In his Confessions Jean-Jacques Rousseau tells the story of his life, from the formative experience of his humble childhood in Geneva, through the achievement of international fame as novelist and philosopher in Paris, to his wanderings as an exile, persecuted by governments and alienated from the world of modern civilization. In trying to explain who he was and how he came to be the object of others' admiration and abuse, Rousseau analyses with unique insight the relationship between an elusive (...) but essential inner self and the variety of social identities he was led to adopt. The book vividly illustrates the mixture of moods and motives that underlie the writing of autobiography: defiance and vulnerability, self-exploration and denial, passion, puzzlement, and detachment. Above all, Confessions is Rousseau's search, through every resource of language, to convey what he despairs of putting into words: the personal quality of one's own existence. (shrink)

A leading philosopher presents a radical manifesto for the future of art andfilm.

Face aux sommes colossales investies par les Etats, à l'augmentation des débris dans les orbites autour de la Terre, aux risques pris par les spationautes, et à l'exploitation commerciale de l'espace, cet ouvrage propose une réflexion critique sur les stratégies mises en oeuvre par les hommes dans leur conquête des étoiles.

La question des services publics, dans son idée de mise en commun des biens sociaux, suscite aujourd’hui une réflexion sur les mutations du politique. Les transformations des services publics, leur diminution voire leur abolition correspondent, selon l’auteur, au recul d’un certain projet politique de mise en commun. Le partage des biens sociaux découle, de plus en plus, du jeu des rapports de force au détriment d’un projet de mise en commun conforme à un projet politique plus vaste qui définirait les (...) paramètres d’un « vivre ensemble de solidarité ». (shrink)

L’article est un essai qui propose de faire trois additions à la théorie évolutionniste hayékienne.La première pour éclairer l’émergence des règles, sociales, zone d’ombre chez Hayek, en introduisant le concept “ d’espaces relationnels ”, embryons des espaces institutionnels.La seconde pour faire apparaître le rôle de l’action humaine dans l’évolution des règles sociales : des individus ou groupes d’individus jouent un rôle “ entrepreneurial ” et cherchent à changer des institutions qui ne conviennent pas à leurs exigences éthiques.La dernière pour réintroduire (...) une référence à l’ordre naturel qu’Hayek avait voulu éliminer, mais qui valide le processus hayékien à condition de retenir une approche subjective du droit naturel par opposition aux approches objectives courantes.This paper tries to add three elements to Hayek’s theory of evolution.The first element sheds light on a moot point in Hayek’s thought, the emergence of social rules. It does so by introducing the concept of “relational spheres”, deemed as incipient institutional spheres.The second element tries to make the role of human action conspicuous in the evolution of social rules: individuals or groups of individuals play an “entrepreneurial” role and seek to alter institutions which are no longer in harmony with their ethical moorings.The last element introduces a reference to natural order which Hayek discarded in his thought. This reference validates the Hayekian process as long as a subjective approach to natural law is retained in contrast to contemporary objective approaches. (shrink)

. Fresh evidence from Free Choice Items (FCIs) in French question the current perception of the class. The role of some standard distinctions found in the literature is weakened or put in a new perspective. The distinction between universal and existential is no longer an intrinsic property of FCIs. Similarly, the opposition between variation-based vs intension-based analyses is relativized. We show that the regime of free choiceness can be characterized by an abstract constraint, that we call Non-Individuation (NI), and which (...) can be satisfied in different ways that match current distinctions. NI says that the information conveyed by a sentence containing a FCI should not be reducible to a referential situation, that is a situation in which particular individuals satisfy the sentence in the current world. The widely used resource of modal variation becomes a particular scenario of free-choiceness, not its essence. In fact, we show that under certain conditions, FCIs can occur in episodic, non-modal sentences, a fact that NI can accommodate. We also discuss more fine-grained aspects of the semantics of FCIs, such as their emotional colour. (. . .) the tripod fell spontaneously, because, though it stood on its feet so as to serve for a seat, it did not fall so as to serve for a seat. Aristotle, Physics II,6. (shrink)

“Pedagogics of Unlearning”: this phrase obviously echoes a notion and a figure that I had set up in my own way when I published a book entitled The Ignorant Schoolmaster with the subtitle “Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation”.1 Both entail the idea of a specific form of learning, which is a negative one: learning how to unlearn, teaching as an ignoramus, learning the emancipatory virtue of ignorance. This idea raises two interrelated problems. First, how are we to understand the type (...) of negativity at work in this unlearning or this ignorance? Secondly, what is the exact target of this negative action? What is the positivity that is under attack? In other words, what is at stake in matters of... (shrink)

Seul Jésus dans les Evangiles parle du Fils de l'homme, et si d'autres prononcent ce nom, c'est toujours en s'adressant à lui. Des disciples, des auditeurs, peuvent reprendre sa façon de parler, ils ne font jamais parler que lui, et jamais d'un autre que de lui. Les quatre-vingt textes évangéliques sur le Fils de l'homme ne suffisent pas à caractériser son personnage ni à définir son action. Mais ils expriment souvent de façon très libre ses réactions les plus personnelles. A (...) ce titre, ils sont incomparables. Ils couvrent d'ailleurs assez largement les terrains abordés par les Evangiles. Si les annonces eschatologiques occupent facilement la première place, la présence du Fils de l'homme donne à ces perspectives toute leur ampleur. Même quand Jésus demeure silencieux ou discret, la présence du Fils de l'homme donne au récit et aux événements une portée nouvelle.L'évangile de Jean n'attache pas moins d'importance que les synoptiques au Fils de l'homme. Et s'il transforme l'image en profondeur, il ne la quitte pas. Il n'oublie ni l'ampleur de l'horizon, vaste comme la création de Dieu ni la personnalité du Fils de l'homme. Même s'il concentre le regard sur quelques textes seulement, il développe une vision tout à fait originale et parfaitement cohérente. Il donne ainsi aux perspectives synoptiques, et sans doute au langage original de Jésus, toute leur plénitude.In the Gospels only Jesus speaks of the Son of Man, and if others pronounce that name, it is always to address him. The disciples and listeners can take up his way of speaking ; they only want to hear about him, and no one else but him. The eighty Gospel texts concerning the Son of Man are not enough to characterize his person nor to define his action. But they often express in a very free way his most personal reactions. In this way they are incomparable. They cover fairly completely, in fact, the ground dealt with by the Gospels. If eschatological declarations easily occupy the first place, the presence of the Son of Man g ives all its fullness to these perspectives. Even when Jesus remains silent or discrete, the presence of the Son of Man gives to the story and events a new dimension.The Gospel of John does not give less importance than the Synoptics to the Son of Man. And it transforms the image of a greater depth, it does not leave it. It forgets neither the breadth of the horizon, vast as the creation of God, nor the personality of the Son of Man. Even if John concentrates only on several texts, he develops a vision completely original and perfectly coherent. Thus he gives to the Synoptic perspectives, and without doubt to the original language of Jesus, all their fullness. (shrink)

Trois alternatives sous-tendent le questionnement sur l'homme aujourd'hui. Tout d'abord, faut-il disjoindre la nature et l'homme? Ensuite l'anthropologie étant plurielle, à quelle instance revient-il de penser l'homme? Enfin, quel sera l'avenir de la spécificité anthropologique? C'est à ces questions cruciales que répond l'auteur en en appelant à des reprises critiques et des reformulations consenties.

Faut-il abandonner l'idée de catégorisation ou lui conserver une fonction plus restreinte, diversifiée, domaniale ? On se demande ce qui peut être préservé de la conception transcendantale pour prolonger son évolution récente au-delà de Wittgenstein, Goodman et Peirce. On propose une approche interrogative, présuppositionnelle et textologique qui lui conserve assez de fonctions , pour qu'il reste significatif de parler de catégorisation. Au lieu d'être immobiles, les catégories ont vocation à commander la recherche, qu'elle soit enquête scientifique ou même quête religieuse. (...) Un concept devient catégorial pour autant qu'il ouvre un domaine à la recherche, la guide ou lui permet de se réorganiser. A first question is raised, whether the idea of categorisation should be altogether dismissed or retained, but with more restricted, diversified and less extensive functions. The second question deals with what of the transcendantal dogma can be maintained in order to extend its recent developments beyond Wittgenstein, Goodman and Peirce. An interrogative, pre suppositional and textological approach is put forward, which could preserve enough functions to allow to go on speaking of categorisation with some kind of relevance. Far from being immovable, the categories indeed call for leadership in matters of research, be it scientific investigation or sacred religious quest. It appears that a concept becomes categorial in so far as it breaks fresh ground for research, provides guidance and enables it to perform self reorganisation. (shrink)

Manuel Cruz launches a nuanced study of memory and forgetting, defining their forms and uses, political meanings, and social and historical implications. Memory is not an intrinsically positive phenomenon, he argues, but an impressionable and malleable one, used to advance a variety of agendas. Cruz focuses on five memory models: that which is inherently valuable; that which legitimizes the present; that which supports retributive justice; that which is essential to mourning; and that which elicits renunciation or revelation.

This article postulates a method of determining the date of human settlement in the Canary Islands by establishing when species of mice, which are commensal with human beings and hence in all likelihood migrated with them, arrived in the archipelago. At the same time, the extinction of several species of endemic rodents may also correlate with such arrivals. The study establishes the outer limits for the arrival of the mouse species, between the 5th millennium BCE and the 15th century CE, (...) but, while indicative archaeological evidence indicates human settlement was established by around the middle of the 1st millennium BCE, the absence of conclusive dating of fossil mice remains leaves a definitive conclusion for the start of such settlement still open. (shrink)

Myth, Telos, Identity: The Tragic Schema in Greek and Shakespearean Drama. By Iván Nyusztay (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 2002), 202 pp. $45.00/£24.85 paper.

According to the realist, the meaning of a declarative, non-indexical sentence is the condition under which it is true and the truth-condition of an undecidable sentence can obtain or fail to obtain independently of our capacity, even in principle, to recognize that it obtains or that fails to do so.1 In a series of papers, beginning with “Truth” in 1959, Michael Dummett challenged the position that the classical notion of truth-condition occupied as the central notion of a theory of meaning, (...) and proposed that it should be replaced by the anti-realist (and intuitionistic) notion of assertability-condition. Taken together with normalization results obtained by Dag Prawitz, Dummett’s work truly opened up the anti-realist challenge at the level of proof-theoretical semantics.2 There has been since numerous rejoinders from partisans of classical logic, which were at times met with by attempts at watering down the anti-realist challenge, e.g., by arguing that anti-realism does not necessarily entail the adoption of intuitionistic logic. Only a few anti-realists, such as Crispin Wright and Neil Tennant, tried to look instead in the other direction, towards a more radical version of anti-realism which would entail deeper revisions of classical logic than those recommended by intuitionists.3 In this paper, which is largely programmatic, we shall also argue in favour of a radical anti-realism which would be a genuine alternative to the traditional anti-realism of Dummett and Prawitz. The debate about anti-realism has by now more or less run out of breath and we wish to provide it with a new lease on life, by taking into account the profound changes that took place in proof theory during the intervening years. We have in mind in particular the considerable development within Gentzen-style proof theory of non-classical, substructural logics other than intuitionistic logic, which seriously opens up the possibility that anti-realism, when properly understood, might end up justifying another logic, and the development of closer links between proof theory and computational complexity theory that has renewed interest in a radical form of anti-realism, namely strict finitism. (shrink)