This article argues for the reassessment of Indrabhuti’s Jnanasiddhi in the light of newly discovered primary witnesses and previously unnoticed relations to other works. Presumably composed in the late eighth to early ninth century CE, it belongs to the earlier phase of Tantric Buddhism, a transitional period between the predominance of the Yoga- and Mahayogatantras to the later Yoginitantras, and relates to a variety of important scriptures of this formation. While this article briefly discusses the origins, authorship, contents and context (...) of the Jnanasiddhi, including a brief overview of its modern scholarship, it also highlights its intertextual relations with and notable influences upon other tantric works of major importance. The Jnanasiddhi stands out as a tantric scripture of paramount importance, and we attempt to demonstrate the necessity of its reassessment with recourse to hitherto neglected but nonetheless vital sources that have only recently come to light. (shrink)

Does the critical discourse about resilience reiterate the problematic dichotomy between suffering and agency that the concept of resilience inscribes? In this discussion piece, I engage with Brad Evans’ and Julian Reid’s reflections on resilience. Although I share with Evans and Reid a normative critique of resilience, I am critical of their discussion of vulnerability. Rather than arguing that vulnerability precludes political transformation, as Evans and Reid do, or that vulnerability enables political coalition, as in Judith Butler’s account of (...) precarity, one should ask: how is vulnerability framed? I argue for framing vulnerability through a critical theory of the victim which explores the interconnections between injurability and agency rather than treating them as oppositional terms. (shrink)

Does the critical discourse about resilience reiterate the problematic dichotomy between suffering and agency that the concept of resilience inscribes? In this discussion piece, I engage with Brad Evans’ and Julian Reid’s reflections on resilience. Although I share with Evans and Reid a normative critique of resilience, I am critical of their discussion of vulnerability. Rather than arguing that vulnerability precludes political transformation, as Evans and Reid do, or that vulnerability enables political coalition, as in Judith Butler’s account of (...) precarity, one should ask: how is vulnerability framed? I argue for framing vulnerability through a critical theory of the victim which explores the interconnections between injurability and agency rather than treating them as oppositional terms. (shrink)

In this paper we make a proposal for reforming biomedical research that is aimed to align re-search more closely with the so-called fair-share principle according to which the proportions of global resources as-signed to different diseases should agree with the ratios of human suffering associated with those diseases.

Is the brain the biological substrate of consciousness? Most naturalistic philosophers of mind have supposed that the answer must obviously be «yes » to this question. However, a growing number of philosophers working in 4e (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) cognitive science have begun to challenge this assumption, arguing instead that consciousness supervenes on the whole embodied animal in dynamic interaction with the environment. We call views that share this claim dynamic sensorimotor theories of consciousness (DSM). Clark (2009) a founder and (...) leading proponent of the hypothesis of the extended mind, demurs, arguing that as matter of fact the biology of consciousness doesn’t allow for a brain, body and world boundary crossing architecture. We begin by looking at one of the arguments for DSM, the variable neural correlates argument. We then outline two criticisms that Clark has made of this argument and endorse his criticisms. However we finish up by using the case of sensory substitution to argue that something of this argument for DSM nevertheless survives. We suggest that Clark ought to concede sensory substitution as a case in which the conscious mind extends. (shrink)

The recent judgement in the case of Re:M in which the Court held that it would be unlawful to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration from a woman in a minimally conscious state raises a number of ethical issues of wide application. Central to these is the extent to which precedent autonomous decisions should be respected in the absence of a legally binding advance decision. Well-being interests can survive the loss of many of the psychological faculties that support personhood. A decision (...) to respect precedent autonomy can contradict the well-being interests of the individual after capacity is lost. These decisions raise difficult questions about personal identity and about the threshold of evidence that is required of an earlier decision in order for it to be respected. (shrink)

According to the free energy principle all living systems aim to minimise free energy in their sensory exchanges with the environment. Processes of free energy minimisation are thus ubiquitous in the biological world. Indeed it has been argued that even plants engage in free energy minimisation. Not all living things however feel alive. How then did the feeling of being alive get started? In line with the arguments of the phenomenologists, I will claim that every feeling must be felt by (...) someone. It must have mineness built into it if it is to feel a particular way. The question I take up in this paper asks how mineness might have arisen out of processes of free energy minimisation, given that many systems that keep themselves alive lack mineness. The hypothesis I develop in this paper is that the life of an organism can be seen as an inferential process. Every living system embodies a probability distribution conditioned on a model of the sensory, physiological, and morphological states that are highly probably given the life it leads and the niche it inhabits. I argue for an ecological and enactive interpretation of free energy. I show how once the life of an organism reaches a certain level of complexity mineness emerges as an intrinsic part of the process of life itself. (shrink)

Is medicine still good for us? sets out the facts about our medical establishments in a clear, engaging style, interrogating the ethics of modern practices and the impact they have on all our lives.

Greely’s target article outlines six categories of ethical issues associated with human brain surrogate research. Some of these issues are familiar from other research contexts; others, less...

Margaret J. Osler - Jan W. Wojcik 1944-2006 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.4 iv Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Jan W. Wojcik 1944–2006 Margaret J. Osler Jan Wojcik, who served as Book Review Editor for The Journal of the History of Philosohy, died in Paris, France,..

Two approaches to evidential reasoning compete in the biomedical and social sciences: the experimental and the pragmatist. Whereas experimentalism has received considerable philosophical analysis and support since the times of Bacon and Mill, pragmatism about evidence has been neither articulated nor defended. The overall aim is to fill this gap and develop a theory that articulates the latter. The main ideas of the theory will be illustrated and supported by a case study on the smoking/lung cancer controversy in the 1950s.

Philosophical conceptions of educational justice are centered at the intersection of political philosophy and philosophy of education. They justify moral‐political rights to education and sometimes also determine who is responsible for their realization through which kinds of pedagogical practices or systemic educational reform. This article concentrates on contemporary conceptions of educational justice in primary and secondary education and highlights central practical implications that the various conceptions of educational justice have under non‐ideal circumstances. Section 2 explains the conceptions of fair and (...) luck‐egalitarian equal educational opportunity, Section 3 the conception of educational priority for the least‐advantaged students, and Section 4 the conception of democratically adequate education. Finally, Section 5 presents a philosophical conception of global justice in school education. Section 6 concludes. (shrink)

A recent movement in the social sciences and philosophy of the social sciences focuses on mechanisms as a central analytical unit. Starting from a pluralist perspective on the aims of the social sciences, I argue that there are a number of important aims to which knowledge about mechanisms—whatever their virtues relative to other aims—contributes very little at best and that investigating mechanisms is therefore a methodological strategy with fairly limited applicability. Key Words: social science • mechanisms • explanation • critical (...) realism • methodology. (shrink)

Este artículo se propone estudiar la noción de expresión en los dos libros que Deleuze publica en 1968: _Spinoza y el problema de la expresión _y _Diferencia y repetición. _Se trazarán las correspondencias entre las formas de expresión en el primero y los planos ontológicos del segundo, para luego considerar en qué consiste el _renversement _ del spinozismo que Deleuze propone. Se mostrará que este no consiste en invertir el rol del fundamento entre lo Uno y lo múltiple, sino en (...) liberar las formas de expresión del cuádruple cepo de la razón suficiente, y darle a cada una su lógica y potencia propias. (shrink)

Resumen: Deleuze y Guattari caracterizan el capitalismo como una serie de relaciones diferenciales entre flujos: trabajo / capital; medios de pago / moneda de financiamiento; códigos científicos y tecnológicos / mercado. Al mismo tiempo consideran las formas de lucha a partir del operaismo italiano. Este artículo muestra cómo se articulan ambas dimensiones de lo político a partir de establecer que son respectivamente la aplicación de los dos conceptos ontológicos fundamentales de Diferencia y repetición : la Idea diferencial y la intensidad (...) como factor de individuación. Para ello, se concentra en la relación monetaria, a partir de la teoría de los economistas que Deleuze y Guattari usan como fuente y la lucha a nivel monetario planteada por Berti.: Deleuze and Guattari characterize Capitalism as a series of differential relations between flows: labor / capital; means of payment / financing currency; scientific and technological codes / market. At the same time, they think the ways of struggle through the Italian operaismo. This paper shows the articulation of the two dimensions of politics by holding that they are an application of the two fundamental ontological concepts of Difference and Repetition : differential Idea and intensity as factors of individuation. To do that, we will focus on the monetary relation, using the theory of the economists who are source for Deleuze and Guattari and the struggle at a monetary level proposed by Berti. (shrink)

Since 1945, and particularly since the facts of the 'Heidegger case' became widely known in 1987, an enormous number of words have been devoted to establishing not only Heidegger's involvement with Nazism, but also that his philosophy is irredeemably discredited thereby. This book, while in no way denying the depth or seriousness of Heidegger's political involvement, challenges this tide of opinion, arguing that his philosophy is not compromised in any of its phases, and that acceptance of it is fully consistent (...) with a deep commitment to liberal democracy. This striking thesis is grounded in an astute examination of Heidegger's thought that will provide the reader with a clear and valuable exposition of the philosophy of one of the twentieth century's greatest thinkers. (shrink)

The prelims comprise: Introduction Controversial Choices Kinds of Normative Reasons for Action Limits on Respect for Autonomy Children and Controversial Choice Controversial Choices and the Duty to Strive Toward Perfection and Full Autonomy Acknowledgments Notes References.

This paper aims (a) to provide characterizations of realism and instrumentalism that are philosophically interesting and applicable to economics; and (b) to defend instrumentalism against realism as a methodological stance in economics. Starting point is the observation that ‘all models are false’, which, or so I argue, is difficult to square with the realist's aim of truth, even if the latter is understood as ‘partial’ or ‘approximate’. The three cheers in favour of instrumentalism are: (1) Once we have usefulness, truth (...) is redundant. (2) There is something disturbing about causal structure. (3) It's better to do what one can than to chase rainbows. (shrink)

This article explores the contribution of Jürgen Habermas’ discourse theory of morality, politics, and law to theorizing educational justice. First, it analyzes Christopher Martin’s discourse-ethical argument that the development of citizens’ discursive agency is required on epistemic grounds. The article criticizes this argument and claims that the moral importance of developing discursive agency should be justified instead on the basis of moral grounds. Second, the article examines Harvey Siegel’s critique of Habermas’ moral epistemology and suggests that Siegel neglects that the (...) epistemic justification of moral claims proceeds differently from the epistemic justification of assertoric claims. Finally, the article presents a discourse-theoretic conception of educational justice that defends the importance of discursively justifying norms of educational justice through properly arranged structures of justification. (shrink)

The second edition of this popular compendium provides the necessary intellectual equipment to engage with and participate in effective philosophical argument, reading, and reflection Features significantly revised, updated and expanded entries, and an entirely new section drawn from methods in the history of philosophy This edition has a broad, pluralistic approach--appealing to readers in both continental philosophy and the history of philosophy, as well as analytic philosophy Explains difficult concepts in an easily accessible manner, and addresses the use and application (...) of these concepts Proven useful to philosophy students at both beginning and advanced levels. (shrink)

While early theory and research on cosmopolitanism have been criticized for their European focus, a number of works have incorporated non-Eurocentric perspectives. This article contributes to this literature by examining the colonial production of cosmopolitan orientations as evidenced in the writings of Frantz Fanon. Colonialism has been treated as a deviation in the historical sociology of cosmopolitanism, but Fanon helps disclose how colonialism has also contributed to a particular form of cosmopolitanism that has been overlooked in existing theory and research: (...) postcolonial cosmopolitanism. This form of cosmopolitanism, forged from the spaces of colonialism’s contradictions, emphasizes global citizenship and humanism but strives to remember rather than repress the history of modern empire. It seeks to negate colonialism’s contradictions and thus realize the ideals which Europe had initially pronounced but which it failed to institute. (shrink)

This article tries to shed light on the multiple, but underrated pleasures of the heist film – a genre that has attracted numerous major directors from Jean-Pierre Melville and Stanley Kubrick to Michael Mann and Steven Soderbergh, but has received limited scholarly attention. I approach the genre from a, broadly, philosophical perspective and draw on thinkers such as Peter Sloterdijk, Georg Simmel, Paul Souriau and Bruno Latour to argue that their emphasis on (1) skillful action and kinaesthetic empathy, (2) smooth (...) transgression of boundaries and (3) well-functioning social collaboration and we-connection, the genre's best exemplars satisfy, in fictional and quasi-utopian form, a number of real-life desires. (shrink)

There is a consensus that our culture is already "post-metaphysical." Does this mean that the culture has abandoned the philosophy? This question is not separable in fact from the historical-philosophical relationships between science and philosophy. These relationships determine the contemporary metaphilosophical positions, which are analyzed in the first half. The second and third parts address the metaphilosophical question in the light of Heidegger's position on the "end of philosophy." This analysis concludes that the issue " postmetaphysics or postphilosophy?" refers to (...) another question, envisioned but not settled by Heidegger: are the symbolic forms, known until today (religion, art, philosophy, science), a closed set of transcultural universals or an open set, able to admit new elements in the future? (shrink)

Suppose we morally ought to maximize social welfare. Suppose profit maxi­mization is a means to maximize social welfare. Does this imply that we morally ought to maximize profits? Many proponents of the view that we have a moral obligation to maximize profits (tacitly) assume the validity of this argument. In this paper, we critically assess this assumption. We show that the validity of this argument is far from trivial and requires a careful argumentative defence.

A través de la puesta en serie de _Diferencia y repetición_ (1968) y _La imagen-movimiento_ (1983), trazaremos cuatro senderos en la ontología divergente de Gilles Deleuze, mostrando cómo cada una de las escuelas de montaje del cine clásico implica una _inversión_ determinada respecto a cuatro facetas de la tradición filosófica, representadas por Hume, Spinoza, Hegel y Descartes. La taxonomía de los estudios sobre cine abrirá caminos _claros_ en la oscura ontología de Deleuze, mientras que el libro del ‘68 revelará la (...) carga filosófica implícita en los desarrollos cinematográficos, al mismo tiempo que mostrará las divergencias e incomposibilidades que gruñen debajo de la aparente pulcritud de la clasificación de las imágenes cinematográficas. (shrink)

My father really looked forward to reading my book and then was terribly disappointed when he found it was unreadable. One of the reader’s reports for the press when it was published said ‘This book is written ordinary English – there are no symbols, little of what could be called technical terminology – but this appearance is entirely misleading’.

Our ordinary conception of time has it that there are temporal particulars: not only do people do things, but there are particular doings by people; not only are we born, but the birth of each one of us was a particular event, and each of us will have our own particular death. Temporal particulars in this sense are individuated, fundamentally, by their temporal locations or relations, rather than by their intrinsic or qualitative characteristics. In this respect they are unrepeatable, not (...) just de facto, but as a matter of their very nature. However, there is a tradition in philosophy that seriously downplays this aspect of our thinking about time. According to this tradition, the fundamental unit of temporal representation is _tensed truth_; the notion of an unrepeatable particular, individuated by its temporal location, is at best an abstraction from a complex of tensed truths. The aims of this paper are, first, to argue that the representation of temporal particulars is deeply implicated in our ordinary conception of the past as fixed and unalterable; and, secondly, to argue that the theorist of tensed truth is able to provide only a pale imitation of this aspect of our thinking. I will then reflect on the consequences of this for debates about the metaphysics of tense. (shrink)

It is suggested, following a proposal made recently by Smolin, that the most fundamental law of the universe takes this form: Among the set of all possible universes compatible with an irreducibly minimal set of structural constraints, the actually realized universe is the one which maximizes a mathematically well-defined number (the variety) that measures the structural variety of the universe (in the totality of its history). This gives expression to Leibniz's idea that the actual universe gives “the greatest variety possible, (...) but with the greatest possible order.” Two models are proposed in which the idea can be realized and its consequences tested; both are discrete in nature and satisfy highly nonlocal laws. In such a scheme a unique (finite) universe is called into being by the fundamental requirement of maximal variety (for given definition of the variety), which it is conjectured could have such a powerful ordering effect that space, time, the currently known laws of physics, and the observed structure of the universe could all appear as emergent consequences of the single underlying law. (shrink)

In ‘Moral Luck,’ Bernard Williams famously argued that “there is a particularly important species of regret, which I shall call ‘agent-regret,’ which a person can feel only towards his past actions.” Much subsequent commentary has focused on Williams’s claim that agent-regret is not necessarily restricted to voluntary actions, and questioned whether such an attitude could be rationally justified. This focus, however, obscures a more fundamental set of questions raised by Williams’s discussion: what is the role in our moral psychology of (...) evaluative attitudes that relate essentially to past exercises of our agency—occurrences which, by their very nature, cannot be repeated? On a standard conception, regret is directed principally towards actions that resulted from suboptimal deliberation. On this view, the main point of regret is to guide us away from similar poor decisions in the future. But Williams’s key insight in ‘Moral Luck,’ I argue, is that there is a mode of evaluation of one’s past actions and decisions that does not track considerations one could and should have been responsive to at the time, and is for this reason essentially retrospective. From this perspective, the full significance of regret cannot be captured in terms of a disposition to deliberate better in the future. Rather, the particular kind of painful of consciousness of the past embodied in regret amounts to a reflective, and essentially backward-looking, insight into the contingency and finitude of our own agency—that I am a particular person leading a particular life, and that the possibility of leading a different life is now gone forever. I end by making some speculative comments about the intractable question whether it is ultimately good or desirable to be disposed to regret one’s past mistakes. (shrink)

The chapter presents Bergson’s conception of philosophy as a way of life, as a thinking that seeks to make contact with the creativity of life as a whole. This endeavor to alter our vision of the world, and ultimately, our action and sense of being in the world, seeks to operate a “conversion of attention.” For Bergson, such a conversion is tied in with what he calls the “true empiricism” that allows us to experience and think change as that which (...) makes up living reality as a whole. Bergson conceptualizes this move beyond the human in terms of sympathy, a term employed both descriptively, to develop the notion of a sympathetic whole of life in which philosophy as a way of life resituates the self, and prescriptively, as urging us to overcome our estrangement from “the ocean of life” to which we owe our existence. This effort of sympathy takes the form of a spiritual exercise. Not limited to mere contemplation of the world, it transforms the manner in which we perceive the reality of duration and thus opens the path for a different way of living. (shrink)