In this chapter the author discusses some of Wittgenstein's statements, which directly concern the problem of linguistic complexity. The chapter provides a discussion on invented language games of the kind envisaged by Wittgenstein. The chapter explains two negative insights concerning the complexity of content in language. Summarized as claims they are: (1) there is no special realm of sense between “reality” and language, which would be the domain of grammar (or logical grammar); and (2) employing a complex sentence is a (...) complex action in a different sense of complexity than is the action of “singing from the score.” The author discusses the first thesis in talking about Wittgenstein's critical use of the picture of “meaning‐bodies” in conjunction with the discussion of the function of an expression in a sentence. (shrink)

This chapter analyzes how Wittgenstein explicitly addresses the possibility of distinguishing between word types, and not only in the form of presentation of examples. Wittgenstein might be using the terms “kind of word” and “part of speech” in a quite unusual way. The author focuses on just one language, thus no longer being concerned with the possibility of developing diverse new languages without limit. It is not surprising that in the natural languages very many more word types than did “the (...) logicians,” above all Frege, Russell, and the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, particularly if one does not limit one's interest in language to the expression of a “judgeable content.”. Wittgenstein hints that the classification of words or sentences by their ways of usage on one hand and by their belonging to different types on the other, is a result of two different standpoints on the classification of elements of language. (shrink)

On the basis of many years of personal experience the paper describes Buddhist meditation as a mystical practice. After a short discussion of the role of some central concepts in Buddhism, William James’ concept of religious experience is used to explain the goal of meditators as the achievement of a special kind of an experience of this kind. Systematically, its main point is to explain the difference between a craving for pleasant ‘mental events’ in the sense of short-term moods, and (...) the long-term project of achieving a deep change in one’s attitude to life as a whole, a change that allows the acceptance of suffering and death. The last part argues that there is no reason to call the discussed practice irrational in a negative sense. Changes of attitude of the discussed kind cannot be brought about by argument alone. Therefore, a considered use of age-old practices like meditation should be seen as an addition, not as an undermining of reason. (shrink)

The paper develops a perspective on religion that is inspired by William James’ concept of religious experience and by the philosophy of language of the later Ludwig Wittgenstein. It proceeds by naming basic steps leading to the proposed conception and by showing that none of them must be a hindrance for a substantial understanding of religion. Among the steps discussed are the acceptance of non-theistic religions, an existential version of functionalism, and the acceptance of the possibility of non-literal truths about (...) the human condition. Furthermore, it proposes a way to interpret the expression ‘the sacred’ in the given framework. Finally it points out two contradictory necessities that make interreligious dialogue difficult: In the beginning one has to use an abstract vocabulary in order not to exclude any positions, but on the other hand one has to avoid robbing the participants of the means for articulating their specific religious views. (shrink)

To Vallortigara & Rogers's (V&R's) evidence of everyday directional asymmetries in the natural environment of a variety of species, we offer one more example for human beings. It is the bias for holding an infant on the left side, and it illustrates several themes in the target article.

Wittgenstein′s early philosophy of language is shown to be inspired by the idea of a notation in Nelson Goodman′s sense. Seeing this allows us to reject the thesis that for the sole reason that they do not represent 'states of affairs′, ethical statements must be nonsense. Positively, by exploring his Lecture on Ethics as well as the linguistic means provided in his later Philosophy, it is shown that what he had called 'the Ethical′ can be an object of communication. The (...) ethical position reached is a kind of cognitivism without metaphysics. (shrink)

This paper extends previous attempts at understanding the nature of organizational integrity and its increasingly important role for companies which, after all, bear a moral and societal responsibility. Interpretations of organizational integrity in business ethics literature incorporate aspects ranging from the behavior of managers and employees to corporate structures and incentive systems. We argue that virtue ethics builds an indispensable framework for understanding the origin of the concept of integrity and transfer these findings to an organizational level. Hence, we first (...) define organizational integrity, and second operationalize it in a closed three-step process, consisting of morally sound corporate commitments, their transparent institutionalization within the company, and their implementation into actions. We consider the main goal of organizational integrity to be of a preventative investment nature. Organizational integrity is a company investment that translates into avoiding fines for potential violations of the law or ethical missteps, as well as an investment in the company’s reputation. In turn, organizational integrity can protect a company from disruptions that can threaten its existence. Defining and operationalizing the concept of organizational integrity provides the foundation for future scientific research and the basis for developing practical guidance for organizations and managers. (shrink)

Liebe Grete Herrmann, besten Dank für Ihren Brief vom 19.5! Auch ich freue mich, Sie auf dem Pariser Kongreß zu sehen; wahrscheinlich werde ich auch an der vorangehenden Positivistentagung teilnehmen, also schon am 29.7. in Paris sein. Es interessiert mich, diese antimetaphysischen Metaphysiker einmal aus der Nähe zu beobachten. Ich werde sehen, es so einzurichten, daß ich eventuell auch nach dem Hauptkongreß noch einige Tage in Paris sein kann, um die von Ihnen angeregten Diskussionen mitzuführen. Jedenfalls hoffe ich auf einige (...) gründliche Gespräche mit Ihnen. (shrink)

Die wirtschaftliche und soziale Bedeutung der Juden im Mittelalter.--John Spencer's Erklärung der biblischen Gesetze in ihrer Beziehung zu Maimonides.--Max Webers Soziologie des antiken Judentums.--Zu Gabirols allegorischer Deutung der Erzählung vom Paradies.--Das Problem der Willensfreiheit bei Ḥasdai Crescas und den islamschen Aristotelikern.--Religion und Wissenschaft im mittelalterlichen und im modernen Denken.--Zur Kritik der Offenbarungsreligion in der islamischen und jüdischen Philosophie.--[Le-ḥeḳer ha-meḳorot shel Sefer ha-ʻiḳarim].--Die Akademie für die Wissenschaft des Judentums.--Die religiösen Motive in der Philosophie des Maimonides.--Das Problem der Kontingenz in der Philosophie (...) des Maimonides.--Die Normierung des Glaubensinhalts im Judentum.--Hermann Cohens Ethik. (shrink)

Organizational integrity is a key concept with and through which a company can assume its responsibility for ethical and societal issues. It is a basic premise for sustainable corporate success, as ethical risks ultimately become economic risks for a company. Recent research shows the potential of integrity‐based governance models to reduce corporate risks and to improve business performance. However, companies are not yet able to assess nor evaluate their level of organizational integrity in a sound and systematic way. We aim (...) to develop a theoretical model as a basis for the measurement of organizational integrity by conceptualizing the construct and sizing the theoretical model's scope. We suggest that the theoretical model follows a holistic approach and involves three types of dimensions: prerequisite dimensions, independent dimensions, and dependent dimensions. The organizational integrity triad—consisting of active commitments to self‐imposed norms and principles, their transparent institutionalization into corporate processes and structures, and their implementation into action—plays a key role in this context. (shrink)

There is no large number of very small bads that is worse than a small number of very large bads – or so, some maintain, it seems plausible to say. In this article, I criticize and reject two recently proposed vindications of the above intuition put forth by Dale Dorsey and Alex Voorhoeve. Dorsey advocates for a threshold marked by the interference with a person's global life projects: any bad that interferes with the satisfaction of a life project is worse (...) than any number of bads that don't interfere with such a life project. Such thresholds, I argue, are broadly implausible. Voorhoeve gives a contractualist account for the irrelevance of minor bads. His account, I argue, does not, among other things, provide the right kind of reason in defence of the above intuition. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that joint action permits a certain degree of luck. The cases I have in mind exhibit the following structure: each participant believes that the intended ends of each robustly support the joint action. This belief turns out to be false. Due to lucky circumstances, the discordance in intention never becomes common knowledge. However, common knowledge of the relevant intentions would have undermined the joint action altogether. The analysis of such cases shows the extent to which (...) common knowledge of the participants’ intentions can be harmful to joint action. This extends a recent line of research that has questioned the necessity of common knowledge in joint action. (shrink)

Speakers frequently perform representational gestures to depict concepts in an iconic fashion. For example, a speaker may hold her index finger and thumb apart to indicate the size of a matchstick. However, the process by which a physical handshape is mentally transformed into abstract spatial information is not well understood. We present a series of experiments that investigate how people decode the physical form of an articulator to derive imaginary geometrical constructs, which we call “gesture form.” We provide quantitative evidence (...) for several key properties that play a role in this process. First, “profiling,” the ability to focus on a structural subunit within the complex form of the physical hand. Second, “perspective,” for which we show that one and the same handshape seen from different perspectives can lead to different spatial interpretations. Third, “selectivity,” the fact that gestures focus on specific spatial features at the expense of others. Our results provide a first step toward mapping out the process of how representational gestures make the communication of spatial information possible. (shrink)