Depuis le milieu du XIXe siecle, on a generalement considere qu'un cycle de sept disciplines scolaires (grammaire, dialectique, rhetorique, musique, astronomie, geometrie et arithmetique), connu au Moyen Age sous le nom des sept arts liberaux, avait constitue la base de l'instruction habituelle et cela depuis l'epoque hellenistique jusqu'a l'epoque imperiale et au Moyen Age. Cette these, largement vulgarisee par le livre Histoire de l'education dans l'Antiquite d'Henri-Irenee Marrou, est fondamentalement remise en question dans le present ouvrage, qui montre que ce (...) fameux cycle des sept arts, que l'on croyait deja connu par Varron au Ier siecle avant J.-C., est ne en realite dans le neoplatonisme et n'a jamais constitue le programme d'education des jeunes gens de rang social eleve au cours de l'Antiquite. Cette nouvelle edition comprend des notes additionnelles au texte prealablement publie, un reexamen de la question varronienne qui tient compte de publications parues entre 1983 et 2003 (B. Cardauns, N. Cipriani, J. Doignon et D. Shanzer), et six articles sur certains themes fondamentaux traites dans la premiere edition, comme l'enseignement des mathematiques et de la medecine a l'epoque imperiale, l'organisation de l'enseignement philosophique, l'attitude des philosophes a l'egard du savoir encyclopedique ou la signification du terme eclectique dans la philosophie antique. (shrink)

Édition commentée des deux fragments de manuscrits littéraires grecs découverts dans la trésorerie du palais d'Aï-Khanoum, dans un contexte daté de 145 av. J.-C. Ces manuscrits avaient été rédigés dans des officines méditerranéennes et sont paléographiquement datables entre le milieu du IIIe et le début du IIe s. av. J.-C. Le premier texte, rédigé sur papyrus, est un dialogue philosophique platonicien ou aristotélicien relatif à la théorie platonicienne des Idées ; le second, rédigé sur parchemin en trimètres iambiques, relève peut-être (...) du genre théâtral. Leur présence à Aï Khanoum atteste l'existence d'une bibliothèque dans le palais de cette cité. (shrink)

Pierre Hadot is best known as a historian of ancient philosophy and for advocating the relevance of ancient thinking for contemporary lives. What is less well known is that he was one of the first French philosophers to take a serious interest in the work of Wittgenstein, publishing between 1959 and 1962 two essays on the Tractatus and two on the Philosophical Investigations, since republished as Wittgenstein et les limites de langage (Paris: J. Vrin, 2010). Only two of these (...) essays are available (and not widely) in English translation. Part of my goal is to argue that they deserve the attention of anglophone readers. My focus here is on Hadot's remarks about the Philosophical Investigations. Hadot argues that this work produces a self‐defeating paradox because it claims that we can speak intelligibly only within a language‐game, but Wittgenstein, like the philosophers he criticises, tries to transcend language‐games in the presentation of his views. Despite this criticism, Hadot is inspired by Wittgenstein's discussion of the multiplicity of language‐games to argue that the texts of ancient philosophy are not part of the same language‐game as those of modern philosophy and must be approached as ‘spiritual exercises’, rather than as bodies of doctrine or theory. Wittgenstein is thus a key inspiration for Hadot's historiographical method. I argue that Hadot is too impressed by a faulty analogy between the Tractatus and the Investigations and that he gives a problematically reductive interpretation of Wittgenstein's talk of language‐games and implausibly attributes to Wittgenstein a reverence for ‘the ordinary’ that supposedly takes the place of his earlier wonder at the existence of the world. Many commentators since Hadot have made similar errors, so his case remains instructive. I conclude by suggesting, nonetheless, that something like Hadot's proposals about historiographical method may be justified by a better reading of the Investigations. (shrink)

Rethinking the powers of the imagination, Søren Kierkegaard both anticipates and challenges contemporary approaches to a descriptive philosophy of religion. In contrast to the reigning approaches to religion in his day, Kierkegaard reconceives philosophy as, first of all, descriptive of human, including specifically ethical and religious, existence. To this end, he develops conceptual tools, including a descriptive ontology of human existence, a “pluralist epistemology” exploring both cognitive and passional dimensions of religion, and a role for the poetic in philosophy, strikingly (...) expressed in his observer figures who “imaginatively construct” “thought projects” to explore human existence. While this new descriptive account anticipates subsequent approaches to the philosophy of religion, it could be interpreted as another “objectivist” endeavor, yet Kierkegaard attempts more in this descriptive philosophy. He imaginatively deploys conceptual and rhetorical strategies maieutically to both describe and elicit self-reflection aimed at transformation, thus expanding the imagination’s uses for his readers. Comparing Kierkegaard to Pierre Hadot’s recovery of ancient Greek philosophy as “a way of life” will show how Kierkegaard also engages the particularity of “the Christian principle”, with implications for how philosophy can both describe and elicit the pathos of other religious traditions as well. (shrink)

This article challenges the recurrent critique that Pierre Hadot’s identification of ancient philosophy with the practice of spiritual exercises introduces a non- or irrational dimension into metaphilosophy. The occasion to do this is provided by Kerem Eksen’s recent reading of Descartes’s Meditations as consisting of solely intellectual, rather than spiritual, exercises—since the latter, Eksen claims, involve extrarational means and ends. Part 2 presents an alternative account of the role of cognition in the ancient meditatio at issue in understanding Descartes’s (...) antecedents. This account is indebted to Michel Foucault’s characterization of ancient meditation as involving two cognitive mechanisms: an appropriation of thought, and an experiment in identification. Part 3 argues that attempts such as Eksen’s to depict spiritual exercises as wholly noncognitive themselves are the product of an “unexamined Cartesianism” that is fundamentally at odds with the monistic psychology of ancient Stoics like Marcus Aurelius as discussed in Hadot’s studies. (shrink)

This book consists of essays exploring aspects of a single theme, philosophy as an effort to transform our vision of, and being in, the world. The first and second essays show that the Christian tradition of "spiritual exercises" is inspired by a similar tradition in pagan philosophy. The first essay indeed argues that ancient philosophy is to be understood in the main, not as a variety of doctrinal systems, but as an attempt to transform the soul by means of techniques (...) which can properly be referred to as "spiritual exercises." For example, Stoicism teaches, not an abstract theory, but a new way of life achieved through training the logos in us. Epicureanism also aims at changing our lives through the use of various exercises. Hadot then points to Socrates' interest in "care of the soul" and to the function of Socratic and Platonic dialogue in training the soul of the participant/reader so as to "turn it around." Hadot concludes this first major essay by noting that to treat ancient philosophies as if they were attempts at system-building is to misunderstand their character. The third essay is an important study of the figure of Socrates as a transformer of souls. The themes of irony and eros in particular are explored and compared to their recurrence in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. This is followed by another major essay, which shows that Marcus Aurelius' Meditations are not at all the sort of autobiographical journal that they are usually assumed to be. They are in fact a Stoic manual of spiritual exercises. One specific training technique is examined, that of "physical definition." This and two other techniques are shown in the next essay to constitute the organizational principle of Marcus Aurelius' apparently disorganized work and to derive from Epictetus. The following essay establishes the influence Marcus Aurelius' work had on the French historian Michelet. The book concludes with a very general survey of the theme of "conversion," considered from religious, philosophical, social, and psychological points-of-view, and with an essay on the limitations of language in Greek philosophy and in Wittgenstein. Hadot demonstrates in this book a deep and unusually comprehensive knowledge of ancient philosophy and an ability to throw new light on aspects not only of ancient philosophy but also of the Western cultural tradition and indeed of human nature.--Dominic J. O'Meara, Université de Fribourg. (shrink)

A good illustration of the interpretation of ancient philosophy argued for by P. Hadot in the book reviewed above is provided by the Roman Stoic philosopher Musonius Rufus, the teacher of Epictetus. In the present work A. Jagu supplies a rather brief introduction to Musonius, a French translation of ancient texts reporting Musonius' views, and comprehensive indices. The translation is accurate and reads well. Jagu's notes on the texts are copious, showing Musonius' orthodoxy by referring to the early Stoics (...) and his influence on Epictetus and Clement of Alexandria. Musonius himself wrote nothing, but his opinions were recorded by pupils, in particular by a certain Lucius. The Christian John Stobaeus, in compiling his anthology, incorporated excerpts from Lucius' work, thus saving it partially from oblivion. This means that as far as our evidence for Musonius is concerned, we are largely at the mercy of Lucius' understanding of his master and of Stobaeus' conventional moralistic interests. These factors account for the almost total absence of material concerning logic and physics and the preservation of fairly trivial discussions concerning, for example, food, clothing, furniture, and even beards! More central issues are also touched on--marriage, children, education, should women do philosophy?, exile, etc. If then what survives relates almost exclusively to ethics, it is clear that in any case Musonius subordinated logic and physics to ethics as did classical Stoicism. Apart from what derived from Lucius, a small amount of evidence concerning Musonius and originating elsewhere is preserved in Stobaeus, Plutarch and some other authors, but it does little more than give a somewhat different impression of Musonius than does Lucius. This book, especially the notes, will be of use not only to those interested in Stoic philosophy and its history but also to students of Roman society and politics of the first century A.D., in which Musonius played a prominent role.--Dominic J. O'Meara, Université de Fribourg. (shrink)

In 1711, François Noël s.j. (1651-1729) published in Pragua two books related to Chinese philosophy, the Philosophia Sinica — a systematic presentation of Confucianism according to an Aristotelian framework divided into three treatises — and the Sinensis Imperii libri classici sex — a translation of the six Confucian Classics. In these two books, François Noël, who spent more than fifteen years in China, exemplifies how a European missionary has been transformed by reading Confucian Classics and their commentaries. Although his writings (...) were caught up in the Rites controversy, German philosophers like Christian Wolff were in contact with them. They used them in a debate where the autonomy of rationality in the field of ethics was at stake. Even if Noël’s assumptions and hermeneutical methods are no longer academically valid, his testimony shows that engaging with Confucian classics can change one’s framework, especially practically. Noël’s works are also an invitation to reconsider the modern split between systematic philosophy and philosophy as a practice, an opinion already formulated in the works of Pierre Hadot. In that sense, Noël’s attempt to bridge Aristotle with Confucius is a witness of a larger movement of interweaving symbolic tools belonging to different traditions to answer human existence issues. (shrink)

HADOT, Ilsetraut et Pierre, Apprendre à philosopher dans l'Antiquité. L'enseignement du "Manuel d'Epictète" et son commentaire néoplatonicien, Paris, Librairie générale Française, "Le livre de poche", 2004, 219 p. LAKS, André, Le vide et la haine. Eléments pour une histoire archaïque de la négativité, Paris, PUF, "Libelles", 2004, 49 p. PLATON, Hippias mineur - Hippias majeur, traduction, introduction, notes et index J.-F. Balaudé, Paris, Librairie Générale Française, "Le livre de poche",..

Richard Shusterman's Philosophy and the Art of Writing suggests something vital about the tension between philosophical discourses that cannot capture or be the full meaning of living a life in relation to wisdom, and lived philosophies that cannot do away with discourses to deepen a lived experience beyond them: that philosophy as “an embodied way of life” is a sub-creation that emerges from the tension between them. This paper uses several different moments and ideas from Philosophy and the Art of (...) Writing as points of departure for further inquiry. Some “memories,” repurposed, reorganized, and manipulated, take up these starting points to further the investigation. The present work was a spiritual exercise for the author and, one hopes, will be for the reader in what it means to practice philosophy as a way of life. By doing so, we may find more forgiveness and appreciation for our philosophical vocation that creates something more than what we say or are now. (shrink)

Investigation into the theme of receptions and influences is one of traditional topics in the historiography of national philosophies. This article analyses the models of reception and influence used by Ukrainian historians of philosophy: the model of “influence without reception” (А. Tykholaz), the model of “studying philosophy” (D. Tschižewskij) and the model of “reception without influence” (V. Horskyi). Resting upon works by J.-L. Viellard-Baron and P. Hadot, the author tried to argue that: а) the place that reception studies occupies (...) in historiography as well as understanding of its phenomenon is traditionally dictated by the perception of the historic-philosophical process, the genre of the historiography of philosophy and specific historiographic attitudes; b) reception is a complex phenomenon, which has totally different configurations and meanings in different periods of the history of philosophy and cannot be put into one formula; c) the application of obvious formulas from the contemporary vision of receptions in separate historical contexts can verify or objection of the originality or even the existence of separate philosophical traditions; d) through the reflection on the phenomenon of reception in all of its complexity it possible to reveal some aspects, research into which notably corrects our perception of the history of philosophy; e) the popular over the past decades idea of the history of philosophy as dialogue among philosophers is a challenge for the historiography, though it can have a positive effect on historic-philosophical research as well as on historic-philosophical discourse in general. Particularly, the research into reception and using dialogue as a regulatory idea can influence the international circulation of ideas and contribute to turning it into “rational dialogue”, promoted by P. Bourdieu. (shrink)

A magisterial mappa mundi of the terrain that Pierre Hadot has so productively worked for decades, this ambitious work revises our view of ancient philosophy- ...

In the last two decades, some authors in the philosophy for children movement have theorized that the community of philosophical inquiry can be a form of spiritual practice, of the care of the self, or a wisdom practice (De Marzio, 2009; Gregory, 2009, 2013, 2014;Gregory & Laverty, 2009). Yet, it is unclear if philosophy for children is, by itself, a form of spiritual education, or if it requires some sorts of modification to be one. And, if it is or can (...) be a form of spiritual education, we can interrogate in what ways and to what extent is it one. It is these questions that this text aims to explore. To do so, we will first clarify the meaning of spiritual education through the presentation of two authors who have explicitly written on that topic. The first is Parker J. Palmer, who has developed a perspective on what it means to reclaim the spiritual roots of education, derived from his study and practice of Quaker spirituality. The second is Pierre Hadot, who has explored how the practice of philosophy in Western antiquity was a form of spiritual exercise. From our presentation of these two authors will emerge a particular perspective of what spiritual education means. In the last section of the text we will use this presentation to examine in what ways philosophy for children can be a form of spiritual education and if requires adaptations to be one. (shrink)

This book presents a history of spiritual exercises from Socrates to early Christianity, an account of their decline in modern philosophy, and a discussion of ...

Die Schultradition im Mittelplatonismus und Porphyrios, von H. Dörrie.--Porphyrios und Numenios, von J. H. Waszink.--Ammonios und Porphyrios, von W. Theiler.--La métaphysique de Porphyre, par P. Hadot.--Die Lehre von der Seele, von H. Dörrie.--Porfirio commentatore di Platone, di A. R. Sodano.--Porphyre, exégète d'Homère, par J. Pépin.--Porphyry and the Arabic tradition, by R. Walzer.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Inner Citadel. The Meditations of Marcus AureliusJames KerPierre Hadot. The Inner Citadel. The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius. Translated by Michael Chase. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998. Pp. xii + 351. Cloth, $45.00Marcus Aurelius has sometimes been viewed as a Stoic "half-way to Platonism," so overawed by the brevity of human life within the infinite procession of eternity that he "almost lost faith in his own existence" (...) (J. M. Rist). Hadot's book, however, in this excellent English translation (first published as La Citadelle Intérieure: Introduction aux "Pensées" de Marc Aurèle, Paris, 1992), argues not only that the Meditations are thoroughly Stoic in their doctrine, but that to call Marcus a Platonist (or a pessimist) is to misinterpret the techniques by which he seeks to live a Stoic life. For Hadot it is the teachings of the philosopher-slave Epictetus that explain the Meditations, and the bulk of the book is concerned with demonstrating that Marcus's writings are spiritual exercises by which the author seeks to instill in himself three basic Epictetan disciplines corresponding to the tripartite Stoic system of logic, physics, and ethics. Readers of Hadot's other works will already recognize his concern with the ancient conception of philosophy as a way of life [3]. This study aims to show how Marcus's self-therapy relates to specific elements of Stoic doctrine and to redefine our understanding of the Meditations as a literary work.The book begins by tracing Marcus's initiation into the philosophic life, with special emphasis on the role of statesman-philosopher Junius Rusticus, who introduced Marcus to the writings of his influential teacher, Epictetus. In Chapter Two Hadot approaches the text which we refer to as the Meditations and argues that they are better referred to as Marcus's "personal notes" (hypomnêmata): their characteristic features (discontinuity, repetition, self-address, and refined literary form) are due to their being the product of day-by-day exercises in which Marcus, focussed upon the definitiveness of the present moment, strove to keep the essential rules of life ever present in his mind. Marcus's constant repetition of familiar doctrine indicates that for him "the [End Page 116] essential thing was not to invent or to compose, but to influence himself and produce an effect upon himself" (244).Hadot is at pains in Chapter Three, however, to reveal that these exercises derive from the "highly rigorous conceptual system" which he calls "the true key to the Meditations," namely, a set of three dogmas that require (a) the regulation of judgment to assent only to what is objectively true; (b) the restriction of the desires to that which is in accordance with universal Nature and Destiny; and (c) the disciplining of one's impulse toward action to be just and altruistic, in agreement with one's human nature. According to Hadot, this systematic distinction between the disciplines of judgement, desire, and impulse, and the three dogmas on which they depend, is "a doctrine which is peculiar to Epictetus and which is not found in Stoicism prior to him" (70). Marcus, then, in organizing his spiritual exercises around these three disciplines, "was working with pre-existing materials" (52). Thus Chapter Five is dedicated entirely to explaining how the practical disciplines of judgment, desire, and impulse to action, which Hadot argues correspond respectively to logic, physics, and ethics, operate within "the Stoicism of Epictetus."There is a certain apparent tension generated by Hadot's argument concerning the Stoicism of Epictetus. Although he depicts him as a distinctive innovator, Hadot also states that Epictetus does not change the system of Zeno and Chrysippus but simply adds "color and tonality" (73)—a statement that allows him to classify both Epictetus and Marcus as authentic Stoics but thereby risks undermining his argument about Epictetus's distinctiveness. This real ambiguity could be explained by reference to the emphasis on originality in Stoicism, in which the embodiment of philosophy in each new Stoic establishes him as an independent authority. (As Seneca says to Lucilius, "Zeno said this. But what do you say?" Epistulae Morales 33.7.) Indeed Hadot illustrates how didactic procedures in particular were... (shrink)

In seinem Werk "Philosophie als Lebensform" vertritt Pierre Hadot (1922-2010) die These, dass die Philosophie bis zu Beginn der hochmittelalterlichen Scholastik nicht primar Wissenschaft mit Anspruch auf systematische Stimmigkeit und Objektivitat sei, sondern auf einen psychologisch-padagogischen Effekt fur die Lebenspraxis abziele: Die Philosophie der hellenistischen und romischen Epoche stellt sich als eine Lebensweise, eine Lebenskunst und eine Seinsweise dar. Es geht darum, das Sein des Menschen zu verwandeln und ihm zum Gluck zu verhelfen. Das fruhe Christentum sowie das mittelalterliche (...) Monchtum knupften daran an und verstanden das spirituelle Leben als philosophia, die durch die Praxis geistiger Ubungen in Christus den alten Menschen ablegt und den neuen anzieht (vgl. Eph 4,22-24). In der Mystik, die seit Dionysius Areopagita (ca. 500 n. Chr.) zu einem expliziten Inhalt des Denkens wird, spitzt sich dieses Spannungsverhaltnis zwischen Theorie und Praxis zu. Per definitionem ist Mystik eine uberwaltigende Erfahrung, die alle Affekte involviert. Aber genau diese Erfahrung wird schon in der vorchristlichen griechischen Philosophie zum Inhalt einer rationalen Reflexion. Dementsprechend oszilliert der Begriff einer theologia mystica zwischen unmittelbarem Erleben und systematischer Theorie. Mit Beitragen von Rolf Darge, Lioba Fau OSB, Paul D. Hellmeier OP, Johannes Herzgsell SJ, William J. Hoye, Johann Kreuzer, Isabelle Mandrella, Johannes Schaber OSB, Christian Schafer, Peter Sloterdijk, Wolfgang Speyer und Martin Thurner. (shrink)

The paper delves into the methodological aspects of how foundational mathematical and physical tenets, most notably the principle of least action, are interpreted and assimilated within humanities discourse. The pursuit of the article’s objectives is driven by the necessity for a philosophical and methodological analysis of the current conceptual status of the principle of least action. This analysis is informed by cognitive-axiological and teleological imperatives of a “synthetic” development program for the principle. Any fundamental principle will not have a definitive (...) explanation, as otherwise it would not be fundamental, but in this case, some justification can be given based on deeper grounds discussed in the article. Drawing on the epistemological frameworks of French philosophers P. Hadot, E. Levinas, J. Bouveresse, and J.-T. Desanti, the article weaves together mathematical abstractions with human experience and philosophical doctrines with physical theories. J.-T. Desanti’s perspective on mathematical objects as an outcome of human activity is examined. Also scrutinized is B. Nicolescu’s concept of transdisciplinarity, which challenges the traditional subject-object dualism in science. The author’s methodological stance emerges from a dialectical viewpoint, one that eschews a simplistic dichotomy between materialism and idealism and is grounded in rigorous scientific inquiry and an exhaustive examination of the subject matter itself. The principle of least action, as a paramount principle in physics, is shown to exemplify a legacy of innovation, positioning it as both methodologically insightful and heuristically valuable. The paper also highlights how this principle diverges from the classical principle of economy. The broader goal – within the context of “sustainable development,” transdisciplinary studies, and creative industries – is to establish the principle of least action as a paradigmatic imperative for interaction within social and economic systems. The conclusions drawn from this study contribute to a deeper understanding of the principle’s essence, the nature of transdisciplinarity, and confront the vestiges of scientism in the humanities. (shrink)

The article deals with philosophical questions on the “art of living” in philosophy in recent decades. It provides an overview of the conceptions that continue to resonate in philosophy, covering the basic approach to conceptions of the “art of living” found in the work of theorists such as P. Hadot, J. Kekes, A. Nehamas, Z. Bauman, A. MacIntyre, R. Veenhoven, W. Schmid, and J. Dohmen.The basic framework of the “art of living” can, we believe, be imagined as a square, (...) where each side represents an essential component : 1. value system; 2. integrity of life; 3. meaning of life; 4. authenticity of life. The art of living therefore presupposes that there is a value system the individual can use as a navigational guide and to make decisions in the world. It also presupposes an ability to integrate one’s life within a meaningful whole and to seek out and find the meaning of one’s life. Finally the art of living depends on the ability to lead an authentic life. (shrink)

The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius are treasured today--as they have been over the centuries--as an inexhaustible source of wisdom. And as one of the three most important expressions of Stoicism, this is an essential text for everyone interested in ancient religion and philosophy. Yet the clarity and ease of the work's style are deceptive. Pierre Hadot, eminent historian of ancient thought, uncovers new levels of meaning and expands our understanding of its underlying philosophy. Written by the Roman emperor for (...) his own private guidance and self-admonition, the Meditations set forth principles for living a good and just life. Hadot probes Marcus Aurelius's guidelines and convictions and discerns the hitherto unperceived conceptual system that grounds them. Abundantly quoting the Meditations to illustrate his analysis, the author allows Marcus Aurelius to speak directly to the reader. And Hadot unfolds for us the philosophical context of the Meditations, commenting on the philosophers Marcus Aurelius read and giving special attention to the teachings of Epictetus, whose disciple he was. The soul, the guiding principle within us, is in Marcus Aurelius's Stoic philosophy an inviolable stronghold of freedom, the "inner citadel." This spirited and engaging study of his thought offers a fresh picture of the fascinating philosopher-emperor, a fuller understanding of the tradition and doctrines of Stoicism, and rich insight on the culture of the Roman empire in the second century. Pierre Hadot has been working on Marcus Aurelius for more than twenty years; in this book he distills his analysis and conclusions with extraordinary lucidity for the general reader. (shrink)

Bien des difficultés que nous éprouvons à comprendre les oeuvres philosophiques des Anciens proviennent souvent du fait que nous commmettons en les interprétant un double anachronisme: nous croyons que, comme beaucoup d'oeuvres modernes, elles sont destinées à communiquer des informations concernant un contenu conceptuel donné et que nous pouvons aussi en tirer directement des renseignements clairs sur la pensée et la psychologie de leur auteur. Mais en fait, elles sont très souvent des exercices spirituels que l'auteur pratique lui-même et fait (...) pratiquer à son lecteur. Elles sont destinées à former les âmes. Elles ont une valeur psychagogique. (shrink)

La définition platonicienne du philosophe; la philosophie comme mode de vie; rupture et continuité, le Moyen Age et les temps modernes. [SDM].

Since its original publication in France in 1963, Pierre Hadot's lively philosophical portrait of Plotinus remains the preeminent introduction to the man and his thought. Michael Chase's lucid translation—complete with a useful chronology and analytical bibliography—at last makes this book available to the English-speaking world. Hadot carefully examines Plotinus's views on the self, existence, love, virtue, gentleness, and solitude. He shows that Plotinus, like other philosophers of his day, believed that Plato and Aristotle had already articulated the essential (...) truths; for him, the purpose of practicing philosophy was not to profess new truths but to engage in spiritual exercises so as to live philosophically. Seen in this light, Plotinus's counsel against fixation on the body and all earthly matters stemmed not from disgust or fear, but rather from his awareness of the negative effect that bodily preoccupation and material concern could have on spiritual exercises. (shrink)

Les études réunies ici témoignent de la découverte de la philosophie analytique par les philosophes français de l’après-guerre : dans les années 1950, Pierre Hadot fut en effet l’un des premiers à s’intéresser aux rapports entre logique et langage dans la pensée de Wittgenstein. Ces études pionnières sont suivies d’une lettre d’Elisabeth Anscombe à Pierre Hadot, et de la traduction d’un texte de Gottfried Gabriel sur la signification de la forme littéraire chez Wittgenstein.

Athenian and Alexandrian Neoplatonism and the Harmonization of Aristotle and Plato by Ilsetraut Hadot deals with the Neoplatonist tendency to harmonize the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle.

In this article, Pierre Hadot examines the late philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and the so-called “linguistic turn” in philosophy and the social sciences. Although certain interpreters of Wittgenstein have thought that Philosophical Investigations shows philosophy to be predicated on a series of confusions based on the misuse of language, Hadot argues contrarily that an understanding of Wittgenstein’s idea of “language games”—far from ending philosophy—allows us to see it anew and to discern the source of some of its deepest (...) perplexities. Of particular concern is the notion of the ancient idea of philosophical discourse as intrinsically connected to various forms of apprenticeship or spiritual formation. It is in this context that the supposed inconsistencies and unusual repetitions of ancient philosophy can be understood. Only from the Middle Ages do philosophical language games begin slowly to become detached from certain kinds of training, of pedagogies connected to forms of life, and become texts—and “systems”—in the sense of being written for the purposes of merely conventional reading. (shrink)

English summary: The idea of spiritual guidance as a philosophical practice lies at the center of Senecas thought, and can provide us with a new perspective on our own moral conduct, as well as the meaning of philosophy itself. Through a close philological, historical, and philosophical study, Ilsetraut Hadot breathes new life into Senecas work and restores it to its place at the heart of western philosophy. French description: Seneque et la philosophie du present : la distance qui les (...) separe est precisement ce qui nous permet de nous voir nous-memes plus objectivement et de mieux comprendre les insuffisances de nos systemes philosophiques contemporains. L'idee de direction spirituelle en tant que pratique philosophique est au centre de la pensee de Seneque et, dans toute sa specificite, nous ouvre une perspective nouvelle sur notre conduite morale aussi bien que sur le sens de la philosophie elle-meme. Car ce sont paradoxalement Seneque et la tradition de la direction spirituelle qui nous apportent des concepts et des exercices precieux pour decouvrir, dans notre passe philosophique, notre vraie actualite. Ainsi, grace a sa lecture rigoureuse, a la fois philologique, historique et philosophique, Ilsetraut Hadot restitue a la richesse de l'oeuvre de Seneque son role essentiel au coeur de l'histoire de la pensee occidentale. C'est a nous d'utiliser cette lecture pour mettre en pratique l'experience de la philosophie. (shrink)

Here we are witness to the great cultural event of the West, the emergence of a Latin philosophical language translated from the Greek. Once again, it would be necessary to make a systematic study of the formation of this technical vocabulary that, thanks to Cicero, Seneca, Tertullian, Victorinus, Calcidius, Augustine, and Boethius, would leave its mark, by way of the Middle Ages, on the birth of modern thought. Can it be hoped that one day, with current technical means, it will (...) be possible to compile a complete lexicon of the correspondences of philosophical terminology in Greek and Latin? Furthermore, lengthy commentaries would be needed, for the most interesting task would be to analyze the shifts in meaning that take place in the movement from one language to another. In the case of the ontological vocabulary the translation of ousia by substantia, for example, is justly famous and has again recently inspired some remarkable studies. This brings us once more to a phenomenon we discretely alluded to earlier with the word philosophia, and which we will encounter throughout the present discussion: the misunderstandings, shifts or losses in meaning, the reinterpretations, sometimes even to the point of misreading, that arise once tradition, translation, and exegesis coexist. So our history of the Hellenistic and Roman thought will consist above all of recognizing and analyzing the evolution of meanings and significance. Pierre Hadot holds the chair of the History of Hellenistic and Roman Thought at the Collège de France. He is the author of many books and articles on the history of ancient philosophy and theology. Among his works are Plotin et la simplicité du regard, Porphyre et Vitctorinus, Marius Victorinus: Recherches sur sa vie et ses oeuvres, and Exercises spirituels et philosophie antique. Arnold I. Davidson, executive editor of Critical Inquiry, is associate professor of philosophy and a member of the Committees on the Conceptual Foundations of Science and General Studies in the Humanities at the University of Chicago. He introduced and edited the “Symposium on Heidegger and Nazism” . He is currently working on the history of horror as it relates to the epistemology of norms and deviations. Paula Wissing, a free-lance translator and editor, has recently translated Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant’s The Cuisine of Sacrifice among the Greeks . She also contributed translations of articles by Maurice Blanchot, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, and Emmanuel Levinas for the “Symposium on Heidegger and Nazism.”. (shrink)

On parle beaucoup dans cet ouvrage de contresens, de contresens parfois createurs, qui ont fait progresser la pensee, mais aussi de contresens qui ne produisent qu'erreur et confusion, comme ceux que commettent certains tenants de la psychologie historique. On presente dans cet ouvrage plusieurs applications a des textes philosophiques d'une methode d'interpretation qui consiste a les replacer dans le contexte de l'enseignement et de la vie des ecoles philosophiques. A cote d'etudes de details consacrees a des termes philosophiques importants, on (...) trouvera dans ce volume plusieurs contributions generales, justement celebres, consacrees aux divisions de la philosophie, a l'organisation de l'enseignement dans les ecoles philosophiques, a la repartition des disciplines ou encore a la figure du sage. Les recherches de Pierre Hadot ont porte tout d'abord sur les rapports entre hellenisme et christianisme, puis sur la mystique neoplatonicienne et la philosophie de l'epoque hellenistique, et enfin sur la description du phenomene spirituel de la philosophie. (shrink)

Crucial in Pierre Hadot’s account of ancient philosophy as a way of life is the phenomenon of conversion. Well before he encountered some of the decisive influences upon his understanding of philosophy, Hadot already understood ancient philosophy and its long legacy in later thinkers of the West as much more than a formal discourse. Philosophy is an experience, or at least the exploration and articulation of a potential for experience. The energy of this potential originates in a polar (...) tension between epistrophe and metanoia. The two poles, which are grounded in primal experiences of the living organism, motivate and model the conversion which must be lived by the philosopher. The genius of Western philosophical experience lies in the effort to synthesize return and rebirth, and thereby recover the self as an ontological point of identification with and origin of the cosmos. (shrink)

Un aphorisme hante la philosophie occidentale. celui d'Héraclite, qui veut que " la Nature aime à se voiler ". Près de vingt-cinq siècles durant, ces quelques petits mots ont successivement signifié: que tout ce qui naît tend à mourir; que la Nature s'enveloppe dans des formes sensibles et dans des mythes; qu'elle cache en elle des vertus occultes ; mais également que l'Etre est originellement dans un état de contraction et de non-déploiement ; ou bien encore qu'il se dévoile en (...) se voilant. Ainsi cet aphorisme aura-t-il servi à expliquer les difficultés de la science de la nature, à justifier l'exégèse allégorique des textes bibliques ou à défendre le paganisme, à critiquer la violence faite à la nature par la technique et la mécanisation du monde, à expliquer enfin l'angoisse qu'inspire à l'homme moderne son être-au-monde. La même formule, illustrée par l'image du voile d'Isis et déployée par Pierre Hadot dans l'histoire de l'Occident, aura justifié, par suite de contresens créateurs, l'attitude prométhéenne - l'homme doit se rendre maître et possesseur de la Nature - comme l'attitude orphique - nul ne peut soulever le voile des mystères de la Nature, sinon le poète et l'artiste. Elle n'aura jamais cessé de tracer des perspectives nouvelles sur la réalité et de révéler les attitudes les plus diverses à l'égard de la Nature. Par là, elle confirme le propos de Nietzsche : " Une bonne sentence est trop dure à la dent du temps et tous les millénaires n'arrivent pas à la consommer, bien qu'elle serve à tout moment de nourriture. ". (shrink)

Tied to the apron strings of the church -- Researcher, teacher, philosopher -- Philosophical discourse -- Interpretation, objectivity and nonsense -- Unitary experience and philosophical life -- Philosophical discourse as spiritual exercise -- Philosophy as life and as a quest for wisdom -- From Socrates to Foucault : a long tradition -- Inacceptable? -- The present alone is our happiness.

The French translation with commentary, the first in a modern language, allows historians of philosophy access to a fundamental work for the understanding of medieval and modern thought. They could also explore more easily the great variety of information contained in the commentary of Simplicius on the history of the exegis of the _Catégories of Aristotle_, and more generally on the history of comparative philosophy of Simplicius. They will discover some important aspects in the actual thought of Simplicius, which so (...) far has hardly been explored. (shrink)

Pierre Hadot, vous êtes un grand spécialiste de la philosophie antique. Vous êtes, entre autres, auteur de Qu’est-ce que la philosophie antique1et vous venez de publier une édition du Manuel d’Épictète2. Mais vous avez aussi écrit, par exemple, sur Montaigne, Kierkegaard, Thoreau, Foucault, Wittgenstein...