Downside risk aversion (downside RA) and decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) are different concepts that describe preferences for which the harm from bearing risk is lessened by an increase in wealth. This note presents some intuitive explanations of the difference between the two concepts using simple lotteries and graphical analysis. All risk-averse utility functions exhibit downside risk aversion, except those that exhibit sufficiently strong increasing absolute risk aversion. In a sense, downside RA is to be expected: adding downside risk to (...) a baseline lottery is analogous to increasing risk while adding upside risk is analogous to decreasing risk. The difference between the two concepts can be attributed to the use of different measures of the harm from risk bearing: downside RA measures harm using the utility premium and DARA measures harm using the risk premium. The two premia can change at different rates and even in different directions as wealth increases. (shrink)

The relationship between willingness to pay to reduce the probability of an adverse event and the degree of risk aversion is ambiguous. The ambiguity arises because paying for protection worsens the outcome in the event the adverse event occurs, which influences the expected marginal utility of wealth. Using the concept of downside risk aversion or prudence, we characterize the marginal WTP to reduce the probability of the adverse event as the product of WTP in the case of risk neutrality and (...) an adjustment factor. For the univariate case, the adjustment factor depends on risk aversion and prudence with respect to wealth. For the bivariate case, the adjustment factor depends on risk aversion and cross-prudence in wealth. (shrink)

In this, the first book to address the ongoing debate, Plantinga presents his influential thesis and responds to critiques by distinguished philosophers from a ...

This important contribution to the ground-breaking Radical Orthodoxy series revisits the works of Husserl, Heidegger, Augustine and Derrida to reconsider the challenge of speaking of God through predication, silence, confession and praise. James K. A. Smith argues for God's own refusal to avoid speaking as well as for our urgent need of words to make Him visible to us. This leads to a radical new "incarnational phenomenology" in which God's love endows imperfect signs with the means to indicate true (...) states of infinitude, and in which we may ultimately discover a new theology of the arts. (shrink)

★ Publishers Weekly starred review One of the Top 100 Books and One of the 5 Best Books in Religion for 2019, Publishers Weekly Christianity Today 2020 Book Award Winner (Spiritual Formation) Outreach 2020 Resource of the Year (Spiritual Growth) Foreword INDIES 2019 Honorable Mention for Religion This is not a book about Saint Augustine. In a way, it's a book Augustine has written about each of us. Popular speaker and award-winning author James K. A. Smith has spent time (...) on the road with Augustine, and he invites us to take this journey too, for this ancient African thinker knows far more about us than we might expect. Following Smith's successful You Are What You Love, this book shows how Augustine can be a pilgrim guide to a spirituality that meets the complicated world we live in. Augustine, says Smith, is the patron saint of restless hearts--a guide who has been there, asked our questions, and knows our frustrations and failed pursuits. Augustine spent a lifetime searching for his heart's true home and he can help us find our way. "What makes Augustine a guide worth considering," says Smith, "is that he knows where home is, where rest can be found, what peace feels like, even if it is sometimes ephemeral and elusive along the way." Addressing believers and skeptics alike, this book shows how Augustine's timeless wisdom speaks to the worries and struggles of contemporary life, covering topics such as ambition, sex, friendship, freedom, parenthood, and death. As Smith vividly and colorfully brings Augustine to life for 21st-century readers, he also offers a fresh articulation of Christianity that speaks to our deepest hungers, fears, and hopes. (shrink)

We have undertaken to discuss the nature of mathematical systems, the way in which they are discovered, and the uses to which they are put in the empirical sciences. The empirical sciences employ mathematical systems in framing final formulations, but adopt mathematical techniques long before reaching that stage. It is a prerequisite that the mathematics they employ has been developed separately and within its own domain. We shall return to the relation between mathematics and the empirical sciences before we are (...) done, but in the meanwhile we shall be constrained to begin by discussing the situation in mathematics in isolation from any empirical considerations. (shrink)

What are international codes of conduct for? The broad support for such codes masks fundamental differences about their purpose. Corporations see codes of conduct as regimes for regulating their relations with their suppliers in developing countries and—not least—to counter negative publicity. For labor and human rights activists, on the other hand, codes of conduct are levers for forcing positive change in global labor and environmental standards. Here I consider two areas typically covered by codes of conduct—wages and child labor—and identify (...) some of the dangers of using codes to force change. If low wages or child labor are the result of poverty, and can’t be fixed by enlightened corporate policies, then codes will at best leave the underlying problems untouched and at worst will aggravate them. I conclude that we should be cautious about using codes to force higher standards. (shrink)

Neither income nor wealth should be too highly unequal. But there is a fundamental distinction between pay for work and the ownership of capital assets. The reasons to moderate these inequalities therefore differ, and the arguments are best considered separately.

Given the enchanted worldview of pentecost-alism, what possibility is there for a uniquely pentecostal intervention in the science-theology dialogue? By asserting the centrality of the miraculous and the fantastic, and being fundamentally committed to a universe open to surprise, does not pentecostalism forfeit admission to the conversation? I argue for a distinctly pentecostal contribution to the dialogue that is critical of regnant naturalistic paradigms but also of a naive supernaturalism. I argue that implicit in the pentecostal social imaginary is a (...) distinct conception of nature that is amenable to science but in conflict with naturalism. (shrink)

The problem in the philosophy of science which interests me beyond all others is that of constructing an abstract deductive system isomorphic with the theory of the natural sciences. Clearly, this task must be the work of many years and many minds. Some portions of it have already been accomplished; but a great deal remains to be done, and the difficulties of the problems yet unsolved impress me as formidable. I believe, however, that it would be hard to overestimate the (...) benefits which might follow from the construction of such an abstract theory, always provided that that theory met certain conditions. Not only must the system in question measure up to the standards of rigor and precision set by the logicians, but it must also be cast in such form that a working scientist could learn to understand at least that part of it applicable to his own specialty without being forced to drop his professional work and devote the labor of years to mastering the subject. (shrink)

Norman Daniels, who has written extensively on population health, once sighed that medical care is simply “the ambulance waiting at the bottom of the cliff” (Daniels 2008, 79). At the bottom of Dan...

If, then, we wish to reintroduce the category of substance into the set of those categories which can be justified in terms of modern knowledge, we shall have to treat it in connection with chance and irrationality, or accident. Real, objective chance means the fortuitous occurrence of just this predicate or property here and now rather than any other out of a whole host of possibles. This blue wall--why is it blue? And if we are told it had been painted (...) we could still ask why it had been painted blue. And driving back the series of causes conceals the fortuitous element, putting the selection on some antecedent cause which in turn has an antecedent chance element, and so on in an accidental series. (shrink)

This work presents an annotated text of the most comprehensive and detailed arguments in Erasmus's conflict with the Catholic, conservative, scholastic theologians, the Declarationes. It also shows the contrast between the scholastic/ /logical and the humanist/rheorical approach to Scripture and to theological questions.