Gegen die verbreitete Vorstellung, dass Negativität im Interesse von mehr Selbstverwirklichung, Produktivität und Positivität überwunden oder be-grenzt werden muss, eröffnet dieser Band eine andere Perspektive. Er geht den verschiedenen Formen des Negativen in Kunst, Recht und Politik nach, um zu zeigen, dass es nicht allein eine Negativität gibt, die dem Gelingen im Weg steht oder zu dessen sicher beherrschtem Mittel wird. Die Beiträge des Bandes erweisen Negativität vielmehr als eine Kraft der Befreiung, die ein Gelingen anderer Art ermöglicht.

The concept of democratic freedom refers to more than the kind of freedom embodied by political institutions and procedures. Democratic freedom can only be properly understood if it is grasped as the expression of a culture of freedom that encompasses an entire form of life. Juliane Rebentisch’s systematic and historical approach demonstrates that we can learn a great deal about the democratic culture of freedom from its philosophical critics. From Plato to Carl Schmitt, the critique of democratic culture has always (...) been articulated as a critique of its ãaestheticization“. Rebentisch defends various phenomena of aestheticization Ð from the irony typical of democratic citizens to the theatricality of the political Ð as constitutive elements of democratic culture and the notion of freedom at the heart of its ethical and political self-conception. This work will be of particular interest to students of Political Theory, Philosophy and Aesthetics. (shrink)

This essay reconsiders the role of irony in the Hegelian project of developing a theory of modern ethical life. It recognizes in Socratic irony the traces of an alternative concept of morality that leads both to an acknowledgement of Hegel’s convincing critique of the Kantian moral principle and to a rejection of Hegel’s misconception of Socratic and Romantic irony. Arguing against Hegel that irony cannot be reduced to a form of alienation from the normative dimension of ethical life as a (...) whole, but should instead be understood as a necessary component of a dynamic mediation between subjective freedom and ethical universality, the author further claims that irony, thus conceived, takes on the productive function that it should actually have had within the Hegelian system. That is, ironyis a phenomenon that, from the standpoint of morality, refers us to a form of ethical life in which subjective freedom and difference are respected. (shrink)

Walter Benjamin a suggéré de voir dans le fascisme une « esthétisation de la politique ». Avant lui, ce même diagnostic était appliqué non pas aux régimes autoritaires, mais, au contraire, aux régimes démocratiques. De Platon à Carl Schmitt, la philosophie a dénoncé la démocratie comme une multitude inconsistante et « bigarrée », qui préfère le jeu à l’ordre. Rebentisch estime que derrière ce jugement dépréciatif, les ennemis de la démocratie ont en fait parfaitement saisi quelques-uns de ses traits distinctifs (...) qu’il s’agit aujourd’hui de défendre dans une culture démocratique. La démocratie ne peut se passer de la mise en scène, car c’est sur scène qu’elle peut figurer le visage qu’elle veut se donner collectivement, consciente de l’écart qui subsiste toujours entre les identités actuelles et les identités possibles. (shrink)

The essay discusses the logic of distinction under the sign of the contemporary culture of difference and proposes a discussion of the relationship between taste and contemporary art. The recent trend toward greater individualization might have rendered social codes more permeable. But this state of affairs is neither the opposite of the standardization nor does it imply that the social logic of distinction has been suspended. It has merely undergone further differentiation, but without abolishing the signifiers of status. On the (...) one hand art as a commodity partakes in the respective developments, on the other, certain strands in contemporary art can also be read as opposing the subject of aesthetic experience to the subject of consumerist taste. (shrink)

Whereas Plato's Protagoras rejects the notion that someone who knows what is good for him can nonetheless do something else of his own free volition, his Republic names the particular conditions under which such an act, an act of weakness of the will, can take place: the conditions of democracy. Because democracy, Plato writes, places an excessive freedom at its centre, it fosters desires, weakening the force of reason, destabilizing the will, and thus engendering an unprincipled human being. This paper (...) defends the democratic conception of freedom against this portrayal by advocating a concept of freedom of the will that does not unilaterally identify it with willpower. (shrink)

When I recently read a little aesthetic manifesto by Alain Badiou, who is getting a lot of recognition in the intellectual scene in Berlin at the moment, I found myself disagreeing with nearly every single point that Badiou makes there – but it inspired me to present what I want to say today as a response to this piece, and in the form of a counter-manifesto, if you will. Not only because it is generally more fun to articulate the theses (...) one might have on « Aesthetics and Contemporary Art » in a way that sounds a little apodictic and macho, but also because it is challenging to try and do this with theses that counter precisely the smart claims to universalism, truth, abstraction that have become so fashionable again today, especially, and not surprisingly, it seems to me, among young male intellectuals. (shrink)