This article makes a comparative examination of the widening spectrum of cases in which both tort law and contract law are employed, jointly or separately, to impose non-consensual liability on a contracting party. The article focuses on liability imposed on a contracting party either toward another contracting party or toward a third party for failure to perform an obligation that, on the one hand, is predicated on and arises from the contract, but, on the other hand, does not genuinely originate (...) in the consent of the liable party because it is external to her genuine intention. The primary objective of this article is to propose general guidelines for either choosing between tort law and contract law when imposing non-consensual liability on a contracting party or else allowing liability under both headings. These guidelines for the classification of non-consensual liability also bear on the preliminary question of whether to impose non-consensual liability at all and on the delicate interplay between contract and tort in general and particularly when the two lead to conflicting legal outcomes. (shrink)

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 threw the world into an unexpected turmoil; schools were closed, exams cancelled, and educational systems were forced to react to deep and unexpected changes. In educational policy, however, the idea that we should prepare for an unknown, uncontrollable and risky future has been widely accepted long before the outbreak. Building on insights from complexity theory and the study of dynamic systems, the article critically examines how the standard educational response to future unpredictability, (...) which focuses on enhancing adaptability, fares in a time of crisis. It is argued that the emphasis on adaptability in response to a world that is increasingly becoming volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous is often uncritically embraced in educational policy. We suggest that furthering adaptability through education could be suited for tackling everyday uncertainty, yet is an ill-suited response to crisis situations because it hinders transformative change. The article also points to some additional difficulties with striving to further adaptability. Instead, it is argued that developing a vision might prove to be instrumental in guiding an adequate educational response. It is acknowledged that relying on a vision might raise some difficulties, but it is maintained that these can be, at least partially, avoided. (shrink)

Israel Scheffler is the pre-eminent philosopher of education in the English-speaking world today. This volume collects seventeen original, invited papers on Scheffler's philosophy of education by scholars from around the world. The papers address the wide range of topics that Scheffler's work in philosophy of education has addressed, including the aims of education, cognition and emotion, teaching, the language of education, science education, moral education, religious education, and human potential. Each paper is followed by a response from Scheffler himself. (...) The collection is essential reading for anyone concerned with contemporary scholarship in philosophy of education, or with the place of this singularly important author in it. (shrink)

This book argues that the irreducible singularity of each person as a psychical subject implies the privacy of the psychical and that of experience, and yet the private accessibility of each person to his or her mind is compatible with interpersonal communication and understanding. The book treats these major issues against the background of the author's original metaphysics--panenmentalism."--Publisher's website.

The commentaries address our view of abstraction, our ontology of abstract entities, and our account of predictive cognition as relying on relatively concrete simulation or relatively abstract theory-based inference. These responses revisit classic questions concerning mental representation and abstraction in the context of current models of predictive cognition. The counter arguments to our article echo: constructivist theories of knowledge, “neat” approaches in artificial intelligence and decision theory, neo-empiricist models of concepts, and externalist views of cognition. We offer several empirical predictions (...) that address points of contention and that highlight the generative potential of our model. (shrink)

This book elaborates the author's original metaphysics, panenmentalism, focusing on novel aspects of the singularity of any person. Among these aspects, integrated in a systematic view, are: love and singularity; private, intersubjective, and public accessibility; multiple personality; freedom of will; akrasia; a way out of the empiricist-rationalist conundrum; the possibility of God; and some major moral questions.

Brain-imaging technologies have posed the problem of breaching our brain privacy. Until the invention of those technologies, many of us entertained the idea that nothing can threaten our mental privacy, as long as we kept it, for each of us has private access to his or her own mind but no access to any other. Yet, philosophically, the issue of private, mental accessibility appears to be quite unsettled, as there are still many philosophers who reject the idea of private, mental (...) accessibility. I have attempted to refute such rejections and to establish this idea on firmer grounds. My arguments in this paper show that brain imaging allows no access to our mind and that mind privacy is quite different from brain privacy, as the latter can be breached by brain imaging, whereas the former cannot. A reduction of the mind to the body inescapably fails, as there is a categorial difference between mind and body or brain, which is compatible with their inseparability. Brain imaging cannot enable one to “read” the mind or to breach our mental privacy. There is no external access to one’s mind. Each of us has exclusive access to his or her own mind. (shrink)

Immunologists use psychological and cognitive terms to describe and explain the behavior of our immune system. Do they use them metaphorically or literally? In this paper I show that on the grounds of some psychophysical assumptions, the uniqueness of each person as an individual organism necessarily corresponds to the singularity of each person as a psychological subject. On the basis of these assumptions, immunologists, irrespective of their various conceptual frames, are entitled to ascribe psychological and cognitive traits to our immune (...) system and its behavior. Immunologists are allowed to do so because each immune system of any higher, unique individual organism corresponds to psychological traits, which are ascribable only to persons, each of whom is a singular being. This correspondence is necessarily compatible with the psychophysical unity or inseparability. Furthermore, the psychological or cognitive traits pertain to the immune system require no consciousness. In the case of artificial immune systems, in contrast, the application of psychological or cognitive terms is only metaphorical, for each such system is not unique but it is duplicable or replicable. Only the immune system of unique individual organisms that as psychological subjects are singular beings—i.e. persons—can be subject, literally or non-metaphorically, to psychological and cognitive terms. (shrink)

The time-honored questions concerning the meaning and significance of life should be discussed not only in the light of various philosophical and literary considerations but also from the natural scientific perspectives as human beings are conditioned parts of nature as a whole. Hence, in this paper, I discuss these questions from the perspectives of two major and universal scientific fields, namely, generalized crystallography and quantum mechanics. On the philosophical grounds, the question of the meaning and, especially, the significance of life (...) should be focused on the assumption that each human being is a singular individual whose significance is universal. Such a philosophical approach is compatible with the two above-mentioned natural scientific aspects. (shrink)

An account of the essentially Aristotelian philosophy of John Sergeant (1623-1707) and his Blackloist colleagues, Kenelm Digby and Thomas White. Sergeant and his circle were concerned to present a theology and philosophy immune to sceptical doubts; and, though hitherto neglected, they exemplify an important aspect of seventeenth-century thought.

This book is a detailed study of how Plato constructs his seminal philosophical dialogue, the Phaedo, as a unique tragedy, a poetic masterpiece whose structure is organic and symmetrical. Plato's mental Odyssey leads to the internal drama of the Phaedo plot. The analysis examines how Plato's literary art overcomes the philosophical problem of the separation of Ideas from sensible things. And it traces literary and philosophical offspring of the mental Odyssey, including Joyce and Proust.

From Mendeleev’s time on, the Periodic Table has been an attempt to exhaust all the chemical possibilities of the elements and their interactions, whether these elements are known as actual or are not known yet as such. These latter elements are called “eka-elements” and there are still some of them in the current state of the Table. There is no guarantee that they will be eventually discovered, synthesized, or isolated as actual. As long as the actual existence of eka-elements is (...) predicted, they cannot be considered as actual but only as purely possible. Given that eka-elements are chemical pure possibilities, a possibilist approach, entitled “panenmentalism,” can gain support as well as an important implication. (shrink)

In recent years, scientists have increasingly taken to investigate the predictive nature of cognition. We argue that prediction relies on abstraction, and thus theories of predictive cognition need an explicit theory of abstract representation. We propose such a theory of the abstract representational capacities that allow humans to transcend the “here-and-now.” Consistent with the predictive cognition literature, we suggest that the representational substrates of the mind are built as ahierarchy, ranging from the concrete to the abstract; however, we argue that (...) there are qualitative differences between elements along this hierarchy, generating meaningful, often unacknowledged,diversity.Echoing views from philosophy, we suggest that the representational hierarchy can be parsed into:modality-specificrepresentations, instantiated on perceptual similarity;multimodalrepresentations, instantiated primarily on the discovery of spatiotemporal contiguity; andcategoricalrepresentations, instantiated primarily on social interaction. These elements serve as the building blocks ofcomplex structures discussed in cognitive psychology (e.g., episodes, scripts) and are the inputs for mental representations that behave like functions, typically discussed in linguistics (i.e.,predicators). We support our argument for representational diversity by explaining how the elements in our ontology are all required to account for humans’ predictive cognition (e.g., in subserving logic-based prediction; in optimizing the trade-off between accurate and detailed predictions) and by examining how the neuroscientific evidence coheres with our account. In doing so, we provide a testable model of the neural bases of conceptual cognition and highlight several important implications to research on self-projection, reinforcement learning, and predictive-processing models of psychopathology. (shrink)

In discussing cruelty toward human beings, I argue that disregarding the singularity of any human being is necessary for treating her or him cruelly. The cruelty of Peter the Great, relying upon the intolerance of any human singular individuality, serves me as a paradigm-case to illustrate that. The cruelty of Procrustes and that of Stalin rely upon similar grounds. Relating to a person’s singularity is sufficient to prevent cruelty toward that person. In contrast, a liberal state of mind or solidarity (...) is insufficient to prevent cruelty and, under some circumstances, may even cause it. (shrink)

Regardless or independent of any actuality or actualization and exempt from spatiotemporal and causal conditions, each individual possibility is pure. Actualism excludes the existence of individual pure possibilities, altogether or at least as existing independently of actual reality. In this paper, I demonstrate, on the grounds of my possibilist metaphysics—panenmentalism—how some of the most fascinating scientific discoveries in chemistry could not have been accomplished without relying on pure possibilities and the ways in which they relate to each other . The (...) discoveries are the following: Dan Shechtman’s discovery of quasicrystals; Linus Pauling’s alpha helix; the discovery of F. Sherwood Rowland and Mario J. Molina concerning the destruction of the atmospheric ozone layer; and Neil Bartlett’s noble gas compounds. On the grounds of the analysis of these cases, actualism must fail, whereas panenmentalism gains support. (shrink)

Considering various arguments in Hume’s Treatise, I reconstruct a Humean argument against personal identity or unity. According to this argument, each distinct perception is separable from the bundle of perceptions to which it belongs and is thus transferable either to the external, material reality or to another psychical reality, another bundle of perceptions. Nevertheless, such transference (Hume’s word!) is entirely illegitimate, otherwise Hume’s argument against causal inference would have failed; furthermore, it violates private, psychical accessibility. I suggest a Humean thought (...) experiment clearly demonstrating that, to the extent that anything within a psychical reality is concerned, no distinction leads to separation or transference and that private, psychical accessibility has to be allowed in the Humean argument for personal identity or unity. Private accessibility and psychical untransferability secure personal identity and unity. Referring to the phenomenon of multiple personality along the lines of the Humean argument for personal identity or unity, I illustrate both private accessibility and a possible notion of one and the same person distinct from his/her alters or psychical parts. Finally, I show why Parfit’s Humean argument against personal identity must fail. (shrink)

Brutus wanted to kill Caesar. He believed that Caesar was an ordinary mortal, and that, given this, stabbing him (by which we mean plunging a knife into his heart) was a way of killing him. He thought that he could stab Caesar, for he remembered that he had a knife and saw that Caesar was standing next to him on his left, in the Forum. So Brutus was motivated to stab the man to his left. He did so, thereby killing (...) Caesar. (shrink)

The paper proposes to base the notion of the significance of life on the grounds of the singularity of each person as a psychical subject, i.e. personal singularity. No two persons are alike; each one of us, as a person, is intrinsically different from every other person. This personal singularity has a universal significance, namely, it makes a universal difference, whether or not this difference is distinct and acknowledged. Because morality and the significance of a person's life both rely upon (...) personal singularity, there is an inseparable connection between morality and the significance of a human life. Nevertheless, as relying upon personal singularity, there is no insignificant or meaningless life, for a person's life has a universal significance whatever the actions of that person may be. Immoral actions or behavior do not reflect or express the personal singularity of an agent, whereas moral ones reflect or express this singularity. There is more to personal singularity and the significance of life than morality. As singularity is not subject to any comparison or competition, personal singularity implies that the life of one person is not more significant than the life of any other person. Thus, in my view, the significance of life is strictly egalitarian. (shrink)

This book discovers areas and themes, especially in philosophical psychology, for novel observations and investigations, the diversity of which is systematically unified within the frame of the author¿s original metaphysics, panenmentalism. The book demonstrates how by means of truthful fictions we may detect meaningful possibilities as well as their necessary relationships that otherwise could not be discovered.

By critically interrogating the methodological foundations of orthodox economic theory, Tal Gilead challenges the growing conviction in educational policymaking quarters that, being more scientific than other forms of educational investigation, inquiries grounded in orthodox economics should provide the basis for educational policymaking. He argues that the main methodological problem with accepting orthodox economic theory as a guide to educational policymaking is not, as commonly claimed, its alleged reliance on a materialistic and egoistic conception of human nature, but rather its (...) embracement of a value-free conception of science and the hypothetico-deductive model of prediction. These, Gilead maintains, prevent economics-based investigations from adequately dealing with questions of human agency and ethics, which are central to education. Orthodox economic thinking, he concludes, should not be accorded a dominant role in educational policymaking, but rather should only be viewed as providing one additional source of insight that has limited applicability. (shrink)

This book presents a systemic analysis of Spinoza’s philosophy and challenges the traditional views. It deals with Spinoza’s concepts of substance, truth conditions, attributes, and the first, second, and supreme grades of knowledge. Based upon an analysis of the relevant details in all of Spinoza’s philosophical works, the book reveals many important points, including the following: Spinoza’s system is not, nor is meant to be, a foundational-deductive system but was meant to be a coherent system of a network model. Spinoza’s (...) reality is not made in the image of a mathematical model. Imaginatio, the first grade of knowledge, and ratio, the second grade, are parts or properties of the supreme grade of knowledge, scientia intuitiva, which is their essence. Finite beings, especially humans, are necessary and eternal (unless they are mistakenly perceived by imaginatio) whereas time, place, and death are simply “entities of imagination.” The salvation, happiness, and blessedness that Spinoza’s Ethics offers us, are active and depend only upon us. Concluding a careful examination and interpretation, the book suggests additional novel viewpoints in interpreting Spinoza’s philosophical psychology and political philosophy. (shrink)

Human reason consists of all the patterns of individuation and order, of a priori concepts, principles, ideas and the ideal, as well as interests, needs, imperatives, postulates, and ends, whether embodied in theory, in practice, or in aesthetic judgment. Our reason is not an aggregate but a system. In other words, the unity of all these aspects, parts, and activities of reason is determined a priori and, therefore, necessarily. This multiplicity is subordinated to the unity of the end of reason (...) as a whole. Kant deals with this problem in “The Architectonic of Pure Reason” of the Critique of Pure Reason. Architectonic is the art of systems, a theory about the scientific nature of our knowledge, since there is no science without systematic unity. (shrink)

The Spinozistic essence is the factor of individuation of a particular or individual thing. Affects or emotions are properties of an essence, which, under the attribute of thought, is an idea, i.e., cognition. Such essence is the human mind, which is the idea of a particular actual body. Since our emotions are properties of our cognitions, whether adequate or not, concerning the state of our body, which reflects nature as a whole in a particular way, I entitle Spinoza’s theory of (...) emotions "cognitivism." In light of Spinoza’s cognitivism, I attempt to explain what is precisely the significance of the intellectual love of God and how cognitive means serves Spinoza’s philosophical psychotherapy or theory of salvation. (edited). (shrink)

Already in 1863, Jules Verne knew about Caselli's "pantelegraphy," which was what he described as a "photographic telegraphy, invented during the last century by Professor Giovanni Caselli of Florence."1 Following the mistaken belief that facsimile machines could not been invented until well after the nineteenth century, and wrongly assuming that Caselli was a fictional inventor, merely a figment of Verne's most productive fertile imagination (as such imaginative elements characterize his latter writings), some of Verne's readers mistakenly ascribed to him the (...) discovery of the possibility of the fax machine. They thus committed what I will call soon "a reversed actualist fallacy."In challenging actualist mistakes .. (shrink)

Since the 1960s, the influence of economic thought on education has been steadily increasing. Taking Jean-Jacques Rousseau's educational thought as a point of departure, Tal Gilead critically inquires into the philosophical foundations of what can be termed the economic approach to education. Gilead's focus in this essay is on happiness and the role that education should play in promoting it. The first two parts of the essay provide an introduction to Rousseau's conception of happiness, followed by an examination (...) of the economic approach to education and the notion of human capital. In the course of this discussion, Gilead shows that increasing happiness is one of the economic approach's major aims. In the third part of the essay, he uses Rousseau's views to interrogate significant aspects of the economic approach to education. He then continues by highlighting some of the educational implications that stem from Rousseau's critique. Gilead maintains that Rousseau's ideas can provide valuable suggestions regarding how education might contribute to the promotion of happiness. The article concludes by proposing that while Rousseau's ideas on the matter should not necessarily be embraced, contemporary policymakers can learn some important lessons from them. (shrink)

This article examines how the existence of unpredictability should influence the quest to promote distributive justice in education. First, the article briefly discusses resource allocation in education finance policy and its relationships with existing philosophical theories of distributive justice. It then explains why unpredictability comes into play in education and how this endangers the achievements of distributive justice. It is argued that unpredictability poses a real challenge to enhancing educational justice. Second, the article examines the common policy conception that educational (...) justice can best be promoted by reducing unpredictability through means of increased control. It is maintained that the costs of this solution exceed its benefits. Finally, the article offers alternative routes for dealing with unpredictability in educational resource allocations. It is argued that we have good reasons, both normative and practical, to embrace a new approach for furthering distributive justice in education that takes into account the complexity of the educational system. (shrink)

The boldest and most unsettling of the major early modern philosophers, Spinoza, had a much greater, if often concealed, impact on the international intellectual scene and on the early Enlightenment than philosophers, historians, and political theorists have conventionally tended to recognize. Europe-wide efforts to prevent the reading public and university students learning about Spinoza, the man and his work, in the years immediately after his death in 1677, dominated much of his early reception owing to the revolutionary implications of his (...) thought for philosophy, religion, practical ethics and lifestyle, Bible criticism, and political theory. Nevertheless, contrary to what has sometimes been maintained, his general impact was immediate, very widespread, and profound. One of the main objectives of the book is to show how early and how deeply Leibniz, Bayle, Arnauld, Henry More, Anne Conway, Richard Baxter, Robert Boyle, Henry Oldenburg, Pierre-Daniel Huet, Richard Simon, and Nicholas Steno, among many others, were affected by and led to wrestle with his principal ideas. (shrink)

Over the last two decades, complexity theory, which is designed to deal with systems of multiple interdependent variables, has been increasingly applied to analyse and shed light on various aspects of education. So far, however, complexity theory has rarely been used, if at all, to examine questions related to educational justice. This article offers a theoretical examination of some possible links between complexity theory and distributive justice in education. It asks how accepting the premise that education is a complex dynamic (...) system should shape the way distributive justice in education is conceptualized and approached. It is argued that complexity theory challenges many assumptions on which the dominant approach for dealing with distributive justice in education rests. The article focuses on three subjects that stem from complexity theory but have implications for dealing with distributive justice in education: system diversity, reductionism, and change. Each of these subjects is examined separately, and some possible contributions of complexity theory to illuminating these subjects in relation to distributive justice in education are discussed. The article ends with a brief illustration of where a complexity-based approach to educational justice leads that focuses on school choice and contrasts it with Brighouse's views on this issue. (shrink)

The idea that science teaching in schools should prepare the ground for society's future technical and scientific progress has played an important role in shaping modern education. This idea, however, was not always present. In this article, I examine how this idea first emerged in educational thought. Early in the 17th century, Francis Bacon asserted that the study of nature should serve to improve living conditions for all members of society. Although influential, Bacon's idea was not easily assimilated by educational (...) thinkers who remained committed to the traditional aims of teaching about nature. Yet in the second half of the 18th century a change has occurred; educational thinkers started to embrace Baconian ideas and therefore argued that science teaching should be oriented towards generating future scientific progress. Analysing the work of 18th century French and British educational thinkers, this article links the emergence of this new view to developments in the understanding of natural philosophy and to a rising interest in it. It is argued, however, that in themselves, these developments could not adequately explain why Baconian ideas started to influence educational theory in the time in which they did. It is maintained that the incorporation of Baconian ideas into educational thought resulted from a fundamental theoretical shift in the understanding of the role of education itself. (shrink)

This book presents a philosophy of science, based on panenmentalism: an original modal metaphysics, which is realist about individual pure (non-actual) possibilities and rejects the notion of possible worlds. The book systematically constructs a new and novel way of understanding and explaining scientific progress, discoveries, and creativity. It demonstrates that a metaphysics of individual pure possibilities is indispensable for explaining and understanding mathematics and natural sciences. It examines the nature of individual pure possibilities, actualities, mind-dependent and mind-independent possibilities, as well (...) as mathematical entities. It discusses in detail the singularity of each human being as a psychical possibility. It analyses striking scientific discoveries, and illustrates by means of examples of the usefulness and vitality of individual pure possibilities in the sciences. (shrink)

In recent decades education is increasingly perceived as an instrument for generating economic growth and enhancing production. Unexpectedly, however, many prominent economists, throughout history, have rejected this view of education. This article examines the grounds on which Tibor Scitovsky, who was one of the leading economists of twentieth century America, objected to the spread of production oriented education. The article begins by an historical overview of the relationship between economic and educational theory. It then explains why Scitovsky held the economic (...) growth achieved in the 20th necessitates an educational reform and presents the outline of this proposed educational reform. It is argued that by distinguishing between creative and defensive forms of consumption and by highlighting the inherent tension between comfort and pleasure, Scitovsky offers an innovative and challenging conception of the desired relationship between economics and education that can serve as an alternative to the one that prevails today and amend its many fallacies. The paper concludes by briefly exploring some of the educational implications that stem from Scitovsky’s thought. It is maintained that Scitovsky’s views provides an original defense for teaching the arts and humanities and a suggestive perspective on consumer education and teaching of high culture. (shrink)

I attempt to save akrasia from the skeptical doubt and denial as to its possibility in a new way. I argue that the akratic agent – the akrates – has unconscious reason(s) for the akratic action. Moreover, the akrates does not weigh and value the reasons for and against the akratic action in full awareness, including their emotive significance, consciously experienced as feelings. He follows his feelings favoring the akratic action (since he does not tolerate or resist them), and does (...) not let his unconscious emotions, supporting the wanted, chosen action, play a causal role in impelling him to perform this action. (shrink)

This book, combining integratively-revised previously-published papers with entirely new chapters, challenges and treats some major problems in Kant’s philosophy not by means of new interpretations but by suggesting some variations on Kantian themes. Such variations are, in fact, reconstructions made according to Kantian ideas and principles and yet cannot be extracted as such directly from his writings. The book also analyses Kant's philosophy from a new metaphysical angle, based on the original metaphysics of the author, called panenmentalism. It reconstructs some (...) missing links in Kant's philosophy, such as the idea of teleological time, which is vital for Kant's moral theory. Although these variations cannot be found literally in Kant’s works, they can be legitimately explicated, developed, and implied from them. Such is the case because these variations are strictly compatible with the details of the texts and the texts as wholes, and because they are systematically integrated. Their coherence supports their validation. The target audiences are graduate and PhD students as well as specialist researchers of Kant's philosophy. (shrink)

This book, combining integratively-revised previously-published papers with entirely new chapters, challenges and treats some major problems in Kant’s philosophy not by means of new interpretations but by suggesting some variations on Kantian themes. Such variations are, in fact, reconstructions made according to Kantian ideas and principles and yet cannot be extracted as such directly from his writings. The book also analyses Kant's philosophy from a new metaphysical angle, based on the original metaphysics of the author, called panenmentalism. It reconstructs some (...) missing links in Kant's philosophy, such as the idea of teleological time, which is vital for Kant's moral theory. Although these variations cannot be found literally in Kant’s works, they can be legitimately explicated, developed, and implied from them. Such is the case because these variations are strictly compatible with the details of the texts and the texts as wholes, and because they are systematically integrated. Their coherence supports their validation. The target audiences are graduate and PhD students as well as specialist researchers of Kant's philosophy. (shrink)

The attempts to justify torture tacitly assume that no person is a singular being. This assumption ignores the ontological and moral status of any human being as a singular subject, whose inner, psychical reality cannot be accessible from without, and whose value as a singular being is universal. Were torturers and those who attempt to justify them right, the categorical difference between objects and persons would be obliterated. Torturers also ignore the absolute moral rights of any person as a singular (...) human being, however atrocious. In light of the principle that any person is a singular human being, I clarify in detail that inflicting torture is absolutely immoral. Torture fails to meet the universal test emerging from the singularity principle. (AN PHL2160254) Subjects: ETHICS; PERSON; SINGULARITY; TERRORISM; TORTURE. (shrink)

First published in 1991, _In Praise of Cognitive Emotions_ comprises fourteen of Scheffler's most recent essays - all of which challenge contemporary notions of education and rationality. While defending the ideal of rationality, he insists that rationality not be identified with a mental faculty or a mechanism of inference but taken rather as the capactity to grasp principles and purposes and to evaluate them in the light of relevant reasons. Examining a broad range of issues - from computers in school (...) to math education, from metaphor to morality - these essays are unified by Scheffler's conviction of the primacy of critical thought in education. Scheffler is especially concerned to promote a broad interpretation of rationality to counteract the narrowing of vision accompanying the technological revolution now sweeping education. Addressing three specific areas of curriculum, the work offers a critique of computer applications to education, develops a notion of strategic rationality in understanding mathematical reasoning, and, contrary to prevalent notions of moral education, connects reason with care, thus emphasizing the intimate connection between emotion and reason and challenging the dominant perception of the two as oppositional. (shrink)

1. At its core, education is characterized by a preoccupation with the future. Despite the notable lack of agreement concerning the aims of education (e.g., social mobility, personal development, w...