Empirical reports on scientific competition show that scientists can be depicted as self-interested, strategically behaving agents. Nevertheless, we argue that recognition-seeking scientists will have an interest in establishing methodological norms which tend to select theories of a high epistemic value, and that these norms will be still more stringent if the epistemic value of theories appears in the utility function of scientists, either directly or instrumentally. (Published Online July 11 2006) Footnotes1 The author gratefully acknowledges financial support from DGI grant (...) BEC2002-03715 (Ministerio de Educación y Cultura). 2 The author gratefully acknowledges financial support from grants PB98-0495-C08-01 and BFF2002-03656 (Ministerio de Educación y Cultura). (shrink)

Virtuous arguers are expected to manifest virtues such as intellectual humility and open-mindedness, but from such traits the quality of arguments does not immediately follow. However, it also seems implausible that a virtuous arguer can systematically put forward bad arguments. How could virtue argumentation theory combine both insights? The solution, I argue, lies in an analogy with virtue epistemology: considering both responsibilist and reliabilist virtues gives us a fuller picture of the virtuous arguer.

El demiurgo es el encargado de organizar un material espacial informe (chóra), para lo que contempla las formas inteligibles, y produce así las imágenes, las cosas sensibles. La causa de la diferencia entre las formas inteligibles (modelo) y las cosas sensibles (imagen) radica en el material caótico e indeterminado (receptáculo). Pretendemos analizar la chóra en el Timeo de Platón, donde convergen dos aspectos: el ¿constitutivo¿, ¿aquello de lo que¿ están constituidas las cosas sensibles, y el ¿espacial¿, ¿aquello en lo que¿ (...) aparecen. Este material espacial sufre una transmutación terminológica en la hyle de Aristóteles de Física, IV, 2. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore a selection of Castoriadis’ writings, paying special attention to the seminars devoted to Plato’s Statesman, and discuss his divorce from the Platonic and Platonic tradition. Castoriadis places Plato beyond a theoretical and academic interpretation: the Ancient Greece that Castoriadis claims, from his political ontology, is not a paradigm, but a “germ” of autonomy, by which understand the birth of democracy, philosophy and history in order to transform himself and society.

Los Elementos de ética de Hierocles, junto a los extractos que conservamos por Estobeo, constituyen una presentación ordenada de la ética estoica desde sus primeros fundamentos. En este trabajo nos proponemos desgranar el argumento estoico de la familiaridad (οἰκείωσις) y la tesis de que lo primero familiar, ya seamos seres humanos o animales, no es solo la percepción de sí mismo sino también el impulso a la conservación de sí mismo. Hierocles exhorta a ponerse los unos en el lugar de (...) los otros y a abrirse progresivamente en círculos concéntricos a la humanidad, pero sin demoler, desde el centro de la razón, la perspectiva de lo propio y familiar. (shrink)

En la Sentencia 18 Por!rio se inspira en un pasaje plotiniano de En. III 6 [26] 4, 41-52, donde trata precisamente sobre la sensación, pero introduciendo dos innovaciones relevantes: 1) la noción de ser vivo, donde Plotino menciona solo la parte pasiva del alma y la materia – lo que constituye una manera de insistir en la relación íntima que se da entre el alma y el cuerpo en el compuesto–; y 2) las nociones de “armonía no separada” y de (...) “armonía separada”, donde Plotino alude solo a una armonía que hace vibrar ella misma las cuerdas y que dicta su regla al músico. La armonía separada puede intensi!carse con la relación armónica que existe en sí, independiente del instrumento y de la interpretación musical. Asimismo, para trazar un paralelismo entre la armonía de la lira y el estado de inherencia del alma, Jámblico se re!ere a la concepción plotiniano-por!riana del ser vivo: el animal es el cuerpo que posee una naturaleza particular y que ha sido vivificada no por el alma, sino por una especie de derivado del alma que denomina “huella” o “luz” del alma, por lo que el alma misma no se une al cuerpo. (shrink)

La Dialéctica de la Ilustración se encuentra en el epicentro de todas las disputas en torno a la Teoría Crítica. Para la mayoría de sus intérpretes es el reflejo de un estado de ánimo provocado por el fascismo, la II Guerra y el genocidio. Una manifestación de filosofía negativa de la historia, que solo tuvo sentido como provocación, pero ya no nos sirve para interpretar ni aquel momento, ni el presente. ¿Es posible retornar a esta obra con provecho? En este (...) artículo se analiza el concepto de dialéctica que encontramos en el título. Cómo se llegó a él y cuál es su verdadero significado. Con ello se ofrece una contribución que ayude a resolver algunos de los malentendidos que todavía existen sobre esta obra clave del siglo XX. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza la relación entre individuo y sociedad en Theodor W. Adorno. Para ello se centra en las tensiones y mediaciones entre teoría de la sociedad y psicoanálisis. Su punto de partida es el horizonte histórico concreto del vínculo que une a ambos: la conjunción de crisis e integración. Después presenta la constitución social de la subjetividad desde la perspectiva de teoría crítica, la economía psíquico-libidinal como matriz psicosocial de dicha constitución, la tesis de la debilitación del individuo en (...) un capitalismo monopolista autoritario, su expresión en el carácter autoritario y el narcisismo herido, para acabar señalando los límites históricos del sujeto neurótico y modelo edípico y los elementos de una posible actualización de las aportaciones de una psicología social psicoanalítica. (shrink)

A virtue approach to argumentation would focus on the arguers’ character rather than the arguments. Therefore, it must be explained how good arguments relate to virtuous arguers. This article focus on this issue and attempts to provide an answer to the question: Could a bad arguer produce a good argument? It is argued that, besides the usual logical, dialectical, and rhetorical standards, a virtuously produced good argument must meet two additional requirements: the arguer must be in a specific state of (...) mind, and the argument must be broadly conceived of as an argumentative interaction and thus excel from every perspective. (shrink)

The international community has not been able to agree on a definition of “terrorism,” which has been a controversial term for decades. In order to understand the controversy, here the meaning of “terrorism” is analysed by means of the inferentialist framework developed by Robert Brandom. It will be shown that there is wide agreement about (at least some of) the consequences of application of the term, whereas the conditions of application are precisely what is at issue. Three consequences of application (...) will be distinguished: epistemic, evaluative, and programmatic. Evaluative and programmatic consequences of application of the term “terrorism” are widespread and very serious, even in the absence of a precise definition, and that explains why the conditions of application are a controversial matter. In the end, the controversy is best understood as a clash of interests regarding when the consequences of the term should apply. (shrink)

Is a virtue approach in argumentation possible without committing the ad hominem fallacy? My answer is affirmative, provided that the object study of our theory is well delimited. My proposal is that a theory of argumentative virtue should not focus on argument appraisal, as has been assumed, but on those traits that make an individual achieve excellence in argumentative practices. An agent-based approach in argumentation should be developed, not in order to find better grounds for argument appraisal, but to gain (...) insight into argumentative habits and excellence. This way we can benefit from what a virtue argumentation theory really has to offer. (shrink)

Harry Frankfurt characterised bullshit as assertions that are made without a concern for truth. Assertions, however, are not the only type of speech act that can be bullshit. Here, I propose the concept of argumentative bullshit and show how a speech acts account of bullshit assertions can be generalised to bullshit arguments. Argumentative bullshit, on this account, would be the production of an argument without a concern for the supporting relation between reasons and claim.

Virtue argumentation theory focuses on the arguers’ character, whereas pragma-dialectics focuses on argumentation as a procedure. In this paper I attempt to explain that both theories are not opposite approaches to argumentation. I argue that, with the help of some non-fundamental changes in pragma-dialectics and some restrictions in virtue argumentation theory, it is possible to regard these theories as complementary approaches to the argumentative practice.

Despite its obvious advantages, the disruptive development of neurotechnology can pose risks to fundamental freedoms. In the context of such concerns, proposals have emerged in recent years either to design human rights de novo or to update the existing ones. These new rights in the age of neurotechnology are now widely referred to as “neurorights.” In parallel, there is a considerable amount of ongoing academic work related to updating the right to freedom of thought in order to include the protection (...) of “freedom of thinking” (i.e., freedom of thought itself) and not only its social manifestations. Neurorights such as cognitive liberty, free will, mental freedom, and mental self-determination come into play here. Importantly, freedom of thought has often been considered a prerequisite for all the other fundamental freedoms and rights. In any case, just as other rights require additional legal instruments to guarantee their compliance, substantial neurorights will probably require specific complementary developments in procedural law. In relation to this, there is a long tradition of habeas corpus as an emergency remedy to enforce the rights of a citizen against illegal or arbitrary detention. More recently, the habeas data writ has been proposed and admitted in certain countries to guarantee a person’s ownership of their personal data. In this article, we propose to expand this procedural apparatus by incorporating a third habeas, which we call habeas cogitationem: a writ aimed primarily at enforcing the right to freedom of thinking (and, subsidiarily, the rest of neurorights) against direct, harmful interferences in a person’s thought process by both public and private perpetrators. (shrink)

The study of the problem of argumentative bullshit can be useful to shed some light on the practice of argumentation and the essence of argumentative virtues. Since argumentative bullshit is arguably the greatest threat to argumentation, and it is characterised by an indifference to the constitutive value of argumentation (supporting a claim with reasons), argumentative virtue could be understood as the opposite to that indifference: caring about the practice of argumentation and being disposed to sustain and improve it through their (...) participation in it. Whoever produces argumentative bullshit cares more about certain external ends (reputation, political goals, making fun…) than about argumentative practice, whereas virtuous arguers never lose sight of the value of the argumentative practice. This suggests a MacIntyrean conception of the practice of argumentation, according to which argumentation is a practice with internal goods than can only be recognised and achieved through participation in it, while argumentative virtues are those traits conducive to the appreciation and achievement of argumentative goods. (shrink)

The pragma-dialectical research program begins with a philosophical estate, in which a conception of reasonableness is offered that must serve as ground for the theoretical estate. Pragma-dialectics has produced many important insights in the theoretical estate, including the ideal model and the rules for critical discussions. However, here I will argue that the conception of reasonableness that the pragma-dialecticians adopt in the philosophical estate, based on anti-dogmatism, assumption of fallibilism and willingness to engage in critical discussion, is too narrow to (...) support the whole system of pragma-dialectical rules. What the philosophical estate requires is a broad and rich conception of excellent performance in argumentative practice, which then the rules of the critical discussion are intended to capture systematically in the theoretical estate. In my view, a virtue approach to argumentation is the ideal framework for such a philosophical ground. Virtues such as intellectual empathy, intellectual honesty, faith in reason, or recognition of reliable authority, point towards aspects of a philosophical conception of excellent arguing that are absent in the pragma-dialectical view of reasonableness. Finally, I will argue that what pragma-dialecticians call “second-order conditions” for a critical discussion are better understood as minimal argumentative virtue, a basic degree of virtue that arguers are required to possess in order to be prepared to participate in a fruitful critical discussion. The possession of such a basic degree of argumentative virtue is, I believe, what we mean when we characterise someone as reasonable. (shrink)

La literatura mexicana de Chicago es un fenómeno de extracción obrera que reivindica la figura del migrante, rompiendo así con paradigmas establecidos en la literatura canónica mexicana. La obra colectiva de los autores mexicanos de Chicago es, por lo tanto, una literatura subversiva.

Los argumentos y las explicaciones son dos tipos de discurso que no siempre han sido distinguidos cabalmente. En la actualidad, tanto en la pedagogía de la ciencia como en los estudios de la argumentación, se ha insistido en la necesidad de diferenciarlos para captar adecuadamente la naturaleza de las explicaciones y los argumentos. Es en la teoría de la argumentación donde más explícitamente se han propuesto criterios de demarcación entre ambos. Sin embargo, aquí argumentaré que los criterios que habitualmente se (...) usan en la teoría de la argumentación para distinguir entre un argumento y una explicación (lo que llamo la “distinción estándar”) adolecen de varios problemas. Por un lado, en varios casos relevantes los criterios no proporcionan ninguna orientación o arrojan resultados cuestionables. Por otro lado, los criterios de distinción se han limitado al ámbito de la argumentación teórica y han ignorado las particularidades del ámbito práctico. (shrink)

Francisco de Vitoria en sus comentarios a la Summa Theologiae y en la Relectio de bello admite que un simple ciudadano tiene la posibilidad (incluso la obligación) de no combatir en una guerra que él, en conciencia, considera injusta. Aunque no tiene obligación de examinar por sí mismo las causas de la guerra, no puede dejar de obrar en conciencia. Lo contrario a como actúan, por ejemplo, los mercenarios, siempre dispuestos a combatir en cualquier guerra, sea justa o no. Sería (...) un precedente de la objeción de conciencia; pero no a combatir en cualquier guerra, sino en “esta guerra” en particular. No obstante, en caso de duda, un simple ciudadano podría combatir obedeciendo a su príncipe, fiado de la rectitud de intención del gobernante. (shrink)