We developed an ex silico evolutionary‐based systematic synteny approach to define and name the duplicated genes in vertebrates. The first convention for the naming of genes relied on historical precedent, the order in the human genome, and mutant phenotypes in model systems. However, total‐genome duplication that resulted in teleost genomes required the naming of duplicated orthologous genes (ohnologs) in a specific manner. Unfortunately, as we review here, such naming has no defined criteria, and some ohnologs and their orthologs have suffered (...) from incorrect nomenclature, thus creating confusion in comparative genetics and disease modeling. We sought to overcome this barrier by establishing an ex silico evolutionary‐based systematic approach to naming ohnologs in teleosts. We developed software and compared gene synteny in zebrafish using the spotted gar genome as a reference, representing the unduplicated ancestral state. Using new criteria, we identified several hundred potentially misnamed ohnologs and validated the principle manually. Also see the video abstract here: https://youtu.be/UKNLa_TvSgY. (shrink)

Homo sapiens is a mammal of the order Primates. What most distinguishes primates from other mammals is their ability to cerebrate. Cerebration developed fastest among the Anthropoidea primates , and subsequently the hominids . The increase in brain mass only by Homo sapiens—and only over the past 10,000 years—possess superior Darwinian fitness: for the preceding 30 million years primates had played a rather marginal role in the world’s biological system.Homo sapiens’ success as the creator of developed civilization was possible only (...) thanks to his special adaptation capabilities, shaped by natural selection at the dawn of his existence.Primates first appeared in the Oligocene about 30 million years ago, and the first two-legged anthropoid, Australopithecus, about 6.5–5.7 million years ago. The transition from Australopithecus to the species we call Homo was in many ways an evolutionary milestone. Australopithecus was exclusively herbivorous and formed neither organized communities nor settlements. His successor, Homo erectus, on the other hand, possessed heretofore unknown skills like hunting and gathering, which considerably influenced both his lifestyle and his diet—he increasingly ate meat from cadavers or animals he had killed himself. Fossil remains of Homo erectus dating back two million years have been unearthed throughout Africa, China, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Middle East, and Europe.Homo sapiens derives from the rather small Homo erectus population in East Africa and has been the earth’s only hominid for a relatively short time about 10,000 years ago before he still shared his world with Neanderthal man and the diminutive Homo floresiensis.Despite racial differences there is surprisingly little variation in the human genome. We are all 99 percent genetically alike, moreover genome variations do not correlate to skin color.Homo sapiens’ hunter-gatherer lifestyle led him to seek solutions which today find application only in human communities. In time his biological capabilities were enriched by the skill of speech, this in turn helping to develop creativity, self-awareness, a sense of dignity, and group, ethnic and national loyalty, eventually leading to the emergence of religion as a path to life’s fundamental truths and an antidote to the everpresent fear of death.The Neolithic Revolution began about 10,000 years ago. Several thousand years later the evolution of farming and breeding led to the emergence of the first civilizations. The transition from hunting and gathering to agriculture changed radically not only economic and social structures but, as speech developed, helped form civilizations and cultures.Over the past 2000 years humanity has changed the global environment but has itself remained unchanged in heritability. The awareness that despite all racial, ethnic, cultural, or linguistic differences we belong to an exceptionally homogeneous species, can be an inspiration for humanity to strive towards a universal civilization in which all these differences could be contained. (shrink)

This book provides a critical survey of Western political philosophy from a classical liberal perspective, paying particular attention to knowledge problems and the problem of political authority. Its central argument is that the state is a tool for solving a historically changing set of problems, and that, as a tool, the state is frequently deficient on both moral and practical grounds. Government action can be considered as a response to a set of problems, all of which may conceivably be solved (...) in some other manner as well. The book examines in particular the relationship between the state and technology over time. Technological developments may make the state more or less necessary over time, which is a consideration that is relatively new in the history of political philosophy, but increasingly important. The book is organized chronologically and concludes with an essay on trends in the history of political philosophy, as well as its surprisingly bright prospects for future development. (shrink)

Jacek Urbaniec: Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics does not necessarily imply that there are links between the temporal physical world and the eternal world of mathematics..

There is a long-standing disagreement among Branching-Time theorists. Even though they all believe that the branching representation accurately grasps the idea that the future, contrary to the past, is open, they argue whether this representation is compatible with the claim that one among many possible futures is distinguished—the single future that will come to be. This disagreement is paralleled in an argument about the bivalence of future contingents. The single, privileged future is often called the Thin Red Line. I reconstruct (...) the history of the arguments for and against this idea. Then, I propose my own version of the Thin Red Line theory which is immune to the major objections found in the literature. I argue that the semantic disagreement is grounded in distinct metaphysical presuppositions. My solution is expressed in a conceptual framework proposed by John MacFarlane, who distinguishes semantics from postsemantics. I extend his distinction and introduce a new notion of presemantics to elucidate my idea. (shrink)

In this paper we present a characterization of hyper-connexivity by means of a relating semantics for Boolean connexive logics. We also show that the minimal Boolean connexive logic is Abelardian, strongly consistent, Kapsner strong and antiparadox. We give an example showing that the minimal Boolean connexive logic is not simplificative. This shows that the minimal Boolean connexive logic is not totally connexive.

The purpose of the paper is to rethink the role of actuality in the branching model of possibilities. We investigate the idea that the model should be enriched with an additional factor—the so-called Thin Red Line—which is supposed to represent the single possible course of events that gets actualized in time. We believe that this idea was often misconceived which prompted some unfortunate reactions. On the one hand, it suggested problematic semantic models of future tense and and on the other, (...) it provoked questionable lines of criticism. We reassess the debate and point to potential pitfalls, focusing on the semantic dimension of the Thin Red Line theory. Our agenda transcends the semantics, however. We conclude that semantic considerations do not threaten the Thin Red Line theory and that the proper debate should be carried in the domain of metaphysics. (shrink)

We investigate the semantics of historical counterfactuals in indeterministic contexts. We claim that "plain" and "necessitated" counterfactuals differ in meaning. To substantiate this claim, we propose a new semantic treatment of historical counterfactuals in the Branching Time framework. We supplement our semantics with supervaluationist postsemantics, thanks to which we can explain away the intuitions which seem to talk in favor of the identification of "would" with "would necessarily".

We prove that no logic (i.e. consequence operation) determined by any class of orthomodular lattices admits the deduction theorem (Theorem 2.7). We extend those results to some broader class of logics determined by ortholattices (Corollary 2.6).

Let J be any proper ideal of subsets of the real line R which contains all finite subsets of R. We define an ideal J * ∣B as follows: X ∈ J * ∣B if there exists a Borel set $B \subset R \times R$ such that $X \subset B$ and for any x ∈ R we have $\{y \in R: \langle x,y\rangle \in B\} \in \mathscr{J}$ . We show that there exists a family $\mathscr{A} \subset \mathscr{J}^\ast\mid\mathscr{B}$ of power ω (...) 1 such that $\bigcup\mathscr{A} \not\in \mathscr{J}^\ast\mid\mathscr{B}$ . In the last section we investigate properties of ideals of Lebesgue measure zero sets and meager sets in Cohen extensions of models of set theory. (shrink)

Jacek Filek criticizes the modern “nonethical” ethics. He points out its break with philosophy, lack of self-criticism, inanity, undue and fruitless formalism, and academism. His article makes a general request for the restitution of ethics as the independent and dignified scholarly discipline closely connected with world and life.

In the present essay, while entering into discussion with William Hasker, I addressed two divine dilemmas in “the pre-creation situation.” My considerations focused on the reasons for creating a world—the love reason and the manifestation reason—which in some way prevailed over the reasons against creating a world and whose concurrence prompted the image of an optimal creatable world. It turns out that the latter resembles both our world and the world suggested by Hasker’s theism. In that world, God has brought (...) to existence both what is unworthy and what displays high degrees of excellence. On this view, the eschatological conclusion of the world would be the full actualization of divine grace and of the manifestation of God. In the final part of the essay, I attempted to show that my view does not entail the rejection of the idea of divine impassibility. (shrink)

Author: Migasiński Jacek Title: TRANSCENDENTALISM OF LEVINAS (Transcendentalizm Levinasa) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2006, vol:.6, number: 2006/1, pages: 21-41 Keywords: LEVINAS, KANT, TRANSCENDENTALISME, PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIE Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:En s’inspirant de l’approche de Natalie Depraz qui defini la position théorique de Husserl tardif comme «l’empirisme transcendental», je propose retrouver aussi dans la philosophie de Emmanuel Levinas une forme specifique du transcendentalisme, transcendentalisme de genese – différente de l’apriorisme transcendental de (...) Kant. Je demontre que – en dépit de l’apparence – on peut interpreter certaines couches de la réalité ou certains phénoménes ou encore événements que Levinas soumet à l’analyse – telles que «il y a», «la mort», «le feminin», «la fecondité», «la jouissance» et «le travail – la demeure» – comme les conditions empirico-transcendentales de la genese du sujet mur et susceptible de nouer «l’intrigue éthique». Je montre ainsi combine Levinas doit aux méthodes classiques de la phénoménologie. Cependant je demontre aussi que ni la transcendence de l’Infini qui se devoile dans «l’épiphanie du visage», ni cette figure du sujet qui est décrite dans la dernière période de Levinas, notamment «le soi» – le sujet dechiré de l’interieur par la diachronie propre a lui, le sujet an – archique, indicible dans un langage prédicatif – ne peuvent plus remplir les functions transcendentales. En fin j’essai de demontrer que la perspective transcendentale chez Levinas trouve ses limitations et qu’elle est remplacée dans la dernière période par une sorte de dialectique apophatique. (shrink)

Author: Sójka Jacek Title: STUDIES IN CULTURE AND THEIR ORIGINS (Kulturoznawstwo i jego źródła) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.12, number: 2011/1, pages: 171-181 Keywords: STUDIES IN CULTURE, CULTURAL STUDIES, PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE, SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE, JÓZEF CHAŁASIŃSKI, JERZY KMITA Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:In this paper the author traced the origins of studies in culture (in Polish: kulturoznawstwo). The first part deals with the philosophical tradition out of which (...) several philosophies of culture had emerged, esp. within German philosophy at the beginning of the 20th century. The second part is dedicated to the tradition of British cultural studies which has influenced considerably today’s reflection on culture. Finally, the third part points at the Polish sociology of culture of the last century. A special emphasis was put on the work of Józef Chałasiński who tried to work out a “science of culture in its totality”. His “American culture” from 1962 can be seen as a project of cultural studies in today’s sense of the word. In conclusion the author tries to relate all three sources of studies in culture to the theory of Jerzy Kmita, a founder of studies in culture developed at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań. (shrink)

The following logics are the most noteworthy from the perspective of the calculus of combinators: the Hilbert’s positive implicational logic , the Church’s weak theory of implication , the BCK-logic, and the BCI-logic. Their significance is due to a certain correspondence between combinators and implicational formulas . The first three logics mentioned have been immensely investigated but it was not so in case of the remaining one. The BCI-logics was mentioned by A. N. Prior in the second edition of his (...) Formal Logic of 1962 where it was credited to C. A. Meredith and dated in 1956 . A. (shrink)

The first part of the paper is a reminder of fundamental results connected with the adequacy problem for sentential logics with respect to matrix semantics. One of the main notions associated with the problem, namely that of the degree of complexity of a sentential logic, is elucidated by a couple of examples in the second part of the paper. E.g., it is shown that the minimal logic of Johansson and some of its extensions have degree of complexity 2. This is (...) the first example of an exact estimation of the degree of natural complex logics, i.e. logics whose deducibility relation cannot be represented by a single matrix. The remaining examples of complex logics are more artificial, having been constructed for the purpose of checking some theoretical possibilities. (shrink)

In a recently published paper, Patrick Todd (2016, 'Future contingents are all false! On behalf of a Russellian open future') advocates a novel treatment of future contingents. On his view, all statements concerning the contingent future are false. He motivates his semantic postulates by considerations in philosophy of time and modality, in particular by the claim that there is no actual future. I present a number of highly controversial consequences of Todd’s theory. Inadequacy of his semantics might indirectly serve as (...) an argument against the philosophical view underpinning his proposal. (shrink)

In the current paper, I enter into debate with Marcin Tkaczyk and the chosen Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophers of religion to discuss the theological version of the problem of future contingents. I take into consideration some varieties of Ockhamism (retroactivism)—the position denying the temporal necessity (non-determination) of all past events and allowing some form of retroactivity. Strong Ockhamism postulates real retroactive causation, moderate Ockhamism limits it to the meanings of physical and psychical events, and weak Ockhamism replaces the notion of retroactive (...) causation with that of retroactive dependence. I compare different forms of retroactivism with eternalism (of Boethius, St. Anselm of Canterbury, and St. Thomas Aquinas) to show that the latter has significant advantage. At the same time, I point out that eternalism in its presentist and relativist version (proposed by Brian Leftow) avoids the objections put forward against it, and that, within such eternalism, the problem of future contingents does not arise. (shrink)

It is argued that the assignment of truth values to future contingents is threatened not by a tensed metaphysics but by a temporally “local” notion of truth, i.e., by the assumption that whatever is true at a given time needs to be grounded in what exists at that time. If this assumption is accepted, tensed and tenseless metaphysics are equally vulnerable; if it is rejected, both can accommodate true future contingents. This means that semantic decisions are largely independent of metaphysical (...) considerations. The work of Correia and Rosenkranz (2018) is a clear example of how the tensed metaphysics of the growing block can incorporate true future contingents. Two potential worries are discussed in the context of their work: (a) that their grounding strategy overgeneralizes and admits true counterfactual contingents; and (b) that the growing block theory lacks sufficient resources to distinguish the unique possible future course of events that is relevant for the grounding of future contingents. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate some basic semantic and syntactic conditions characterizing the equivalence connective. In particular we define three basic classes of algebras: the class of weak equivalential algebras, the class of equivalential algebras and the class of regular equivalential algebras.Weak equivalential algebras can be used to study purely equivalential fragments of relevant logics and strict equivalential fragments of some modal logics. Equivalential algebras are suitable to study purely equivalential fragment of BCI and BCK logic. A subclass of the (...) class of regular equivalential algebras is suitable to study equivalential fragments of ukasiewicz logics. Some subvarieties of the class of regular equivalential algebras provide natural semantics for equivalential fragments of the intuitionistic prepositional logic and various intermediate logics. (shrink)

In this text I discuss and debate Adam Jonkisz’s book Questions and Answers: Set-theoretic approach. I consider, among other things, the problem of the minimal component of question, of the division of questions, of the specificity of existential questions. I put forward a thesis that every question is a question to be completed, in the sense that every question expresses a ‘gap’ in our knowledge that should be filled. The natural division of questions corresponds to the numbers and types of (...) these ‘gaps.’. (shrink)

The paper briefly presents a genesis of the research project called the theology of science initiated by Michał Heller in early 1980s, but also enriched by the remarks of Józef Życiński. Then the main features of the new Heller’s book Science and theology – not necessarily exclusively on one planet are discussed. The book develops and strengthens the early ideas of theology of science. The paper draws also attention to another author—C.B. Kaiser who—since a dozen years—has been developing a similar (...) project: theology of scientific endeavor. It is also suggested that the Heller’s project, especially in its axiological and praxeological aspects, could take advantage of the achievements of several Francophone authors who once developed a field of the so-called theology of earthly realities. (shrink)

In this text, in discussion with J. L. Schellenberg, I develop a position that I call Christian ultimism. This position lies between Schellenberg’s simple ultimism and traditional Christian theism. Christian ultimism is more apophatic than personalistic, though it more clearly emphasizes the presence of a supra-personal and communicative element in the Ultimate Reality. The proposed position is resistant to a philosophical version of the hiddenness argument, but it must answer to the challenge of the theological problem of the lack of (...) universal access to Christian revelation. Schellenberg’s idea of deep time both magnifies this problem and provides the tools for solving it: the awareness of deep time does not allow us to judge the future, but it does allow us to hope for a revelation accessible to all at the eschatological end of time. (shrink)

t. 1. Etyka ogólna -- t. 2, cz. 1-2 Etyka szczegółowa.

Intentionality is one of the most frequently discussed topics in contemporary phenomenology and analytic philosophy. This book investigates intentionality from the point of view of intentional objects. According to the classical approach to this concept, whatever can be consciously experienced is regarded as an intentional object. Thus, not only ordinary existing individuals but also various kinds of non-existents and non-individuals are considered as intentional. Alexius Meinong, an Austrian philosopher, is particularly well-known as the `inventor' of an abundant ontology of objects (...) among which even incomplete and impossible ones, like `the round square', find their place. Drawing inspirations from Meinong's ideas, the author develops a simple logic of intentional objects, M-logic. M-logic closely resembles classical first-order logic and, as opposed to the formally complicated contemporary theories of non-existent objects, it is much more friendly in apprehending and applications. However, despite this resemblance, the ontological content of M-logic far exceeds that of classical logic. In this book formal investigations are intertwined with philosophical analyses. On the one hand, M-logic is used as a tool for investigating formal features of intentional objects. On the other hand, the study of intentionality phenomena suggests further ways of extending and modifying M-logic. Audience: The book is addressed to logicians, cognitive scientists, philosophers of language and metaphysics with either a phenomenological or an analytic background. (shrink)

The book is comprised of three components. The first component analyses the creative contribution to the theory of imperatives and norms provided by 20th-century Polish researchers. The second component summarizes their reflections and considerations. The third component is an anthology of the classic writings of Polish authors of the time; it constitutes an illustration of the first part and indicates that their research covered practically the whole scope of this theory. Author Jacek Jadacki (born 1946) is professor at Warsaw (...) University. His scholarly production includes approximately hundred works spanning almost every domain in philosophy: from logic, through ontology, epistemology, aesthetics and ethics, to the history of these disciplines. Among his more than twenty books are Possible Ontologies (with Zdzislaw Augustynek; 1993), From the Viewpoint of the Lvov-Warsaw School (2003), and Polish Analytical Philosophy (2009). His pupils include such well-known figures of modern Polish thought as Anna Brozek, Mariusz Grygianiec, Joanna Odrowaz-Sypniewska, and Mieszko Talasiewicz. (shrink)

This book is dedicated to the life and work of logician Janusz Czelakowski on the topic of logical consequence. It consists of three parts – a biography, a survey and research sections. The volume begins with an autobiographic chapter by Janusz Czelakowski followed by a historical chapter written by Jacek Malinowski. The survey section forms the backbone of the volume with each chapter covering one of Janusz Czelakowski’s results. They focus on his results in the area of logical consequence, (...) demonstrate how his results influenced following research, and presents potential future results, problems and applications. This volume is of interest to logicians and mathematicians. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Brief History of Medical Ethics Code in PolandJacek A. Piątkiewicz (bio)On March 15, 1934 a Parliamentary Act authorized the General Medical Chambers, a body incorporating all Polish physicians, to establish general rules of medical ethics. These rules governed medical conduct in Poland until 1950, when the Communist government dissolved the General Medical Chambers.From 1950 to 1989 the only medical organization in Poland tolerated by the Communist government was (...) the Polish Medical Association, which included about 30% of the country's physicians. In 1967 this group produced the "Collection of Ethico-deontological principles of the Polish Physician" which constituted a kind of code of medical ethics. This collection was a compromise between objective ethical principles and the demands of the Communist regime. For example, Principle 1 of the Collection stated that the physician "had to observe the ethico-deontological principles obligatory in socialist society."During round-table talks in early 1989 with representatives of the Communist government, the Solidarity movement argued for the revival of autonomous medical organizations like the Medical Chambers. On May 17, 1989 an Act of Parliament re-established the group. The Act (article 33, part 1) also stipulated that the National Congress of Physicians, the legislative body of Medical Chambers, establish rules of medical ethics. The Act (article 15, part 1) also states that all practicing Polish physicians are obliged to observe these rules.When the revived Chambers began its work in January 1990, its governing body—the General Medical Council—created a Commission to prepare a draft of a medical ethics code. After a year and a half of work, the Commission completed its draft, which received preliminary acceptance by the General Medical Council. [End Page 361]On December 13-14, 1991 the Extraordinary Second National Congress of Physicians was held in Bielsko-Biala (South Poland) and one of the main items on the agenda was the Code. Every article of the Code was discussed exhaustively throughout the second day of the meeting, and close to midnight the Code, including the Physician' Oath, was approved by an overwhelming majority (449 for, 75 against, 58 abstaining).Some of the liveliest discussion centered on Article 37, which relates to abortion. The delegates realized that the Code was inconsistent with a 1956 Act on abortion then under discussion in the Parliament which was not as restrictive as the Code. They decided to defer implementation of the Code for five months, until May 3, 1992. As described in the following text by Robert Baker, Article 37 has now been appealed and a decision resolving the discrepancy would have to come from Poland's Constitutional Tribunal or its Parliament. [End Page 362]Jacek A. Piątkiewicz Jacek A. Piątkiewicz, M.D., Ph.D., is Chairman of the Legislative Commission of the General Medical Council of Poland in Warsaw.Copyright © 1993 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

Recently, constructivism has become one of the most important movements in metaethics. According to metaethical constructivism, moral judgements do not refer to moral facts but are constructed as solutions to practical problems. At the same time this claim is not seen as incompatible with cognitive realism. A variant of metaethical constructivism, developed in opposition to the dominant Kantian branch, alludes to Aristotle’s practical philosophy. In this article I raise two issues. Firstly, I present a new version of the Aristotelian constructivism (...) in metaethics, more elaborate than the previous proposals. Its fundamental element is the concept of the coherence of emotional response seen as a complex cognitive-affective state. Secondly, I argue that the acceptance of the Aristotelian version of metaethical constructivism entails the need to accept constructivism in the area of the theory of knowledge, which is contrary to the metaethical premises of constructivism. (shrink)

Bóg i przypadek W niniejszym tekście analizuję sześć pojęć przypadku oraz – dodatkowo – definiuję pojęcie zdarzenia losowego. Odrzucając istnienie zdarzeń całkowicie bezprzyczynowych, zastanawiam się nad relacją zdarzeń losowych do Boga. Moją koncepcję opieram na trzech zasadach: zasadzie jednoczesnego współdziałania, zasadzie komplementarności oraz zasadzie wiedzy pośredniej. Przyjęcie tych trzech zasad pozwala mi pogodzić istnienie klasycznie pojętego Boga z istnieniem zdarzeń losowych. W ten sposób uzyskuję model alternatywny do modeli proponowanych przez teizmy rewizyjne, w tym przez teizm probabilistyczny Łukasiewicza.

Panpsychism may be roughly defined as a view that at least some of the properties constituting the fundamental level of reality are mental or proto-mental. Despite its long history, it has been revived in recent discussions as a solution to the problems raised by the mind, especially to the so-called hard problem of consciousness. Contemporary panpsychism differs significantly from incarnations known from the history of philosophy mainly due to the fact that the former is often combined with so-called Russellian monism. (...) According to Russellian monism, the intrinsic properties of physical things remain unknown. This encourages panpsychists to argue that those properties are in fact mental. In my paper, I examine the three most common arguments for panpsychism: the Continuity Argument, the Hegelian Argument, and the Agnostic Argument. I take a closer look at each of them to assess their advantages and weaknesses. As I point out, the way in which one argues implies the version of panpsychism one adopts. This turns out to be especially important with regard to the Hegelian Argument and the Agnostic Argument. Both can be combined with Russellian monism, resulting in Russellian panpsychism. However, I claim that the philosophical consequences of these arguments are different, so it is legitimate to distinguish two kinds of Russellian panpsychism. In conclusion, I hold that there are reasons to prefer panpsychism based on the Agnostic Argument, which is more promising, as it responds to some general problems of panpsychism. (shrink)

Main headings: Introduction: Philosophy and precision. - Part I. Being and essence. - Part II. Truth and nonsense. - Part III. Understanding and silence. - Conclusion: Science and creation.