The spiritual geography of Russian cosmism. General characteristics ; Recent definitions of cosmism -- Forerunners of Russian cosmism. Vasily Nazarovich Karazin (1773-1842) ; Alexander Nikolaevich Radishchev (1749-1802) ; Poets: Mikhail Vasilyevich Lomonosov, (1711-1765) and Gavriila Romanovich Derzhavin (1743-1816) ; Prince Vladimir Fedorovich Odoevsky (1803-1869) ; Aleksander Vasilyevich Sukhovo-Kobylin (1817-1903) -- The Russian philosophical context. Philosophy as a passion ; The destiny of Russia ; Thought as a call for action ; The totalitarian cast of mind -- The religious and spiritual (...) context. The kingdom of god on earth ; Hesychasm: two great Russian saints ; The Third Rome ; Pre-Christian antecedents -- The Russian esoteric context. Early searches for "deep wisdom" ; Popular magic ; Higher magic in the time of Peter the Great ; Esotericism after Peter the Great ; Theosophy and anthroposophy -- Nikolai Fedorovich Fedorov (1829-1903), the philosopher of the common task ; The one idea ; The unacknowledged prince ; The village teacher ; First disciple: Dostoevsky and Tolstoy ; The Moscow librarian ; Last years: Askhabad: the only portrait -- The "common task" ; Esoteric dimensions of the "common task" ; Fedorov's legacy: projectivism, delo, regulation -- The religious cosmists. Vladimir Sergeevich Solovyov (1853-1900) ; Sergei Nikolaevich Bulgakov (1871-1944) ; Pavel Aleksandrovich Florensky (1882-1937) ; Nikolai Aleksandrovich Berdyaev (1874-1948) -- The scientific cosmists. Konstantin Edouardovich Tsiolkovsky (1857-1935) ; Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadsky (1863-1945) ; Alexander Leonidovich Chizhevsky (1897-1964) ; Vasily Feofilovich Kuprevich (1897-1969) -- Promethean theurgy. Life-creation ; Cultural immortalism ; God-building ; Re-aiming the arrows of Eros ; Technological utopianism ; Occultism -- Fedorov's twentieth century followers. Nikolai Pavlovich Peterson (1844-1919) and Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kozhevnikov (1852-1917) ; Svyatogor and the biocosmists ; New wine and the universal task ; Alexander Konstantinovich Gorsky (1886-1943) and Nikolai Alexandrovich Setnitsky (1888-1937) ; Valerian Nikolaevich Muravyov (1885-1932) ; Vasily Nikolaevich Chekrygin (1897-1922) -- Cosmism and its offshoots today. The N.F. Fedorov museum-library ; The Tsiolkovsky museum and Chizhevsky center ; ISRICA - Institute for Scientific Research in Cosmic Anthropoecology ; Lev Nikolaevich Gumilev (1912-1992) and neo-eurasianism ; The hyperboreans ; Scientific immortalism: Igor Vishev, Danila Medvedev ; Conclusions about the Russian cosmists. (shrink)

Various authors have recently argued that you cannot rationally stick to your belief in the face of known disagreement with an epistemic peer, that is, a person you take to have the same evidence and judgmental skills as you do. For, they claim, because there is but one rational response to any body of evidence, a disagreement with an epistemic peer indicates that at least one of you is not responding rationally to the evidence. Given that you take your peer (...) to have the same judgmental skills as you do, and thus regard her to be equally good at assessing the evidence as you are, you will have as much reason for thinking that it is you who is not responding rationally to the evidence as for thinking that it is her. You thus have reason for thinking that your belief on the disputed matter is not a rational response to the evidence. Hence, you cannot rationally stick to your belief. (shrink)

The conceptual spaces approach has recently emerged as a novel account of concepts. Its guiding idea is that concepts can be represented geometrically, by means of metrical spaces. While it is generally recognized that many of our concepts are vague, the question of how to model vagueness in the conceptual spaces approach has not been addressed so far, even though the answer is far from straightforward. The present paper aims to fill this lacuna.

According to what is now commonly referred to as “the Equation” in the literature on indicative conditionals, the probability of any indicative conditional equals the probability of its consequent of the conditional given the antecedent of the conditional. Philosophers widely agree in their assessment that the triviality arguments of Lewis and others have conclusively shown the Equation to be tenable only at the expense of the view that indicative conditionals express propositions. This study challenges the correctness of that assessment by (...) presenting data that cast doubt on an assumption underlying all triviality arguments. (shrink)

Many have the intuition that the right response to the Lottery Paradox is to deny that one can justifiably believe of even a single lottery ticket that it will lose. The paper shows that from any theory of justification that solves the paradox in accordance with this intuition, a theory not of that kind can be derived that also solves the paradox but is more conducive to our epistemic goal than the former. It is argued that currently there is no (...) valid reason not to give preference to the derived accounts over the accounts from which they come. (shrink)

The Preface Paradox has led many philosophers to believe that, if it isassumed that high probability is necessary for rational acceptability, the principleaccording to which rational acceptability is closed under conjunction (CP)must be abandoned. In this paper we argue that the paradox is far less damaging to CP than is generally believed. We describe how, given certain plausibleassumptions, in a large class of cases in which CP seems to lead tocontradiction, it does not do so after all. A restricted version (...) of CP canthus be maintained. (shrink)

List and Pettit have stated an impossibility theorem about the aggregation of individual opinion states. Building on recent work on the lottery paradox, this paper offers a variation on that result. The present result places different constraints on the voting agenda and the domain of profiles, but it covers a larger class of voting rules, which need not satisfy the proposition-wise independence of votes.

In the paper I offer some criticisms on Parfitian account of personal identity. Firstly, I show that his view amounts to a position, wich I call 'nihilism', the view, that persons do not exist. Secondly, I argue that his account of personal identity is not consistent with the classical view of identity that Parfit seems to accept.

In a review of Adler’s Belief’s Own Ethics , I had challenged the book’s main argument for the thesis that we cannot but believe in accordance with our evidence. Van Willigenburg replied to the review , defending Adler’s argument against my critique. In the present note, I briefly respond to van Willigenburg.

In the paper I offer a brief overview of main problems in the contemporary metaphysics of time: debates on tensed and detensed theories of time and presentism-eternalism debate. I systematically expose the solutions from the point of view that the truth is grounded in reality and consider the main arguments for each position.

The aim of this article is to analyze the main contributions of Wesley C. Salmon to the philosophy of science, that is, his concepts of causation, common cause, and theoretical explanation, and to provide a critique of them. This critique will be based on a comparison of Salmon’s concepts with categories developed by Hegel in his Science of Logic and which can be applied to issues treated by Salmon by means of the above given three concepts. It is the author’s (...) contention that by means of Hegelian categories it becomes possible to provide a critique of Salmon’s philosophy of science and at the same time to enlarge the concept framework of philosophy of science. (shrink)

Ovaj rad predstavlja preispitivanje Makijavelijevog makijavelizma, odnosno stanovista da je Makijavelijeva politicka teorija imoralisticka. Prvi deo rada posvecen je poredjenju Platonove i Makijavelijeve politicke filozofije. U njemu se analiziraju slicnosti i razlike u delima ova dva filozofa. Autor zastupa tezu da su Platonova shvatanja politike i politicke zajednice pogubnija od Makijavelijevih, kao i da je Makijavelijevo razumevanje politike, drzave i zakona blize nacelima liberalizma, nego nacelima tiranije ili totalitarizma. Drugi deo rada posvecen je tumacenju koncepta autonomije politike i koriscenju svireposti (...) i zala kao instrumenata vladavine u Makijavelijevom delu. U ovom delu autor porice da je Makijaveli bio filozof zla i zastupnik politickog razbojnistva. (shrink)

This article examines how Deleuze attempts to conceive the possibility of a non-Hegelian universal history by referring simultaneously to Nietzsche’s history of nihilism and to Marx’s history of social formations in the light of capitalism. It shows that this attempt involves a diagnosis of modernity after the historic failures of the nineteenth century messianisms. It also leads to the notion of becoming-revolutionary, which replaces Marx’s conception of revolution. From this triple point of view (universal history, the diagnosis of modernity, becoming-revolutionary), (...) it would seem that Deleuze’s reading of Marx stems from his interpretation of Nietzsche. (shrink)

By unfolding the meaning of a Deleuzian formula from Difference and Repetition —“the virtual possesses the reality of a task to be performed, or a problem to be solved”— we attempt to show that the Deleuzian concept of the virtual implies the three main features of a philosophy of nature: a theory of ontogenesis, a theory of regimes of individuation and an ontological foundation of ethics. After demonstrating that the virtual-actual pair makes it possible to form a theory of ontogenesis, (...) we show that, by distinguishing different regimes of individuation (physico-chemical, biological, psychic), Deleuze grants a certain privilege to thought, the only one capable of fully expressing the virtual reality that conditions it. By comparing this theory with that of Étienne Souriau, we show how this privilege is inseparable from an ethical task, and implies no anthropocentrism: for Deleuze, man is not the subject of thought. (shrink)

Conceptual spaces have become an increasingly popular modeling tool in cognitive psychology. The core idea of the conceptual spaces approach is that concepts can be represented as regions in similarity spaces. While it is generally acknowledged that not every region in such a space represents a natural concept, it is still an open question what distinguishes those regions that represent natural concepts from those that do not. The central claim of this paper is that natural concepts are represented by the (...) cells of an optimally designed similarity space. (shrink)

Conditionals are sentences of the form 'If A, then B', and they play a central role in scientific, logical, and everyday reasoning. They have been in the philosophical limelight for centuries, and more recently, they have been receiving attention from psychologists, linguists, and computer scientists. In spite of this, many key questions concerning conditionals remain unanswered. While most of the work on conditionals has addressed semantical questions - questions about the truth conditions of conditionals - this book focuses on the (...) main epistemological questions that conditionals give rise to, such as: what are the probabilities of conditionals? When is a conditional acceptable or assertable? What do we learn when we receive new conditional information? In answering these questions, this book combines the formal tools of logic and probability theory with the experimental approach of cognitive psychology. It will be of interest to students and researchers in logic, epistemology, and psychology of reasoning. (shrink)

I FORMS AND PROBLEMS OF CULTURE INTEGRATION AND METHODS OF THEIR STUDY I. Culture Integration And Culture Unity — A Dark Problem Is every culture an ...

A defense of the rationality of adductive inference from the criticisms of Bayesian theorists.

The article characterizes the substantial level of sacralization of values in the spiritual culture of the Greater Altai. The main emphasis is placed on identifying the grounds for the sacralization of values. It is established that the world order is one of the bases of sacralization and simultaneously performs the function of consolidating cultural carriers. The key thesis of the research is the thesis that spiritual culture cannot be fully comprehended without reference to sacred values. In addition, the sacralization of (...) values is considered as a condition for ensuring spiritual security and continuity of values and norms between generations of cultural carriers. The assessment of the spiritual potential of the culture of the Greater Altai is of great importance. The main conclusions of the study are the following provisions: 1) the sacralization of key values is carried out at the essential or substantial level, while the stages of sacralization are mainly "tied" to the religious and mythological development of culture and its value-normative system; 2) sacralization encompasses those value structures that acquire importance in human existence and are a factor in the integration of cultural carriers and their generations; 3 sacralization is the process of identifying specific value-semantic structures – they are attributed symbolic meaning, and they are also correlated with certain cultural codes, signs and texts. (shrink)

This paper aims to contribute to our understanding of the notion of coherence by explicating in probabilistic terms, step by step, what seem to be our most basic intuitions about that notion, to wit, that coherence is a matter of hanging or fitting together, and that coherence is a matter of degree. A qualitative theory of coherence will serve as a stepping stone to formulate a set of quantitative measures of coherence, each of which seems to capture well the aforementioned (...) intuitions. Subsequently it will be argued that one of those measures does better than the others in light of some more specific intuitions about coherence. This measure will be defended against two seemingly obvious objections. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with formal solutions to the lottery paradox on which high probability defeasibly warrants acceptance. It considers some recently proposed solutions of this type and presents an argument showing that these solutions are trivial in that they boil down to the claim that perfect probability is sufficient for rational acceptability. The argument is then generalized, showing that a broad class of similar solutions faces the same problem. An argument against some formal solutions to the lottery paradox The (...) argument generalized Some variations Adding modalities Anticipated objections. (shrink)

It is undeniable that inductive reasoning has brought us much good. At least since Hume, however, philosophers have wondered how to justify our reliance on induction. In important recent work, Schurz points out that philosophers have been wrongly assuming that justifying induction is tantamount to showing induction to be reliable. According to him, to justify our reliance on induction, it is enough to show that induction is optimal. His optimality approach consists of two steps: an analytic argument for meta-induction (that (...) is, induction over inductive methods) and an application of meta-induction to empirical findings concerning the predictive accuracy of our actual inductive practices as compared to various non-inductive methods. The present article agrees with Schurz’s general conclusion but also argues that it leaves an important aspect of our inductive practices unaccounted for, to wit, that these practices have so far been highly successful; to satisfy the optimality requirement, induction only needs to be as successful as random guessing. To explain the success of induction, I turn to insights from social epistemology, also highlighted in Schurz’s work, and make these formally explicit in a framework that combines the Hegselmann–Krause model for opinion dynamics and Carnap’s system of λ rules. Within this framework, I use a standard evolutionary algorithm to show how communities of interacting agents may, through variation and selection, come to consist of highly successful inductive reasoners. (shrink)

Il'in's classic work is the most impassioned and cogent work by a Russian jurist on the rule of law. The product of nearly four decades of labor, which could not be published in the former Soviet Union, this revised edition places the work in the context of developments since its first English translation in 2013. The text is accompanied by one of Il'in's early and influential articles on law and power, a bibliography devoted to his life and work, and informed (...) introductory essays about his contribution to the rule of law dialogue, the origins and transformations of the concept of legal consciousness and the fascinating history of his treatise on that subject. x, 403 pp. Ivan Aleksandrovich Il'in (Доктор государственных наук) [1883-1954], sometime professor, Moscow Lomonosov State University, is one of the most widely-read legal philosophers of the twentieth century in post-Soviet Russia. William E. Butler is the John Edward Fowler Distinguished Professor of Law, Penn State Dickinson Law; Emeritus Professor of Comparative Law, University College London; and author of numerous works on post-Soviet legal systems, including Russian Law and Legal Institutions (3d ed.; 2021). Philip T. Grier, who has written extensively on Hegel and Il'in and translated Il'in's principal treatise on Hegelianism, is the Emeritus Thomas Bowman Professor of Philosophy and Religion at Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Paul Robinson is a professor at the University of Ottawa. (shrink)

This article compares inference to the best explanation with Bayes’s rule in a social setting, specifically, in the context of a variant of the Hegselmann–Krause model in which agents not only update their belief states on the basis of evidence they receive directly from the world, but also take into account the belief states of their fellow agents. So far, the update rules mentioned have been studied only in an individualistic setting, and it is known that in such a setting (...) both have their strengths as well as their weaknesses. It is shown here that in a social setting, inference to the best explanation outperforms Bayes’s rule according to every desirable criterion. 1 What Is Inference to the Best Explanation?2 Judging the Rules—By Which Lights?3 From an Individualistic to a Social Perspective 3.1 The Hegselmann–Krause model 3.2 A probabilistic extension of the Hegselmann–Krause model 3.3 Simulations4 Results and Discussion5 Interpretation6 Conclusion. (shrink)

It has been claimed that epistemic peers, upon discovering that they disagree on some issue, should give up their opposing views and ‘split the difference’. The present paper challenges this claim by showing, with the help of computer simulations, that what the rational response to the discovery of peer disagreement is—whether it is sticking to one’s belief or splitting the difference—depends on factors that are contingent and highly context-sensitive.Keywords: Peer disagreement; Computer simulations; Opinion dynamics; Hegselmann–Krause model; Social epistemology.

Bayesians have traditionally taken a dim view of the Inference to the Best Explanation, arguing that, if IBE is at variance with Bayes ' rule, then it runs afoul of the dynamic Dutch book argument. More recently, Bayes ' rule has been claimed to be superior on grounds of conduciveness to our epistemic goal. The present paper aims to show that neither of these arguments succeeds in undermining IBE.

Van Fraassen (1989) argues that Inference to the Best Explanation is incoherent in the sense that adopting it as a rule for belief change will make one susceptible to a dynamic Dutch book. The present paper argues against this. A strategy is described that allows us to infer to the best explanation free of charge.

There is an ongoing controversy in philosophy about the connection between explanation and inference. According to Bayesians, explanatory considerations should be given weight in determining which inferences to make, if at all, only insofar as doing so is compatible with Strict Conditionalization. Explanationists, on the other hand, hold that explanatory considerations can be relevant to the question of how much confidence to invest in our hypotheses in ways which violate Strict Conditionalization. The controversy has focused on normative issues. This paper (...) investigates experimentally the descriptive question of whether judgments of the explanatory goodness of hypotheses do play a role when people revise their degrees of belief in those hypotheses upon the receipt of new evidence. We present the results of three experiments that together strongly support the predictive superiority of the explanationist position. (shrink)

The Lottery Paradox and the Preface Paradox both involve the thesis that high probability is sufficient for rational acceptability. The standard solution to these paradoxes denies that rational acceptability is deductively closed. This solution has a number of untoward consequences. The present paper suggests that a better solution to the paradoxes is to replace the thesis that high probability suffices for rational acceptability with a somewhat stricter thesis. This avoids the untoward consequences of the standard solution. The new solution will (...) be defended against a seemingly obvious objection. 1 The paradoxes of rational acceptability 2 The standard solution 3 A new solution to the paradoxes 4 Basic assumptions 5 The new solution defended 6 Conclusion 7 Appendix. (shrink)