Despite the increase in the research field of ethics in artificial intelligence, most efforts have focused on the debate about principles and guidelines for responsible AI, but not enough attention has been given to the “how” of applied ethics. This paper aims to advance the research exploring the gap between practice and principles in AI ethics by identifying how companies are applying those guidelines and principles in practice. Through a qualitative methodology based on 22 semi-structured interviews and two focus groups, (...) the goal of the current study is to understand how companies approach ethical issues related to AI systems. A structured analysis of the transcripts brought out many actual practices and findings, which are presented around the following main research topics: ethics and principles, privacy, explainability, and fairness. The interviewees also raised issues of accountability and governance. Finally, some recommendations are suggested such as developing specific sector regulations, fostering a data-driven organisational culture, considering the algorithm’s complete life cycle, developing and using a specific code of ethics, and providing specific training on ethical issues. Despite some obvious limitations, such as the type and number of companies interviewed, this work identifies real examples and direct priorities to advance the research exploring the gap between practice and principles in AI ethics, with a specific focus on Spanish companies. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to explore the connection between expressivism and disagreement. More in particular, the aim is to defend that one of the desiderata that can be derived from the study of disagreement, the explanation of ‘crossed disagreements’, can only be accommodated within a semantic theory that respects, at the meta-semantic level, certain expressivistic restrictions. We will compare contemporary dynamic expressivism with three different varieties of contextualist strategies to accommodate the specificities of evaluative language –indexical contextualism – (...) truth-conditional pragmatics –, pragmatic strategies using implicatures, and presuppositional accounts. Our conclusion will be that certain assumptions of expressivism are necessary in order to provide a semantic account of evaluative uses of language that can allow us to detect and prevent crossed disagreements. (shrink)

In recent debates on phenomenal consciousness, a distinction is sometimes made, after Levine (2001) and Kriegel (2009), between the “qualitative character” of an experience, i.e. the specific way it feels to the subject (e.g. blueish or sweetish or pleasant), and its “subjective character”, i.e. the fact that there is anything at all that it feels like to her. I argue that much discussion of subjective character is affected by a conflation between three different notions. I start by disentangling the three (...) notions in question, under the labels of “for-me-ness”, “me-ness” and “mineness”. Next, I argue that these notions are not equivalent; in particular, there is no conceptual implication from for-me-ness to me-ishness or mineness. Empirical considerations based on clinical cases additionally suggest that the three notions may also correspond to different properties (although the claim of conceptual non-equivalence does not depend on this further point). The aim is clarificatory, cautionary but also critical: I examine four existing arguments from subjective character that are fuelled by an undifferentiated use of the three notions, and find them to be flawed for this reason. (shrink)

Recent debates on phenomenal consciousness have shown renewed interest for the idea that experience generally includes an experience of the self – a self-experience – whatever else it may present the self with. When a subject has an ordinary experience (as of a bouncing red ball, for example), the thought goes, she is not just phenomenally aware of the world as being presented in a certain way (a bouncy, reddish, roundish way in this case); she is also phenomenally aware of (...) the fact that it is presented to her. This supposed phenomenal dimension has been variously called “mineness”, “for-me-ness”, “pre-reflective self-awareness” and “subjective character”, among others. This view, associated with historical figures such as William James, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, is attracting a new surge of attention at the crossroads of phenomenology, analytic philosophy of mind and the philosophy of cognitive science, but also intense controversy. This book explores some of the questions running through the ongoing debate on the putative subjective dimension of experience: Does it exist?, the existence question; What is it?, the essence question; What is it for?, the function question; and What else does it explain?, the explanation question. The volume also surveys various domains of human experience, both normal and pathological, where a “sense of self” might be at play, including agency, bodily awareness, introspection, memory, emotions and values, and offers insights into the possible relations between the notions of subjective awareness involved. The first part of the book is devoted to more sceptical or deflationary views about self-experience, and the second, to more robust ones. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue against the later Wittgenstein's conventionalist account of necessity. I first show that necessary propositions and grammatical rules differ in ways that make an explanation of the former in terms of the latter inadequate. I then argue that even if Wittgenstein's account were adequate, the explanation of necessity it offers would still fail to be genuinely reductive of the modal notion.

In this paper we analyze some of the major difficulties of informed consent. We consider insufficient to base IC on the principle of autonomy. We must not forget that the patient may be in a situation of extreme vulnerability and the good doctor should assume a degree of commitment and responsibility with his/her decisions. Our aim is to introduce the ethics of responsibility of Levinas in practice and theory of IC in order to generate a beneficent medical practice in which (...) the supervision and overseeing of the patient do not undermine his/her autonomy. (shrink)

The indexical word “I” has traditionally been assumed to be an overt analogue to the concept of self, and the best model for understanding it. This approach, I argue, overlooks the essential role of cognitive phenomenology in the mastery of the concept of self. I suggest that a better model is to be found in a different kind of representation: phenomenal concepts or more generally phenomenally grounded concepts. I start with what I take to be the defining feature of the (...) concept of self, namely its “super-reflexivity”: to use this concept is not just to think of oneself, but to think of oneself as the thinker of the present thought. I call this familiar observation the “Thinker Intuition”. I review some shortcomings of the indexical model of the concept of self, which is the classical account of the Thinker Intuition. I go on to propose a different account, the “phenomenal model”, according to which the concept of self is a phenomenally grounded concept, anchored in a generic kind of cognitive phenomenolog... (shrink)

Esta investigación analiza la interpretación hegeliana de América. Por un lado, mostraremos su carácter más problemático, al reducir toda actividad del hombre americano como parte de la categoría «culturas naturales», aun cuando se registraron noticias de las civilizaciones azteca e inca. Por otro lado, también se revalorará a las civilizaciones aludidas, especialmente la andina, teniendo en cuenta la concepción hegeliana de la historia. Dicha reconsideración encuentra suficiente sustento para afirmar, contrario a lo propuesto por Hegel, que los incas fueron un (...) imperio, o, en otras palabras, una civilización semejante a las que existieron en Asia, África y Europa. Asimismo, se muestra que en el territorio andino se desplegó un espíritu propio, impulsando el desarrollo de los diferentes pueblos; a su vez, alcanzado su máxima expresión en el imperio de los incas o Tawantinsuyu. (shrink)

It has recently been proposed that the framework of semantic relativism be put to use to describe mental content, as deployed in some of the fundamental operations of the mind. This programme has inspired in particular a novel strategy of accounting for the essential egocentricity of first-personal or de se thoughts in relativist terms, with the advantage of dispensing with a notion of self-representation. This paper is a critical discussion of this strategy. While it is based on a plausible appeal (...) to cognitive economy, the relativist theory does not fully account for the epistemic profile that distinguishes de se thinking, as some of its proponents hope to do. A deeper worry concerns the reliance of the theory on a primitive notion of “centre” that hasn’t yet received enough critical attention, and is ambiguous between a thin and a rich reading. I argue that while the rich reading is required if the relativist analysis of the de se is to achieve its most ambitious aims, it also deprives the theory of much of its explanatory power. (shrink)

“The First Person” is the paper where G. E. M. Anscombe supports the thesis that “I” is not a referring word. Mainly I deal with her argument against the indexical view of “I” from the scenario of the “A” user, who refers to himself as the person who is under the special observation of the “A” user. On the one hand, I put forward that a use of “A” might have a guaranteed reference in a semantic sense: a referential use (...) of “A” as a definite description guarantees the one reference to oneself. On the other hand, the indexical view is left untouched: the reference of “A” is not fixed by the self-reference rule, and thus “I” and “A” are not indistinguishable referring words. Also I explore the idea that unlike “A”, “I” has a guaranteed reference in an epistemic sense, being immune to error through misidentification. (shrink)

Resumen: Las políticas europeas de inmigración y refugio han sido criticadas por quienes las consideran emblemas de una concepción que pone en grave riesgo elementos básicos del Estado de Derecho y aun de la democracia. El epítome es la aparición de mercados de esclavos en Libia, a las puertas de la UE, un Estado fallido que la UE y sus Estados miembros se empeñan en elevar a la condición de partner privilegiado de sus políticas de externalización. Tomando como base los (...) análisis de Lochak, Agambem y Bauman y la concepción de la propuesta por el filósofo camerunés Mbembé, desarrollando tesis de Foucault (biopolítica), se proponen algunas alternativas que vienen presididas por la exigencia de reconocimiento y garantía de derechos básicos de inmigrantes y refugiados. Abstract: European immigration and refuge policies have been criticized by those who see them as emblems of a conception that puts in serious risk basic elements of the Rule of Law and even of democracy. The epitome is the emergence of slave markets in Libya (at the gates of the EU), a failed state that, nevertheless, the EU and its Member States are determined to raise to the status of privileged partner of their outsourcing policies. Based on the analysis of Lochak, Agambem and Bauman and the conception of the proposed by the Cameroonian philosopher Mbembé who develops Foucault's thesis about biopolitics, this text will propose some alternatives that are leaded by the requirement of recognition and guarantee of rights of immigrants and refugees. (shrink)

We argue that relating to myself as me provides, as such, a reason to care about myself: grasping that an event involves me, instead of another, makes it matter in a special way. Further, this self-concern is not simply a matter of seeing in myself some instrumental value for other ends. We use as our foil a recent skeptical challenge to this view offered in Setiya 2015. We think the case against self-concern is powered by unwarrantedly narrow construals of three (...) key notions. One is the notion of a first-personal way of relating to oneself. A narrow account of the first person in terms of special epistemic relations to oneself makes it easy to overlook a source of non-instrumental reasons of self-concern, located in the special relation a subject has to herself as agent. Two is the notion of what it is to be a reason. And, three, is the notion of self-concern itself. We show that the skeptical case rests in part on a slide towards neighbouring but distinct notions of egoism and selfishness. We also argue that Setiya’s notion of self-love, offered to capture the pre-theoretical intuition of self-concern, cannot do it justice. (shrink)

One broadly recognised characteristic feature of (a core subset of) the self-attributions constitutive of self-knowledge is that they are ‘immune to error through misidentification’ (hereafter IEM). In the last thirty years, Evans’s notion of “identification-freedom” (Evans 1982) has been central to most classical approaches to IEM. In the Evansian picture, it is not clear, however, whether there is room for a description of what may be the strongest and most interesting variant of IEM; namely what Pryor (1999) has first brought (...) to the fore under the name “Which-object IEM”, and which I’ll prefer calling existential IEM. I argue that recent development of relativist frameworks in semantics and pragmatics, particularly in Recanati (2007a-b), (2009), (2010), (2012a), may be precisely of a nature to address this limitation. The relativist theory of IEM, and in particular its suitability to cover existential IEM, may superficially seem to stem from a rejection of the core elements of the classical identification-freedom approach. However, I hope to show that, modulo a clarification and richer un-derstanding of the relevant notions of identification and identification-freedom, the relativist theory of IEM can be seen as both pushing further and complementing Evans’s intuitions, rather than conflicting with them. (shrink)

Siguiendo la aproximación de Peacocke a la naturaleza de los conceptos, este artículo presenta una teoría del concepto de primera persona en términos de su condición de posesión. Propongo que tal condición de posesión es cuestión de, necesariamente, estar dispuesto a realizar un juicio de orden superior con el contenido cuando uno tiene un pensamiento consciente con el contenido. Consecuentemente, intento motivar y defender esta concepción respondiendo a supuestos contraejemplos. Adicionalmente, proporciono una teoría de la determinación del valor semántico respecto (...) a cómo esa condición de posesión individúa el concepto de primera persona dando la condición que alguien tiene que satisfacer para ser su referente. Following Peacocke's approach to the nature of concepts, this paper presents a possession condition theory of the first-person concept. I propose that such a possession condition is a matter of, necessarily, one's being disposed to make a higher-order judgement with the content just when one has a conscious thought with the content. Accordingly, I try to motivate and defend this view responding to supposed counterexamples. In addition, I provide a theory of the determination of the semantic value as to how that possession condition individuates the first-person concept by giving the condition that someone has to satisfy in order to be its referent. (shrink)

En los tiempos actuales, una materia que viene estudiando la relación entre derecho y bioética es la que se conoce como bioderecho o biojurídica, la cual trata de ofrecer una respuesta a los problemas más polémicos de la ética de la vida. Para suministrar elementos al contenido de tal disciplina se exponen en este trabajo algunos argumentos del derecho natural clásico aristotélico-tomista, mostrando cómo la corriente positivista del derecho adolece de razonamientos fuertes y, sobre todo, reivindicando la idea de dignidad (...) de la persona humana basada en su naturaleza humana. Este dato ontológico es la clave para entender el bioderecho o biojurídica y, en general, los problemas de la bioética. (shrink)

No nos aventuramos realmente a decir nada muy original cuando decimos que la religión, o, mejor dicho, las religiones, son un fenómeno sumamente complejo que para su estudio científico requiere de una mirada atenta que trate de comprender las múltiples aristas que parecen dividirse y reproducirse según nos acercamos a cualquiera de sus fenómenos y representaciones.

Philosophical hermeneutics has become an unavoidable reference in the field throughout the twentieth century but has seldom been extended to draw conclusions in the area of political theory. Two intellectuals that have contributed to such a project are Charles Taylor and Gianni Vattimo, although they exhibit some important differences in key aspects of this enterprise, both at the level of the conceptual premises and at that of the prescribed policies and objectives. Here I examine these thinkers’ notion of tradition – (...) an essential feature of hermeneutical theories – its ontological underpinnings, and the place each of them assign to it in sociopolitical decision-making, especially in the context of multicultural societies. In the end, I argue for the superiority of Taylor’s model of understanding and employing tradition in current political and moral debates. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo fue calcular la proporción global de ansiedad de estudiantes de medicina durante la pandemia de COVID-19. Se realizó una búsqueda sistemática de artículos publicados hasta el 6 de enero de 2021 en Medline que reportaran prevalencia de ansiedad (según GAD-7) en estudiantes de medicina durante la pandemia de COVID-19. Diez estudios fueron incluidos en el meta-análisis, arrojando una prevalencia global estimada de ansiedad en estudiantes de medicina del 42. Este hallazgo sugiere la necesidad de evaluar (...) sintomatología ansiosa entre los estudiantes de medicina durante la pandemia de COVID-19 y establecer programas de apoyo psicológico adecuados. (shrink)

La psicología clásica griega se sirvió de la acotación filosófica de expresiones del lenguaje ordinario para desarrollar su teoría de las facultades del alma. Tal fue el caso de la facultad sensible. El artículo muestra cómo en la República de Platón convive la documentación de la amplitud de significados del uso ordinario de aisthanesthai y aisthesis con una aproximación a la acuñación filosófica del término aisthesis, a través del concepto de dynamis que, como muestra la frecuente indistinción entre aisthesis y (...) doxa, no alcanza los rasgos definitorios presentes en diálogos posteriores. Palabras clave: Platón; Psicología; Teoría de la PercepciónClassical Greek psychology made use of the philosophical marking off of everyday language expressions to develop its theory of soul faculties. So it was with the sensitive faculty. The paper shows how in Plato’s Republic there coexist the documenting of the many meanings of aisthanesthai and aisthesis in their ordinary usage, together with an approach to the philosophical coining of the term aisthesis, by means of the concept of dynamis. As the frequent lack of distinction between aisthesis and doxa shows, the former does not reach the definiteness of later dialogues. Keywords : Plato; Psychology; Theory of Perception. (shrink)

The four books under review form part of a resurgent social science interest in elites as obligatory entry points in understanding changing relations of power and growing inequalities in a post-organized capitalism. All four books demonstrate, in differing but often complementary ways, that in an age of formal meritocracy, rising powers, government outsourcing, weightless information economies, financial deregulation, and increasingly dense digitized networked information and communication systems, elites have changed. Their mobile lives, their ability to feel at ease in almost (...) any situation, and their role as intermediaries connecting different spheres of cultural, economic and political life are defining features of the new, truly global elites. The four books demonstrate the enduring influence of Bourdieu as a theorist of elites and showcase methodological and conceptual innovations to further develop comparative research. (shrink)

This paper revisits the charges of fideism and irrationalism oftentimes leveled against Kierkegaard's consideration of the relation of ratio to fides. To this avail the author engages one of the key texts in this polemic, namely the first three chapters of Philosophical Fragments. His reading centers on the rather subtle suggestion that eroticlove, as a surrendering of oneself to another, plays the role of a metaphor or image for the downfall of the understanding characteristic of religious conversion. By considering the (...) possibilities and limitations of this metaphoric relation, he suggests that thedownfall of the understanding required in religious conversion occurs, surprisingly, not without an understanding, however limited, of the downfall. Because the experience oferotic love reveals where our true passion lies, we gain access to an alternative account of religious conversion according to Kierkegaard, one where ratio is not necessarilyput on the verge of disappearing by fides. Moreover, thanks to this metaphoric relation, not only does erotic love itself acquire a novel meaning—under the religious command of loving one's neighbor — but also one grasps in advance the risk of becoming dispassionate in a religious sense. (shrink)

"El hombre es una caña, la más débil de la naturaleza" -sospechó Pascal- pero es una caña que piensa". Esta combinación de debilidad y pensamiento está en la base del desarrollo de las culturas humanas. El ser humano se sintió animal amenazado y su cerebro -aún en proceso de desarrollo- le dijo que podría tratar de protegerse fabricando algo con lo que defenderse de sus amenazas. Había nacido el "homo faber".

El artículo analiza los fundamentos epistemológicos y metodológicos del esquema cruzado en el campo de las ciencias sociales y en particular del análisis cualitativo, considerando que el origen de tal esquema se encuentra en las coordenadas cartesianas. Tales coordenadas tienen un conjunto de elementos que a la vez están en la base de la geometría analítica y a partir de ella se resaltan tres aspectos que han sido “exportados” mediante el uso de este esquema, hacia las ciencias sociales: la lógica (...) de opuestos, la “espacialización” o “espacialidad” y la fecundidad conceptual. A partir de esta triada de elementos se analiza el aporte de la lingüística estructural y del estructuralismo antropológico en torno al esquema en cuestión y en relación al objetivo de formalización en ciencias sociales. El texto ilustra algunos usos del esquema analizado realizados por distintos autores contemporáneos y termina por clasificar a los mismos de acuerdo a la integración, en tales análisis, de elementos epistémico-metodológicos implícitos en las coordenadas cartesianas.This article analyses the epistemological and methodological bases of crossed diagram in the field of social sciences and especially in qualitative research, considering that the origin of this diagram is located in the Cartesian coordinate system. Such coordinates provide elements that are at the bases of analytic geometry and from it, we highlight three aspects that have been ‘exported’ in the use of this diagram by the social sciences: the logic of the opposites; ‘spacialisation’; and conceptual fecundity. From these three aspects, we analyse the contribution of structural linguistics and anthropological structuralism to this diagram, particularly regarding the goal of formalization in the social sciences. The article shows some of the uses given to this diagram by different contemporary authors, to end classifying those authors according to their analytical integration of epistemic and methodological aspects implicit in the Cartesian coordinate system. (shrink)

La autonomía del arte ha sido un concepto siempre discutido. En el caso de la concepción moderna del arte, la autonomía se confundió en algunos casos con la soberanía de un concepto determinado del arte, excluyente de otros. Esta concepción se radicalizó a tal punto, que su crisis en los años ochenta dio origen a consignas como "La muerte del arte", paradójicamente, cuando el arte en sus diferentes formas mostraba una gran vitalidad. Estas contradicciones han servido para elaborar la distinción (...) entre arte moderno y arte contemporáneo, y redefinir la autonomía en términos de pluralismo artístico. (shrink)

Ambas posiciones son filosóficas y no sólo historiográficas: en Hegel, para comprender el arte en la modernidad; en Danto, en la posmodernidad. El "fin del arte" no significa para Hegel el acabamiento, sino un cambio fundamental de función dentro de las figuras de la verdad que el arte en la época moderna tiene que compartir con la religión y la filosofia. La forma absoluta de representar la verdad, forma clásica, cede a la forma romántica. El "fin del arte" en Danto (...) significa el ingreso del arte a la época poshistórica puesto que la historia del arte dejó de ser la necesidad interna de renovación permanente, y a la posfilosófica pues la reflexión ha convertido el arte en una praxis cognitiva de sí mismo que lo ha hecho equiparable a la filosofía. (shrink)

Resumen Los mensajes de Navidad del rey Juan Carlos I constituyen una de las pocas ocasiones en las que el jefe del Estado español se dirige a los españoles a través de la televisión. El objetivo principal de este artículo es analizar estos textos emitidos por el monarca en el período de su reinado. Estamos ante unos mensajes que los pronuncia el representante de la institución de la Corona, pero que no tienen el correspondiente refrendo legal. Son costumbres y tradiciones (...) aceptadas por todos. El estudio se lleva a cabo desde la perspectiva del análisis del discurso y desde la semiótica de la comunicación, para poner de relieve cómo el texto es utilizado con fines ideológicos para consolidar la imagen de la Monarquía, a la vez que la estructura del Estado. Las figuras del ethos y de la auctoritas reales se ponen de relieve cuando se quiere afianzar la imagen del monarca y de la institución que encarna. Los mensajes siguen el modelo de la oratoria clásica y se utilizan como medio para comentar, persuadir y arbitrar un marco de convivencia en España en la que el rey juega un papel de moderador entre el Estado y la ciudadanía. (shrink)

Las memorias del 2001 en los sectores populares del Gran Buenos Aires se enfocan en los saqueos de diciembre y, en especial, en los rasgos de quién participó de ellos. Así, pueden ser estudiadas como desplazamientos en términos de proximidades y distancias respecto a la figura del saqueador. Si bien todos los entrevistados comparten una representación de dicha figura bajo el predominio de la lejanía, las modalidades de elaboración de esta memoria se encuentran segmentadas según el impacto de la crisis (...) en la trayectoria laboral del sujeto y los usos del espacio local. (shrink)