This study demonstrates the extent to which academic philosophers and social scientists make philosophy difficult. It highlights the political dimension of the state, law, morality and production, and shows they need to be understood in terms of how a conflict of forces operates.

Illusionism treats the almost universally held belief in our ability to make free choices as an erroneous, though beneficent, idea. According to this view, it is sadly true, though virtually impossible to believe, that none of a person’s choices are avoidable and ‘up to him’: any claim to the effect that they are being naïveté or, in the case of those who know better, pretense. Indeed, the implications of this skepticism are so disturbing, pace Spinoza, that it must not be (...) allowed to see the light of intellectual day, confined to the nether regions of consciousness. Even those who have ‘done the philosophy’ and disabused themselves here should nevertheless (somehow) continue believing in free will, lest they come to regard our lives as meaningless, spreading despair and social upheaval. Thus, the “Illusionists” who propound this view are themselves circumspect in doing so. -/- But is escaping the (putative) truth really possible here? Could a disabused philosopher ever return to something like his former intellectual innocence? Self-deception may not be possible; but would an attempt at it reveal anything significant about choice formation? If one were to try to regain one’s illusion, what would one realize? I shall argue here that one would reflectively discover precisely the opposite of what the Illusionists contend- that there are indeed free choices. Let us begin by considering the inconsistency that supposedly entails the illusion of free will. (shrink)

Zygon®, Volume 56, Issue 4, Page 846-873, December 2021.

This article addresses the notion of “illusions of the multitude”, or the ideas created by the imagination in the analysis that Baruch Spinoza makes in his works. The text aims to explore the following questions: What characteristics reveal the ideas originating from the imagination? What role do these ideas play in the political and so- cial space? First, I emphasize Spinoza’s explanation of the imagination, as a first mode of knowledge. Secondly, I delve into the characteristics of the ideas that (...) stem from it and the affections that accompany them. Finally, I analyze their effects on the political and social space. (shrink)

This is a philosophical discussion of cinema’s power to create positive illusions and myths, drawing on Nietzsche, Kracauer, and Deleuze.

This project aims to examine whether music has an emotional nature. I use the ancient Chinese text Music Has No Grief or Joy to construct three arguments for the illusion view, according to which music has no emotional nature and the emotional appearances of music are illusory. These arguments highlight representational inconstancy, expressive incapability, and evocative underdetermination as three ways to problematize the idea that music has an emotional nature. I draw on the Confucian tradition to formulate three responses (...) to the illusion view from representational reliability, expressive sincerity, and evocative appropriateness. These responses are shown to be inadequate. To examine the illusion view in detail, I adopt a comparative approach to structure a dialogue between ancient Eastern philosophy and contemporary Western philosophy. Nine arguments are constructed from three prominent approaches in contemporary Western musical aesthetics on the evocation, expression, and representation of emotion. I argue that each of these arguments reads emotion into music. Nevertheless, three insights emerge from the comparative discussion. The autonomy of emotional enjoyment, the possibility of emotional communication, and the function of emotional language in musical experiences call for explanations. I argue that the illusion view are amenable to these insights. The illusion view allows us to claim full ownership of emotional responses, have emotional communication by recognizing intended emotional meanings in music, and appreciate the practical value of emotional language in music industry and education. I formulate a possible objection on the basis of Charles Swann’s musical experience in Marcel Proust’s novel, according to which music has emotional agency in the formation of an emotion. This objection can be met and Swann’s musical experience can be integrated into the illusion view. The illusion view turns out to be experientially richer than it might appear at first. This project liberates musical listening and philosophical thinking from beliefs entrenched in the emotional illusion of music. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Amidst all the anticipation, anxiety, and hype swirling around the year 2000, we may find ourselves searching for some sure guidance as we enter the new millennium. Dharma: The Way of Transcendence provides it. Written by His Divine Grace A. C. Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada, whom scholars and spiritual leaders worldwide recognize as the most distinguished teacher of Indian culture and philosophy of the modern age, Dharma answers essential questions thoughtful people ask in every millenium: Who am I? What are (...) my deepest needs? How can I fulfill them? Srila Prabhupada writes, "The body and the mind are but superfluous outer coverings of the spirit soul. The spirit soul's needs must be fulfilled. The need of the spirit soul is that he wants to get out of the limited sphere of material bondage and fulfill his desire for complete freedom. He wants to get out of the covered walls of the greater universe. He wants to see the free light and the spirit." To learn what that free light and spirit are, and how you can see them, read Dharma. Book jacket. (shrink)

Jean Piaget was one of the most salient and inspirational figures in psychological and educational research this century. He was prolific, authoring or editing over eighty books and numerous journal papers which have spawned a huge and fertile continuation of his research over the decades. A major component of any course on children's psychological development and a research tradition that is expanding, scholars need access to the original texts rather than relying on secondhand accounts. Jean Piaget: Selected Works is a (...) chance to acquire key original texts, most of which have been previously unavailable for several years. (shrink)

‘You can’t stop progress’, we are endlessly told. But what is meant by “progress”? What is “progress” toward? We are rarely told. Human flourishing? And a culture? That would be a good start – but rarely seems a criterion for ‘progress’. Rather, ‘progress’ is simply a process, that we are not allowed, apparently, to stop. Or rather: it would be futile to seek to stop it. So that we are seemingly-deliberately demoralised into giving up even trying.Questioning the myth of ‘progress’, (...) and seeking to substitute for it the idea of real progress – progress which is actually assessed according to some independent not-purely-procedural criteria – is a vital thing to do, at this point in history. Literally: life, or at least civilisation, and thus culture, may depend on it.Once we overcome the myth of ‘progress’, we can clear the ground for a real politics that would jettison the absurd hubris of liberalism and of most ‘Leftism’. And would jettison the extreme Prometheanism and lack of precaution endemic to our current pseudo-democratic technocracy. The challenge is to do so in a way that does not fall into complete pessimism or into an endorsement of the untenable and unsavoury features of conservatism. The challenge, in other words, is to generate an ideology or philosophy for our time, that might yet save us, and ensure that we are worth saving.This paper is then a kind of reading of Wittgenstein’s crucial aphorism on this topic: ‘Our civilization is characterized by the word progress. Progress is its form rather than making progress being one of its features.’. (shrink)

This collection of eleven essays, four of them previously unpublished, extends from specific problems in metaphysics and epistemology to Lazerowitz' hypothesis about the hidden nature of philosophy. The book concludes the program of two previous books, The Structure of Metaphysics, and Studies in Metaphilosophy. The hypothesis was developed to explain a puzzle for both its friends and foes, that while it has always commanded great intellectual efforts, "in its 2400 years of existence, technical philosophy has not produced a (...) single uncontroverted proposition." Lazerowitz agrees that the essence of philosophy is not in the descriptive function of its statements. Using some Freudian insights, he helps to show that philosophy is one of those creative activities of man whose matter is language, and that it is similar to and distinguished from poetry and religion. The essays can be read independently of one another and each provides the reader a brisk workout in both scholarship and argumentation, with a provocative application of Lazerowitz' explanatory hypothesis at the end. Although he claims to be exposing what technical philosophers are really up to, and anticipates rejection of his thesis by those whom it most truly describes, this is a book to be enjoyed by accomplished philosophers, who have the erudition and technique to keep up and to appreciate the exercise.--M. B. M. (shrink)

This book aims to present trompe-l'oeil painting as an ambigous aesthetic ideal offered by early modern theory of art. It embodies the idea of an image identical to what it represents. It is interpreted in terms of perceptual and aesthetic illusion, mimesis, diegesis, play, irony and scientific illustration.

Since the first publication of Insight and Illusion in l972, a wealth of Wittgenstein's writings has become accessible. Accordingly, in this edition Professor Hacker has rewritten six of his eleven original chapters and revised the others to incorporate the new abundant material.Insight and Illusion now fully clarifies the historical backgrounds of Wittgenstein's highly differing masterpices, the Tractatus and the Investigations, and traces the evolution of Wittgenstein's thought. Hacker explains all of Wittgenstein's writings in detail, focusing on his critique (...) of metaphysics, his famous "private language argument," and his account of self consciousness. (shrink)

This article intends, firstly, to enrich the study of the role that the concept of tone plays in Kantian idea of reason, by extending it to the analysis of music as art of sounds, which the Critique of Judgment fulfills. Secondly, it aims to determine the grounds that could explain why the mathematics, due to the specificity of the philosophical method and the physical reception of music, respectively, are itself incapable to express the procedures of reason and of the art (...) of sounds. Finally, it points out a similarity between reason and music concerning their common rejection of succumbing to the Schwärmerei, although the distance which divides them as two contrary ways to exercise and promote the life and its feeling.O artigo tenciona, primeiramente, enriquecer o estudo da função que o conceito de tom desempenha na ideia kantiana de razão, ao estendê-lo à análise da música como arte dos sons que a Crítica do Juízo contém. Em segundo lugar, propõe-se determinar os motivos pelos quais a matemática se revela incapaz, devido à especificidade do método filosófico e à corporalidade da recepção musical, respectivamente, de expressar o modo de proceder da razão e da arte dos sons. Finalmente, aponta-se para uma semelhança entre música e razão, no que diz respeito à rejeição que compartilham da queda na Schwärmerei, apesar da distância que se estabelece entre ambas enquanto duas maneiras contrárias de exercitar e fomentar a vida e o sentimento dela. (shrink)

Since the first publication of Insight and Illusion in l972, a wealth of Wittgenstein's writings have become accessible. Accordingly, in this edition Professor Hacker has rewritten six of his eleven original chapters and revised the others to incorporate the new abundant material. Insight and Illusion now fully clarifies the historical backgrounds of Wittgenstein's highly different masterpieces, the Tractatus and the Investigations, and traces the evolution of Wittgenstein's thought. Hacker explains all of Wittgenstein's writings in detail, focusing on his (...) critique of metaphysics, his famous "private language argument," and his account of self-consciousness. (shrink)

Tibetan Buddhist writings frequently state that many of the things we perceive in the world are in fact illusory, as illusory as echoes or mirages. In Twelve Examples of Illusion , Jan Westerhoff offers an engaging look at a dozen illusions--including magic tricks, dreams, rainbows, and reflections in a mirror--showing how these phenomena can give us insight into reality. For instance, he offers a fascinating discussion of optical illusions, such as the wheel of fire (the "wheel" seen when a (...) torch is swung rapidly in a circle), discussing Tibetan explanations of this phenomenon as well as the findings of modern psychology, and significantly clarifying the idea that most phenomena--from chairs to trees--are similar illusions. The book uses a variety of crystal-clear examples drawn from a wide variety of fields, including contemporary philosophy and cognitive science, as well as the history of science, optics, artificial intelligence, geometry, economics, and literary theory. Throughout, Westerhoff makes both Buddhist philosophical ideas and the latest theories of mind and brain come alive for the general reader. -/- "This delightful book offers a rich and satisfying philosophical feast to anyone interested in the phenomenon of illusion itself or in the Buddhist analysis of the human condition. Westerhoff draws together classical Buddhist scholarship, contemporary cognitive science and his own judicious philosophical reflection in a serious but refreshingly accessible engagement with the Buddhist tradition in the exploration of the role of illusion in our cognitive and emotional lives." Jay L. Garfield, author of Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika -/- "Jan Westerhoff creatively juxtaposes an important Buddhist study of illusion with fascinating modern researches on illusory experiences, using the latter to illuminate the former. The result is a revealing account of the pervasiveness of illusion in our cognitive experience and the very structure of our cognitive apparatus. It brings to life the Buddhist discussion of illusion, making it relevant to our everyday experience instead of being high-minded intellectual exercises only." -/- Tao Jiang, author of Contexts and Dialogue: Yogacara Buddhism and Modern Psychology on the Subliminal Mind -/- "The twelve similes for the illusory nature of this world are very profound, and Westerhoff does them wonderful justice in this excellent book." -/- Robert Thurman, Jey Tsong Khapa Professor of Buddhist Studies, Columbia University. (shrink)

In this chapter I will employ a well-known scientific research heuristic that studies how something works by focusing on circumstances in which it does not work. Rather than trying to describe what scientific understanding would ideally look like, I will try to learn something about it by observing mundane cases where understanding is partly illusory. My main thesis is that scientists are prone to the illusion of depth of understanding (IDU), and as a consequence they sometimes overestimate the detail, (...) coherence, and depth of their understanding. I will analyze the notion of understanding and its relation to a sense of understanding. In order to make plausible the claim that these are often disconnected, I will describe an interesting series of psychological experiments by Frank Keil and his coauthors that suggests that ordinary people routinely overestimate the depth of their understanding. en I will argue that we should take seriously the possibility that scientific cognition is also aðected by IDU and spell out some possible causes of explanatory illusions in science. I will conclude this chapter by discussing how scientific explanatory practices could be improved and how the philosophy of science might be able to contribute to this process. (shrink)

Projecting Illusion offers a systematic analysis of the impression of reality in the cinema and the pleasure it gives to the film spectator. Film provides a compelling experience that can be considered as a form of illusion akin to the experience of day-dream and dream. Examining the concept of illusion and its relationship to fantasy in the experience of visual representation, Richard Allen situates his explanation within the context of an analytical criticism of contemporary film and critical (...) theory. He argues that many contemporary film theorists correctly identify the significance of the impression of reality, although their explanation of it is incorrect because of an invalid philosophical understanding of the relationship between the mind, representation and reality. Offering a clear presentation and critique of the central arguments of contemporary film and critical theory, Allen also touches on fundamental issues in current discourses of philosophy, art history and feminist theory. (shrink)

Illusion und Aufklärung: 1. Apologie der Illusion in Kants Opponenten-Rede gegen Johann Gottlieb Kreutzfeld. 2. Eine heilsame Illusion: wie die Kultur aus der Natur entsteht. 3. Acedia und das radikal Böse -- Praktiken der Illusion in der Moderne: 1. Nietzsches Tanz um die Philosophie. 2. Erzeugung von Zukunft. Sprachformen der Apokalypse bei Hermann Cohen. 3. Zu Benjamins Kritik des Scheins im Wahlverwandtschaftenaufsatz mit einem Exkurs zu Cohens Behandlung des Empfindungsproblems. 4. Heilsame Illusion und auratische Wahrnehmung. (...) 5. Antigenealogische Revolte und Reproduktion -- Nachspiel: Diffraktion Statt Reflexion. Die Fadenspiele von Donna J. Haraway: eine Methode mit kleinem "m.". (shrink)

It is often thought that Hegel’s social philosophy is straightforwardly hostile toward liberal ideals. In this article, I contend that many such suspicions can be dispelled through a more nuanced engagement with his rhetorical and argumentative strategies. To tackle such a broad topic in this space, I focus on the shortcomings of a rights-based individualism within the Philosophy of Right — where Hegel describes civil society as a ‘semblance’ [Schein] of a rational polity. Although such passages might suggest (...) the collectivism that has long haunted his legacy, I propose that he is offering something rather more normatively attractive. More specifically, I argue that his grammar of recognition disinters the suppressed social conditions for those rights (and the individuality they protect) that are often misrecognized as foundational by liberal theorists. (shrink)

This major study of Kant provides a detailed examination of the development and function of the doctrine of transcendental illusion in his theoretical philosophy. The author shows that a theory of 'illusion' plays a central role in Kant's arguments about metaphysical speculation and scientific theory. Indeed, she argues that we cannot understand Kant unless we take seriously his claim that the mind inevitably acts in accordance with ideas and principles that are 'illusory'. Taking this claim seriously, we (...) can make much better sense of Kant's arguments and reach a deeper understanding of the role he allots human reason in science. (shrink)

To express concern for our "relationship" with our environment is immediately to raise the questions of what our environment is and what sort of relationship we do--or ought to--have with it. While environmental thinkers frequently make broad factual and normative claims about our environment, I argue that these claims are usually based on a profound misunderstanding of the scope and limits of human knowledge; specifically, they overlook the ambiguity of our knowledge of our environment in favor of the apparent certainty (...) of speculative philosophy. I take as an important symptom of this the pronounced ambivalence of environmental thinkers toward the sciences, in consequence of which environmental thought cannot adequately integrate detailed, scientific knowledge of the material relationships that constitute our environment and bind us to it. ;Drawing from sources in the history of philosophy, the history and philosophy of science, and the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, I re-evaluate the conceptual and theoretical bases of environmental thought, assess the possibilities and limits of our knowledge of material relationships as studied by ecology and the other environmental sciences, and discuss relevance of that knowledge for practical decision-making. James Lovelock's "Gaia" hypothesis serves as the key example throughout. ;Finally, I establish that an emphasis on scientific knowledge, properly understood, results in a radical revision of the meaning and the prospects of environmental thought. I identify three aspects of this revision: from theories of "relatedness" to an appropriate attention to material, particularly biological, relationships; from "biocentrism" to a newly constituted "anthropocentrism"; and from intellectualism to a more broadly based "environmental pragmatics," in which philosophy and the sciences each play a vital though narrowly circumscribed role. (shrink)

Illusion is a significant concept in philosophy, art history, literary theory and aesthetics. It has a concrete scientific basis in the perspective of modern cognitive neuroscience. Historically, it has been critically discussed by many philosophers, including Plato, Bacon, Descartes, Kant, and Nietzsche, who considered it to be a distortion of reality. Yet illusion is connected with so many basic aesthetic issues -- such as ambiguity, imagination, and imagery -- that it remains an indispensable concept in modern aesthetics. (...) In the different art media communication of creators with appreciators involves illusory imagery. Its importance is emphasized by Ernst Gombrich in his Art and Illusion, one of the most influential art history texts in the English-speaking world. The concept of illusion becomes the crossing point of classical philosophy and contemporary aesthetics. In this article, the philosophical, psychological and aesthetic bases of illusion will be introduced. In different fields, illusion has different content, but depends on the same psychological mechanisms. The neural mechanisms that underpin aesthetic illusion in contemporary artistic production also function in the modern ideology described by Adorno, Eagleton, and Williams. Not all aesthetic illusions have positive functions, which sometimes leads to distorted cognition and emotional complexity. When it deviates too far from reality, aesthetic illusion contains particular cognitive emotional qualities that conflict with artistic imagery in classical arts. As a bearer of modern aesthetic emotion, it is also shaped by special economic and political situations and always has a kind of ideological character. Thus aesthetic illusion often promotes new configurations of aesthetics and art history. (shrink)

In this chapter I will employ a well-known scientific research heuristic that studies how something works by focusing on circumstances in which it does not work. Rather than trying to describe what scientific understanding would ideally look like, I will try to learn something about it by observing mundane cases where understanding is partly illusory. My main thesis is that scientists are prone to the illusion of depth of understanding (IDU), and as a consequence they sometimes overestimate the detail, (...) coherence, and depth of their understanding. I will analyze the notion of understanding and its relation to a sense of understanding. In order to make plausible the claim that these are often disconnected, I will describe an interesting series of psychological experiments by Frank Keil and his coauthors that suggests that ordinary people routinely overestimate the depth of their understanding. en I will argue that we should take seriously the possibility that scientific cognition is also aðected by IDU and spell out some possible causes of explanatory illusions in science. I will conclude this chapter by discussing how scientific explanatory practices could be improved and how the philosophy of science might be able to contribute to this process. (shrink)

(2000). The illusion of permanence: Work motivation and membership turnover at twin oaks community. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy: Vol. 3, The Philosophy of Utopia, pp. 157-171.

30th Nov. and 1st Dec. 2013 at Kyoto University. Organizer: Takeshi Sakon.

The Illusion of Doubt confronts one of the most important questions in philosophy and beyond: what can we know? The radical sceptic's answer is 'not very much' if we cannot prove that we are not subject to deception. For centuries philosophers have been impressed by the radical sceptic's move, but this book shows that the radical sceptical problem turns out to be an illusion created by a mistaken picture of our evidential situation. This means that we don't (...) need to answer the radical sceptical problem 'head on', but rather to undermine the philosophical assumptions that it depends on. For without these assumptions, radical scepticism collapses all by itself. This result is highly significant, as it manages to dissolve one of the most intractable philosophical problems that has bedevilled some of the greatest minds until the present day. (shrink)

Wie frei sind wir? Ist der freie Wille eine Illusion? Mit dem Disput zwischen Philosophie und empirischen Wissenschaften um unsere Freiheit greift dieser Band eine Debatte auf, die in jüngster Zeit nicht nur akademisch mit Vehemenz geführt wurde, sondern auch auf breite öffentliche Resonanz gestoßen ist. Der Autor kritisiert den empirischen Angriff auf unseren freien Willen, stellt aber zugleich die abstrakte philosophische Freiheitsdebatte auf eine solide empirische Basis und deckt so nicht nur die Grenzen, sondern auch die Perspektiven einer (...) empirischen Annäherung an die philosophische Frage Wie frei sind wir? auf. (shrink)