers with a broad variety of non-Humean and Humean committments have reason to take Hume's ethics seriously, in part because the account of Hume's ethics for which I have argued changes the map of contemporary ethics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume's Moral Sentiments and the Structure of the Treatise LOUIS E. LOEB ACCORDING TO NORMAN KEMP SMITH and Thomas Hearn, Hume classified moral sentiments as direct passions.' According to Pb.II A,rdal, Hume classified the basic moral sentiments of approval and disapproval of persons as indirect passions. if either of these interpretations is correct, there is an intimate connection between Books II and 111 of (...) class='Hi'>Hume's Treatise. This is because the direct and indirect passions (together with the will) are the subject of Book 11 and moral sentiments are discussed in Book 111. So if moral sentiments are special cases of either direct or indirect passions, the treatment of passions in Book Ii is central to the understanding of Book 111. 1 contend, on the contrary, that Hume's moral sentiments are neither direct nor indirect passions. Consequently, the connection between Books 11 and 111 of the Treatise is much less intimate than A,rdal and Hearn have recently suggested.' i. Hume's Classification of the Impressions of Reflection In the four paragraphs of II, i, I Hume provides an exhaustive "Division of the Subject"--the "subject" being "all the perceptions of the mind. ''4 Nowhere else in the Treatise is a complete "division" to be found. As A,rdal points out, such introductory chapters "are likely to be written after the bulk of the book has been completed, or at least to be carefully revised in the light of the main arguments in the book. ''~ For these reasons, there is a strong presumption that the "division" in!I, i, 1should be taken as canonical. Hume's "division" is straightforward. In the first paragraph, perceptions are divided into ideas and impressions; in the first and second paragraphs, impressions are divided into those of sensation and those of reflection; in the third paragraph, impressions of reflection are divided into the calm and the violent; in the fourth (as I am indebted to Wdham Frankena, Ronald Glossop, and Peter Jones for their most helpful comments. ' Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (New York: St. Martm'~ Press, 1966), pp. 167-168; and Thomas K. Hearn, Jr., "Ardal on the Moral Sentiments in Hume's rreattse," Phtlosophy 48 (1973):290. z Passton and Value m Hume's "Treatise" (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), pp. I 1, 109-133. For a discussion heavily influenced by Ardal, see Stewart R. Sutherland, "Hume on Morality and the Emotions," Phllosophwal Quarterly 26 (1976) : 14-19 especially. ' See Ardal, pp. I-5, 109-133; and Hearn, pp. 288, 292. 9 A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), p. 275; hereafter cited as T followed by page number. 9 Ardal, p. 94. 13951 396 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY indicated by the last sentence of the third), the violent impressions of reflection are divided into the direct and the indirect. The structure is of a genus-species sort, and none of the distinctions cut across each other: J calm i sense of beauty and deformity (T, 276), moral sentiments impressions of reflection = emotions (secondary impressions) violent = passions direct indirect desire, aversion, grief, joy, pride, humility, love, hope, fear (T, 277, 439) hatred (T, 276-277) This classification is based upon the only natural reading of paragraph three and the first sentence of paragraph four of II, i, I. I quote this material, adding my own emphasis and deleting Hume's: The reflective impressions may be divided into two kinds, viz. the calm and the violent. Of the first kind is the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition, and external objects. Of the second are the passions of love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility. This division is far from being exact. The raptures of poetry and music frequently rise to the greatest height; while those other impressions, properly called passions, may decay into so soft an emotion, as to become, in a manner, imperceptible. But as in general the passions are more violent than the emotions arising from beauty and deformity, these impressions have been commonly distinguish'd from each other. The subject of the human mind being so copious and various, I shall here take... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hume’s Natural Philosophy and Philosophy of Physical Science by Matias SlavovKrisztián PeteMatias Slavov. Hume’s Natural Philosophy and Philosophy of Physical Science. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020. Pp. 216. Hardcover. ISBN 9781350087866, £95.Although the relationship between Hume and Newton is a recurring theme in the Hume literature, Matias Slavov’s book does not seek to contribute to the debate between the traditional (Hume imitated Newton’s natural (...) class='Hi'>philosophy) and the critical (Hume intended his “science of Man” as the foundation of all other sciences) approaches regarding the nature of this relation. The book is intended to be a summary of Hume’s natural philosophy—or rather an aggregation of his comments on natural philosophical topics—pursued by exploring and analysing themes and issues that were prominent in the natural philosophy of the early modern period. In this respect it is a pioneering undertaking.Of course, Slavov does not claim in his book that Hume is a natural philosopher. “[F]irst and foremost... [h]e is not; for his main objective is to establish a new science of human nature” (1). But Slavov does claim that Hume’s natural philosophical views can be understood and valued in themselves and in the philosophical-scientific context of his time as well. The book is not a discussion of the natural philosophical dimensions of the “science of human nature,” but rather, of the natural philosophical views which are reconcilable with his main objective. In this respect, the book is not a methodological approach to Hume’s supposed natural philosophy, but a synthesis of certain elements of Hume’s philosophy that can feature in a consistent natural philosophy. Although his arguments are generally indirect and are more about what Hume seems to be committed to and what follows from his epistemological position rather than his actual positions, Slavov’s conclusions seem mostly convincing.Thus, Slavov’s point is not that the empiricist method is compatible in every detail with Newtonian mechanics, but rather that Hume seems to be committed more to a Cartesian natural philosophy. Slavov does not write about the possibility and significance of applying natural philosophical methods to moral philosophy; rather, he wants to build a complete philosophy of nature around some of Hume’s basic ideas to “fill the gap for a book on Hume’s relation to natural philosophy and philosophy of physical science” (2).The book has two “equally important aims” (ix): to shed more light onto Hume’s relationship to natural philosophy, and to demonstrate that physics and philosophy have overlapping domains. Hume was hardly concerned with physics, so Slavov’s strategy of defining natural philosophy as an overlap between physics and philosophy (chapter 1) does, to some extent, explain the lack of textual evidence in this area. The definition of natural philosophy chosen by Slavov is also intended to ensure [End Page 170] that these two goals are intertwined, since according to Slavov’s definition, natural philosophy is “a grey area between philosophy and physics” (12).Personally, I do not feel comfortable with this definition because it is not informative enough; it says that natural philosophy is more than modern physics (mathematized natural science), but it is not quite philosophy. While the first implication is very agreeable, and a number of scholars have addressed the issue, to assess the second implication, we would need to know exactly what philosophy is in this context. Perhaps the best candidate is metaphysics, even if Slavov keeps the reader somewhat in the dark on this point, despite the fact that chapter 2 is intended to establish precisely that point. Yet, the metaphysics of this period was usually (with the possible exception of Spinoza) used to support natural scientific explanations. I believe that natural philosophy is more than a “grey area” (9, 12, 22), or a contact zone; it is a complex enterprise that evolved in different forms with different emphases: Cartesian mechanics still sought to understand nature, pursuing the Aristotelian ideal of knowledge, albeit rejecting Aristotelian methods, while empiricists increasingly envisaged a more instrumentalist role for natural explanations. Newton himself was caught between the two.In this context it is intriguing whether Hume carries forward Berkeley... (shrink)

Do the moral sentiments move us to act, according to Hume? And if so, how? Hume famously deploys the claim that moral evaluations move us to act to show that they are not derived from reason alone. Presumably, moral evaluations move us because (as Hume sees it) they are, or are the product of, moral sentiments. So, it would seem that moral approval and disapproval are or produce motives to action. This raises three interconnected interpretive (...) questions. First, on Hume's account, we are moved to do many virtuous actions not by the sentiments of approval and disapproval, but by other sentiments, such as gratitude and parental love; so when and how do the moral sentiments themselves provide motives to act morally? The second question arises as a result of a position I defend here, that the moral sentiments are best understood as Humean indirect affections. Hume says that the four main indirect passions (pride, humility, love and hatred) do not directly move us to act. The second question, then, is whether their status as indirect affections nonetheless allows moral approval and disapproval to be or provide motives. Finally, if we make a natural assumption about how Hume thinks belief about future pleasure is connected to the desire to obtain it (I call it the signpost assumption), it turns out that the mechanisms for producing motives that most naturally come to mind are ones that are equally available to reason alone. This introduces the third question: given the constraints Hume imposes on the nature of the moral sentiments, is there a way in which they can move us to act that is not also a way in which reason alone does? I argue that, given the signpost assumption, while Hume has greatly constrained his options, his moral sentiments do have one very limited way of moving us to act that is not available to reason alone. However, there are reasons to doubt that Hume endorses the signpost assumption. Without it, our moral evaluations have a far greater capacity to produce motives to act. One important objection arises; but this problem can be solved by rejecting a further assumption about what counts as being produced by reason alone. (shrink)

Rachel Cohon offers an original interpretation of the moral philosophy of David Hume, focusing on two areas.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume's Moral Sentimentalism Daniel Shaw In chapter 7 ofhis book, Hume, Barry Stroud considers and rejects a number of standard interpretations of Hume's sentimentalism and then argues for his own 'projectionist' interpretation.1 In this paper I shall commentbriefly on all thesereadings, raise objectionsto Stroud's proposal, and, finally, argue in favour of what I shall call the 'power* interpretation ofHume's sentimentalism. Hume maintains that the vice or (...) virtue ofan action is not a matter offact about the action that can be inferred from anything, by causal orinductive reasoningalone, nor afact that canbe discovered by direct perception ofan action, but that, rather, vice and virtue are matters of moral sentiment. Hume writes, Take any action allow'd to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see ifyou can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, voUtions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflexion into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but 'tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object. So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but thatfrom the constitution ofyour nature youhave a feeling or sentiment ofblame from the contemplation of it. Vice andvirtue, therefore, maybe compar'd to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not quaUties in objects, but perceptions in the mind.2 Stroud gives the following explanation ofthis passage: [W]hat we believe or 'pronounce' when we regard an action as vicious is different from and more than anything we can discover by perception of the action or by inference from its observed characteristics to other matters of fact about it. Hume grants that there are certain observable characteristics an action can be known to possess such that when we know Volume XIX Number 1 31 DANIEL SHAW that the action has them we inevitably regard it as vicious. (H 178) In a case of wilful murder, for example, we can discover by (roughly) causal reasoning that one man deliberately and unnecessarily destroyed a human life, and caused great suffering, pain and hardship both to the victim and to others. (H 177) And Hume would grant that when we know that the man's action has these characteristics we inevitably regard it as vicious. But, he quiterightlyinsists that that does notimply thatregarding that action as vicious is simply believing that it has those observable [and inferrable] characteristics. He thinks that pronouncing an action to be vicious is something different and that is why he says that the vice entirely escapes you as long as you consider only the object thought to be vicious. (H 178) Why does Hume think that, for example, believing an act of wilful murder to be vicious cannot consist simply and entirely in beUeving it to possess the observable and inferrable characteristics of being a deliberate and unnecessary destruction of human life which caused great suffering, pain, etc.? Surely, one might think, to believe all that ofan action is all there need be for believing the action to be a morally vicious action. But, of course, Hume would argue that since the above beliefis itselfmerely a conclusion ofperception and causal reasoning, which in itself has no motivating power, and since, by contrast, the judgement that the act is morally vicious, being a moral judgement, must in itselfbe capable ofmotivating us to act, that is, to refrain from murder and do all we can to prevent murder, the latter active motivational moraljudgement must involve something over and above the former inert conclusion ofreason. I would agree with Stroud that Hume is right about this. Imagine a case ofa psychopath whose ability to argue and draw valid inferences is in perfectly good working order but whose motivational and emotional derangement is so severe that... (shrink)

Eighteenth century British moral philosophy focused on three issues: moral apprehension; moral motivation; and the relationship of moral apprehension to moral motivation. Hume resolved these issues by a Copernican revolution in which the basic perspective is that of an engaged and socially responsible agent as opposed to the classic philosophical perspective of the disengaged theoretician. As a consequence he could distinguish clearly the cognitive from the affective elements in moral apprehension, identify the non- (...) class='Hi'>moral origins of moral motivation, and account for the growth of the moral perspective through sympathy. (shrink)

The main line of argument in Bricke’s stimulating and well-written interpretation of Hume’s moral theory runs roughly as follows: Hume holds that, in practical reasoning, beliefs are subordinate to desires, and is therefore a “conativist” ; we must attribute to Hume the view that both desires and beliefs have representational content, so that they are essentially distinguished by their opposite “directions of fit”—otherwise we cannot forestall the cognitivist from simply insisting that intrinsically motivating beliefs are possible; moral sentiments (...) are motivating and must accordingly be founded in desire, not in belief; moral sentiments are therefore neither true nor false, but, since they arise when an impartial point of view is adopted, intersubjective agreement in moral attitude and a measure of objectivity are possible; this in turn helps to explain the cognitive form of moral language; and conventions underlying the artificial virtues originally arise from, and are sustained by, the natural activity and intercourse of our moral sentiments. Bricke concludes with some penetrating thoughts on the nature of Humean free will and the relation of enduring desires to personal identity. (shrink)

Alasdair MacIntyre criticizes the modern morality for having emotivist features and in his cent- ral book After Virtue he points out that David Hume is the main personality who provides these emotivist contents to the modern morality. According to MacIntyre, Hume’s and the modern emotivist moral philosophy include fundamental contrasts generally with the classical moral tradition particularly with Aristotle’s moral philosophy. However, MacIntyre underlines these contrasts in After Virtue, he in his other texts out of (...) After Virtue, distinguishably brings Hume and Aristotle together as they both have similar standpoints about how to understand morality. Therefore, MacIntyre’s interpretation on Hume needs to be examined with a perspective poin- ting these two different and seemingly mutually exclusive aspects. Putting together these two perspectives, this article aims to construct a holistic comprehension about MacIntyre’s placing Hume in the modern emotivism. (shrink)

A commentary on the arguments whereby Hume endeavored to delimit the role of reason in morality. Harrison’s procedure is largely one of logical analysis: he identifies individual arguments, examines inferences, asks whether there are reasons to believe premises. Throughout, he displays a balanced, appreciative approach, and when obliged to draw attention to Hume’s mistakes, he does so only reluctantly. Over half of the book is taken up in a careful examination of the text which, in terms of clarity and penetration, (...) goes beyond previous studies of Hume’s ethics. Additionally, Harrison offers chapters on Hume’s general epistemology and on the classical is/ought passage. In the latter he declares that Hume quite obviously thought that the derivation of an ought from an is was impossible, and then goes on, in what he labels an independent treatment of the problem, to offer a subtle exploration on the contours of our usage of the language of evaluation and obligation. But perhaps the most valuable contribution of the book is the closing section in which Harrison endeavors to arrive at a depiction of Hume’s alternative to rationalism. He puts forward five distinct interpretations of Hume’s positive moral philosophy, each of which has textual support as well as its own advocates. Harrison finds no grounds for affirming that any one of these interpretations defeats the others. Concluding with the judgment that Hume was confused in expounding his own position, the author notes that "Hume himself would not have approved of a reverence which substituted a superficial acceptance for a thorough grasp and realistic appraisal of his opinions." Despite the opposition which his work may provoke from those who defend some single interpretation of Hume’s moral philosophy, Harrison’s study may be expected to become a standard reference work on Hume’s ethics.—J.T.K. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Religion and Faction in Hume’s Moral Philosophy by Jennifer A. HerdtJames FieserJennifer A. Herdt. Religion and Faction in Hume’s Moral Philosophy. Studies in Religion and Critical Thought 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Pp. xv + 300. Cloth, $59.95.Jennifer A. Herdt’s book, Religion and Faction in Hume’s Moral Philosophy, is a study of Hume’s notion of sympathy. It is not, however, just (...) an analysis of the psychological mechanism of sympathy as expounded in Books II and III of the Treatise. For Herdt, sympathy plays a crucial role in Hume’s vision of how to combat many social ills, especially the effects of religious fanaticism, and Hume self-consciously drew on the notion of sympathy to secularize discourse about morality and social responsibility. Awareness of Hume’s use of sympathy illuminates Hume’s critique of religion and it also casts new light on the philosophical merits of Hume’s History. Herdt notes that, according to most Hume commentators, Hume’s attacks on religion were driven by epistemological problems arising from attempts at rationally justifying religion. According to Herdt, though, the unfortunate effects of religion on society more directly motivated Hume’s religious critique. Hume exposes these effects in his History, and offers sympathy as an antidote to religious fanaticism. Hume is not merely a vocal philosophical critic of religion, but he is also a social reformer attempting to advance peace and prosperity in Scotland.The key to Herdt’s interpretation is Hume’s distinction between limited and extensive sympathy (T 384–389). Briefly, for Hume, the degree to which I sympathetically commiserate with you hinges on both the degree of your misery and my relation to you. Herdt refines Hume’s notions of sympathy, distinguishing between active/passive sympathy, occurrent/dispositional sympathy, weak/strong sympathy, the sympathetic understanding, and the sympathetic imagination. In essence, there are both bad and good social aspects of the various types of sympathy. A bad social aspect is when sympathy is only a superficial emotional contagion, which can even breed religious fanaticism. The principal good social aspect is when sympathy becomes more generalized and gives rise to a sense of concern for the well-being of others. Herdt’s refinement of Hume’s sympathy vocabulary is both textually justified and an important aid in understanding the various technical senses of sympathy especially in Hume’s Treatise. Herdt argues that, after the moral Enquiry, Hume’s use of the term “sympathy” diminished, and when he did use it he meant it mainly in the sense of limited sympathy. Herdt believes, though, that the fundamental conception of extended and general sympathy is a running theme in the History.Hume’s later use of the term “sympathy” is not quite as diminished as Herdt contends. By consulting a text file database of Hume’s writings, we can quickly spot the frequency with which Hume used both the term “sympathy” and the related word “compassion”: Treatise: sympathy (150), compassion (8), First Enquiry: sympathy (6), Second Enquiry: sympathy (26), compassion (9), “Of Tragedy:” sympathy (4), compassion (6), “Dissertation on the Passions:” sympathy (3), compassion (8), Natural History of Religion: sympathy (3), History: Sympathy (25); compassion (54). Additionally, about twelve of Hume’s essays contain one or two occurrences each of either the words “sympathy” or “compassion.” Examination of the various occurrences of these terms shows that Hume [End Page 170] sometimes had in mind a technical notion of sympathy and other times a colloquial notion. The technical notion typically makes a psychological point, such as the discussion at T 384–389. We find the technical notion largely in the Treatise and the Moral Enquiry, with more isolated discussions in the Natural History of Religion, “Of Tragedy,” the “Dissertation on the Passions,” and a letter to Adam Smith on July 28, 1759.By contrast, Hume’s more colloquial uses of “sympathy” and “compassion” usually appear alongside other terms, such as fellow-feeling, cordial affection, humanity, friendship, mutual attachment, and fidelity. The colloquial use is also sometimes designated in the phrases “sympathy of manners” and “sympathy of character.” Hume’s use of the terms “sympathy” and “compassion” in the History are virtually all... (shrink)

In Hume's Social Philosophy, Christopher J Finlay presents a highly original and engaging reading of David Hume's landmark text, A Treatise of Human Nature, and political writings published immediately after it, articulating a unified view of his theory of human nature in society and his political philosophy. The book explores the hitherto neglected social contexts within which Hume's ideas were conceived. While a great deal of attention has previously been given to Hume's intellectual and (...) literary contexts, important connections can also be made between the fundamentals of Hume's philosophy and the social world in which it was developed. Finlay argues that Hume's unified theory of human nature, conceived in terms of passions, reason and sociability, was meant to account for human nature in its most articulate manifestations, in the commercial and 'polite' social contexts of eighteenth-century Europe. Through careful exegetical study of Hume's analysis of reasoning and the passions, Finlay explores the diverse aspects of sociability which the Treatise of Human Nature invokes. In particular, this study finds in the Treatise an important exploration of the tensions between the selfish motivations of individuals and their propensity to bond with others in complex and diverse kinds of social group. Analysis of Book III of the Treatise and of essays published afterwards shows how the various individualist and social propensities explored through the passions are addressed in Hume's theories of justice, morals and politics. (shrink)

A compact and accessible edition of Hume’s political and moral writings with essays by a distinguished set of contributors A key figure of the Scottish Enlightenment, David Hume was a major influence on thinkers ranging from Kant and Schopenhauer to Einstein and Popper, and his writings continue to be deeply relevant today. With four essays by leading Hume scholars exploring his complex intellectual legacy, this volume presents an overview of Hume’s moral, political, and social philosophy. Editors Angela (...) Coventry and Andrew Valls bring together a selection of writings from Hume’s most important works, with contributors placing them in their appropriate context and offering a lively discourse on the relevance of Hume’s thought to contemporary subjects like reason’s dependence on emotion and the importance of social convention in political and economic behavior. Perfect for classroom use, this volume is an invaluable companion for anyone studying an important thinker who advanced the development of moral philosophy, economics, cognitive science, and many other fields of the Western tradition. (shrink)

But in many orders of beauty, particularly those of the finer arts, it is requisite to employ much reasoning, in order to feel the proper sentiment; and a false relish may frequently be corrected by argument and reflection. There are just grounds to conclude, that moral beauty partakes much of this latter species, and demands the assistance of our intellectual faculties, in order to give it a suitable influence on the human mind (EPM, 173).

Some scholars have recently found commonalities between Hume's motivational psychology and Kantian understandings of reason and obligation. Although this trend corrects certain misreadings of Hume, it goes too far in other respects. This essay argues that we can understand Hume's explanation of the artificial virtue of justice in a way that avoids such mistakes. I begin by considering Stephen Darwall's argument that features of Hume's account of justice reveal an inadequacy in the empirical naturalist tradition and underlying (...) commitments to the proto-Kantian tradition. I argue that a broader understanding of Hume's ethics and reinterpreting crucial passages dissolve Darwall's 'puzzles' about Humean justice. I defend Hume against the charge of inconsistency by suggesting an alternative interpretation of his theory of the will and his arguments about the justice's development as a virtue. Finally, I argue that Hume's theory of the will can consistently account for motives to Humean justice, properly understood. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to present Reid's answer to Hume's claim that religion is contrary to natural human moral passions. Religion, according to Hume, weakens natural human inclinations toward virtue and invents new species of merit. Reid would respond, first, that morality is indeed tied to human nature, and that Hume fails to recognize that a sense of justice is natural as well. Since justice does not arise within human social conventions, Reid would conclude that justice (...) is not a virtue that is limited to the human domain. Second, Reid would argue that the concordance between natural moral human motives and natural non-moral motives is a sign of design. And third, Reid would argue that uncorrupted religion is one that is faithful to morality and human nature, and that does not distort natural motives. Overall, Reid holds that the moral faculty is a natural human faculty that gives rise to natural inclinations and beliefs, but that these are concordant with religious beliefs and practices prescribed b.. (shrink)

Hume's moral theory is often taken to be descriptive rather then normative. This is a misinterpretation: Hume justifies moral claims, as he justifies claims about what to believe, by appeal to initially credible cases. This procedure is defensible.

Hume insisted that property serve as the foundation of society because it best promotes the greatest amount of industry and therefore contributes to public utility. Industry thus plays a central role in Hume’s theory of justice. Given that Hume extensively discussed the social, political, cultural, and moral implications of industry in the Political Discourses, I suggest that Hume’s economic writings should be understood as an integral part of his overall philosophical project. In offering a parallel reading of the Enquiry (...) Concerning the Principles of Morals and the Political Discourses, I argue that Hume’s theory of justice does not resolve into a mere theory of property, as many philosophers complain, but rather, emerges as a rich account of how justice both generates the greatest material affluence and promotes the formation of the most virtuous society. (shrink)

Review of Nicholas Capaldi, Hume's Place in Moral Philosophy -/- In Hume’s Place in Moral Philosophy Professor Capaldi attempts “to construct a coherent account of Hume’s moral philosophy both with an eye to those issueswhich have persistently vexed his readers and commentators and with the intent of underscoring those novel and challenging aspects of his moral philosophy which ...remain unnoticed or unappreciated” (p.xi).Capaldi’s project falls into three distinct, but related, parts. First, (...) he provides a “brief sketch of the intellectual milieu in which Hume was writing”. Many of the misunderstandings of Hume’s philosophy, Capaldi suggests, “are largely the result of failing to see the specific issues and opponents Hume had in mind” (p. 28 - cp. p. 93). O n this matter Capaldi’s overall view is that Hume’s moral thought may be interpreted as an effort to incorporate “Hutcheson’s moral philosophy and teachings into a more fundamental framework which can only be described as Newtonian” (p.21). Throughout this work Capaldi is particularly at pains to emphasise Hume’s (supposed) antagonism to Hobbes’s “selfish system” of morals (e.g. pp. 5-9, 13, 23, 198-99, 209-10, 292, 298, 301). Second, Capaldi cites four “major issues within moral philosophy” which structure his own interpretation of various specific aspects of Hume’s moral thought. The four issues are: (i) the existence of a “moral domain”; (ii) the nature of our “access” to this domain; (iii) the relationship between “moral apprehension” and “moral motivation”; and, finally, (iv) the relationship between “moral motivation” and “non-moral motivation” (p. 2). It is largely within this framework that Capaldi discusses the familiar issues concerning moral obligation, moral judgement, sympathy, moral sentiment, and justice. Third, Capaldi’s principal concern in this study is to present an account or description of Hume’s ‘Copernican Revolution in Philosophy’. This “revolution" is described in terms of the shift from the ‘Ithink’ to the ‘WeDo’ perspective (see esp.pp.21-7 andCh. 8).This feature of Hume’s philosophical thought has, Capaldi claims, been insufficiently understood and this has resulted in both unnecessary misunderstanding and misplaced criticism of Hume’s moral thought.... (shrink)

Hume's moral theory, I shall here argue, is explicitly and in fundamental ways a common sense theory. It is widely accepted, of course, that Hume found moral distinctions to rest on sentiment, and that he found in the principle of sympathy the means by which individual sentiments come to be experienced by others. What has not received adequate attention is Hume's concern to refute moral skepticism and his explicit reliance on appeals to “common sense,” nor,so (...) far as I know, has anyone suggested how these several features coalesce in an outlook which is appropriately designated a common sense theory. To support my claim I shall first show that Hume is not, as is widely supposed, what we would term a “subjectivist” in morals, and that in fact he means to establish, in at least two important senses of the term, the “objectivity”of morals. (shrink)

Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments has long been recognized as importantly influenced by, and in part responding to, David Hume’s earlier ethical theory. With regard to Smith’s account of the foundations of morals in particular, recent scholarly attention has focused on Smith’s differences with Hume over the question of sympathy. Whilst this is certainly important, disagreement over sympathy in fact represents only the starting point of Smith’s engagement with – and eventual attempted rejection of – Hume’s core (...) class='Hi'>moral theory. We can see this by recognizing the TMS’s account of moral foundations as predicated upon a rejection of Hume’s distinction between the natural and artificial virtues. Smith is in turn revealed as generating a major break with Hume – a break which, if based on a superior theory of moral foundations has important consequences for how we treat Smith and Hume in both the history of philosophy and contemporary moral theory. (shrink)

The name Nicholas Capaldi is well known to students of David Hume, since Capaldi has been a key figure in the Hume renaissance of the last quarter century. Over a span of two decades he has written numerous articles on Hume, edited anthologies, and authored two Hume books, of which this is the second. The quality of this work will therefore surprise no one; Hume's Place in Moral Philosophy is a first rate piece of scholarship. Capaldi concentrates (...) here on the Treatise and the second Enquiry, as is proper, but he knows the rest of Hume and Hume scholarship so well that the book cannot be said to neglect anything of importance. (shrink)