Neste artigo apresentamos as análises fenomenológicas sobre a dor que Jan Patočka desenvolveu nos anos 40. Nelas, o filósofo aponta para uma posição interessante sobre a dor como uma experiência do mal. Em particular, a dor é uma intenção negativa, onde existe um objeto peculiar que aniquila todos os objetos possíveis aos quais os desejos humanos aspiram. Esta tese do filósofo checo, além de esclarecer todo o seu trabalho, enquadra-‑se plenamente nos atuais debates filosóficos e interdisciplinares sobre a dor.

Será la guerra, justamente, el escenario propicio para el abuso de cadáveres con fines políticos, en el que confluyen dos elementos consustanciales al Mal. El primero apunta a la negación del Otro como ser humano y sujeto de derecho, lo cual habilita al agresor para proceder con crueldad sobre su víctima. El segundo remite a la gradual “espectacularización” del cadáver, cuyas imágenes develan el ensañamiento con el Otro. Del arte a las imágenes digitales, las escenografías del Mal se despliegan de (...) modo polisémico. El drama, por lo tanto, acontece en la puesta en escena del sufrimiento del otro, reside no solo en el rostro de dolor y el grito de muerte del derrotado -o en el placer, coraje o valentía de su verdugo-, sino también en un más allá, en el uso y abuso del cadáver enemigo para prolongar el daño y el dolor -directa o indirectamente- en el deudo y su comunidad. (shrink)

O artigo trata da relação entre Humanidades, Ciências Humanas e Sociais e Filosofia, considerada à luz dos projetos pedagógico e epistêmico das humanidades clássicas, tendo por fio condutor a Renascença italiana e os Studia Humanitatis, com a Filosofia como disciplina-piloto. Ao fazer o trânsito para a modernidade, com o surgimento das ciências humanas e sociais e o descentramento da filosofia, haverá o colapso dos projetos pedagógico e epistêmico dos Studia dos renascentistas, num ambiente de pesada cultura disciplinar, tendo por resultado (...) a ultrafragmentação do conhecimento, levada a cabo sem qualquer perspectiva de unificação. O resultado é o mal-estar epistemológico, que vai junto com a ideia de perda de relevância da filosofia, ao se ver afastada dos processos pedagógico e epistêmico das ciências, e, paralelamente, das próprias disciplinas científicas, impedidas, em razão da ultrafragmentação, de nos dar uma visão unificada da humanidade e da realidade humana circundante. Tal situação levará ao questionamento acerca da oportunidade de relançamento do projeto pedagógico-epistêmico das Humanidades Clássicas, visando vencer o mal-estar epistemológico e a síndrome da irrelevância da filosofia e das ciências empíricas do homem. Contudo, como mostraremos, tal relançamento não poderá consistir numa volta aos Studia ou em sua retomada pura e simples, mas deverá dar-se em novas bases científicas e filosóficas, levado a cabo em bases interdisciplinares, e não mais holísticas, com a filosofia como disciplina-piloto, como na Renascença. Neste cenário, o Brasil será considerado e uma proposta condizente com o nosso contexto acadêmico e a realidade nacional nos dias de hoje será feita. (shrink)

Valérie Chevassus-Marchionni | : Après une étude de la notion de symptôme en psychanalyse chez Freud et chez Lacan, la paresse est envisagée précisément comme un symptôme. Mais quel peut être le sens de ce symptôme? Quelle est la nature du désir inconscient qui préside à son apparition? Après avoir considéré plusieurs causalités et élaboré quelques interprétations possibles, nous nous intéressons au cas particulier du personnage d’Oblomov dans le roman éponyme d’Ivan Gontcharov. Si la paresse d’Oblomov a un sens (...) qu’il est possible de déterminer à l’aide des outils de la psychanalyse, il est intéressant aussi de ne pas en chercher à tout prix la signification et de l’envisager davantage comme un sinthome au sens lacanien du terme : Oblomov ferait usage de sa paresse comme d’une véritable création visant à contourner son mal-être et à lui permettre de s’accommoder à sa manière des souffrances générées par son existence et sa sensibilité. En conclusion est présenté succinctement le cas de Svevo qui donne de la paresse une illustration bien différente. | : A study of the notion of symptom in psychoanalysis in Freud’s and Lacan’s work shows that laziness can be regarded exactly as a symptom. But what can be the significance of this symptom? What is the nature of the unconscious desire which presides over its appearance? Having considered several causalities and developed some possible interpretations, we’re concerned with the particular case of the character of Oblomov in Ivan Gontcharov’s eponym novel. If Oblomov’s laziness has a significance which it is possible to determine by means of the tools of psychoanalysis, it is also interesting not to look at all costs for the meaning and to envisage it more as a sinthome in the Lacanian sense of the term : Oblomov would make use of his laziness as a real creation to bypass his ill-being and to adapt, in his own way, to the sufferings generated by his existence and sensitivity. In conclusion is briefly presented the case of Svevo which gives of the laziness a very different illustration. (shrink)

The "theory of mind" framework has been the fastest growing body of empirical research in contemporary psychology. It has given rise to a range of positions on what it takes to relate to others as intentional beings. This book brings together disparate strands of ToM research, lays out historical roots of the idea, and indicates better alternatives.

An overview on archaeological evidence, provided by Colagè and d’Errico, reveals that the timing, location, and pace of cultural innovations are more consistent with scenarios that take culture, rather than genetic evolutionary processes, as the key driving force for human cognition. The authors elaborate on those mechanisms by which cultural evolution operates, with a specific focus on cultural exaptation and cultural neural reuse.

Introduction 'Indoctrination' belongs to a family of concepts which includes ' teaching', 'education', 'instruction', and 'learning'. ...

Gatchel, R. H. The evolution of the concept.--Wilson, J. Indoctrination and rationality.--Green, T. F. Indoctrination and beliefs.--Kilpatrick, W. H. Indoctrination and respect for persons.--Atkinson, R. F. Indoctrination and moral education.--Flew, A. Indoctrination and doctrines.--Moore, W. Indoctrination and democratic method.--Wilson, J. Indoctrination and freedom.--Flew, A. Indoctrination and religion.-- White, J. P. Indoctrination and intentions.--Crittenden, B. S. Indoctrination as mis-education.--Snook, I. A. Indoctrination and moral responsibility.--Gregory, I. M. M. and Woods, R. G. Indoctrination: inculcating doctrines.-- White, J. P. Indoctrination without doctrines?

Identifying, classifying, and analyzing arguments in legal discourse has been a prominent area of research since the inception of the argument mining field. However, there has been a major discrepancy between the way natural language processing (NLP) researchers model and annotate arguments in court decisions and the way legal experts understand and analyze legal argumentation. While computational approaches typically simplify arguments into generic premises and claims, arguments in legal research usually exhibit a rich typology that is important for gaining insights (...) into the particular case and applications of law in general. We address this problem and make several substantial contributions to move the field forward. First, we design a new annotation scheme for legal arguments in proceedings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) that is deeply rooted in the theory and practice of legal argumentation research. Second, we compile and annotate a large corpus of 373 court decisions (2.3M tokens and 15k annotated argument spans). Finally, we train an argument mining model that outperforms state-of-the-art models in the legal NLP domain and provide a thorough expert-based evaluation. All datasets and source codes are available under open lincenses athttps://github.com/trusthlt/mining-legal-arguments. (shrink)

Multiple selves is a conventional assumption in behavioural welfare economics for modelling intrapersonal well-being. Yet an important question is which self has normative authority over others. In this paper, we advance an argument for what we call the ‘ontological approach’ to personal identity in behavioural welfare economics. According to this approach, ethical questions – such as which preference should be granted normative authority over another – can be informed by the ontological criterion of personal persistence, which aims at determining what (...) it takes for an individual to persist from one time to another. (shrink)

Conversation analysts have noted that, in psychotherapy, formulations of the client's talk can be a vehicle for offering a psychological interpretation of the client's circumstances. But we notice that not all formulations in psychotherapy offer interpretations. We offer an analysis of formulations that are diagnostic: that is, used by the professional to sharpen, clarify or refine the client's account and make it better able to provide what the professional needs to know about the client's history and symptoms. In doing so, (...) these formulations also have the effect of shepherding the client's account towards subsequent therapeutic interpretation. In a coda, we notice that sometimes the formulations are designed discreetly. We examine one such discreet formulation in detail, and show how its very ambiguity can lead to its failure as a diagnostic probe. (shrink)

El propósito de este trabajo es indagar la crítica foucaultiana del neoliberalismo desarrollada en las conferencias que Michel Foucault dictó en el Collège de France en 1979. En dicho curso, el filósofo francés propuso un abordaje crítico de la economía política al que denominó crítica política del saber. Por lo tanto, el foco de este artículo es la crítica política del saber económico que despliega en el curso mencionado. Investigación arqueo-genealógica en la que el neoliberalismo no es estudiado ni como (...) una ideología ni como una teoría económica, sino como una racionalidad gubernamental. (shrink)

Epistemicists claim that if it is vague whether p, it is unknowable whether p. Some contest this on epistemic grounds: vague intuitions about vague matters need not fully preclude knowledge, if those intuitions are response-dependent in some special sense of enabling vague knowledge. This paper defends the epistemicist principle that vagueness entails ignorance against such objections. I argue that not only is response-dependence an implausible characterization of actual vague matters, its mere possibility poses no threat to epistemicism and is properly (...) accounted for by the epistemicist’s own principles. (shrink)

We use this editorial essay as a call for a more effective use of new technologies, such as mobile apps and Web 2.0 tools, to educate students and other relevant stakeholders on business ethics, corporate social responsibility, and sustainability topics. We identify three overarching reasons that justify the need for new ways of teaching that further incorporate technology to foster the innovative thinking needed to tackle imminent societal grand challenges such as climate change and increasing inequality. First, we are facing (...) a new generation of millennials and Generation Z students who are digital natives and more likely to search for educational content on their electronic devices. Second, new technologies offer opportunities to reach students globally, helping to democratize education. Third, we posit that the intrinsic characteristics of societal grand challenges, which are complex, uncertain, and evaluative, can benefit from technology as an effective translator of multilayered concepts into more digestible action items. Our essay ends with a brief summary of the four essays included in the thematic symposium: “There is an App for that! The Use of New Technologies and Apps in Ethics, Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainability Education.”. (shrink)

The paper offers a semantic and pragmatic analysis of statements of the form ‘x is beautiful’ as involving a double speech act: first, a report that x is beautiful relative to the speaker’s aesthetic standard, along the lines of naive contextualism; second, the speaker’s recommendation that her audience comes to share her appraisal of x as beautiful. We suggest that attributions of beauty tend to convey such a recommendation due to the role that aesthetic practices play in fostering and enhancing (...) interpersonal coordination. Aesthetic practices are driven by a disposition towards the attunement of attitudes and aesthetic recommendations contribute to forwarding such attunement. Our view is motivated by an attempt to satisfy the following set of desiderata: to account for the experiential nature of aesthetic judgments, disagreements in aesthetic debates, and the normative aspirations of aesthetic discourse, as well as to avoid appealing to error theory and realist ontological commitments. (shrink)

In virtue of what does a linguistic act count as an insult? I discuss five main approaches to this question, according to which an insult is determined by (i) the semantic properties of the expression used; (ii) the insulter, her intention, or attitudes; (iii) the addressee and her personal standard; (iv) the features of the speech act performed; and (v) the standard of the relevant social group. I endorse the last, objectivist account, according to which an act x counts as (...) an insult if and only if x is assessed as demeaning when addressed at A by the standard of the relevant social group at t. (shrink)

I argue that an analogy between pains and sounds suggests a way to give an objective account of pain which fits well with a naïve perceptualist account of feeling pain. According to the proposed metaphysical account, pains are relational physical events with shared qualitative nature, each of which is constituted by tissue damage and the activation of nociceptors. I proceed to show that the metaphysical proposal is compatible with platitudes about pains being animate, private, and self-intimating states.

Stewart Shapiro has objected to the epistemicist theory of vagueness on grounds that it gives counterintuitive predictions about cases involving conditional obligation. This paper details a response on the epistemicist’s behalf. I first argue that Shapiro’s own presentation of the objection is unsuccessful as an argument against epistemicism. I then reconstruct and offer two alternative arguments inspired by Shapiro’s considerations, and argue that these fail too, given the information-sensitive nature of conditional obligations.

An assertion is existentially known if and only if: (i) the speaker knows that the sentence she uses to make the assertion expresses a true proposition; (ii) she makes the assertion based on that knowledge; and (iii) she does not believe, have justification for, or know the proposition asserted. Accordingly, if existentially known assertions could be made correctly—as argued by Charlie Pelling in his ‘Assertion and the Provision of Knowledge’—this would show that the norm of assertion cannot be the speaker's (...) belief in, justification for or knowledge of the proposition. In this paper, I try to show that Pelling's argument is inconclusive, as it rests on two assumptions which can be resisted. In turn, I offer a pair of alternative strategies to explain how we can deal with existentially known assertions under the assumption that the speaker's knowledge is the norm of assertion. (shrink)

In this study we replicated the explanatory effect of a label which had been found by Giffin et al.. In their experiments, they used vignettes describing an odd behavior of a person based on culturally specific disorders that were unfamiliar to respondents. It turned out that explanations which explain an odd behavior through a person’s tendency to behave that way seemed more persuasive if the disorder was given a label that was used in the explanation. We replicated these results in (...) Experiment 1, and in a follow-up Experiment 2 we examined the familiarity with category information and the evaluation of that category over time. We realized that the label effect persists even when people make judgments based on their recollections about a category. Furthermore, according to a content analysis of the recollections, participants in the label condition remembered more information from the vignettes but tended to forget an artificial label; however, they used other words from the disorder domain instead. This allowed us to suggest a new interpretation of this effect: we suppose that in the Giffin et al. experiments the label did not bring any new features to a category itself, but pointed to a relevant domain instead, so the effect appeared from the activation of areas of knowledge in semantic memory and the application of relevant schema for learning a new phenomenon. (shrink)

According to Brouwer’s ‘theory of the exodus of consciousness’, our experience includes ‘egoicity’, a distinct kind of feeling. In this paper, we describe his phenomenology in order to explore and elaborate on the notion of egoic sensations. In the world of perception formed from sensations, some of them are, Brouwer claims, not completely separated or ‘estranged’ from the subject, which is to say they have a certain degree of egoicity. We claim this phenomenon can be explained in terms of the (...) primordial state of consciousness from where the ‘exodus’ starts. Having undertaken the analysis and interpretation of Brouwer’s descriptions and examples of egoic sensations, we provide a formal account of egoicity based on Brouwer’s definition of its relation to estrangement, desire and fear. We show that the four terms can be modeled by a classical and a graded logical hexagon, giving the corresponding axiomatizations. (shrink)

This article has four main objectives. First, it introduces the ideal types of domination of Weber. Contrary to the received wisdom, which knows only “three ideal types” (traditional, charismatic and legal rational) I present the “fourth” type of domination, Weber called “Wille der Beherrschten” as an important correction of his ideal type of legal-rational authority. Next I make a novel, critical distinction between patrimonial and prebendal types of traditional authority. Third, I discuss various ways that communist regimes tried to legitimate (...) themselves and how they entered eventually a legitimation crisis, leading to the collapse of communism. In the next section, I explore the different ways post-communist capitalisms seek legitimacy (with various combinations of legal rational authority and patrimonialism), and finally I conclude with a trend of re-convergence of some post-communist systems (especially Russia and Hungary, but with signs for similar trends elsewhere) into an illiberal, prebendal quasi-democratic system. (shrink)