This article provides an original reappraisal of the notion of Minnemystik in the work of the 13th-century Flemish beguine Hadewijch of Antwerp, with specific reference to its Trinitarian and Christological orientations. After an introduction to the nature and origins of Hadewijch’s work, relating to the discovery of four extant manuscripts in Belgium in 1838, followed by an elucidation of the experience-driven epistemology of the Victorians Richard of St Victor and Hugo of St Victor as her key early scholastic influences, Hadewijch’s (...) Minnemystik is distinguished from Wesenmystik, as encountered in the mystical work of her French contemporary and beguine counterpart, Marguerite Porete. From this discursive basis, Hadewijch’s Minnemystik is reassessed and represented as pertinently Trinitarian and Christological in orientation, and therefore as a theological presentation from the 13th century. (shrink)

Bd. 1. 1791-1794.--Bd. 2. 1793-1795.--Bd. 3.--1794-1796.--Bd. 4. 1797-1798.--Bd. 5. 1798-1799.--Bd. 6. 1799-1800.--Bd. 7. 1800-1801.--Bd. 8. 1801-1806.--Bd. 9. 1806-1807.--Bd. 10. 1808-1812.

Band 7 der «Gesammelten Schriften» von Johann Georg Sulzer bietet erstmals eine philologisch zuverlässige Präsentation sowie eine detaillierte Kommentierung und Kontextualisierung von Sulzers Beiträgen zur Dichtung und Literaturkritik der Aufklärungsepoche. Abhandlungen, Vorreden und Rezensionen dokumentieren seine vielfältige Partizipation an den literarischen Debatten seiner Zeit. Zugleich rückt Sulzer selbst als Dichter ins Blickfeld, der etwa die Erzählung «Damon oder die platonische Liebe» und das Schauspiel «Cymbelline» verfasste. Die versammelten literarischen und literaturkritischen Texte umfassen Sulzers gesamte Schaffensphase (1745-1779) und stellen eine (...) entscheidende Schnittstelle zu weiteren Bänden der Edition dar, etwa zu den ästhetischen und philosophischen Schriften (Band 2, 3 und 4) und zu dem Briefwechsel Sulzers mit Johann Jacob Bodmer (Band 10). (shrink)

This paper sketches a theory of the reason‐giving force of well‐being that allows us to reconcile our intuitions about two of the most recalcitrant problem cases in population ethics: Jan Narveson's Procreation Asymmetry and Derek Parfit's Non‐Identity Problem. I show that what has prevented philosophers from developing a theory that gives a satisfactory account of both these problems is their tacit commitment to a teleological conception of well‐being, as something to be ‘promoted’. Replacing this picture with one according to which (...) our reasons to confer well‐being on people are conditional on their existence allows me to do better. It also enables us to understand some of the deep structural parallels between seemingly disparate normative phenomena such as procreating and promising. The resulting theory charts a middle way between the familiar dichotomy of narrow person‐affecting theories and totalist or wide‐person affecting theories in population ethics. (shrink)

L’objet de la présente contribution vise moins à analyser tel aspect de la Philosophie de la volonté élaboré par Ricœur que de repérer, dans son œuvre ultérieure, les structures de transition (et le sens de leur articulation) entre une phénoménologie d’abord centrée sur l’ eidos d’une volonté bien solitaire à une philosophie du co-agir qui débouche sur le souci de l’autre et des institutions. On peut ainsi, dans une perspective très panoramique, pointer trois structures de transition complémentaires venant initialement de (...) traditions philosophiques hétérogènes, d’une part, la socio-phénoménologie couplée avec la philosophie hégélienne de la Sittlichkeit, d’autre part, la tradition chrétienne du socius et du prochain couplée avec une philosophie politique néo-aristotélicienne, enfin une sémantique de l’action issue des courants analytiques. (shrink)

This essay argues that non-linguistic animals qualify not just for externalist notions of rationality (maximizing biological fitness or utility), but also for internal ones. They can act for reasons in several senses: their behaviour is subject to intentional explanations, they can act in the light of reasons - provided that the latter are conceived as objective facts rather than subjective mental states - and they can deliberate. Finally, even if they could not, it would still be misguided to maintain that (...) animals are capable only of (mechanical) behaviour, not of (intentional) action. (shrink)

Im "System der Sittenlehre" fand Fichtes praktische Philosophie im direkten Anschluß an die Wissenschaftslehre von 1794 ihre vollendete Gestalt. Fichtes theoretischer Ansatz bietet den bis heute einzigen methodisch konsistenten Versuch einer Letztbegründung des Sollens als Beweis der sittlichen Freiheit des Einzelnen.

Bd. 1-2. 1. Abth. Zur theoretischen Philosophie.--Bd. 3-4. 2. Abth., A. Zur Rechts- und Sitteniehre.--Bd. 5. 2. Abth., B. Zur Religionsphilosophie.--Bd. 6-8. 3. Abth. Populärphilosophische Schriften.

This article investigates the palimpsest reception of Pseudo-Dionysius (ca. 500) in the metaphysics of Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464). The article covers Cusa’s political theory and metaphysics, which are intertwined. Reading Cusa against the backdrop of an analysis of Pseudo-Dionysius’ metaphysics in a preceding article, the author, in a synthetic conclusion, isolates seven Dionysic ‘trails’ (S1 to S7) in Cusa’s metaphysics: the interpretation of transcendence as bound to immanence; the affirmation of God’s transcendence in the world (or a metaphysics of ‘creation (...) as teophany’); the radical transcendence and simultaneous radical immanence of God (that is, God as ‘Beingness’); fundamental restrictions of language and the analogical ‘Naming’ of God; creation as a system of dialectical symbols about God; the analogical participation of the subject in creation; and unification (reditus, the ‘flowing of things back to God’). The Dionysic trails in Cusa’s metaphysics are described as a noteworthy, if not important, palimpsest in the corpus of late Medieval philosophy and is indicative of what the author puts forward as ‘discursive memory’, which is presented as a modern-critical concept. (shrink)

La présente contribution met en confrontation une double figure contradictoire de la démesure. Celle de la figure nietzschéenne de l'excès de vie contre tout ce qui risque de soustraire sa puissance. Celle de la figure lévinassienne de la démesure du visage comme injonction éthique. Il y a bien chez Nietzsche et chez Levinas une "grammaire commune" et une réhabilitation iconoclaste de l'excès (à l'encontre de sa longue condamnation et damnation dans l'histoire de la philosophie occidentale). Mais à travers cette réhabilitation, (...) l'ontologie nietzschéenne de la vie et l'éthique lévinassienne demeurent incompossibles et se regardent comme des soeurs ennemies. (shrink)

Mit seiner zweifellos wichtigsten religionsphilosophischen Abhandlung unternahm Fichte den Versuch, seine Wissenschaftslehre einem breiteren Publikum wenigstens in ihren zentralen Aussagen zugänglich zu machen und das Verhältnis von gelebtem Glauben und wissenschaftlicher Reflexion klar zu bestimmen.

One of the most important works of the Enlightenment—in the first new, unabridged English translation in more than two centuries Published in four volumes between 1784 and 1791, Herder’s Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Mankind is one of the most important works of the Enlightenment—a bold, original, and encyclopedic synthesis of, and contribution to, the era’s philosophical debates over nature, history, culture, and the very meaning of human experience. This is the first new, unabridged English translation of (...) the Ideas in more than two centuries. Gregory Martin Moore’s lively, modern English text, extensive introduction, and commentary bring this neglected masterpiece back to life. The Ideas—which engages with many of the leading thinkers of the eighteenth century, such as Montesquieu, Kant, Gibbon, Ferguson, Buffon, and Rousseau—is many things at once: an inquiry into the unity and purpose of history, a reflection on human nature and the place of humans in the cosmic order, an examination of what was beginning to be called “culture,” and a narrative of cultural progress across time among different peoples. Along the way, Herder considers a dizzying variety of topics, including the formation of the earth and solar system, species change, race, the immortality of the soul, the establishment of society, and the pursuit of happiness. Above all, the Ideas is an anthropology—what Alexander Pope had termed an “essay on man”—pervaded by an appropriately humane spirit. A fresh and much-needed modern translation of the complete Ideas, this volume reintroduces English readers to a classic of Enlightenment thought. (shrink)

This article compares situated cognition to contemporary Neo-Aristotelian approaches to the mind. The article distinguishes two components in this paradigm: an Aristotelian essentialism which is alien to situated cognition and a Wittgensteinian “capacity approach” to the mind which is not just congenial to it but provides important conceptual and argumentative resources in defending social cognition against orthodox cognitive science. It focuses on a central tenet of that orthodoxy. According to what I call “encephalocentrism,” cognition is primarily or even exclusively a (...) computational process occurring inside the brain. Neo-Aristotelians accuse this claim of committing a “homuncular” or “mereological fallacy”. The article explains why the label “fallacy” is misleading, reconstructs the argument to the effect that encephalocentric applications of psychological predicates to the brain and its parts amount to a category mistake, and defends this argument against objections by Dennett, Searle, and Figdor. At the same time it criticizes the Neo-Aristotelian denial that the brain is the organ of cognition. It ends by suggesting ways in which the capacity approach and situated cognition might be combined to provide a realistic and ecologically sound picture of cognition as a suite of powers that flesh-and-blood animals exercise within their physical and social environments. (shrink)

These selections provide a brief but comprehensive introduction to Fichte’s philosophical system and his place in the history of German Idealism. In addition to some of Fichte’s most influential texts, such as the First and Second Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre and The Basis of Our Belief in a Divine Governance of the World, Breazeale has translated, for the first time into English, several other writings from the same period, including Attempt at a New Presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre, Other short essays, (...) including Fichte’s replies to the charge of atheism, extend the discussions of the Introductions and respond to criticisms. Breazeale’s substantial Introduction supplies the context needed for a sound appreciation of Fichte’s enterprise and achievement. (shrink)

Plastik - einige Wahrnehmungen über Form und Gestalt aus Pygmalions bildendem Träume ist ein unveränderter, hochwertiger Nachdruck der Originalausgabe aus dem Jahr 1778. Hansebooks ist Herausgeber von Literatur zu unterschiedlichen Themengebieten wie Forschung und Wissenschaft, Reisen und Expeditionen, Kochen und Ernährung, Medizin und weiteren Genres. Der Schwerpunkt des Verlages liegt auf dem Erhalt historischer Literatur. Viele Werke historischer Schriftsteller und Wissenschaftler sind heute nur noch als Antiquitäten erhältlich. Hansebooks verlegt diese Bücher neu und trägt damit zum Erhalt selten gewordener Literatur (...) und historischem Wissen auch für die Zukunft bei. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

T. 1. Worin die wahre Glückseligkeit des Menschen bestehe -- T. 2. Wie man glückselig werden könne.

This paper maintains that objectivism about practical reasons should be combined with pluralism both about the nature of practical reasons and about action explanations. We argue for an ‘expanding circle of practical reasons’, starting out from an open-minded monist objectivism. On this view, practical reasons are not limited to actual facts, but consist in states of affairs, possible facts that may or may not obtain. Going beyond such ‘that-ish’ reasons, we argue that goals are also bona fide practical reasons. This (...) makes for a genuine pluralism about practical reasons. Furthermore, the facts or states of affairs that function as practical reasons are not exclusively natural or descriptive, but include normative facts. That normative facts can be reasons justifies a pluralism about reason explanations, one which allows for what we call enkratic explanations in addition to teleological ones. (shrink)

Human oversight has become a key mechanism for the governance of artificial intelligence (“AI”). Human overseers are supposed to increase the accuracy and safety of AI systems, uphold human values, and build trust in the technology. Empirical research suggests, however, that humans are not reliable in fulfilling their oversight tasks. They may be lacking in competence or be harmfully incentivised. This creates a challenge for human oversight to be effective. In addressing this challenge, this article aims to make three contributions. (...) First, it surveys the emerging laws of oversight, most importantly the European Union’s Artificial Intelligence Act (“AIA”). It will be shown that while the AIA is concerned with the competence of human overseers, it does not provide much guidance on how to achieve effective oversight and leaves oversight obligations for AI developers underdefined. Second, this article presents a novel taxonomy of human oversight roles, differentiated along whether human intervention is constitutive to, or corrective of a decision made or supported by an AI. The taxonomy allows to propose suggestions for improving effectiveness tailored to the type of oversight in question. Third, drawing on scholarship within democratic theory, this article formulates six normative principles which institutionalise distrust in human oversight of AI. The institutionalisation of distrust has historically been practised in democratic governance. Applied for the first time to AI governance, the principles anticipate the fallibility of human overseers and seek to mitigate them at the level of institutional design. They aim to directly increase the trustworthiness of human oversight and to indirectly inspire well-placed trust in AI governance. (shrink)

Paul Ricœur laisse comme testament une œuvre immense.Elle est justement saluée aujourd'hui pour s'être confrontée aux principaux enjeux intellectuels du XXe siècle, sans jamais cesser de dialoguer pour autant avec le "grand livre de la philosophie". A travers la diversité des thématiques abordées par le philosophe, cet ouvrage nous éclaire sur ce qui fait la trame et le moteur de cette pensée en mouvement : une réflexion sur l'homme en tant qu'être agissant.L'auteur propose de reconfigurer le parcours de cette philosophie (...) de l'agir humain en suivant trois perspectives à la fois distinctes et complémentaires. Selon une première perspective, il s'agit de retracer la genèse d'une anthropologie philosophique qui porte sur les fondamentaux de l'agir humain. Selon une deuxième perspective, l'auteur cherche à resituer l'épistémologie de Paul Ricœur, ressourcée dans la tradition herméneutique, au contact des sciences de l'homme.Selon une troisième perspective, il s'agit de reconstituer les jalons d'une philosophie normative qui ouvre la morale, le politique, la justice et le droit à l'horizon de l'universalité, sans dénier l'incarnation de l'agir humain dans un "monde de la vie" déjà structuré par des valeurs. A l'opposé d'une rhétorique hagiographique ou d'une critique systématique, la "juste distance" prise par l'auteur permet de restituer l'unité profonde de l'œuvre ricoeurienne et d'en dévoiler en même temps les tensions et les paradoxes.Cet ouvrage accorde une large place à la réception philosophique du travail de Paul Ricœur sur l'agir humain en le présentant comme une "œuvre ouverte", élevée au "conflit des interprétations". C'est dire qu'après la mort du penseur, sa pensée ne fait que commencer, que renaître dans l'esprit de chaque nouveau lecteur. (shrink)