This paper aims at giving a brief historical survey of the growth and development of the meaning attributed by the ancient Indians to the term maya. In studying this term we must not lose sight of the fact that it is very often used in various texts without any bearing upon the great problem of the,reality' of the phenomenal world as compared with brahman. In a large number of texts originating in pre-or non-Vedantic circles the word occurs in a great (...) variety of connotations : « power, wisdom, subtle device », and, especially, « incomprehensible power enabling its possessor to create something » ascribed to mighty beings. In the Vedic period there is no basis for any conception of the unreality of the phenomenal world in the use of the term. It does not mean « chimera, illusion, fascination, delusion, fata morgana, etc. ». It refers to a reality of an artificial or misleading character, to phenomena produced by a special ability or imagination ; it can often be translated by a locution beginning with pseudo —, or by the Engl. craft in one of its connotations. It can also mean « fraud, deception ». Philosophers often referred to these common meanings of the word in discussing the,relation' of brahman and the phenomena which essentially are brahman. Svet. Up. 4, 9 and 10 nature is called maya : in this upanûad the germs from which the various views or doctrines of the generations to come were to develop had already reached the first stage of growth without differentiating in any considerable degree. Here maya does not express the unreality of the world, but the impossibility of man's understanding its character and the power of its creator. Nor does the Bhagavadgita question the reality of the world either. Deussen and other scholars were wrong in following Sahara's school of thought which interpreted these texts from its own particular point of view. In the history of Indian thought Buddhism is of outstanding importance. According to the ancient Buddhists the world and the individuals are real, but unstable, of a comparatively insignificant,metaphysical dignity'. The Madhyamika's and Nagarjima's relativistic school prepare the way for the idealistic Vijnanavadins who, founding their ontology on the psychology of yoga, hold the view that only vijnana « mere consciousness » exists. Any pretended,reality' outside this reality is to be regarded as dependent on a wrong interpretation of our inner experiences. The,causally dependent aspect', a determined,form of reality' reflects the,absolute aspect'; the lower constructed aspect' or,wrong ideation', the sphere of the concrete phenomena, however, is to be compared to a snake the presence of which we incorrectly assume when, at dusk, we find a cable.In this connection the term maya is also used : a rope may appear in the shape of a snake, or a maya in the shape of a man and other objects which do not really exist in themselves. This maya is void, non-substantial; in the same way the, wrong or constructive ideation' which appears in the, aspect of subject and object' is called non-substantial. In the process by which the reality of consciousness is transformed into the aspect of wrong ideation maya plays an important rôle : it is the power or factor producing the differentiation of the homogeneous consciousness which results in the pseudo-existence of the phenomenal world. Gaudapada, the earliest exponent of the view of pure non-duality writing at a time when the influence of these idealistic Buddhists was predominant, availed himself of the results of their speculative endeavour. On the other hand he made sure of the sanction of the traditional brahminical circles by expounding his views in the form of an expatiation on the Mandukya. Upanmd. The universum, he holds, is like a dream, like a maya ; « it is not actually so ». All phenomenal beings are dreamlike projections of the Divine Self, which is by its very maya able to make itself assume this projected form. But in his book maya also serves to indicate that any relation at all between the world and the Ultimate cannot be rationally sustained, for this,relation' is inexplicable. Maya, inherent to brahman is the condition underlying the,Origin', the pseudo-existence of this world ; but our lack of understanding is also maya. Our empirical knowledge, which makes us believe that things come into being is would-be knowledge. Maya is the hypothesis needed to express in a formula that the diversity of the phenomenal world is neither identical with atman-brahman nor existing by itself. Sawkara likewise regards the world as,pseudo' ; but in contradistinction to Gaudapada who focusses attention on the maya formula and the character of the phenomena, he emphasizes the sole reality of brahman, avoiding any suggestion as to the world's being void, non-being or unsubstantial. This formulation holds good from the higher point of view, viz. that of the supreme reality, into which empirical knowledge cannot penetrate. For practical purposes the world may be considered as really existing. The ignorance which conceals our true character from us and makes us perceive a world which from the standpoint of the Supreme does not exist is maya. Maya hides the reality and projects a pseudo-reality. It is undefinable and inexplicable ; it is neither being nor non-being. Maya is the postulate needed to account for the phenomenon called universe, for the existence of the diversity, though it is only the One which exists. Finally the maya theories of Saktas and Visnuite schools are briefly discussed. According to the former mayasakti is the power of the Supreme to veil itself without ceasing to be what it is ; they emphasize the point of view that « this all is brahman », accusing Sankara of admitting a principle beside brahman. Ramanuja who basing himself on the conviction that Brahman in the first place is God, defends the thesis that the world and the souls are real, and attacks Sankara's maya theory ; according to this great exponent of Visnuite thought maya symbolizes the wonderful and miraculous in God's creation and creative power. (shrink)

1. Svet -- 2. Preizkušanje meja izrekljivega.

Aspiracija za jedinstvenim upravljanjem svetom je stara koliko i sam svet. Ona u suštini proizlazi iz naše percepcije sveta kao jednog, bez obzira na sve razlike koje se u njemu takođe vide. U naše vreme ova percepcija je pojačana utiskom o sve većoj međuzavisnosti delova sveta, kao i osećajem da su razlike, ma koliko bile velike, sve manje važne u odnosu na ono što je isto ili bar slično u različitim delovima sveta. Ovaj osećaj jedinstva je još više pojačan percepcijom (...) potrebe, ili nužde, da se o važnim stvarima u svetu odlučuje i upravlja na jedinstven način, bez kolizija koje bi proces odlučivanja učinile neefikasnim ili nemogućim. Ali jedinstvo sveta bi trebalo da u sebi sadrži ideju ravnopravnosti, i neke načelne jednakosti. Međutim, uvidom u način na koji se ovaj proces unifikacije sveta stvarno odvija vidimo mnoge probleme. Neki od njih su za očekivati – problemi reprezentacije i pristanka na svetsku vlast koja bi bila odraz jedinstvene zakonodavne volje čovečanstva. Takva volja možda uopšte ne može da se konstituiše. Umesto nje imamo volju za hegemonijom koju prati ideja nejednakosti i manihejske podele sveta na naš i tuđi deo, kao i razne vrste pokušaja ukidanja onog uslova koji svakom zakonodavstvu daje njegov legitimet – a to je sloboda. Suočavamo se sa idejom da je, kao uslov mira i demokratije (šta god da to znači, ili što će značiti u bližoj i daljoj budućnosti) potrebno uspostaviti krutu nejednakost i rigidnu kontrolu svih različitosti u jednom zamrznutom stanju podele na povlašćene i obezvlašćene, na „dobre“ i „loše“ momke, kao da se svet sastoji od „momaka“. Ključni deo ove sheme je pretpostavka o univerzalnoj samerljivosti svega što život čini vrednim. Ta pretpostavka uniformiše i simplifikuje, smanjuje, svet, negirajući relevanciju i stvarnost razlikama koji sada predstavljaju stvarnost sveta. Zakoni više ne pretpostavljaju postojanje zakonodavne volje. U toj situaciji proizvodnja ogromne količine iluzorne sreće više liči na podmićivanje svetskog lumpenproletarijata, sa rizikom da celokupno čovečanstvo postane totalno ravnodušno prema svakoj posebnosti i svakoj vrlini, sasvim primereno svojoj novoj lumpenproleterskoj prirodi. (shrink)

Článek se věnuje nejnovější knize Charlese Taylora Secular Age (2007). Poukazuje na její kořeny v hegeliánství a v novějších kritikách modernity a probírá některé námitky vůči Taylorově koncepci včetně Taylorových odpovědí. Taylor představuje dva typy současných etických projektů. Na jedné straně tzv. výlučný humanismus, na druhé straně imanentní antihumanismus. A smyslem jeho genealogie moderního sekularismu je ukázat vzájemnou podmíněnost mezi antihumanismem, humanismem a religiozitou s tím, že bez nějaké formy transcendence se každý západní hodnotový systém vystavuje nepřekonatelným tenzím, aby následně (...) navrhl koncept originality volající k následování jako spojnici hlavního nároku křesťanství ztělesněného v pojmu lásky k bližnímu s moderním uměním jako náhražkovým náboženstvím. Taylorova práce je nejen v tomto ohledu postavena na jeho celoživotním zájmu o Hegelovu filosofii, v níž se hledá takový způsob, jak spojit etiku autenticity se smyslem pro společenství, který by překonal omezení reflektující racionality. Taylorovo obohacení Hegela můžeme chápat jako snahu nahradit tradiční nárok lásky k bližnímu srozumitelnějším pojmem podpory rozmanitosti v jednotě (resp. pojmem kultury). The essay examines Charles Taylor’s latest book The Secular Age (2007) by unveiling its Hegelian roots together with its debt to other critics of modernity and by considering some objections as well as Taylor’s answers. Taylor sketches two types of contemporary ethical projects. On the one hand he considers exclusive humanism, on the other the immanent antihumanism. The moral of Taylor’s story of modern secularism comes to his claim that the anti-humanism is enabled by humanism and humanism again by religiosity. According to him this comes to indispensability of religion: namely, some notion of transcendence is necessary for coherence of any set of values available to western man. Actually the originality inspiring its following is what he understands as the key element that is shared by the central claim of Christianity embodied in the notion of love (agape) overcoming the rigorism of explicit rules on the one hand and modern art as Ersatzreligion.(Not only) this aspect of Taylor’s recent work is rooted in his lifelong interest in Hegel, who looked for such pairing of the ethics of authenticity with a sense for community that could overcome the limits of reflective rationality. We can interpret Taylor’s amendement to Hegel as a substitution of „support for differentiation in unity“ (or simply „culture“) for „love for neighbour“. (shrink)

[Lifeworld, Metaphysics and the Ethics of Nature in Habermas. ].

Článek srovnává pojetí člověka jako bytosti, situované v celkové souvislosti a vyznačující se otevřeností a sebetranscendencí, v myšlení Jana Patočky a Karla Rahnera, a to se zvláštním zřetelem na interpretaci postavy bohočlověka u obou autorů. Srovnává a dává do souvislosti Patočkův pojem "světa" a pojem "tajemství" u Karla Rahnera, jejich pojetí dějinnosti i radikálního ohrožení člověka. Konečně se zabývá interpretací postavy bohočlověka, kterou můžeme u obou autorů chápat jako klíčovou pro lidskou existenci, a zároveň si můžeme všimnout, že odlišné interpretace (...) tohoto motivu u obou autorů jsou si vnitřně překvapivě blízké. (shrink)

The paper deals with von Mises’ metaphysics and argues that his methodological dualism concerns only his epistemology. The framework of Mises´s ontology is materialistic monism. Although Mises strongly criticizes materialism, his critique does not concern metaphysical ontological materialism as long as it does not try to eliminate the specific method of the social sciences. In this sense Mises’ metaphysics is fully naturalistic – it does not include any “spiritual” agents and postulates a world consisting exclusively of elementary physical particles. The (...) study illustrates this point on Mises’ determinism and his rejection of the free will as well as on his Darwinian account of the evolution of human mind. The specific method of the social sciences which makes use of the category of finality serves merely as an efficient heuristics and is based on a pragmatic view of science. It allows us to describe the irreducible complexity of social phenomena that cannot (at least not yet) be grasped by the physicalist vocabulary alone. Thus the argument of complexity is seen as a cornerstone of Misesian methodological dualism. (shrink)

The purpose of this work is to deal with traditional metaphysics, the science that Aristotle called the first philosophy (prote philosophia). This thinking is also called realism, more precisely metaphysical realism, where the relative opposition between subject and object is not equated with the opposition between spirit and being, but being, which is originally spiritual, embraces the subject and the object. The subjectivity of man also belongs to the broader framework of the objective in general; it is only a specially (...) exposed inner place in the great realm of the objective.--Publisher's website. (shrink)

Ondřej Beran. Náš jazyk, můj svět: Wittgenstein, Husserl a Heidegger – vzájemná setkávání a míjení. 1. vyd. Praha: Filosofia, 2010, ISBN 978-80-7007-335-3, 422 stran.

Kritická stať se nejprve vztahuje k Beranovu pokusu srovnat Husserlovu fenomenologii a východisko Wittgensteina období Filosofických zkoumání, přičemž se snaží shrnout pozici tzv. statické fenomenologie a na jejím základě vznést otázky k tezi, že rozeznávání a identifikace předmětů je možno založit pouze z hlediska intersubjektivně sdíleného jazyka.

The article deals with the relation between body and its environment. According to the author the body is not only a centre of orientation, but also a factor of creative interaction. The role of the senses is analysed, drawing from the phenomenology of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. On the background of Levinas ideas the body is conceived as the source of the ethical relationships between the inhabitants of the environment, which is paralelly created by them. The body is interpreted in the (...) context of phenomenological and hermeneutical cultural studies. The author raises the thesis that the body is implicit in the existential creation conceived as an interaction between us and our environment. The phenomenology of culture is conceived as an interaction between different existential layers , where the body lays an important role. The theses, raised in the article, are illustrated by the examples from multi-layer art. (shrink)

Příspěvek se snaží ukázat, jaký dopad mělo poznávání přírody Nového světa na utváření specific- kých podob raně novověké vědecké kooperace a vědy obecně. Záměrem textu je prezentovat originální metody a formy vědění, které v souvislosti s kooperativním poznáváním Nového světa především ve Španělsku vznikaly a jež v soudobé Evropě neměly obdobu. Studie tak chce poukázat na význam, který mělo poznávání Nového světa Španěly v procesu tzv. vědecké revoluce, resp. proměny vědecké praxe i teoretických episte- mologických schémat.