Pollock is developing, and testing computationally a theory of rationality. I endorse his claim that the structure of argument is not always linear, his replacement of the deductive-inductive distinction with a deductive-defeasible distinction, and hi s distinction between rebutting defeaters, and undercutting defeaters. I question the absence of pragmatic constraints in his acceptance rule, an absence which fits ill with his criterion of interruptibility, that it is reasonable to act on the conclusions drawn at any point. I also wonder about (...) building a model of a rational agent in which there is no place for interpersonal argumentative discussion. (shrink)

As a libertarian studying, embracing, and teaching a philosophy of individual freedom, John Hospers, like many of us, was heavily influenced by the philosophical writings of Ayn Rand. Rand’s major novels The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged continue to delight and empower readers through embracing the heroic creator or inventor, technological and scientific progress, and the competent individual. These are some of the archetypes of the Randian hero. At the other end of the scale were the incompetent looters and moochers (...) who could only function in her world by controlling those with ability and the savages of ancient or undeveloped cultures who could not comprehend ability, seizing the means of progress before killing the inventor, then retreating into mysticism and magic. Rand was not an archaeologist and wrote at a time before scholars of prehistory focused on the rational and productive aspects of ancient civilizations upon which enabled the present to emerge in fits and starts. These aspects include technology, record keeping, maritime trade, and pre- monetary economies. This paper will consider the emergence of globalized connectivites in the Mediterranean during the Late Bronze Age (ca. 1700-1300 BCE) which was arguably the first age of globalization in human history. It was also one of the first ages of social acceleration characterized by a confluence of increasing technological and economic interdependency, yet fragile in its susceptibility to climate change, plagues, and authoritarian city-states and small empires ruled by kings claiming divinity or divine authority. Thus, the Late Bronze Age was also an economically fragile era with a high concentration of wealth distributed among supra-regional global elite plutocrats unified more by wealth and shared symbolism than by cultural tradition or ideology. This era was susceptible to populist resistance in the form of piratical activity and banditry. This paper explores the globalist and populist aspects of the ancient Mediterranean. In doing so, I suggest that some globalized elites of the present day perpetuate another Randian archetype, the moochers and looters. In doing so, it transcends ideology to focus on how the non-productive in current society acquire vast concentrations of wealth and power. (shrink)

The epistemologist John Pollock has implemented computationally an architecture for a rational agent which he calls OSCAR. OSCAR models both practical and theoretical (or epistemic) reasoning. I argue that Pollock's model of practical reasoning, which has seven components, is superior not only to the two-component belief-desire model stemming from Aristotle, but also to the three-component belief-desire-intention model developed especially by Michael Bratman. Despite its advantages, Pollock's model of practical reasoning is incomplete in at least three respects: it is solipsistic, (...) it is egoistic and it is unsocial. (shrink)

In an enumerative induction we project a property found in all the examined members of a class to a hitherto unexamined member of that class. I consider an unresolved disagreement between Stephen Thomas and John Nolt about how likely the conclusion of one example of such reasoning is, given the premisses. Reflection on their controversy, and on the example, indicates that many textbook commonplaces about enumerative inductions are false. In particular, uniformity of the examined members of a class does (...) not necessarily make it highly likely that the next member will have the target property; this proposition may still be unlikely, or on the other hand be quite definite, depending on our background knowledge. Also, enumerative induction need not rely on any general assumption about the uniformity of nature or the resemblance of the future to the past. (shrink)

This essay is a return to the scene of a crime. In my recent book on Hitchcock I made an outrageously general argument for the affinity between Hitch’s narrativesand David Hume’s reasoning about human nature. For something so speculative, youexpect cracks to appear pretty soon. But my impulse since the book’s appearance has notbeen to feel I exaggerated – which I’m sure I did – but to sense that I did not go far enough.There was more to be said (...) about this oblique, long distance liaison down the centuries andI now feel it best said through a film which I had not discussed at all, partly because I sharedthe general feeling that this was not one of Hitch’s most auspicious films. The acting wasuneven, the tone whimsical, the plot often cluttered and it suffered, or so I thought, fromthat general uncertainty of touch that sometimes characterised Hitchcock’s return toEngland. But then again his short wartime film Bon Voyage has beenunderestimated, as were in different ways Under Capricorn , the remade The ManWho Knew Too Much and later Frenzy . As Michael Walker has pointed out, Stage Fright has a structural complexity, a narrative coherence anda textual density missing from his 1930s films like Young And Innocent . In otherwords, it brings back to London in 1950 the innovating aspects of Hitchcock’s Hollywoodaesthetic of the 1940s. (shrink)

I resolve an apparently unresolved dispute about how probable uniform experience makes an extrapolation from it, and draw some general lessons about such enumerative induction. Uniform experience does not necessarily confer a high probability on an extrapolation of or generalization from that experience. Rational extrapolation or generalization typically involves a lot of specific background information, though not necessarily a general assumption that nature is uniform or that the future will resemble the past. And new evidence which is highly likely on (...) one hypothesis but highly unlikely on any of its competitors does not necessarily make the former hypothesis highly probable. (shrink)

We provide a solution to the well-known “Shooting-Room” paradox, developed by John Leslie in connection with his Doomsday Argument. In the “Shooting-Room” paradox, the death of an individual is contingent upon an event that has a 1/36 chance of occurring, yet the relative frequency of death in the relevant population is 0.9. There are two intuitively plausible arguments, one concluding that the appropriate subjective probability of death is 1/36, the other that this probability is 0.9. How are these two (...) values to be reconciled? We show that only the first argument is valid for a standard, countably additive probability distribution. However, both lines of reasoning are legitimate if probabilities are non-standard. The subjective probability of death rises from 1/36 to 0.9 by conditionalizing on an event that is not measurable, or whose probability is zero. Thus we can sometimes meaningfully ascribe conditional probabilities even when the event conditionalized upon is not of positive finite (or even infinitesimal) measure. (shrink)

Equality and identity. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic. 19 (2013) 255-6. (Coauthor: Anthony Ramnauth) Also see https://www.academia.edu/s/a6bf02aaab This article uses ‘equals’ [‘is equal to’] and ‘is’ [‘is identical to’, ‘is one and the same as’] as they are used in ordinary exact English. In a logically perfect language the oxymoron ‘the numbers 3 and 2+1 are the same number’ could not be said. Likewise, ‘the number 3 and the number 2+1 are one number’ is just as bad from a logical point (...) of view. In normal English these two sentences are idiomatically taken to express the true proposition that ‘the number 3 is the number 2+1’. Another idiomatic convention that interferes with clarity about equality and identity occurs in discussion of numbers: it is usual to write ‘3 equals 2+1’ when “3 is 2+1” is meant. When ‘3 equals 2+1’ is written there is a suggestion that 3 is not exactly the same number as 2+1 but that they merely have the same value. This becomes clear when we say that two of the sides of a triangle are equal if the two angles they subtend are equal or have the same measure. -/- Acknowledgements: Robert Barnes, Mark Brown, Jack Foran, Ivor Grattan-Guinness, Forest Hansen, David Hitchcock, Spaulding Hoffman, Calvin Jongsma, Justin Legault, Joaquin Miller, Tania Miller, and Wyman Park. -/- ► JOHN CORCORAN AND ANTHONY RAMNAUTH, Equality and identity. Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260-4150, USA E-mail: [email protected] The two halves of one line are equal but not identical [one and the same]. Otherwise the line would have only one half! Every line equals infinitely many other lines, but no line is [identical to] any other line—taking ‘identical’ strictly here and below. Knowing that two lines equaling a third are equal is useful; the condition “two lines equaling a third” often holds. In fact any two sides of an equilateral triangle is equal to the remaining side! But could knowing that two lines being [identical to] a third are identical be useful? The antecedent condition “two things identical to a third” never holds, nor does the consequent condition “two things being identical”. If two things were identical to a third, they would be the third and thus not be two things but only one. The plural predicate ‘are equal’ as in ‘All diameters of a given circle are equal’ is useful and natural. ‘Are identical’ as in ‘All centers of a given circle are identical’ is awkward or worse; it suggests that a circle has multiple centers. Substituting equals for equals [replacing one of two equals by the other] makes sense. Substituting identicals for identicals is empty—a thing is identical only to itself; substituting one thing for itself leaves that thing alone, does nothing. There are as many types of equality as magnitudes: angles, lines, planes, solids, times, etc. Each admits unit magnitudes. And each such equality analyzes as identity of magnitude: two lines are equal [in length] if the one’s length is identical to the other’s. Tarski [1] hardly mentioned equality-identity distinctions (pp. 54-63). His discussion begins: -/- Among the logical concepts […], the concept of IDENTITY or EQUALITY […] has the greatest importance. -/- Not until page 62 is there an equality-identity distinction. His only “notion of equality”, if such it is, is geometrical congruence—having the same size and shape—an equivalence relation not admitting any unit. Does anyone but Tarski ever say ‘this triangle is equal to that’ to mean that the first is congruent to that? What would motivate him to say such a thing? This lecture treats the history and philosophy of equality-identity distinctions. [1] ALFRED TARSKI, Introduction to Logic, Dover, New York, 1995. [This is expanded from the printed abstract.] . (shrink)

Corcoran’s 27 entries in the 1999 second edition of Robert Audi’s Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy [Cambridge: Cambridge UP]. -/- ancestral, axiomatic method, borderline case, categoricity, Church (Alonzo), conditional, convention T, converse (outer and inner), corresponding conditional, degenerate case, domain, De Morgan, ellipsis, laws of thought, limiting case, logical form, logical subject, material adequacy, mathematical analysis, omega, proof by recursion, recursive function theory, scheme, scope, Tarski (Alfred), tautology, universe of discourse. -/- The entire work is available online free at more than (...) one website. Paste the whole URL. http://archive.org/stream/RobertiAudi_The.Cambridge.Dictionary.of.Philosophy/Robert.Audi_The.Cambrid ge.Dictionary.of.Philosophy -/- The 2015 third edition will be available soon. Before you think of buying it read some reviews on Amazon and read reviews of its competition: For example, my review of the 2008 Oxford Companion to Philosophy, History and Philosophy of Logic,29:3,291-292. URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340701300429 -/- Some of the entries have already been found to be flawed. For example, Tarski’s expression ‘materially adequate’ was misinterpreted in at least one article and it was misused in another where ‘materially correct’ should have been used. The discussion provides an opportunity to bring more flaws to light. -/- Acknowledgements: Each of these entries was presented at meetings of The Buffalo Logic Dictionary Project sponsored by The Buffalo Logic Colloquium. The members of the colloquium read drafts before the meetings and were generous with corrections, objections, and suggestions. Usually one 90-minute meeting was devoted to one entry although in some cases, for example, “axiomatic method”, took more than one meeting. Moreover, about half of the entries are rewrites of similarly named entries in the 1995 first edition. Besides the help received from people in Buffalo, help from elsewhere was received by email. We gratefully acknowledge the following: José Miguel Sagüillo, John Zeis, Stewart Shapiro, Davis Plache, Joseph Ernst, Richard Hull, Concha Martinez, Laura Arcila, James Gasser, Barry Smith, Randall Dipert, Stanley Ziewacz, Gerald Rising, Leonard Jacuzzo, George Boger, William Demopolous, David Hitchcock, John Dawson, Daniel Halpern, William Lawvere, John Kearns, Ky Herreid, Nicolas Goodman, William Parry, Charles Lambros, Harvey Friedman, George Weaver, Hughes Leblanc, James Munz, Herbert Bohnert, Robert Tragesser, David Levin, Sriram Nambiar, and others. -/- . (shrink)

Iffication, Preiffication, Qualiffication, Reiffication, and Deiffication. -/- Roughly, iffication is the speech-act in which—by appending a suitable if-clause—the speaker qualifies a previous statement. The clause following if is called the qualiffication. In many cases, the intention is to retract part of the previous statement—called the preiffication. I can retract part of “I will buy three” by appending “if I have money”. This initial study focuses on logical relations among propositional contents of speech-acts—not their full conversational implicatures, which will be treated (...) elsewhere. The modified statement—called the iffication—is never stronger than the preiffication. A degenerate iffication is one logically equivalent to its preiffication. There are limiting cases of degenerate iffications. In one, the qualiffication is tautological, as “I will buy three if three is three”. In another, the negation of the qualiffication implies the preiffication, as “I will buy three if I will not buy three”. Reiffication is iffication of an iffication. “I will buy three if I have money” is reifficated by appending “if there are three left”. Deiffication is the speech-act in which—by appending a suitable and-clause—the effect of an iffication is cancelled so that the result implies the preiffication. “I will buy three if I have money” is deifficated by appending “and I have money”. All further examples come from standard (one-sorted, tenseless, non-modal) first-order arithmetic. All theorems are about first-order arithmetic propositions. An easy theorem, hinted above, is that an iffication is degenerate if and only if the negation of the qualiffication implies the preiffication. The iffication of a conjunction using one of the conjuncts as qualiffication need not imply the other conjunct: “Two is an even square if two is square” does not imply “Two is even”. END OF PRINTED ABSTRACT. -/- Some find that the last statement provides a surprise in logic. https://www.academia.edu/s/a5a4386b75?source=link Acknowledgements: Robert Barnes, William Frank, Amanda Hicks, David Hitchcock, Leonard Jacuzzo, Edward Keenan, Mary Mulhern, Frango Nabrasa, and Roberto Torretti. (shrink)

Through a discussion of two key American films of the 1940s and 1950s – Alfred Hitchcock's Shadow of a Doubt (1943) and John Ford's The Searchers (1956) – this article situates the breakdown of classical cinema, or what Gilles Deleuze calls the “crisis of the action-image”, in relation to the critique of whiteness and the family. Focusing on the figure of the “dweller on the threshold” within these two films, the article shows how this individual's deprivation of action (...) is tied to their status simultaneously as protective of and estranged from the white family. Once whiteness and the family become explicit objects of protection, the myth of their naturalness and goodness is rendered problematic, and in these films, the protector themselves must be excluded in order for the myth to function. Drawing on accounts of the invisibility and dehistoricisation entailed in whiteness in the work of Sara Ahmed, Jacques Derrida, Toni Morrison and Frank B. Wilderson III, the article considers how, in these films, the protection of the white family reveals its mythical status as an ideally ahistorical unit of civilisation. The very effort to protect this myth, these films show, amounts to its collapse. These films enact a deconstruction of the oppositions which constitute the civilisational myths that ground whiteness and return such myths to the moment of their historical institution. They reflect on the very process of erasure and forgetting that produces these myths, through a self-conscious interrogation of the cinematic process of the projection of images itself. Drawing on Deleuze's suggestion that modern cinema promises a new mode of belief in the world, the article argues that such a non-mythic belief can only be realised through an unmaking of whiteness, as a form of life which, being premised upon protection and immunity, denies life itself, and our living connection to the world. (shrink)

[Alfred Hitchcock's] film is called North by Northwest. I assume that nobody will swear from that fact alone that we have here an allusion to Hamlet's line that he is but mad north-northwest; even considering that Hamlet's line occurs as the players are about to enter and that North by Northwest is notable, even within the oeuvre of a director pervaded by images and thoughts of the theater and of theatricality, for its obsession with the idea of acting; and (...) considering that both the play and the film contain plays-within-the-play in both of which someone is killed, both being constructed to catch the conscience of the one for whose benefit they are put on. But there are plenty of further facts. The film opens with an ageless male identifying himself first of all as a son. He speaks of his efforts to keep the smell of liquor on his breath from the watchful nose of his mother, and he comes to the attention of his enemies because of an unresolved anxiety about getting a message to his mother, whereupon he is taken to a mansion in which his abductor has usurped another man's house and name and has, it turns out, cast his own sister as his wife. The abductor orders the son killed by forcing liquid into him. It is perhaps part of the picture that the usurper is eager to get to his dinner guests and that there is too much competitive or forced drinking of liquor. Nor, again, will anyone swear that it is significant that the abductor-usurper's henchmen are a pair of men with funny, if any, names and a single man who stands in a special relationship with the usurper and has a kind of sibling rivalry with the young woman that this son, our hero, will become attracted to and repelled by. These are shadowy matters, and it is too soon to speak of "allusions" or of any other very definite relation to a so-called source. But it seems clear to me that if one were convinced of Hamlet in the background of North by Northwest, say to the extent that one is convinced that Saxo Grammaticus' Danish History is in the background of Hamlet, then one would without a qualm take the name Leonard as a successor to the name Laertes.Stanley Cavell, professor of philosophy at Harvard University, is the author of Must We Mean What We Say?, The Senses of Walden, The World Viewed, The Claim of Reason, and Pursuits of Happiness. His previous contributions to Critical Inquiry are "On Makajev On Bergman" and "A Reply to John Hollander". (shrink)

Meta-arguments are arguments about one or more arguments, or argumentation in general. They contrast to ground-level arguments, which are about natural phenomena, historical events, human actions, abstract entities, etc. Although meta-arguments are common in all areas of human cognitive practice, and although implicit studies of them are found in many works, and although a few explicit scholarly contributions exist, meta-argumentation has never been examined explicitly, directly, and systematically in book-length treatment. This lacuna is especially unfortunate because such treatment can offer (...) not only an understanding of a special class of arguments, but also a promising way of doing logic and argumentation theory. This is the first book that attempts a systematic treatment of meta-arguments, providing both an illustration of the meta-argumentational approach to logical theory, and an analysis of an especially rich collection of meta-arguments. First, it elaborates an empirical methodology derived partly from a critical appreciation of Stephen Toulmin's applied-logic approach, and partly from a novel application of the author's historical-textual approach. Then it examines theoretical meta-arguments, by such scholars as Tony Blair, Robert Fogelin, Alvin Goldman, Trudy Govier, David Hitchcock, Ralph Johnson, Henry Johnstone, Erik Krabbe, Frans van Eemeren, Carl Wellman, and John Woods, on such topics as defining argument, methods of criticism, deep disagreements, and conductive or pro-and-con arguments. Thirdly, it studies famous meta-arguments by such classics as John Stuart Mill, David Hume, and Galileo Galilei, on such topics as freedom of discussion, women's liberation, the existence of God and intelligent design, and the motion of the earth. (shrink)

Introduction: how John the Baptist kept his head, or my life in film philosophy -- A philosophical perspective. Why not realize your world? -- Silence and stasis -- Film and modernity -- André Bazin as Cavellian realist -- On Stanley Cavell's band wagon -- What becomes of the camera in the world on film? -- Studies in criticism. "I never thought I would sink so low as to become an actor": John Barrymore in Twentieth century -- James Stewart (...) in Vertigo -- Hats off to George Cukor! -- Woody Allen's New York -- Blood is thicker than water: the family in Hitchcock -- Space and speech in the films of Yasujiro Ozu -- Romance, eroticism and the camera's gaze in Jean Genet's Un chant d'amour -- Face to face with Chantal Akerman -- Precious memories in philosophy and film -- Seeing the light in The tree of life -- A film that is also a handshake: philosophy in the films of the Dardenne Brothers -- Justifying justified -- Documentary film in Boston in the 1970s and 1980s -- Sometimes daddies don't talk about things like that -- Jean Rouch as film artist -- Dancing with Gardner: Robert Gardner's films on art -- Dead birds re-encountered: a journey of return -- Notes on the essays. (shrink)

Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 0-226-97861-3 (alk. paper) — isbn 0-226-97862-1 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Science — Philosophy. 2. Science — History. 3. Progress. I. Title. Q175 .Z25 2004 501 — dc2i 200301 1970 ...

In a world plagued by disagreement and conflict one might expect that the exact sciences of logic and mathematics would provide a safe harbor. In fact these disciplines are rife with internal divisions between different, often incompatible, systems. Do these disagreements admit of resolution? Can such resolution be achieved without disturbing assumptions that the theorems of logic and mathematics state objective truths about the real world? In this original and historically rich book John Woods explores apparently intractable disagreements in (...) logic and the foundations of mathematics and sets out conflict resolution strategies that evade or disarm these stalemates. An important sub-theme of the book is the extent to which pluralism in logic and the philosophy of mathematics undermines realist assumptions. This book makes an important contribution to such areas of philosophy as logic, philosophy of language and argumentation theory. It will also be of interest to mathematicians and computer scientists. (shrink)

This paper considers three horary quadrants of strikingly similar design and underlying mode of conception. Two are dated, 1398 and 1399, while the third, undated instrument can now be dated for the first time with some certainty to 1400. The parameters used in their construction are analysed, and the latitude for which they were made is elucidated. This shows that all three were made for use in London or southern England. One of the three, dated 1399, has previously been attributed (...) to the patronage of Richard II, King of England, by virtue of the badge decorating the quadrant. The badge on the second quadrant, dated 1398, for a long time also associated with Richard II, has now been established to have been used by Richard's half brother, John Holland, Duke of Exeter. The third quadrant undoubtedlybelongs to the group, but cannot be assigned to the patronage of any individual. (shrink)

A veritable tidal shift in Herder scholarship has taken place over the last quarter century, primarily but not exclusively in German. This review essay seeks to evoke the richness and vitality of this revival with the hope of persuading American academics that some ill-founded opinions still circulating concerning Herder's "irrationalism" and chauvinistic, even racist nationalism, and his philosophical naivety and literary effrontery, might at last be put to rest. The recent revival has brough sharply to the fore two crucial aspects (...) of Herder. First, there is the contribution of Herder's thought to the emergent cultural and social sciences. Second, for Herder the "science of man" was also a natural science: the division between the humanities and the natural sciences that has been such a hallmark of the age from Kant until very recently did not exist for Herder. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Scientific History Scientific History and Scripture The Argument from Divine Signs The Argument from Apostolic Faith The Argument from Divine Character The Argument from Pseudo‐history.

Modularity is a fundamental doctrine in the cognitive sciences. It holds a preeminent position in cognitive psychology and generative linguistics, as well as a long history in neurophysiology, with roots going all the way back to the early nineteenth century. But a mature field of neuroscience is a comparatively recent phenomenon and has challenged orthodox conceptions of the modular mind. One way of accommodating modularity within the new framework suggested by these developments is to go for increasingly soft versions of (...) modularity. One such version, which I call the “system” view, is so soft that it promises to meet practically any challenge neuroscience can throw at it. In this paper, I reconsider afresh what we ought to regard as the sine qua non of modularity and offer a few arguments against the view that an insipid “system” module could be the legitimate successor of the traditional notion. (shrink)

Using Geach’s Principle of the Relativity of Identity, the doctrine of the trinity is defended against charges of inconsistency put forward by David Wiggins and Richard Cartwright.

Ofrezco respuestas a lo que considero son los aspectos más destacados de las críticas de John Biro, James Freeman, David Hitchcock, Robert Pinto, Harvey Siegel y Luis Vega al modelo normativo para la argumentación que he desarrollado en Giving Reasons. Cada respuesta se articula en torno a una cuestión principal, i.e., la distinción entre normatividad constitutiva y regulativa dentro de los modelos de la Teoría de la Argumentación, la evaluación semántica de la argumentación, el concepto de justificación, las (...) diferencias entre el modelo de Toulmin y mi modelo de argumento y el análisis de la dimension pragmática de la argumentación. (shrink)

Excerpt from Man and His Divine Father This book aims to bring cheer and hope to human souls. All are puzzled with the problems of their own being and happiness. This is philosophy, and all men are philosophers; but largely without method, and with poor logic, and no first principles. Hence, there is little agreement; and what is called "Reason and Common Sense" is, in a great degree, nonsense. In the chaos of opinions, we try to find the line and (...) system of plain truth. The beginning of wisdom is knowledge of man, the knower, in himself, his powers and limitations. So we first try to discover our Self, and to portray a man. In consciousness is found a selfhood and positiveness, and a consistent, self-proving philosophy of personal life. This describes beings by their doings. It develops the conception of causation into a connected line and system of the whole philosophy of the nature, relations, and destinies of persons. It gathers to itself, and conserves, all known truth; and from it all the errors, follies, and "Isms," philosophical and religious, fall, of their own weight, discredited. This conductive philosophy rejects many, and conserves many, of the old beliefs of men. It confirms itself by rigid logic, lays itself parallel with all other philosophies and sciences, and courts the attacks of all logic that does not use consciousness and activity for its premises. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

This latest volume of BACAP Proceedings contains some innovative research by international scholars on Plato and Aristotle. It covers such themes as Plato on recollection and on justice, along with Aristotle on Nous and on law._ This publication has also been published in paperback, please click here_ for details.

Noam Chomsky often appeals to the distinction between problems and mysteries. This chapter explains and evaluates Chomsky's remarks on these topics scattered throughout numerous texts. Next, it explains the p/m distinction via Chomsky's analogy of science with language. The chapter briefly discusses the topic of linguistic creativity. It focuses on the distinction itself, not what might fall under it. The chapter critically evaluates Chomsky's considerations in favor of the conception of the p/m distinction. A further suggestion from Chomsky is that (...) convergence is a key signature of a science‐forming faculty. Convergence on scientific theories requires explanation, for that there is convergence at all appears not to follow from the observational data, still less the socio‐cultural facts of scientific practice. (shrink)

An introduction to the philosophy of love, bridging analytic and continental philosophy and the philosophy of religion, through the writings of Harry G. Frankfurt and S.ren Kierkegaard.

The modern interpretation of our existence as “subjective” is of a piece with the recognition that our experience is inherently interpretive or “hermeneutic”. Because we are subjects, our world is a world of meanings. From Descartes, we see that our experience is inherently interpretive, inherently hermeneutical. “Subjectivity” can thus be understood to be semiotic reality. The political stakes of this idea that individual subjectivity is derivative of a more basic reality are thematized in figures such as Marx and Foucault. Kant (...) shows that this interpretation is not so much something we do as something that we undergo. In order to avoid invoking the presumptions of either Aristotelian naturalism or Cartesian subjectivism, Heidegger introduces a new term to designate our existence: Dasein. The ongoing philosophical study of subjectivity reveals that the processes of interpretation that shape our experience are not deliberate acts of individuals, but processes that give rise to individuals. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Setting the Task Constructing the Christ Setting the Boundaries: Christian and/or Jew? The Third Race: Christians as In‐Group Putting on Christ: Christianity's Signals of Commitment Loving Your Neighbor and Turning the Other Cheek.

This chapter contains sections titled: A Perennial Crisis? When “Historiography” Faces “Philosophy” The Poststructuralist/Postmodernist Challenge Practicing Historians and the Challenge of Philosophy Concluding Comment References.

John Ayrton Paris, writer and physician, became a member of the Linnean Society in 1810, and served as president of the Royal College of Physicians from 1844 until his death. Intended for children and originally composed for the author's family, this three-volume work about science was first published in 1827. Dedicated to the writer Maria Edgeworth and with illustrations by George Cruikshank, it aims 'to blend amusement with instruction', since youth, as Paris writes, 'is naturally addicted to amusement'. Topics (...) covered in Volume 1 include momentum, geometry, elasticity and rotatory motion; the science behind these is demonstrated using a yo-yo, a jack-in-the-box and a slingshot, among various other toys and games. A fascinating and popular text in the history of science education, the engaging narrative seeks to prove 'how profitably, and agreeably, the machinery of fiction may be worked for the dissemination of truth'. (shrink)

'Straw Dogs' is a radical work of philosophy that challenges our most cherished assumptions about what it means to be human. John Gray explores how the world and human life look once humanism has been finally abandoned.