Jerzy Perzanowski s ideas were based on an original blend of logic and ontology in what he called onto/logic, where the slash is meant to suggest a quotient of ontology by logic. Perzanowski began as a logician, his early works being on modal logic, then gradually shifted his interest to logical philosophy, meaning not so much philosophy of logic as philosophy informed by logic. Perzanowski was a rare breed of analytical philosopher who thought that a philosophical theory of everything (...) was worthwhile. In this systematic spirit, he began with method. He presented his method of total analysis and synthesis quite simply: reduce the object of research to its simplest possible constituents, and then combine them in some way. Better still, combine them in every possible way, thereby producing a space of possibilities analogous to (and in certain cases identical with) the logical space. Thus, analysis and synthesis differ from a trivial disassembly and reassembly.". (shrink)

Charles U. Zug, following Jeffrey Tulis’s The Rhetorical Presidency (1987), argues that the original design of the Constitution constrained presidents from cultivating a relationship with the American public. In reality, though, presidents are opportunistic politicians who always look for new ways to reach the public in order to gain political advantage and nurture their relationship with the people. In this effort they have often made use of new communication technologies, such that what may look like radical twentieth-century departures from previous (...) understandings of the constitutional place of the president are actually continuous with attempts by presidents from Washington forward to engage in what was—in line with contemporaneous understandings of political issues—persuasive communication designed to influence public policy. (shrink)

Author: Sawicki Jerzy Title: THELEOGICAL PRINCIPLE IN KANT’S METHODOLOGY (Zasada teleologiczna w metodologii Kanta) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2005, vol:.5, number: 2005/1, pages: 281-292 Keywords: KANT, THELEOGICAL PRINCIPLE, FINALISM, MECHANICISM Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The work contains a concise of I. Kant’s views on the problem of the laws of nature and the theleological principle presented in this context, which Kant proposes in the character of a regulative methodological postulate. (...) The analysis of fundamental philosophical notions (the law of nature, necessity, causality, purpose) carried out from the position of an extreme aprioristic rationalism leads Kant to the conclusion about the basic impossibility of educing the conception of purpose (in relation to nature) from aprioristic transcendental laws, ie. such laws which the theoretical reason imposes to the nature by necessity. However, the fact of a total functioning of an organism does not fit, according to Kant, into the frames of a mechanically understood causality. Kant tries to solve this problem choosing the way of conclusion by analogy and finally he suggests to introduce into the living nature a specific causal relation in which the purposes constitute a particular kind of causes and results at the same time. That conception oscillates between mechanicism and theological finalism, and the fitting of a science system into the frames of aprioristic categories does not permit a finally decide about the supremacy of one or the other way of seeing the world. However, nevertheless, the perceiving and stressing of the peculiarity of organic symptoms, the formulation of the postulate about their unreductability to the law of a mechanical type constitute unquestionable and great merit of the author of the Criticism of the Judgment Authority. The idea of the totality of organism, though involved in subjective idealistic non consequences of Kant’s conceptions has in the given historical period all features of a deep and progressive thought, outpacing and inspiring several later research ideas, both in philosophy and in natural science. (shrink)

Chciałem Go pożegnać. Kilkakrotnie próbowałem napisać choć parę słów. O Nim samym. Okazało się, że nie potrafię. Udało mi się tylko przedstawić Jego poglądy na reizm Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego, ale uczyniłem to gdzie indziej. Muszę tu poprzestać na ofiarowaniu Mu tego, co napisałem na Jego dziewięćdziesiąte urodziny, w osiemdziesięciolecie naszej przyjaźni.

This essay presents textual evidence that Nietzsche’s slogan “Gott ist todt!” can be found in several texts of the later Middle Ages. Furthermore, it is argued that Nietzsche read one of these texts very early in his life – probably during the six years of his stay at Schulpforta – and that this may be one of the sources of his famous slogan. It is also shown how the slogan “God is dead!” could originate during the later Middle Ages.

Starting from a passage in the treatise De universali reali by Jean de Maisonneuve, where Jean de Maisonneuve denounces John Buridan as a materialist, the article looks for textual evidence that would support or otherwise refute this claim in Buridan’s works on natural philosophy. In particular, the article analyzes Buridan’s discussion of universal knowledge in the final redactions of his commentaries on Aristotle’s Physica and De anima, which turn out to complement each other. Here, Buridan asks if something extended and (...) material can have universal knowledge. Against the opinion commonly held, according to Buridan, not only by many of his contemporaries, but also by almost all of the ancient commentators, Buridan argues that traditional arguments against a materialistic theory of the human mind are not conclusive. After having removed the main stumbling blocks, he goes on to sketch a theory of universal knowledge that is compatible with the assumption that the human intellect is a material form. As an appendix, the paper contains an edition of the key question on universal knowledge in the penultimate redaction of John Buridan’s Physics commentary, which is made available in print for the first time here. (shrink)

The concepts of measurement and measurable quantity are discussed. A probabilistic interpretation independent of the arrow of time is recommended and a definition of quantizable physical systems is given. The space of states of information about the physical system is Schwarz space rather than Hilbert space.

Science and Convention: Essays on Henri Poincare's Philosophy of Science and The Conventionalist Tradition contains essays concerned with Henri Poincare's philosophy of science, physics in particular, and with the conventionalist tradition in philosophy that he revived and reshaped, simultaneously with, but independently of, Pierre Duhem. Separating five essays as chapters, the book discusses the main ideas of the philosophy (Essays 1 and 5), traces at least some of its historical background (Essays 1, 2, and 3), and provides some of its (...) developments (Essays 2 and 4). (shrink)

In this paper I discuss Ernst Zermelo’s ideas concerning the possibility of developing a system of infinitary logic that, in his opinion, should be suitable for mathematical inferences. The presentation of Zermelo’s ideas is accompanied with some remarks concerning the development of infinitary logic. I also stress the fact that the second axiomatization of set theory provided by Zermelo in 1930 involved the use of extremal axioms of a very specific sort.1.

In times of erosion and dissolution of social structures and institutions, described by Bauman as the interregnum, there arises both a need and a possibility of developing alternative approaches to the most fundamental organizational practices. Marketing, a simultaneously tremendously successful and much criticized sub-discipline and practice, is a prime candidate for such a redefinition. Potential prefigurations of future processes of organizing and institutionalizing can be found within dissenting organizations, the alternative organizations built at the fringes of, and in opposition to, (...) the mainstream businesses as reported by Parker et al.. In this paper, we present an exploration of the alternative yet already enacted practice we call earnest marketing. Drawing on an ethnographic study of a number of dissenting organizations in the United Kingdom and Poland, we focus on the radical reconstitution of marketing evidenced in their practice, defined by an attitude of earnestness and dedication to the dissemination and demonstration of their self-defined goodness: ideas and values. As organizations engage in earnest marketing, they also become receptive to reciprocal messages from their environments. We conclude by reflecting on the possibilities of a dissenting management model developing the principles of earnest marketing beyond disciplinary confines. (shrink)

The so-called ‘type method’ widely employed in biological taxonomy is often seen as conforming to the causal-historical theory of reference. In this paper, I argue for an alternative account of reference for biological nomenclature in which taxon names are understood as descriptive names. A descriptive name, as the concept came to be known from the work of Gareth Evans, is a referring expression introduced by a definite description. There are three main differences between the DN and the causal account. First, (...) according to the DN account, rather than fixing a name to a referent, the assignment of a type specimen to serve as the name-bearer for a taxon should be seen as performatively establishing a synonymy between a name and a definite description of the form “the taxon whose type is t”. Each taxon name is therefore associated with a criterion of application, a semantic rule that establishes the connection between the name and the descriptive content. This is the second major difference from the causal account: taxon names do have some descriptive content associated with them. The final locus of dissent concerns the strength of the modality resulting from the usage of taxon names. In order to address this point, I use the DN account to focus on the debate between Matt Haber and Joeri Witteveen concerning misidentification of type specimens, misapplication of names, and the truth conditions of Joseph LaPorte’s de dicto necessary sentence “Necessarily, any species with a type specimen contains its type specimen”. Using a pragmatic variant of the distinction between attributive and referential uses of descriptions, I argue that a metalinguistic version of the de dicto sentence is in fact falsified, as previously argued by Haber. (shrink)

Table of ContentsAndrzej KLAWITER, Krzystof #ASTOWSKI: Introduction: Originality, Courage and Responsibility List of Books by Leszek NowakSelected Bibliography of Leszek Nowak's WritingsScience and Idealization Theo A.F. KUIPERS: On Two ...

The article is devoted to an evaluation of contemporary cognitive psychology which draws inspirations from current naturalistic epistemology. The author's conclusion is that the philosophical background of some modern psychological theories and conceptions is in midway position between naturalistic and non-naturalistic (anti-psychologistic) epistemology.

The present paper focuses on the mind-body problem. According to the author, the mind-body problem is, as a matter of fact, a bundle of several problems; they are of a different nature and may be solved in the area of interdisciplinary cooperation. The paper concentrates on two aspects of the mind-body problems: the apparent causal interactions of the consciousness and the body, and the unique nature and genesis self-consciousness.

W poniższym artykule przypominam kilka kognitywistycznych założeń dotyczących umysłu, mózgu oraz problemu psychofizycznego. Artykuł porównuje też pojęcie procesów umysłowych, jakie wprowadziła kognitywistyka, z zaproponowanym kilka dekad wcześniej przez środkowoeuropejską teorię intencjonalności pojęciem czynności poznawczych.

Presentism faces the following well-known dilemma: either the truth-value of past-tense claims depends on the non-existing past and cannot be said to supevene on being, or it supervenes on present reality and breaks our intuition which says that the true past-tense claims should not depend on any present aspect of reality. The paper shows that the solution to the dilemma offered by Kierland and Monton’s brute past presentism, the version of presentism according to which the past is supposed to be (...) both a fundamental and present aspect of reality, is implausible and proposes how to cure presentism: the dillema can be avoided by taking a third road consisting of introducing dynamics into presentism in the form of the real passage of time. Dynamic presentism, which is constructed in such a way, can overcome the dilemma by providing an ontological basis for the past-tense propositions in the form of the real past. Dynamic presentism also offers a rationale for treating the future as being open. (shrink)

“Discrimination on the grounds of disability is seldom malicious, but stems more from a lack of understanding.” A disabled businessman explores the need for businesses to cultivate and implement greater disability awareness. After graduating in engineering, he gained his MBA from London Business School in 1992. He now works as a consultant, capitalising on his background in business management and his personal experience of disability to assist clients in developing anti‐discriminatory policies and practice.