This presentation discusses why just war theory is in need of just military preparedness (jus ante bellum) as a new category of just war thinking and it articulates six principles of just military preparedness. The paper concludes that the United States fails to satisfy any of these principles and addresses how this bears on the application of jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum norms to possible future American military interventions.

In this paper I question the morality of U.S. military supremacy or hegemony in terms of what constitute the legitimate use of military force and the proper preparation for using such force. I first discuss in a somewhat synoptic fashion how American hegemonic military force has been justified in dishonest ways and wrongly executed. Next, I show that Just War Theory needs to be revised in order to come to a convincing assessment of U.S. military hegemony (...) and its use of military force. This leads me to propose “just military preparedness,” consisting of five principles of just military preparedness, as a new category of JWT. The failure of the United States to satisfy the principles puts into question its very capability of justly resorting to military force, of lawfully executing force, and of establishing a just peace after war. The principles also point to a more humane alternative of how the United States could meet security threats and sustain a peaceful international order. (shrink)

This paper rejects most aspects of John W. Lango and Eric Patterson’s proposal that the United States should plan for a possible intervention in Sudan on secessionist and humanitarian grounds and announce this planning as a deterrent to the central government of Sudan attacking the people of South Sudan if they would opt in a January 2011 referendum for independence. I argue that secession is not a just cause for armed intervention and that, rightfully, neither the American people nor many (...) of its men and women in uniform would be prepared to engage in an intervention that might easily escalate. I also caution that American intervention against an Islamic regime might have high global security costs. For the sake of avoiding these negative consequences and harm to the people of Sudan, available nonviolent policy alternatives should be pursued. Still, I grant that the global community should intervene in Sudan if mass slaughter of civilians were to occur as a result of renewed hostilities between North and South Sudan. My objections to Lango and Patterson’s intervention proposal appeal to jus ad bellum principles as well as just military preparedness (jus ante bellum) principles. (shrink)

Given certain well-known empirical facts–including the Bush II administration’s motivations and its actions initiating the war – the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 (and its continuing war of occupation) is not just (i.e., is not morally justified), on any standard interpretation of Just War Theory criteria for jus ad bellum. Since there was no imminent threat of attack by Iraq against the U.S., the U.S. invasion of Iraq was a Preventative or Merely Precautionary War (which is notrecognized by either (...) Just War Theory or international law as a legitimate basis for initiating a war) rather than a Preemptive War (which may sometimes be justified, if there is a real threat of imminent attack) or a Reactive War (responding to an unjustified attack from an aggressor, which is always justified). Moreover, the neo-conservative program for perpetual U.S. world domination by the weakening of other nations and the invasions of weaker nations for purposes of U.S. economic and geopolitical advantage (behind the facade of “spreading democracy and freedom”) is not morally justified. However, the moral status of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan is much less clear. Many argue that is was morally justified according to both Just War Theory and international law, given certain well-established empirical facts; particularly, al-Qaeda’s involvement with the events of 9-11 and the Taliban government’s protection of al-Qaeda and its terrorist infrastructure within Afghanistan. On this analysis, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan was justified as both a Reactive War (responding to an unjustified attack against primarily civilian targets) and a Preemptive War (to try to make sure that al-Qaeda did not have the opportunity to use its infrastructure in Afghanistan to arrange other attacks on civilian targets in the U.S. or other nations). But the cogency of this analysis depends on whether there were any realistic alternatives fordisrupting al-Qaeda and bringing its leaders to justice; and some argue that such alternatives did exist. Moreover, even if U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan was morally justified it is arguable that the amount and type of force used – e.g. intensive, wide-spread bombing campaigns that killed many civilians – were not justified. (shrink)

This presentation explores the significance of just military preparedness, or jus ante bellum as a new category of just war theory, for just war thinking, especially with regard to irregular warfare. It articulates six just military preparedness principles. It further discusses how America’s military preparation fails the JMP principles and how this negatively impacts its capability to justly initiate, execute, and conclude war. This critical analysis takes as its point of departure Defense Secretary Robert Gates’s view (...) that the Pentagon needs to be “reprogrammed” toward a “balanced strategy” of preparing for both conventional and irregular warfare. (shrink)

This essay introduces this special issue on virtue ethics in relation to military AI. It describes the current situation of military AI ethics as following that of AI ethics in general, caught between consequentialism and deontology. Virtue ethics serves as an alternative that can address some of the weaknesses of these dominant forms of ethics. The essay describes how the articles in the issue exemplify the value of virtue-related approaches for these questions, before ending with thoughts for further (...) research. (shrink)

This paper seeks to defend the thesis that this American project of military hegemony has a variety of global security costs of such combined magnitude that there is a strong prima facie case against the resort to armed force by the United States, so that its wars might be wrong even when there is a just cause. My thesis is based on the jus ad bellum principle of proportionality.

Critical analysis of development of concept of jus ante bellum.

Just war theory has traditionally focused onjus ad bellum(the justiceofwar) andjus in bello(justiceinwar). What has been neglected is the question ofjus ante bellum, or justicebeforewar. In particular: Under what circumstances is it justifiable for a polity topreparefor war by militarizing? When (if ever) and why (if at all) is it morally permissible or even obligatory to create and maintain the potential to wage war? What are the alternatives to the military? And if we do have militaries, how should (...) they be arranged, trained, and equipped? These considerations are not about whether warmakingis justified, but about whether warbuildingis justified.InEthics, Security, and the War-Machine, Ned Dobos argues that we have not sufficiently calculated the true (noneconomic) costs of the military, and that if we did, having a standing defense force would not seem like as good an idea. Dobos pushes us to reflect on something we have taken for granted: that one of the biggest institutions in our society, which is supposed to keep us safe and allow us to lead our own lives, may in fact pose great dangers and risks to us physically, morally, and culturally. The essays in this symposium take Dobos's work as a starting point and show the importance, complexity, and richness of this new strand of ethical inquiry. (shrink)

Business ethicists should examine not only business practices but whether a particular type of business is even prima facie ethical. To illustrate how this might be done I here examine the contemporary U.S. defense industry. In the past the U.S. military has engaged in missions that arguably satisfied the just war self-defense rationale, thereby implying that its suppliers of equipment and services were ethical as well. Some recent U.S. military missions, however, arguably fail the self-defense rationale. At issue, (...) then, is whether a business supporting these latter missions may not be circumstantially unethical. No it is not, say defense industry advocates, for two principal reasons. For one, this business benefits society at large in numerous ways. And, for another, the organizer of these military missions is a superpower which by its very nature is not subject to the ethical constraints of the self-defense rationale. I dispute both reasons, argue against the second, and conclude that the U.S. military-industrial complex (MIC) is circumstantially unethical. (shrink)

Traditional just war theory maintains that the two types of rules that govern justice in times of war, jus ad bellum (justice of war) and jus in bello (justice in war), are logically independent of one another. Call this the independence thesis. According to this thesis, a war that satisfies the ad bellum rules does not guarantee that the in bello rules will be satisfied; and a war that violates the ad bellum rules does not guarantee that the in bello (...) rules will be violated. A controversial implication of this is that it’s possible for soldiers to undergo acts that are instrumental in bringing about victory in an unjust war and yet do nothing morally wrong. Some authors – call them purists – claim that this cannot be correct. Participating in an unjust war is by itself morally wrong. Yitzhak Benbaji has given what is to my mind the strongest defense of the independence thesis. In this paper I critically examine Benbaji’s argument and conclude that it is not persuasive. My argument against Benbaji incorporates the concept of honor in the military. I seek to show, in part, that if the recent literature is correct concerning both the nature of honor and the importance of instilling it in soldiers, then Benbaji hasn’t given the purist a compelling reason to give up her view. (shrink)

Military-on-military sexual violence—the type of sexual violence that most directly disrupts operations, harms personnel, and undermines recruiting—occurs with astonishing frequency. The U.S. military has responded with a campaign to prevent and punish military-on-military sex crimes. This campaign, however, has made little progress, partly because of U.S. military law, a special realm of criminal justice dominated by legal precedents involving sexual violence and racialized images. By promulgating images and narratives of sexual exploitation, violent sexuality, and (...) female subordination, the military justice system has helped to sustain a legal culture that reifies the connection between sexual violence and authentic soldiering. (shrink)

The “asymmetry myth” is that war crimes are committed by one's enemies but never, or hardly ever, by one's own combatants. The myth involves not only a common failure to acknowledge our own actual war crimes but also inadequate reactions when we are forced to recognize them. It contributes to the high likelihood that wars, just or unjust in their causes, will have a high moral cost. This cost, moreover, is a matter needing consideration in the jus ante bellum (...) circumstances of preparedness for war as well as of conduct within it. As part of the symposium on Ned Dobos's book, Ethics, Security, and the War-Machine, I will argue that the strength of the asymmetry myth is sustained by certain forms of romantic nationalism linked to the glamorization of military endeavor. (shrink)

Abstract None of the numerous modern proposals for jus post bellum models has gained wide acceptance. The proposals tend to resemble laundry lists, often enumerated without an obvious and coherent ethical rationale. Recognizing the importance of jus post bellum, this article seeks to move the jus post bellum discourse forward. First, the article constructs a foundation of seven principles for jus post bellum models by modifying and integrating the separate proposals advanced by Bellamy and Evans. Then building on that revised (...) set of foundational principles, this article incorporates selected criteria and research from prior proposals to erect a five-part jus post bellum framework: (1) respect for persons; (2) establish justice; (3) exercise ecological responsibility; (4) engage multinational commitment and support; and (5) maintain progress toward closure. The article concludes by arguing that the proposed jus post bellum model is comprehensive, parsimonious, pragmatic, and has a universally applicable framework analogous to Just War Theory's other two components. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:After the Smoke Clears: The Just War Tradition and Post-War JusticeAnna Floerke ScheidAfter the Smoke Clears: The Just War Tradition and Post-War Justice Mark J. Allman and Tobias L. Winright Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 2010. 220 pp. $20.00Beginning with Ezekiel’s imagery of a field filled with dry bones in the aftermath of war, Mark J. Allman and Tobias L. Winright approach the burgeoning question of how best to (...) establish a just peace following violent conflict. As theologians committed to the Christian tradition’s emphasis on restoring peace following warfare, their project develops jus post bellum categories that have thus far been considered more by philosophers, political scientists, and international law scholars than by theologians. The authors see themselves as extending the work of Glen Stassen and other just peacemaking theorists. Where just peacemaking provides theologically rooted criteria for jus ante bellum, Allman and Winright want to root theologically jus post bellum. “We believe that expanding the just war tradition to encompass jus post bellum will actually ‘close the loop’ or make for a more honest just war theory by bringing us back to the practices of just peacemaking” (55–56).The book is presented in two parts. The first part offers an overview of the history of the just war tradition and of the emerging discussion of jus post bellum. Despite its brevity, a key strength of this overview is its comprehensiveness. Allman and Winright illustrate the tradition’s roots in Hellenistic philosophy, its development by patristic and medieval theologians, and finally its adoption in the secular sphere. The authors then uncover nascent elements of jus post bellum throughout the just war tradition. Here they pay particular attention to Immanuel Kant before turning to contemporary philosophers, including perhaps the most well-known jus post bellum theorist, Brian Orend, with whom the authors dialogue extensively in the second part.The second part constitutes the book’s major constructive contribution to the theological ethics of warfare and conflict resolution. The authors posit four “categories” that they argue are “consistent with the Christian just war tradition” and necessary for a just peace following war (85). First, they contend that the just cause, which prompts the war, must be reconsidered jus post bellum. “The logic is simple and clear: the end of a just war must be accomplishing the objectives that served as the grounds for going to war in the first place” (100). Second, the authors explore the need for postconflict reconciliation, arguing [End Page 223] for restorative forms of justice alongside retributive forms. This chapter would benefit from more extensive dialogue with theologians such as John de Gruchy, Robert Schreiter, and Charles Villa-Vicencio, who have devoted themselves to the topics of reconciliation and restorative justice from the Christian perspective. Third, the authors discuss the value of punishment in establishing justice. Their discussion of the symbolic importance of reparations is especially insightful. The authors suggest that “reparations require a reversal of power. Those who once were dominant are now in a submissive/vulnerable position” in relation to those who were once powerless (130). Finally, the authors propose a “restoration phase” following warfare wherein basic security must be established and political reforms enacted to preclude any return to the status quo ante bellum. The victors must ensure the economic recovery of the vanquished; provide for the needs of the war’s most vulnerable victims, such as children; and clean up environmental hazards that resulted from fighting.The book is most impressive in that it conjoins multiple postconflict endeavors (e.g., reconciliation and war crimes tribunals) that are frequently separated or seen as oppositional in other literature. This strength indicates that the book may continue to yield serious contributions to the ethics of conflict resolution, especially as scholars accept the authors’ challenge to “develop and further refine” the categories they propose.Anna Floerke ScheidDuquesne UniversityCopyright © 2012 The Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

This article explores the issue of jus contra bellum as a particular development within just war thought. At its heart, the jus contra bellum amounts to an attempt to apply the principles of jus in bello (discrimination and proportionality) in order to negate the jus ad bellum. This approach was rather prevalent throughout the Cold War era, as concerns over the prospective use of nuclear weapons facilitated an increasingly sceptical attitude towards the use of force. Whereas the vast majority of (...) just war thinkers have tended to overlook this phenomenon, James Turner Johnson has adeptly recognised the perils of jus contra bellum, and its rather disastrous implications for just war thought. In this respect, Johnson's analysis of this issue constitutes one of his most significant contributions to the tradition. However, as this article will suggest, his assessment of this approach, and consequent efforts to counter it, do not go far enough. As will be noted, the roots of the jus contra bellum can be traced to the prevailing structure of just war thought – a structure which has been consistently championed by virtually every just war thinker. (shrink)

Not the publicly asserted reasons (humanitarianism and self-defense) but cooptation of oil reserves was the objective behind the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. This underlying motive utterly fails to satisfy just war jus ad bellum conditions. This prioritization of petroleum is well documented and is consistent with decades old US policy towards the Middle East, especially as codified by Anthony Cordesman in 1998 and US DoD's Strategic Assessment 1999 and then adopted by Bush II. This fraudulent use of (...) class='Hi'>military force raises a question as to how motives for war can be accurately identified prior to falsely justified belligerence. Some positive signs are noted herein as to political philosophers' better use of Rawls's reflective equilibrium. (shrink)

In the preface of the 2006 edition ofJust and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer makes an important distinction between, on the one hand, “measures short of war,” such as imposing no-fly zones, pinpoint air/missile strikes, and CIA operations, and on the other, “actual warfare,” typified by a ground invasion or a large-scale bombing campaign. Even if the former are, technically speaking, acts of war according to international law, he proffers that “it is common sense to recognize that they are very different (...) from war.” While they all involve “the use of force,” Walzer distinguishes between the level of force used: the former, being more limited in scope, lack the “unpredictable and often catastrophic consequences” of a “full-scale attack.” Walzer calls the ethical framework governing these measuresjus ad vim, and he applies it to state-sponsored uses of force against both state and nonstate actors outside a state's territory that fall short of the quantum and duration associated with traditional warfare. Compared to acts of war,jus ad vimactions present diminished risk to one's own troops, have a destructive outcome that is more predictable and smaller in scale, severely curtail the risk of civilian casualties, and entail a lower economic and military burden. These factors makejus ad vimactions nominally easier for statesmen to justify compared to conventional warfare, though this does not necessarily mean these actions are morally legitimate or that they do not have potentially nefarious consequences. (shrink)

Although jus in bello violations create transgressive acts that cause moral injury, the primary consideration in thinking about moral injury should be jus ad bellum. If one is fighting in an ad bellum just war, then transgressive acts can be rationalized in a way that allows for consolation. But for morally sensitive combatants engaged in an ad bellum unjust war, consolation is more difficult since there is no way to justify or rationalize morally problematic deeds committed in defense of an (...) unjust cause. Morally serious combatants should consider the question of jus ad bellum as they struggle to deal with moral injury, along with other values such as obedience and loyalty. Such an inquiry can produce further trauma when the justness of the war is called into question. The paper examines moral injury and justice in war, grounding the discussion in concrete examples: the Second World War, the Vietnam War, and the U.S. war in Iraq. It concludes that in a democracy, ordinary citizens should demonstrate solidarity with combatants suffering moral injury, since those combatants serve in wars—even unjust wars—authorized by us and fought in our names. (shrink)

Just War Theorists have neglected that a lack of “just military preparedness” on the side of a country seriously undermines its capability to resort justly to military force. In this paper, I put forth five principles of “just military preparedness” and show that since the new Obama administration will seek to maintain the United States’ dominant military position in the world, it will violate each of the principles. I conclude on this basis that we should anticipate (...) that the Obama administration will add another page to the United States’ history of unjust military interventions. (shrink)

Evolutionary psychologists have suggested that confidence and conservatism promoted aggression in our ancestral past, and that this may have been an adaptive strategy given the prevailing costs and benefits of conflict. However, in modern environments, where the costs and benefits of conflict can be very different owing to the involvement of mass armies, sophisticated technology, and remote leadership, evolved tendencies toward high levels of confidence and conservatism may continue to be a contributory cause of aggression despite leading to greater costs (...) and fewer benefits. The purpose of this paper is to test whether confidence and conservatism are indeed associated with greater levels of aggression—in an explicitly political domain. We present the results of an experiment examining people’s levels of aggression in response to hypothetical international crises (a hostage crisis, a counter-insurgency campaign, and a coup). Levels of aggression (which range from concession to negotiation to military attack) were significantly predicted by subjects’ (1) confidence that their chosen policy would succeed, (2) score on a liberal-conservative scale, (3) political party affiliation, and (4) preference for the use of military force in real-world U.S. policy toward Iraq and Iran. We discuss the possible adaptive and maladaptive implications of confidence and conservatism for the prospects of war and peace in the modern world. (shrink)

Responding to increasing global anxiety over the ethics education of military personnel, this volume illustrates the depth, rigour and critical acuity of Professional Military Ethics Education (PMEE) with contributions by distinguished ethical theorists. It refreshes our thinking about the axioms of just war orthodoxy, the intellectual and political history of just war theorizing, and the justice of recent military doctrines and ventures. The volume also explores a neglected moral dimension of warfare, jus ante bellum (the ethics (...) of pre-war practices) – particularly jus in disciplina bellica (the ethics of educating for warfare). Using metaphor to exemplify the professionalization of the military, the book exposes ambivalences within military professionals' concepts of their professional responsibilities, analyzes issues of self-respect posed by service in an unjust cause, and surveys the deep conflicts inherent in PMEE. While primarily focused on US military academies, the volume will resonate with those responsible for education in military academies across the globe. (shrink)

Should the U.N. Security Council use its coercive powers to bring about effective climate change mitigation? This question remains relevant considering the inadequate mitigation goals set by the signatories of the Paris Climate Accord and the ramifications of U.S. withdrawal from the Accord. This paper argues that the option of the unsc coercing climate change mitigation through military action, or the threat thereof, is morally flawed and ultimately antithetical to effectively addressing climate change. This assessment is based significantly on (...) the application of jus ad bellum principles of just war theory, incorporating some feminist critiques of this theory. (shrink)

How should we think about justice at war’s end in the case of Afghanistan in 2022 and beyond? The basic principles of jus post bellum include order, justice, and conciliation; and there have been numerous policy attempts to realize these principles since the fall of the Taliban and flight of al Qaeda in December 2001. With the precipitous abandonment of Afghanistan by the Biden Administration and other allies in 2021, we have a sober opportunity to reflect on three periods of (...) jus post bellum efforts: an initial humanitarian and human security phase ; the surprising resilience of the Taliban and efforts at some sort of national grand bargain circa the 10-year mark ; and now a future based upon Western withdrawal and the re-emerging dominance of the Taliban. (shrink)

This paper explores Brian Orend's contribution to the just war tradition, specifically his proposed jus post bellum criteria and his idea of pre-commitment to jus in bello and jus post bellum as part of an expanded jus ad bellum criterion of right intention. The latter is based on his interpretation of Kant's work: that as part of the original decision to begin a war, a state should commit itself to certain rules of conduct and appropriate war termination, and if it (...) cannot so commit, it should not continue further down the path to using force. Orend's revised right intention brings jus post bellum ?into the fold? of the just war tradition, requiring that state obligations go beyond correct conduct in war. The article argues that whatever the nature of the just cause, there is a compelling argument for committing to jus in bello and jus post bellum as part of jus ad bellum right intention. The justness of the cause in the contemporary era requires strictness rather than leniency in the conduct and termination of war for a state to remain legitimate in the eyes of the world. In the context of Orend's proposals, this would require that states ?do their homework? and ?tie themselves to the mast?; this includes providing proof that the situation on the ground is understood, conducting a feasibility test on the proposed intervention and publicly identifying and committing to their obligations and responsibilities during and after war. Recognising the practical and political obstacles to adopting this idealistic revision of the just war tradition, the paper nevertheless concludes that Orend's contribution is significant and worthy of exploration: it offers a kernel of hope for counteracting pressures to lower the threshold of resort to force, delivering greater justice for the innocent victims of war and providing greater probability of durable peace post-war. (shrink)

This book chapter addresses two questions. First, can targeted killing by drones in non-battlefield zones be justified on basis of just war theory? Second, will the proliferation and expansion of combat drones in warfare, including the introduction of autonomous drones, be an obstacle to initiating or executing wars in a just manner in the future? The first question is answered by applying traditional jus ad bellum and jus in bello principles to the American targeted killing campaign in Pakistan; the second (...) question is answered on basis of principles of “just military preparedness” or jus ante bellum, a new category of just war thinking. It is concluded that an international ban on weaponized drones is morally imperative and, certainly, that an international treaty against autonomous lethal weapons should be adopted. (shrink)

James Turner Johnson has played a pivotal role in bringing just war thinking to the fore in international relations. This has brought with it increased interest in the relationship between the just war tradition and the laws of war. Whilst Johnson maintains that the legal rules relating to the conduct of war correspond with the requirements of jus in bello, he is more critical of the legal regime relating to recourse to force and has occasionally argued in favour of the (...) superiority of just war thinking to international law in this area. This article discusses Johnson's thinking on the relationship between ethics and law on recourse to force. It begins by outlining Johnson's approach before suggesting that it is overly critical of the post-1945 order. The paper concludes by calling for reconciliation between law and ethics. (shrink)

Several aspects of our post-9/11 reality challenge the relevance, practicality, and international viability of the two primary trajectories of the Christian tradition on war and peace : the rise of strong religion around the world, the privatization of first-world faith, and an American preference for autonomous reason. This article proposes “faith-based diplomacy” as a constructive middle or third way between what have become dichotomous Christian responses to war and violent conflict, and a response that attends to the challenges of our (...) post-9/11 “signs of the times.” After reviewing recent developments in each trajectory, I suggest that faith-based diplomacy cultivates a series of intentional dispositions and actions that foster peace and seek justice even in the absence of armed conflict. It offers a model of “justice before war” or jus ante bellum that complements the growing edges of both the just war theory and peacemaking by offering several as yet unexplored dispositions and commitments necessary for effective responses to violent conflict. (shrink)

In this essay, I reflect on the divergent arguments about limited force made by Daniel R. Brunstetter and Samuel Moyn in their respective monographs. Arguing that their positions can be reconciled, I agree with Brunstetter that limited force has a role to play in establishing and maintaining a just world order. At the same time, however, I am mindful of Moyn's warning that limited force may lead to perpetual war. The way to ensure that limited force both works toward justice (...) and does not result in perpetual war, I argue, is to focus more on considerations of jus ante bellum (right before war) and jus post bellum (right after war), the so-called “growing edges of just war theory.” I hold that the responsible use of statecraft, which just war thinking seeks to inform, accepts that limited force constitutes a legitimate tool to facilitate order, justice, and peace. However, any justifiable use of force must be restrained and limited and aim for a just peace. The embrace of limited force should thus be complemented with an effort by state leaders to bolster the edges of just war in order to facilitate a security environment that requires the use of limited force less frequently. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, Uchena Okeja, inspired by sources in African philosophy and military ethics, argued that war by agreement is the only morally justified war. The present piece is a response to Okeja's contention that agreement is both necessary and sufficient for waging war. Contrasting with Okeja, I contend that agreement is neither necessary nor sufficient for initiating a war. Regarding necessity, I contend that there may be overriding values at risk in a conflict and (...) protecting these values may require engaging in war without agreement. Further, I contend that in cases of self-defense, it is not necessary to have consensus for defending oneself from an attacker. With respect to sufficiency, I uphold that Okeja's perspective fails because his model does not provide just cause, conditions for meaningful consent, or the tools with which to avoid exclusion, elitism, and manipulation in deliberative settings. I conclude that Okeja's arguments are indeed valuable and provide inspirational ideas for how to avoid war, but overall, they do not hold up as a full-fledged theory. (shrink)

There are two contrasting paradigms for dealing with terrorists: war and law enforcement. In this paper, I first discuss how the just war theory assesses the military response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. I argue that the ethical problems with the U.S. attack on Afghanistan in response to 9/11 concern principles of jus ad bellum besides just cause. I show that the principles of right intention, last resort, proportionality and likelihood of success were violated. Furthermore, (...) both jus in bello principles of proportionality and discrimination were not satisfied in targeting terrorists in places where civilians not linked to them live. The law enforcement that takes place in liberal democracies is fully respectful and protective of innocent lives. Crime is dealt with by apprehending lawbreakers and putting them on trial if possible, and by keeping criminal elements on the loose away from potential victims. Good law enforcement also includes acting to remove causes of crime. I examine how this model applies to the problem of terrorism and address objections concerning the impossibility ofeliminating terrorism, the slowness of success, and the possibility that there are “nut cases” who hate America no matter what. (shrink)

Just war theory requires that a nation at war respect proportionality both before it goes to war, jus ad bellum, and in the way it fights a war, jus in bello. To respect proportionality is to know or estimate on good evidence that the whole war and the tactics used in the war will not generate more evil and harm and costs than they will generate good and help and benefits. This paper argues that the 2003–2004 U.S. war on Iraq (...) fails on both counts. It considers, in regard to jus ad bellum, the evils, harms, and costs that the war forces on the Iraqi military and civilians, the American military, and American and non-Iraqi civilians. It considers, under jus in bello, the evils, harms, and costs that the war forces on Iraqi civilians. On the proportionality standards for a just war, this war is a miserable failure. (shrink)

This article argues that the traditional jus ad bellum and jus in bello criteria are fully capable of providing the ethical guidance needed to legitimately conduct military cyber operations. The first part examines the criteria’s foundations by focusing on the notion of liability to defensive harm worked out by revisionist just war thinkers. The second part critiques the necessity of alternative frameworks, which its proponents assert are required to at least supplement the traditional just war criteria. Using the latter, (...) the third part evaluates ethical issues germane to responding to cyber force, including casus belli, moral aspects of “the attribution problem,” and respective rights and duties when attacks involve innocent third-party states. The fourth part addresses in bello issues, including compliance with discrimination, necessity, and civilian due care imperatives; whether civilians may be targeted with sub-“use of force” cyber-attacks and the permissibility of using civilian contractors to conduct cyber-attacks. Throughout these analyses, conclusions are brought into conversation with those of The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare. (shrink)

Whole–exome sequencing (WES) has increased our ability to analyze large parts of the human genome, bringing with it a plethora of ethical, legal, and social implications. A topic dominating discussion of WES is identification of “secondary findings” (SFs), defined as the identification of risk in an asymptomatic individual unrelated to the indication for the test. SFs can have considerable psychosocial impact on patients and families, and patients with an SF may have concerns regarding genomic privacy and genetic discrimination. The Genetic (...) Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA) currently excludes protections for members of the military. This may cause concern in military members and families regarding genetic discrimination when considering genetic testing. In this report, we discuss a case involving a patient and family in which a secondary finding was discovered by WES. The family members have careers in the U.S. military, and a risk–predisposing condition could negatively affect employment. While beneficial medical management changes were made, the information placed exceptional stress on the family, who were forced to navigate career–sensitive “extra–medical” issues, to consider the impacts of uncovering risk–predisposition, and to manage the privacy of their genetic information. We highlight how information obtained from WES may collide with these issues and emphasize the importance of genetic counseling for anyone undergoing WES. (shrink)

This essay addresses two growing edges of the just war tradition. First, theorists have been accused of focusing narrowly on justifying war and governing its conduct, neglecting wider considerations that encompass justice during the years prior to and after war. Second, calling a war "just" allegedly makes it seem "good" so that it is easier to fight a war and to bend or set aside the rules. Based on "imperfect justice," we argue for a "justified" war theory, taking all criteria (...) and categories seriously, including jus ante bellum and jus post bellum. (shrink)

US foreign policy became one of the most popular issues in public and academic discussions, particularly since George W. Bush was elected president. A lot has been said about the negative effects that the Bush administration had on the world's international relations and peace, mainly with regard to the restraints which are required by jus ad bellum. However, not much has been said about the damage that the Bush administration caused to the norms of jus in bello, by ignoring them (...) or turning a blind eye toward their violations. In this paper, I want to recall a few military and civil reasons which have been neglected for following the requirements of jus in bello by the fighting soldiers and the fighting unit, as well as by the belligerent state. (shrink)

Although there has been significant scholarly attention on just war (jus ad bellum) in Byzantium and an increasing interest in the study of the Byzantine culture of war, military trickery and jus in bello (just conduct of war) remain largely unexplored by Byzantinists. This paper aims to fill this gap by studying the theory of military trickery and ethics in Byzantium, c. 900 -1204. It explores and analyses this aspect of jus in bello in Byzantium by employing methods (...) and concepts from Byzantine history, war studies and military ethics. The paper begins by examining the impact of dominant literary traditions (Classical and Biblical) on Byzantine perceptions of military trickery, and then explores the reception and development of Classical and Biblical notions of military trickery and ethics by different sub-cultures in Byzantium (e. g., theologians, jurists, tacticians, historians, orators, poets). The author then attempts to frame a more complete theory of Byzantine military trickery and ethics, and to reflect on the relationship between jus ad bellum and jus in bello in Byzantium. (shrink)

The paper explores the insights of Mahmood Mamdani regarding recent U.S. military actions in Iraq and the U.S. role in setting up a new government there. The majority of the paper does not, however, rely on sources of Mamdani addressing this topic directly. Rather the author consults Mamdani's work on colonialism and imperialism to find clues as to what is at heart wrong with the colonial approach to ruling. Four key attributes of colonialism that also play a role in (...) recent U.S. actions in Iraq are the use of indirect rule, the politicization of indigeneity, economic domination, and the »civilizing mission.« While some advocates of imperialism such as Niall Ferguson think that there can be a good imperial power, Mamdani's analysis leads to a different conclusion. In Mamdani's early works we find that colonialism always sows the seeds of its own destruction; this insight is applied to the current Iraq situation as a cautionary tale. (shrink)

Abstract Right intention is one of the staple criteria of traditional just war theory. In classical terms, right intention is met when a belligerent aims to achieve a just and peaceful order. I will address the problem of determining when a belligerent has satisfied the criterion of right intention. I will argue that right intention is determined by observing a belligerent's acts during and after a conflict. Intention is not merely a private mental act known ultimately only by the people (...) who express the intentions of their governments. Rather, right intention is a communal, public act, for the observable circumstances are how intention is determined. I will demonstrate the effectiveness of this way of determining intention by concentrating on the stated intentions of the Allies before World War II and of the U.S. before the First and Second Gulf Wars. The goal of the paper is to demonstrate that the international community can check a belligerent's stated intentions both while the war is in progress and after the war has ended. I will argue that how well a belligerent conforms to the jus in bello and, when appropriate, to the jus post bellum, provide the international community with much of the information it needs to determine whether or not right intention has been met. (shrink)

One way to tell the story of contemporary ethics of war is as a gradual expansion of the period of time to which theorists attend in relation to war, from ad bellum and in bello to post bellum and ex bello. Ned Dobos, in his new book, Ethics, Security, and the War-Machine, invites us to expand this attention further to the period between wars, which he calls jus ante bellum. In this essay, I explore two significant implications of this (...) shift in normative focus. First, I argue that it opens up an important and productive field of the ethics of military policy-making outside of conflict, including procurement, training, force posture, and military diplomacy. Second, I argue that attending to the relationship between ante bellum and ad bellum considerations contains the seeds of a powerful pacifist argument. (shrink)

The just-war framework neatly distinguishes between jus ad bellum, the criteria that address political leaders’ decisions for waging war, and jus in bello, the criteria that address soldiers’ condu...

I argue that the U.S. ought to reduce its military spending. I first address consequentialist political arguments regarding military spending that are focused on safety and security, and the economy. I then address a justice-oriented argument regarding military spending that is focused on domestic and international opportunity costs. Ultimately, whether the concern is about the consequences of decreasing military spending, or the justice of decreasing military spending, I conclude that we ought to decrease U.S. (...) class='Hi'>military spending. (shrink)

The jus ad bellum requirement of the probability of success can be perceived as an unjust requirement which prohibits the weaker side of a potential or actual military conflict from committing itself to organized violence, even to defend and protect its own survival. This view of the probability of success as an unjust requirement, however, need only be held if: (1) the goal of the weaker state is survival itself. In cases when (1) is true, the requirement should be (...) considered void. On the other hand, if: (2) survival is not considered an overriding factor, then the requirement stands. This paper explores the latter position using the example of the famous Melian Dialogue from Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, and applies it to the question of Ukraine’s right to war and their government’s possible moral obligation to negotiate in their current defensive war against Russia. ---------------------------------------- Received: 26/04/2024. Reviewed: 12/06/2024. Accepted: 5/11/2024. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article provides a normative appraisal of the law of military occupation by looking into occupation courts and their legitimacy. It focuses on two cornerstones of the current regulation of war: the principle of equality of belligerents, that is, the potential relevance ofjus ad bellumconsiderations on thein bellorights of occupants, and the normative force of the traditional distinction between states and non-state armed groups, specially in conflicts not of an international character. Against the currently predominant neoclassical position in just (...) war theory, it argues in favor of the moral equality of just and unjust occupants. Against the orthodox position in international law, it advocates the symmetrical treatment of states and non-state actors fighting internal armed conflicts, at least in terms of the rights they may claim on the territories under their control. It concludes by appraising the way in which this moral landscape should be translated into legal norms. (shrink)

The United States’ continuing engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan have focused reflection on how best to wage counterinsurgency, recognizing that the blurred lines between combatants and noncombatants that characterize this type of fighting broaden the range of opportunities and obligations counterinsurgents face. While many have looked to jus in bello constraints on the just conduct of war to guide this effort, jus post bellum requirements for the just cessation of conflict provide a better framework in which to discuss how soldiers (...) and marines may effectively and ethically pursue insurgents while simultaneously building host-nation capacity to govern politically, economically, and militarily. This paper demonstrates how jus post bellum obligations provide an important structure within which counterinsurgents may understand the full range of their obligations to the host nation and its population, best pursue insurgents while honoring their commitment to noncombatant immunity, and set the standard for what constitutes the end of the conflict and the appropriate point for military disengagement. (shrink)

Ukraine's war of self-defense against Russia is one of the clearest examples of a nation fighting a just war in recent history. Ukraine is clearly entitled to defend itself, and Russia is clearly obligated to cease hostilities, withdraw troops, and make repair. In light of this, some of the most salient moral questions related to Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine involve the international community; namely, what moral duties it has toward Ukraine, especially in light of Russia's extreme and pervasive (...) human rights abuses. The first section of the essay argues that there is a pro tanto moral duty to intervene militarily in Ukraine to stop Russian human rights abuses and ensure that Ukraine achieves a military victory. This duty is grounded in duties of rescue, promissory obligations, and reliance obligations, as well as duties to nations’ own citizens and to the international community. The second section of the essay argues that the most relevant consideration in determining whether there is an all-things-considered duty for the international community to intervene militarily in Ukraine is Russia's nuclear coercion and the associated risk of nuclear war. This section highlights the nuclear risks involved in compliance with Russian nuclear coercion, which I argue have been neglected in prominent discussions. The moral stakes involved in this determination are very high, and succumbing to Russian nuclear coercion in the face of massive human rights violations would set a dangerous precedent. Any course of action should be guided by a thorough analysis of all the risks involved, both nuclear and moral. (shrink)

Tens of thousands of U.S. military personnel remain missing in action (MIA). U.S. law requires that our MIAs be accounted for and that the government maintain a comprehensive, coordinated, integrated and fully resourced program dedicated to accomplishing this enormous task. The aim of this paper is to show that there is also a moral requirement. There is a moral duty to repatriate U.S. military personnel, a duty that is grounded in our individual right to self-defense.

The question whether, in the interim, the "socialist morality" allows adequate restraint on revolutionary action, cannot fairly be answered in abstraction from history, in this case our epoch. We submit that the group of projects called corporate "globalization" - imposing free trade, privatization, and dominance of transnational corporations - shapes that epoch. These projects are associated with polarization of wealth, deepening poverty, and an alarming new global U.S. military domination. Using 9/11 as pretext for a "war on terror," (...) this domination backs corporate globalization. If Nazi occupation of France and French occupation of Algeria made Sartre and Beauvoir assign moral primacy to overcoming oppressive systems, then U.S. global occupation should occasion rebirth of that commitment. Parallels among the three occupations are striking. France's turning of colonial and metropolitan working classes against each other is echoed by globalization's pitting of (e.g.) Chinese against Mexican workers in a race to lower wages to get investment. Seducing first-world workers with racial superiority and cheap imports from near-slavery producers once again conceals their thralldom to their own bosses. Nazi and French use of overwhelming force and even torture are re-cycled by the U.S. and its agents, again to hide the vulnerability of their small forces amidst their enemies. (shrink)