The learnings (apprenticeships) and the transformations in the alternation call up to renewed conceptions (disings). The cooperation can be there when it arouses the reliance and authorizes the emergence. It questions its ends (purposes), its practices and the sense (direction) of its productions, its epistemology.

A prominent version of emotional cognitivism is the view that emotions are preceded by awareness of value. In a recent paper, Jonathan Mitchell (2019) has attacked this view (which he calls the content-priority view). According to him, extant suggestions for the relevant type of pre-emotional evaluative awareness are all problematic. Unless these problems can be overcome, he argues, the view does not represent a plausible competitor to rivaling cognitivist views. As Mitchell supposes, the view is not mandatory since its core (...) motivations can be accommodated by competing views, too. I argue that Mitchell's case against the content-priority view is unconvincing as it misconceives the principal motivation for the view. As I show, properly reconstructed, this motivation provides a strong case for the indispensability of the view to any adequate cognitivist treatment of emotion. Moreover, Mitchell's survey of candidates for pre-emotional value awareness can be seen to rest on problematic phenomenological assumptions. (shrink)

This paper provides a typology of appeals to authority, identifying three distinct types: that which is based on a command; that which is based on expertise; and that which is based on dignity. Each type is distinguished with respect to the reaction that a failure to follow it ordinarily evokes. The rhetorical roots of Locke's ad verecundiam are traced to the rhetorical practices of ancient Rome.

The poor performances of typically developing children younger than 4 in the first-order false-belief task “Maxi and the chocolate” is analyzed from the perspective of conversational pragmatics. An ambiguous question asked by an adult experimenter (perceived as a teacher) can receive different interpretations based on a search for relevance, by which children according to their age attribute different intentions to the questioner, within the limits of their own meta-cognitive knowledge. The adult experimenter tells the child the following story of object-transfer: (...) “Maxi puts his chocolate into the green cupboard before going out to play. In his absence, his mother moves the chocolate from the green cupboard to the blue one.” The child must then predict where Maxi will pick up the chocolate when he returns. To the child, the question from an adult (a knowledgeable person) may seem surprising and can be understood as a question of his own knowledge of the world, rather than on Maxi's mental representations. In our study, without any modification of the initial task, we disambiguate the context of the question by (1) replacing the adult experimenter with a humanoid robot presented as “ignorant” and “slow” but trying to learn and (2) placing the child in the role of a “mentor” (the knowledgeable person). Sixty-two typical children of 3 years-old completed the first-order false belief task “Maxi and the chocolate,” either with a human or with a robot. Results revealed a significantly higher success rate in the robot condition than in the human condition. Thus, young children seem to fail because of the pragmatic difficulty of the first-order task, which causes a difference of interpretation between the young child and the experimenter. (shrink)

argumentation, as originally defined by Dung, is a model that allows the description of certain information about arguments and relationships between them: in an abstract argumentation framework, the agent knows for sure whether a given argument or attack exists. It means that the absence of an attack between two arguments can be interpreted as “we know that the first argument does not attack the second one”. But the question of uncertainty in abstract argumentation has received much attention in the last (...) years. In this paper, we survey approaches that allow to express information like “There may be an attack between these arguments”. We describe the main models that incorporate qualitative uncertainty in abstract argumentation, as well as some applications of these models. We also highlight some open questions that deserve some attention in the future. (shrink)

Work and Experience of Domination in Contemporary Neoliberalism This paper seeks to study the contemporary forms of domination at and through work, by focusing on subjective experiences of work. Against the background of Marx’s analysis of the manyfold nexus between social and political domination in general and domination at work, I begin by drawing in broad strokes the general picture of current experiences of work emerging from the contemporary French sociology and psychology of work. Related to this rich literature but (...) also contrasting with it, the psychodynamic approach developed by Christophe Dejours seems particularly significant, notably because its provides a consistent model explaining the links between subjective experience, social interactions beyond work, material conditions of production, and broad cultural and political factors. From the psychodynamic model arises an original analysis of the current forms of domination and alienation at work, one, I argue in conclusion, which could substantially inform the current attempt to develop a new “social philosophy”. (shrink)

La philosophie cartésienne, en dépit des efforts souvent tentés pour l'exposer suivant une dialectique unilinéaire, n'est point à strictement parler, un système. On la nommerait assez bien, un pluralisme, en ce sens que son contenu ne se laisse ni dériver d'un seul principe ni enfermer dans une seule formule. Pluralisme cohérent, faudrait-il ajouter : non seulement parce que les oppositions qui s'y révèlent ne sont pas (quoi qu'on en ait dit) de formelles contradictions, mais surtout parce que chacun des termes (...) opposés n'y a été admis qu'en vertu d'une même attitude d'esprit, la docilité à l'évidence. Se plier en toutes choses à ce qu'on voit ; l'enregistrer comme on le voit, à quelque ordre qu'il appartienne, sans y rien mêler de sa sensibilité propre : voilà l'attitude cartésienne, telle qu'elle se manifeste dans la théorie de la méthode, comme aussi dans le Cogito et dans les démarches qui en procèdent. C'est l'attitude empirique, au sens premier et authentique du mot : ceux-là seuls répugnent à en convenir que des associations invétérées conduisent toujours à confondre empirique et sensualiste. En sorte que, si nous voulons à toute force caractériser la philosophie de Descartes par un nom, le nom qui lui siérait le mieux serait, tout paradoxe à part, celui d'empirisme - empirisme radical et intégral. (shrink)

For many presentist philosophers, e.g. Zimmerman (Contemp Debates Metaphys 10:211–225, 2008), a central motivation in favour of presentism is that it is supposed to be part of common sense. But the fact that common-sense intuitions are indeed presentist is usually taken for granted (and sometimes also conceded by eternalists). As has been shown in other domains of philosophy (e.g. free will), we should be careful when attributing some supposed intuitions to common sense, and Torrengo (Phenomenology and Mind 12: 50–55, 2017) (...) and Le Bihan (Igitur-Arguments Philos 9(1):1–23, 2018) have legitimately raised doubts about the assumption that common sense is presentist. In this paper, I take up this challenge and try to show that our common-sense intuitions do imply presentism. More precisely, the intuitions that I take to imply presentism are fundamental intuitions about our selves as conscious beings. The upshot is that presentism is so much embedded within our conception of our selves that if presentism is false, then I don’t exist! (shrink)

Introduction -- Ruling the household -- Humans as political animals -- Slavery -- Wives -- Wealth and the proper aims of ruling the household -- Justice -- Good citizens -- Good constitutions -- Friendship -- The scope and aims of political philosophy -- The best constitution -- The best for most -- The best for each -- The preservation of all and any constitutions and regimes.

Este trabalho visa aprofundar o conceito de liberdade como autodeterminação da vontade em Juan Duns Escoto. O problema da escolha é interpretado a partir de uma leitura da ética aristotélica que privilegia um ponto de vista centrado no fato de que a razão é o que direciona adequadamente a escolha, que é entendida como desejo racional. Porém, surge o problema de até que ponto, então, seria realmente uma escolha livre, uma vez que, quando o objeto do desejo é mostrado ao (...) intelecto, este não poderia negá-lo se fosse racional, então a escolha seria determinada por desejo próprio, natureza racional. Nesse sentido, não podendo ir contra a própria racionalidade, ainda, a limitação não seria entendida num sentido negativo, mas sim como coerência. Para Scotus, pelo contrário, a liberdade é constituída principalmente pela possibilidade de escolher qualquer um dos opostos, e mesmo de fazê-lo no momento da escolha. Ou seja, a vontade mantém sempre a possibilidade de escolha a cada momento. Assim, a liberdade seria entendida como autodeterminação da vontade. (shrink)

We define and examine a notion of logical friendliness, which is a broadening of the familiar notion of classical consequence. The concept is tudied first in its simplest form, and then in a syntax-independent version, which we call sympathy. We also draw attention to the surprising number of familiar notions and operations with which it makes contact, providing a new light in which they may be seen.

La fameuse « Préface-annexe » de La Religieuse reprend le texte de la « confession » que, dix ans plus tôt, Grimm avait publié dans son périodique pour confesser son rôle dans la mystification qui avait été jouée au marquis de Croismare. La « reprise » de Diderot accompagne la résurrection du roman que Grimm avait enterré, sans se soucier des affirmations contradictoires qui en résultent. La polygraphie de Diderot est polyphonie ; elle participe de la représentation des pouvoirs de (...) l’écriture, que conquiert Suzanne, l’héroïne du roman. (shrink)

The lush surreal illustrations of this book and its short humoristic story telling make it a fun, quick read for all ages and for anyone obliquely interested in our thirst for development and the nature of who we are. Through a poetic parody of human's desires for more of everything, we become aware that such a quest does not bring us any closer to knowing ourselves or seeing, as contemporary scientific or spiritual leaders are telling us: all things and beings (...) of our planet are intimately related, alive and ultimately "One." While each colorful painting alludes to our close relationship with the world, short lines innocently and wryly comment on the predicaments of our lives pertaining to the industrial world, where dream and reality often appear intertwined. Through the shifting identities of forms, this album gives us a glance at our own formless nature and how our excessive wish for love, home, comfort, power, and productivity inexorably transforms our worldview and make us bypass our deep infinite nature, which cannot be contained through words. As some indigenous traditions have taught us: "life is like a dream. One wonders whether it is by living that we dream or by dreaming that we live.". (shrink)

Le principe de non-contradiction a depuis très longtemps étéreconnu comme le principe le plus fondamental de la pensée rationnelle. II est facile de l'énoncer sous sa forme symbolique: –. Ce principe pose que quelqu'un ne saurait affirmer en même temps une proposition et sa négation. Pour que ce principe ne demeure pas une exigence vide, il faut en outre que l'on puisse déterminer avec précision quelles sont les conditions de son application. Cette détermination des conditions d'application d'un principe commence par (...) la recherche des moyens par lesquels il est possible de démarquer, dans le champ de son application, ce qui en respecte l'énoncé de ce qui n'en respecte pas l'énoncé. Or si rien n'est plus facile que de formuler un précepte, rien, appa-remment, n'est plus difficile que de tracer une ligne nette entre ce qui se conforme au précepte et ce qui le transgresse. Bien qu'il soit l'assise la plus profonde de nos raisonnements, le principe de non-contradiction ne fait pas exception à ce constat. Son énoncé fait sans doute l'unanimité mais il est assez rare que l'on s'accorde, en dehors des disciplines formelles, sur ce qui constitue l'occurrence d'une contradiction. Cet accord sur ce qui constitue ou non l'exemple d'une contradiction m'apparaît faire défaut d'une façon particulièrement marquée en philosophic Cette situation pose un double problème. (shrink)

Dans le précédent numéro de Methodos j’avais fait un compte-rendu de la traduction du De beryllo (Traité du béryl) de Nicolas de Cues, proposée par Maude Corrieras (M. C.). Je considérais que cette traduction s’inscrivait dans la suite des récentes traductions en français d’œuvres du cusain, et je concluais : la traduction proposée du Traité du béryl est une aide estimable à la compréhension de la démarche de Nicolas de Cues, sans que pour autant ce traité puisse se substituer aux (...) grands text... (shrink)

À travers une suite d’œuvres qui cherchaient toujours un autre but, Lévi-Strauss dessine tout de même les contours d’une éthique qui prend acte d’un certain nihilisme - la vie humaine n’a pas un sens qu’elle pourrait « découvrir » et elle ne saurait non plus donner son sens au monde -. Il détermine, en particulier, quelques caractéristiques d’une éthique qui veille à la protection de toutes les cultures et à la préservation de la terre qui abrite tous les vivants et (...) qui verra la fin de l’homme comme elle a connu la fin de tant d’espèces. Le lecteur de Lévi-Strauss s’étonne de constater que le structuralisme que l’auteur met en œuvre par méthode dans son travail anthropologique s’associe à un usage de fictions quand il s’agit de tracer une éthique. Notre enquête consiste à examiner cette association un peu étrange qui fait ressortir que, sans adhérer à l’utilitarisme, qui use d’une théorie des fictions, l’auteur se sert de cette dernière sur des points stratégiques pour éviter les dialectiques de style kantien et hégélien, c’est-à-dire pour que les oppositions se fassent contrepoids entre elles et pour que les contradictions puissent se résoudre en plis plutôt que se déchirer entre elles. (shrink)

Le débat que Suárez engage notamment avec Cicéron dans le De legibus sur le droit naturel est révélateur d’un enjeu éthique et politique entre les anciens et les modernes. Soit pour Cicéron, il faut attribuer au droit naturel un socle correspondant à un ordre universel indépendant de la volonté humaine; cela revient à établir une légitimité échappant à la liberté humaine. Soit pour Suárez, un tel fondement est anthropo-théologique, ce qui signifi e qu’il renvoie au caractère universel de l’être de (...) l’homme: la liberté et la raison. Cette différence présente apparemment un point commun: la recherche de la voie permettant de vivre selon la rectitude aussi bien dans l’ordre moral que politique. Elle ne saurait masquer une divergence qui n’est pas sans conséquence sur la conception du mode d’être humain: pour Suárez, si le fondement du droit naturel échappe à l’homme, il demeure inconcevable indépendamment de l’universalité de l’humain manifestée par la raison et la liberté. Une voie est ainsi ouverte pour une théorie de la constitution de droits subjectifs. (shrink)

Modern barbarity will soon get rid of the human species unless a new form of violence is found able to compete with the state, without turning into a new form a state. This new form is authoritative, legitimate intimidation. But what are the conditions to speak out authoritatively? Are they not distinctive state conditions? Moreover, does authority lie in the form of discourse? If not, because consentment has superseded mere submission, which are the authoritative sources of discourse which, though neither (...) overtly nor primarily conflicting with the state, nor with corporations, could somehow not completely coincide with the interests of it and even work against it, though like it? This paper examines these questions. (shrink)

There are many ways in which language can describe the dependency of one occurrence on another and hence many varieties of conditional construction, including conditionals in ‘if’, ‘when’, ‘since’, and ‘as’, the absolutive conditionals of Stump (1985), and the correlative conditional construction (‘the more, the merrier’) discussed in Fillmore (1986). This paper will be concerned with investigating one species illustrated in (1a) and (1b).

The essay revisits Deleuze and Guattari’s complex relation to Marxism, which it seeks to capture under the name para-Marxism, by way of a close reading of plateau n? 4 of A Thousand Plateaus, which criticizes the mainstream conception of language and draws on Lenin’s pamphlet on slogans. This close reading leads to an account of the articulation of the Deleuze and Guattari machine with the Marxist analysis of language, to be found, for purposes of comparison in Lukacs’s Ontology. The conclusion (...) is that Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of language is an intervention within Marxism: they take to its limit the anti-humanist position defended by Althusser – not so much a flight away from Marxism as a line of flight within Marxism. (shrink)

Este artigo tenta mostrar como a concepção hobbesiana de corpo, longe de ser uma mera metáfora ou o efeito de uma redução fisicalista, constitui antes uma significação primeira para toda ciência possível. A partir dela, é possível pensar o que é o corpo político sem cair em ilusões substancialistas ou totalizantes.

À luz da secularização da sociedade, que marcou a época moderna e a contemporânea e, sobretudo, com a larga difusão do ateísmo, trata-se de discutir a questão do mal, mostrando, por um lado, que a crença em Deus poderia atribuir uma importância cada vez maior à questão do mal, mas, por outro, poder-se-ia esperar, à luz da influência do ateísmo, que o mal assumisse uma significação inédita, ou seja, o deslocamento da questão do mal, exclusivamente, à perspectiva moral. Neste artigo, (...) fala-se não de um mundo sem religião nem sem divino nem sem divindades. Fala-se de um mundo sem Deus, no singular, limitando-se o autor a tratar de uma só das religiões monoteístas e a filosofia que ela inspirou, a saber, o Cristianismo, ainda que sem fazer distinções entre suas diferentes confissões. Partindo, pois, do pressuposto de que o mal é a única coisa que Deus não criou, o autor mostra que os filósofos, inspirados no Cristianismo, consideraram que não seria possível ser virtuoso e dizer-se ateu ao mesmo tempo, a não ser pagando o preço de uma contradição. (shrink)