ABSTRACT This article examines the Fourierist reception of Owenism. In challenging the established historiography on Owen’s reception in France, the article draws on a wide range of Fourierist material – letters, unpublished draft manuscripts, and neglected articles in Fourierist and non-Fourierist periodicals – that previously not accessible to twentieth-century historians in order to reassess the Fourierist response to Owen and Owenism. The article pays special attention to the work of Fourier’s leading disciple, Victor Considerant. It contrasts Fourier’s highly critical evaluation (...) of Owen’s work, with Considerant’s more considered reading of Owen and conciliatory approach in dealing with other socialists, such as the Saint-Simonians and Owen’s French disciples. The article also examines the work of some of Fourier’s other followers, including Jules Lechevalier, Adrien Berbrugger, Alexandre Baudet-Dulary, and Amédée Paget and their evaluations of Owen and Owenism. (shrink)

In this paper, I set out some desiderata for a model of implicit cognition. I present test cases and suggest that, when considered in light of them, some recent models of implicit cognition fail to satisfy these desiderata. The test cases also bring to light an important class of cases that have been almost completely ignored in philosophical discussions of implicit cognition and implicit bias. These cases have important work to do in helping us understand both the role of implicit (...) cognition in action and our attempts to combat implicit biases. (shrink)

Suppose the prevailing distribution of property rights is unjust as determined by the relevant conception of distributive justice. You have far more than you should have under that theory and I have far less. Then I defraud you and in doing so reallocate resources so that our holdings ex post more closely approximate what distributive justice requires. Do I have a duty to return the property to you? There are many good reasons for requiring me to return to you what (...) I have taken. One is that while you may have no right in justice to all that you own, it does not follow that I do, or that I have a right to take it. Thus, requiring me to return the property to you is a way of recognizing that I had no right to take it from you in the first place. (shrink)

Theology and philosophy in the recent past; an introductory essay, by P. LeFevre.--Process philosophy as a resource for Christian thought, by C. Hartshorne.--Phenomenology as resource for Christian thinking, by Q. Lauer.--The two faces of Socrates; language analysis as resource for Christian thought, by F. Ferré.--Existentialism and Christian thought, by J. Macquarrie.

The first part of this book is a translation of a philosophical work by the Breton philosopher Jules Lequyer, which explores questions of divine justice and human equality. The second part is a biography of Lequyer by Donald Wayne Viney, based on Prosper Hemon's life of Lequyer, and other material.

Jules Janssens a construit une œuvre importante, qui, pour de nombreux chercheurs, a ouvert des perspectives de recherches nouvelles et fécondes. Ses travaux ont fait date. Ils portent principalement sur la philosophie d'Avicenne, ses sources, ses rapports avec la pensée musulmane, son influence sur la théologie ash'arite (al-Ghazālī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī) et sa réception dans le monde latin. Pour lui rendre hommage, quatorze collègues et amis de renommée internationale se sont réunis pour poursuivre ses réflexions sur ces thèmes. L'ouvrage (...) qui en est issu offre un état des lieux de la recherche contemporaine sur Avicenne et sa postérité arabo-latine. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

The term 'implicit bias' has very swiftly been incorporated into philosophical discourse. Our aim in this paper is to scrutinise the phenomena that fall under the rubric of implicit bias. The term is often used in a rather broad sense, to capture a range of implicit social cognitions, and this is useful for some purposes. However, we here articulate some of the important differences between phenomena identified as instances of implicit bias. We caution against ignoring these differences: it is likely (...) they have considerable significance, not least for the sorts of normative recommendations being made concerning how to mitigate the bad effects of implicit bias. (shrink)

Philosophers who have written about implicit bias have claimed or implied that individuals are not responsible, and therefore not blameworthy, for their implicit biases, and that this is a function of the nature of implicit bias as implicit: below the radar of conscious reflection, out of the control of the deliberating agent, and not rationally revisable in the way many of our reflective beliefs are. I argue that close attention to the findings of empirical psychology, and to the conditions for (...) blameworthiness, does not support these claims. I suggest that the arguments for the claim that individuals are not liable for blame are invalid, and that there is some reason to suppose that individuals are, at least sometimes, liable to blame for the extent to which they are influenced in behaviour and judgment by implicit biases. I also argue against the claim that it is counter-productive to see bias as something for which individuals are blameworthy; rather, understanding implicit bias as something for which we are liable to blame could be constructive. (shrink)

This essay is part of a larger project exploring the extent to which the market paradigm might be usefully employed to explain and in some instances justify nonmarket institutions. The focus of the market paradigm in this essay is the relationship between the idea of a perfectly competitive market and aspects of both the rationality of political association and the theory of collective choice. In particular, this essay seeks to identify what connections, if any, exist between one kind of market (...) account of the rationality of political association and one kind of market-based social choice rule. The market theory of political association I intend to discuss I call “market contractarianism,” and the collective choice rule whose relation to it I intend to explore is the unanimity rule. What, if anything, is the relationship between market contractarianism and the unanimity rule? (shrink)

Nella seconda parte del _Libro della condanna dello status e dell’ostentazione_ il ventottesimo libro della sua opera principale, _La rinascita delle scienze religiose_ – al-Ghazālī trae molta ispirazione da al-Muhāsibī, soprattutto dalla sua opera _al-Ri’āya al-huqūq Allāh _(_L’osservanza dei diritti di Dio_). Il fatto che al-Ghazālī menziona esplicitamente il nome di al-Muhāsibī non meno di quattro volte in questa sezione testimonia la sua ammirazione profonda per questo grande mistico delle origini. Un attento esame di questi riferimenti e del loro contesto (...) rivela una grande familiarità e un ampio uso della _Ri’āya_, così come un accesso diretto a un’altra grande opera di al-Muhāsibī, cioè il _Kitāb al-Wasāya_ (_Il Libro dei Comandamenti_). Inoltre, la scelta di al-Ghazālī di specifici versetti coranici e delle Tradizioni, sia profetiche che di storie, è molto debitrice della _Ri’āya_, come diventa chiaro sulla base di un esame del primo capitolo di questa seconda parte che consiste interamente in citazioni di versetti coranici e delle Tradizioni riguardanti la questione dell’ostentazione. Per quanto riguarda il secondo capitolo, che si concentra sui modi usati per attirare l’attenzione della gente su di sé sia negli atti religiosi che in quelli verbali, esso condivide molte caratteristiche con l’esposizione di al-Muhāsibī nella _Ri’āya_, compresa la copia quasi letterale di alcuni passaggi. Infine, l’uso che al-Ghazālī fa della _Ri’āya_ in ciascuno degli altri capitoli è brevemente indicato. Questo studio mostra che al-Muhāsibī non era solo una fonte importante per al-Ghazālī – un fatto già noto da quasi un secolo – ma _la_ fonte principale, almeno per questa sezione della sua _Rinascita_. Tuttavia, allo stesso tempo, questo studio chiarisce che al-Ghazālī non è colpevole di cieco plagio. In the second part of the _Book of the Condemnation of Status and Ostentation_ – the twentieth-eight book of his major work, _The Revival of the Religious Sciences_ – al-Ghazālī draws much inspiration from al-Muhāsibī, above all from his work _al-Ri’āya al-huqūq Allāh_ (_Eyeservice to God’s Laws_). The very fact that al-Ghazālī explicitly mentions al-Muhāsibī’s name no less than four times throughout this section clearly testifies to his profound admiration for this great early mystic. A close examination of these references and their context reveals a great familiarity with and an extensive use of the _Ri’āya_, as well as a direct access to another major work of al-Muhāsibī, i.e., _Kitāb al-Wasāya_ (_The Book of Commandments_). Moreover, al-Ghazālī’s choice of specific Qur’anic verses and of Traditions, both prophetic and stories, is much indebted to the _Ri’āya_, as becomes clear on the basis of an examination of the first chapter of this second part which consisting entirely of quotations of Qur’anic verses and Traditions concerning the issue of ostentation. As to the second chapter, which focuses on the ways used to draw people’s attention to oneself both in religious as well as in wordly acts, it shares many features with al-Muhāsibī’s exposition in the _Ri’āya_, including the almost verbatim copying of some passages. Finally, al-Ghazālī’s use of the _Ri’āya_ in each of the other chapters is briefly indicated. This study shows that al-Muhāsibī was not just a major source for al-Ghazālī – a fact already known for nearly a century – but _the_ major source, at least for this section of his _Revival_. However, at the same time, this study makes clear that al-Ghazālī is not guilty of blind plagiarism. (shrink)

The mammalian oocyte is a round cell arrested at prophase I of meiosis. It is characterized by the presence of a large nucleus, called the germinal vesicle, in the middle of which is the nucleolus. Before it can be fertilized, the oocyte must resume meiosis, enter metaphase II and be ovulated. The nucleolus is dissolved during this process. However, the nucleoli of the male and female pronuclei in the zygote are both of maternal origin. A recent paper1 demonstrates that the (...) maternal nucleolus, together with other nucleoplasmic elements, is essential for early embryonic development. These nucleolar and nucleoplasmic factors remain undetermined. BioEssays 30:613–616, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

What is praise? I argue that we can make progress by examining what praise does. Functionalist views of praise are emerging, but I here argue that by foregrounding cases in which expressions of praise are rejected by their direct target, we see that praise has a wider, and largely overlooked, social function. I introduce cases in which praise is rejected, and develop a functionalist account of praise that is well placed to make sense of the contours of these cases. My (...) claim is that praise functions to affirm and entrench values, exerting pressure in praise's audiences to affirm the values expressed. I show how my account overcomes some of the limitations of recently developed accounts of praise. (shrink)

Our focus here is on whether, when influenced by implicit biases, those behavioural dispositions should be understood as being a part of that person’s character: whether they are part of the agent that can be morally evaluated.[4] We frame this issue in terms of control. If a state, process, or behaviour is not something that the agent can, in the relevant sense, control, then it is not something that counts as part of her character. A number of theorists have argued (...) that individuals do not have control, in the relevant sense, over the operation of implicit bias. We will argue that this claim is mistaken. We articulate and develop a notion of control that individuals have with respect to implicit bias, and argue that this kind of control can ground character-based evaluation of such behavioural dispositions. (shrink)

Jules Coleman, one of the world's most influential philosophers of law, here expounds his recent views on a range of important issues in legal theory. Coleman offers for the first time an explicit account of the pragmatist method that has long informed his work, and takes on the views of highly respected contemporaries such as Ronald Dworkin and Joseph Raz.

Research programs in empirical psychology over the past few decades have led scholars to posit implicit biases. This is due to the development of innovative behavioural measures that have revealed aspects of our cognitions which may not be identified on self-report measures requiring individuals to reflect on and report their attitudes and beliefs. But what does it mean to characterise such biases as implicit? Can we satisfactorily articulate the grounds for identifying them as bias? And crucially, what sorts of cognitions (...) are in fact being measured; what mental states or processes underpin such behavioural responses? In this paper, we outline some of the philosophical and empirical issues engaged when attempting to address these three questions. Our aim is to provide a constructive taxonomy of the issues, and how they interrelate. As we will see, any view about what implicit bias is may depend on a range of prior theoretical choices. (shrink)

Can implicit biases be properly thought of as epistemic vices? I start by sketching the contours of implicit biases (1), and then turn to the recent claim, from Cassam, that implicit biases are epistemic vices (2). However, I argue that concerns about the stability of implicit biases and their role in producing behavior make for difficulties in establishing that implicit biases of individuals are epistemic vices (3). I then consider a recently developed model which prompts us to consider implicit biases (...) as properties of groups (4). This raises the question of whether implicit biases might constitute collective epistemic vice. I suggest that there is a way to make sense of this claim, but it requires rethinking how we conceptualise collective epistemic vice (5). These re-conceptualisations can be independently motivated. I close by marshalling some considerations in favour of using the terminology of vice to capture these defects of collective epistemic practice (6). (shrink)

H.L.A. Hart'sThe Concept of Lawis the most important and influential book in the legal positivist tradition. Though its importance is undisputed, there is a good deal less consensus regarding its core commitments, both methodological and substantive. With the exception of an occasional essay, Hart neither further developed nor revised his position beyond the argument of the book. The burden of shaping the prevailing understanding of his views, therefore, has fallen to others: notably, Joseph Raz among positivists, and Ronald Dworkin among (...) positivism's critics. Dworkin, in particular, has framed, then reframed, the conventional understanding, not only of Hart's positivism, but of the terms of the debate between positivists and him. While standing on the sidelines, Hart witnessed the unfolding of not only a lively debate between positivists and Dworkin, but an equally intense one among positivists as to positivism's (and his) core claims. The most important debate has been between so-called inclusive and exclusive positivists: a debate as much about Hart's legacy as about the proper interpretation of legal positivism. (shrink)

Reactive emotion accounts hold that blameworthiness should be analyzed in terms of the familiar reactive emotions. However, despite the attractions of such views, we are not persuaded that blameworthiness is ultimately a matter of correctly felt reactive emotion. In this paper, we draw attention to a range of little-discussed considerations involving the moral significance of the passage of time that drive a wedge between blameworthiness and the reactive emotions: the appropriateness of the reactive emotions is sensitive to the passage of (...) time in ways that attributions of blameworthiness are not. There are a number of ways in which reactive emotion accounts might attempt to accommodate the moral significance of time, however. We consider the most important of these, but ultimately find them wanting. Accordingly, we conclude that the prospects for the reactive emotion accounts are bleak. Our argument, if successful, has a range of implications for legal theory, most importantly in providing a novel moral basis for statutes of limitations and in shedding light on new avenues in the theory of criminal law generally. (shrink)

Oedipus’s basic error was to have viewed evil as a problem, whereas he learns to his grief that it is actually a mystery, an irresolvable paradox, a natural contradiction between the mutually exclusive possibilities of self-determination and predetermination, between freedom of the will and divine omniscience. This is the quandary as it is perceived by philosophy and religion. In the domains of religion and theology Fate is indeed a mystery. Ill-equipped as I am to elucidate mysteries, I will move the (...) discussion to a firmer ground, where the concept of Fate is merely a problem, where scholars, those who “traffic in words,” as Goethe calls us, stand a fighting chance.1My major concerns will be: 1) to determine what .. (shrink)

Recent empirical research has substantiated the finding that very many of us harbour implicit biases: fast, automatic, and difficult to control processes that encode stereotypes and evaluative content, and influence how we think and behave. Since it is difficult to be aware of these processes - they have sometimes been referred to as operating 'unconsciously' - we may not know that we harbour them, nor be alert to their influence on our cognition and action. And since they are difficult to (...) control, considerable work is required to prevent their influence. We here focus on the implications of these findings for epistemology. We first look at ways in which implicit biases thwart our knowledge seeking practices (sections 1 & 2). Then we set out putative epistemic benefits of implicit bias, before considering ways in which epistemic practices might be improved (section 3). Finally, we consider the distinctive challenges that the findings about implicit bias pose to us as philosophers, in the context of feminist philosophy in particular (section 4). (shrink)

One of the first volumes in the new series of prestigious Oxford Handbooks, The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law brings together specially commissioned essays by twenty-six of the foremost legal theorists currently writing, to provide a state of the art overview of jurisprudential scholarship.