WHAT IS PRESENT TO THE MIND? Donald DAVIDSON The University of California at Berkeley There is a sense in which anything we think about is, ...

Isaac Levi is more interested in inquiry and how it progresses than he is in metaphysics. Questions concerning the role of disposition predicates in inquiry are more central to him than those concerning the nature and reality of dispositions. It has not stopped him from giving me and others very useful metaphysical advice. Currently, where empirical metaphysics is in vogue, there is every reason to see whether the two forms of philosophical interest might interlock substantially. Levi has stimulating ideas indeed (...) on the two forms of philosophical interest, and has recently summarized them in the slogan: “The reality of dispositions is a work in progress”. We can learn much about what kinds of dispositions are acceptable from tracing and comparing the histories of successful and less successful disposition predicates in scientific inquiry. Levi explores one route along which dispositions become real. His idea is that the introduction of dispositions facilitates covering law explanation by increasing the number of laws. The successful disposition predicate eventually becomes integrated in scientific theory, much like an ordinary theoretical term, whereas the unsuccessful does not. My impression is that Levi thinks that this is the only way a disposition can become real. To evaluate this claim, an alternative course suggested by Jon Elster is introduced. I then try to bring out the differences between Levi's and Elster's views on dispositions, partly by suggesting that they resemble two aspects of full explanations discussed by Wesley Salmon. But more about that below. (shrink)

In social evolution theory, biological individuals are often represented on the model of rational agents, that is, as if they were ‘seeking’ to maximize their own (expected) reproductive success. In the 1990s, important criticisms of this mode of thinking were made by Brian Skyrms ([1994], [1996]) and Elliott Sober ([1998]), who both argued that ‘rational agent’ models can lead to incorrect predictions when there are positive correlations between individuals’ phenotypes. In this article, I argue that one model of rational choice—namely, (...) Savage’s model ([1954])—can actually be vindicated in evolutionary biology, provided that the pay-offs are computed in inclusive fitness terms. I also show that the use of this model is better avoided when pay-offs are non-additive, or when certain causal influences (due to manipulative behaviours) affect the outcome of natural selection. The result is a partial rehabilitation of this mode of thinking, conditional on both the additivity of the pay-off structure and the absence of any form of manipulation or coercion. 1 Introduction2 When Natural Selection and Rational Deliberation Part Ways3 A Simple Solution: Redefining the Pay-offs in Inclusive Fitness Terms4 Sober on Inclusive Fitness Maximization5 Inclusive Fitness with Non-additive Pay-offs6 Causal Influences and the Savage– Hamilton Model6.1 Reciprocity and partner choice6.2 Coercion and manipulation7 ConclusionAppendix. (shrink)

This article has three objectives: First, it revises the history of the reception of Ludwik Fleck’s monograph Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache (1935, Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact). Contrary to the established picture, Fleck’s book was largely discussed in the years before the outbreak of World War II. What becomes clear when reading these early reviews and especially Fleck’s comments to those written by representatives of Nazi Germany is, second, the political dimension of his epistemology. In this (...) respect, Fleck’s emphasis on the genuinely democratic character of science will be discussed in some detail. And third, Fleck’s notion of “ Denkstil ”—thought-style—shall be examined more closely since, as we will claim, it can be understood as a notion indicating where the democratic dimension of science encounters its limits. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn the Black Notebooks, Heidegger ascribes in 1938/9 to the Jewish race an “empty rationality and calculative ability,” in his view the cause of its “worldlessness.” To assess this characterisation, I present Heidegger’s theories of history as a decline in Being and Time and in his later history of Being. For this purpose, I discuss his notions of Rechnen, Machenschaft, and Geviert, several existentialia from Being and Time, and Heidegger’s identification of modern machination and modern technology. Furthermore, I examine Heidegger’s (...) attitude toward the Jews and the Holocaust. I present his alignment of the unconcealment of modernity and the Jewish race, and compare his theory of machination with the texts “Positionality” and “The Question concerning Technology”. Heidegger’s notes about the Jews in the Black Notebooks after 1944 confirm that he tried “to silence Auschwitz silently,” as I already argued in a paper from 1995. (shrink)

This article will discuss different understandings of love. In particular, two modern perceptions of love will be differentiated: love as consisting of individual, often inconstant, emotions between human beings, and a Christian understanding of love, which is often expressed through caring for other members of the community. Aspects of Christian love will then be examined in ethical terms, emphasising the relevance of love for the diaconal dimension of the church. Before one is able to help one's neighbour, one first has (...) to be actively identified within the complex social structures of society. Next, the nature of diaconal action has to be defined and adapted to individuals who are in need, or who have become needy or been disadvantaged by society, for example, migrant workers, refugees or asylum seekers. A central aspect of diaconal action - in addition to meeting basic needs - lies in giving a voice to such individuals and in empowering them, including politically, to represent their own interests in public life. (shrink)

Kant offered a subtle theory of consciousness and self-knowledge which articulated the intuition that consciousness is a mode of being in a mental state, as opposed to a property of that state. This paper develops this theory and argues that McDowell's treatment of these issues in "Mind" and "World" overlooks the resources of Kant's views. McDowell conflates consciousness and self-consciousness, leading him to formulate too demanding a constraint on rational concept use. Kant's theory can be developed so as to avoid (...) this unfortunate corollary. The paper concludes by comparing Kant's account to contemporary approaches to the problem of consciousness. (shrink)

In this article, the question in focus is the church and Christianity’s prophetic responsibility towards society, and how in the specific case of the South African-born theologian Gerald John Pillay, his prophetic voice should be characterised. The question is addressed as to whether he was an activist at the barricades or a soft-spoken intellectual in his views on society. After a brief discussion on his bio, the focus is on the phenomenon of being a prophet towards society. Then, the focus, (...) largely based on a literature study, moves to Pillay’s perspectives on the South African and New Zealand contexts, and then a discussion of some of Pillay’s writings on being a prophetic voice follows. Finally, in the conclusion, his specific style and model of being a prophetic voice are analysed. (shrink)

Was macht ein Kind zu einem Kind? Sind Kinder ihren Eltern zur Dankbarkeit verpflichtet? Ist die Schulpflicht eine legitime staatliche Vorgabe? Gibt es ein Recht darauf, Kinder zu haben? -/- Das Handbuch liefert einen systematischen Überblick über die zentralen Konzepte und Theorien sowie die wichtigsten Diskussionsfelder der Philosophie der Kindheit. Zur Debatte stehen neben dem moralischen, rechtlichen und politischen Status von Kindern auch Fragen nach dem instrumentellen oder intrinsischen Wert der Kindheit sowie nach historischen Veränderungen im gesellschaftlichen Umgang mit Kindern.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Max Nordau, Madison Grant, and Racialized Theories of IdeologyJohannes Hendrikus BurgersRecently, Jonathan Spiro has undertaken the Herculean task of recovering the ghost of the conservationist and anti-immigrant racist Madison Grant from a very limited archival record. Spiro’s biography is an invaluable resource that covers, in as much detail as possible, Grant’s life and thought. Although largely forgotten now, in the first half of the twentieth century Grant was a (...) leading figure in the eugenics movement that sterilized thousands of people deemed unfit to reproduce. He was also a prominent advocate of immigration restriction, and he helped southern racists ban miscegenation.1 Like other scholars before him, Spiro argues that Grant arrived at many of his views through the work of such racial scientists as Arthur de Gobineau, Francis Galton, and Houston Stewart Chamberlain.2 While he and other scholars are certainly correct in drawing such a lineage, one unlikely and hitherto unexplored parallel to Grant’s thought specifically, and American eugenics in general, was that of Hungarian cultural critic and later Zionist leader, Max Nordau. By elucidating their intellectual kinship, this paper seeks to reveal the extent to which early twentieth-century transatlantic racial discourse involved widely different actors who were at times unknowingly espousing quite similar racial views for entirely different ends. [End Page 119]The reasons why Nordau’s name has not appeared in relation to Grant are several. First, there is a lack of biographical material on Madison Grant: much of his personal correspondence was purloined or destroyed.3 Consequently, evidence that Grant had been influenced by or even read Nordau is largely circumstantial and inferential, and cannot be verified through archival documentation. Secondly, despite a recent Nordau renaissance,4 and notwithstanding certain key publications, he still remains a somewhat marginal figure in the narrative of late nineteenth century history, especially in the American context.5 Thirdly, and more importantly, after the death of Theodore Herzl, Nordau became the most prominent leader of the Zionist movement at the beginning of the twentieth century. Certainly, someone as committed to Jewish advancement and Jewish emigration to America as Nordau, was hardly likely to share similar racial views with a white supremacist, anti-immigration propagandist, and vicious anti-Semite like Grant. In fact, the only indirect textual connection between the two thinkers is the verbatim use of one of Nordau’s articles by Grant’s racist disciple Lothrop Stoddard; a connection that has only been explored very briefly in a footnote by Nordau biographer Meir Ben-Horin.6 Otherwise, there has been no attempt to see these two thinkers in the same context. Hence, contrary to current scholarly opinion about both writers, this paper will show that they both operated within the same racial framework. While making no claim here of a direct causal relationship between Nordau and Grant, I do contend that during this period there is enough intellectual crosspollination of racial theories to create a significant, not merely coincidental, overlap of ideas. Simplifying early twentieth-century racial thinking into two distinct camps of non-racists and racists is conceptually flawed, even if, as in this case, the ostensible disparities could not be greater.The idea Nordau helped introduce to America, and the idea Grant used later, was that there was a hereditary link between race and ideology. Both believed a person’s racial makeup directly influenced their political ideology. Grant and other anti-immigration nativists used this logic to justify the [End Page 120] exclusion of non-Anglo-Saxon foreigners. Unhealthy, degenerate, foreign bodies presented a danger to the body politic, not just because they were not as productive as the white “Nordics” and therefore caused a drain on the system, but, more significantly, because their inferior type made them susceptible to radical anti-American ideologies like socialism and anarchism. Accordingly, their degeneracy was both an economic strain and a political danger to post-World War I America. The tragic irony is that Nordau’s contribution to the late nineteenth-century racial science was intended to combat increasingly virulent European anti-Semitism. Instead, it ended up in the hands of anti-Semitic propagandists. In fact, at the time that Nordau was urging Jews... (shrink)

In a paper entitled “Emmanuel Faye: The Introduction of Fraud into Philosophy?”, Thomas Sheehan accuses Faye of committing many blunders in Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy. In this paper, I address what is according to Sheehan himself the most important part of his paper, namely his charges against Faye’s interpretation of Heidegger’s Being and Time. I show that they are all wholly unfounded. All the aspects of Being and Time that Sheehan addresses speak not only not against Faye (...) but rather even for Faye. (shrink)

Der Beitrag diskutiert die unterschiedlichen Kritiken, die an meiner in „Kontroverse Themen im Unterricht. Konstruktiv streiten lernen“ vorgelegten Position vorgebracht wurden. Im Durchgang durch diese Kritiken werde ich jeweils meine eigene Position klären und aufzeigen, wo Konkretisierungs- und Revisionsbedarf besteht und wo nicht. Ich schließe mit drei Forschungsdesideraten, die Möglichkeiten der konstruktiven Fortführung und Weiterentwicklung der philosophischen und wissenschaftlichen Debatte über kontroverse Themen im Unterricht skizzieren.

Malgré leurs divergences, les interprètes sont en général d’accord sur le fait que pour Aristote, le lieu est bidimensionnel et peu significatif du point de vue de l’ontologie. Dernièrement, ces présupposés ont cependant été remis en question par Casey et Lang. Dans cet article, c’est la position traditionnelle qui est défendue, et j’argumente en faveur de l’idée qu’Aristote développe sa théorie du lieu à partir du point de vue d’une mécanique du mouvement spatial et des outils nécessaires à un corps (...) organique pour son mouvement dans l’espace – et non à partir d’une théorie de la localisation des corps. Pour finir, la méthodologie aristotélicienne est comparée avec la physique contemporaine depuis Descartes. (shrink)

This paper is a concluding speech of the Collegium Logicum that was held in Wittenberg from 20th October 1608 until 12th January 1609.

In Being and Time, Division One, Chapter 4, Heidegger develops the structures “Being-with and Dasein-with [Mitsein and Mitdasein]” and “what we might call the ‘subject’ of everydayness—the ‘they’”. In the last section of the chapter, Section 27, Heidegger presents six characters of the ‘they’, namely, “distantiality, averageness, levelling down, publicness, the disburdening of one’s Being, and accomodation”. The meaning of the last five characters is relatively unproblematic. For instance, by “averageness” Heidegger obviously wants to indicate that the ‘they’ establishes a (...) set of behavioural patterns as normal and ‘natural’. For example, at certain junctures of their lives, individual Daseine have to choose, or are able to choose, among several options within a given set of options. However, the entire set of options as such has already been adopted by them in a self-evident way and without much thought. The ‘they’ forces this choice by suppressing other possibilities and other ways of handling given possibilities. Thus, the respective averageness results from a screening process in which the ‘they’ constantly rules out other possibilities or prevents them from emerging in the first place. Heidegger calls this “the ‘levelling down’ [Einebnung] of all possibilities of Being”. However, the first character, distantiality, seems more difficult to understand. In the English translation, Heidegger characterizes it thus. (shrink)