Journal of Social Philosophy, Volume 53, Issue 1, Page 59-75, Spring 2022.

The First World War was supposed to end all wars, though soon followed WWII. Since 1945 wars continued to abound; now we confront a real prospect of a third world war. Many armed struggles and wars arise in attempts to end repressive government; still more are fomented by repressive governments, few of which acknowledge their repressive character. It is historically and culturally naive to suppose that peace is normal, and war an aberration; war, preparations for war and threats of war (...) belong to ‘normal’ human life. Our tolerance, acceptance or fostering of such repeated injustices and atrocities indicate pervasive failures to understand fundamentals of justice, and what we owe morally to ourselves and to all others, together with our responsibilities to preserve the biosphere, not merely our own store(s) of reserves. As matters both of justice and prudence we must re-orient ourselves, individually and collectively, to promote justice, peace and ecological responsibilities by identifying and instituting just forms of social cooperation, domestically and internationally. All of these are our problems, whether we recognize them or continue our pervasive negligence. We urgently require cogent understanding of the social dimensions of human judgment, rational assessment, right action, and public reason. This requires understanding (inter alia) how Kant’s explication of rational judgment and justification is fundamentally social, how these features of rational judgment and justification are constitutive of Kant’s account of individual autonomy, and how they are central to Kant’s account of proper public use of reason. Reasoning publically remains precarious, not because – as often alleged – the ‘Enlightenment project’ has failed. It has not failed, it has been thwarted, and in our public responsibilities we have too often failed it. (shrink)

Kant was the first great anti-Cartesian in epistemology and philosophy of mind. He criticised five central tenets of Cartesianism and developed sophisticated alternatives to them. His transcendental analysis of the necessary a priori conditions for the very possibility of self-conscious human experience invokes externalism about justification and proves externalism about mental content. Semantic concern with the unity of the proposition—required for propositionally structured awareness and self-awareness—is central to Kant’s account of the unity of any cognitive judgment. The perceptual ‘binding problem’ (...) is central to Kant’s account of the unity of the object in perception. This paper outlines Kant’s development and justification of his a rationalist account of our active intellect and its roles in perceptual consciousness and in rational judgment, including our consciousness of our rational freedom, all through a radically innovative transcendental inquiry into the necessary a priori conditions for us to be conscious at all. Kant’s anti-Cartesianism is a major philosophical breakthrough far surpassing contemporary anti-Cartesian efforts. It behoves us to give Kant his due and avail ourselves of his profound insights into the nature of human mindedness. (shrink)

The comprehensive guide to ethics "An excellent blend of case law, research evidence, down-to-earth principles, and practical examples from two authors with outstanding expertise. Promotes valuable understanding through case illustrations, self-directed exercises, and thoughtful discussion of such issues as cultural diversity."--Dick Suinn, president-elect 1998, American Psychological Association "The scenarios and accompanying questions will prove especially helpful to those who offer courses and workshops concerned with ethics in psychology."--Charles D. Spielberger, former president, American Psychological Association; distinguished research professor of psychology, University (...) of South Florida The authors draw on their professional experience, empirical studies, and case examples to examine the ethical responsibilities that confront psychotherapists and counselors in their day-to-day practice. They offer insights into contending with the sometimes competing demands of clients' needs, formal ethical principles, personal values, and evolving legal standards in a range of areas--including fees, informed consent, sexual concerns, confidentiality, documentation, and supervision. (shrink)

Dan Zahavi has argued persuasively that some versions of self- representationalism are implausible on phenomenological and dialectical grounds: they fail to make sense of primitive self-knowledge and lead to an infinite regress. Zahavi proposes an alternative view of ubiquitous prereflective self-consciousness.

Although Maimonides' discussion of creation is one of his greatest contributions - he himself claims that belief in creation is second in importance only to belief in God - there is still considerable debate on what that contribution was. Kenneth Seeskin takes a close look at the problems Maimonides faced and the sources from which he drew. He argues that Maimonides meant exactly what he said: the world was created by a free act of God so that the existence (...) of everything other than God is contingent. In religious terms, existence is a gift. In order to reach this conclusion, Seeskin examines Maimonides' view of God, miracles, the limits of human knowledge, and the claims of astronomy to be a science. Clearly written and closely argued, Maimonides on the Origin of the World takes up questions of perennial interest. (shrink)

A 5,000-word conspectus of Hegel’s moral philosophy which considers the theoretical context of his moral philosophy (§1), his accounts of legal, personal, moral and social freedom (§2), the structure of Hegel’s analysis in his Philosophy of Justice (or »Rechtsphilosophie«) (§3), his account of role obligations as a central component of social freedom (§4), and his integrated account of individual autonomy and social reconciliation (§5).

This book examines the Socratic method of elenchus, or refutation.

In 1956 U. T. Place proposed that consciousness is a brain process. More attention should be paid to his word ‘process’. There is near-universal agreement that experiences are processive—as witnessed in the platitude that experiences are occurrent states. The abandonment of talk of brain processes has benefited functionalism, because a functional state, as it is usually conceived, cannot be a process. This point is dimly recognized in a well-known but little-discussed argument that conscious experiences cannot be functional states because the (...) former are occurrent, while the latter are dispositional. That argument fails, but it can be made sound if we reformulate it with the premise that occurrent states are processive. The only way for functionalists to meet the resulting challenge is to abandon the standard individuation of functional states in terms of purely abstract causal roles. (shrink)

The twofold world -- Three relational realms -- What is "genuine community" -- Who is the "real I"? -- Glimpsing the "eternal thou" -- The way of "turning" -- Postscript -- Frequently asked questions -- The way of "inclusion".

Doug Husak suggests that sometimes an actor should be deemed reckless, and not merely negligent, with respect to the risks that she knowingly created but has forgotten at the moment of action. The validity of this conclusion, he points out, depends crucially on what it means to be aware of a risk. Husak’s neutral prompt and counterfactual actual belief criteria are problematic, however. More persuasive is his suggestion that we understand belief, in this moral and criminal law context, as a (...) concept whose meaning is determined by its function as a culpability standard. Husak concludes that inadvertent actors are often less culpable than knowing-but-later-forgetful actors; this is plausible, but there are also numerous counterexamples. Holly Smith focuses on negligence cases in which an agent’s failure to notice a risk stems, not from a prior culpable choice, but from an objectionable attitude or set of attitudes. She is right to emphasize that genuine moral culpability does not depend on conscious choice. However, Smith also asserts that decisions that flow from an actor’s objectionable attitudes are only rarely culpable, because they often do not arise from a reasonably full configuration of the actor’s motives. This last requirement is, I fear, an unrealistic and unnecessarily demanding criterion of culpability. Even when many of the actor’s evaluative attitudes are inactive in Smith’s sense, the actor might deserve blame for not bringing them to bear on his decision. Michael Moore and Heidi Hurd thoroughly explore, and find deficient, H.L.A. Hart’s unexercised capacity theory of negligence. They are correct that that theory requires a further judgment: an actor’s inadvertence is culpable only if he had the capacity to have adverted if X where X is the source of the actor’s moral desert. They overstate, however, in suggesting that the capacity issue falls out of the picture once we identify that underlying desert basis. The authors also worry that if desert is grounded on an underlying vice, we lack a reliable way of ranking the different vices that might explain the actor’s inadvertence; this is not a fatal objection, however, because negligence determinations are quite feasible even in the absence of clear rankings. Moore and Hurd conclude by identifying eight distinct categories in which criminal liability for negligence is justifiable. Negligence is indeed a surprisingly complex and pluralist concept. The three articles in this symposium brightly illuminate some of the most fundamental conceptual and normative issues in the debate over whether it is just to blame and punish the negligently inadvertent. (shrink)

There has been a general failure among mental health theorists and social psychologists to understand the etiology of work-engendered depression. Yet the condition is increasingly prevalent in highly industrialized societies, where an exclusionary focus upon work, money, and the things that money can buy has displaced values that traditionally exerted a liberating and humanizing influence. Social critics have called the result an impoverishment of the spirit, a state of cultural bankruptcy, and an incapacity for genuine leisure. From a clinical perspective, (...) the condition has been diagnosed as widespread narcissism and obsessive work. -/- Acedia, a concept developed by the Scholastics, throws clarifying light on the origin of this form of depression. (shrink)

The book attempts to develop an account of simplicity in terms of testability, and to use this account to provide an adequate characterization of induction, one immune to the class of problems suggested by Nelson Goodman. It is then shown that the past success of induction, thus characterized, constitutes evidence for its future success. A qualitative measure of confirmation is developed, and this measure - along with the considerations of simplicity - is used to provide an account of the consilience (...) of inductions, and also an inductivist account of the structure and progress of scientific theory. An appendix extends the treatment of simplicity to statistical distributions and provides a reasonable interpretation of the maximum entropy principle. Thus, this book is an attempt to characterize induction in terms of a well-defined notion of simplicity and to use that characterization as a basis of an account of empirical, and in particular, scientific reasoning. (shrink)

Providing a groundbreaking collective commentary, by an international group of leading philosophical scholars, _Blackwell’s Guide to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit_ transforms and expands our understanding and appreciation of one of the most challenging works in Western philosophy. Collective philosophical commentary on the whole of Hegel’s _Phenomenology_ in sequence with the original text. Original essays by leading international philosophers and Hegel experts. Provides a comprehensive Bibliography of further sources.

The essay begins with an explanation of the underlying theological vision that supports Catholic social teaching's commitment to the centrality of the common good and the role of solidarity as both a virtue and a norm. The vision of humanity as one family and the church as a sacrament of unity is the foundation for a communitarian ethic that prizes inclusion, participation, and relative equality in the quest for a truly just society. An array of social science studies is then (...) employed to show that economic inequality “bleeds” into other realms of public life to undermine fundamental commitments of American society, namely, equal opportunity and political democracy. The essay concludes that an understanding of Catholic social teaching promotes a critical perspective that is deeply at odds with ongoing trends in the U.S. economy. (shrink)

In the present article I have surveyed several approaches to modeling the clinical diagnostic process. I have argued that at this point of the field's development, logics which simulate the reasoning patterns and knowledge base of expert clinicians represent research programs that are most likely to succeed. No logic of diagnosis has yet attained the status of being definitive; in spite of striking progress much more research and testing is required. On the basis of various existing logics, I have attempted (...) to articulate a number of desiderata which an ideal diagnostic logic should satisfy. In spite of these criticisms, I would maintain that programs such as MYCIN and INTERNIST have already matured to the point where they are useful both in consultations and in teaching diagnostic reasoning. (shrink)

Kenneth Dorter's Can Different Cultures Think the Same Thoughts? is a study of fundamental issues in metaphysics and ethics across major philosophical traditions of the world, including the way in which metaphysics can be a foundation for ethics, as well as the importance of metaphysics on its own terms. Dorter examines such questions through a detailed comparison of selected major thinkers and classic works in three global philosophical traditions, those of India, China, and the West. In each chapter Dorter (...) juxtaposes and compares two or more philosophers or classic works from different traditions, from Spinoza and Shankara, to Confucius and Plato, to Marcus Aurelius and the Bhagavad Gita. In doing so he explores different perspectives and reveals limitations and assumptions that might otherwise be obscure. The goal of Dorter's cross-cultural approach is to consider how far works from different cultures can be understood as holding comparable philosophical views. Although Dorter reveals commonalities across the different traditions, he makes no claim that there is such a thing as a universal philosophy. Clearly there are fundamental disagreements among the philosophers and works studied. Yet in each of the case studies of a particular chapter, we can discover a shared, or at least analogous, way of looking at issues across different cultures. All those interested in metaphysics, ethics, Indian philosophy, Chinese philosophy, and comparative philosophy will find much of interest in this book. (shrink)

This paper describes the Antarctic environment, the mission and work setting at the U.S. research stations, the general population and living conditions, and the healthcare situation. It also dispels some common misconceptions that persist about this environment and about the scope and quality of medicine practiced there. The paper then describes specific ethical issues that arise in this environment, incorporating examples drawn from both the author’s experiences and those of his colleagues. The ethics of providing healthcare in resource-poor environments implies (...) two related questions. The first is: What can we do with the available resources? This suggests that clinicians must not only know how to use all available equipment and supplies in the standard manner, but also that they must be willing and able to go beyond standard procedures and improvise, when necessary. The second question is: Of all the things we can do, which ones should we do? This paper addresses both questions in relation to Antarctic medical care. It describes the wide range of activities required of healthcare providers and some specific ethical issues that arise. Finally, it suggests some remedies to ameliorate some of those issues. (shrink)

In workplace health interventions, engaging management and union decision makers is considered important for the success of the project, yet little research has described the process of making this happen. A case study of a knowledge-transfer process is presented to describe the practices and processes adopted by a knowledge broker who engaged workplace parties in discussions on research on physical and psychosocial factors important for employee health. The process included one-on-one interactions between the knowledge broker and individuals to explain the (...) research, to build trust and credibility, and to explore the applicability of the research to their work (sense making). It also included facilitated group sessions, where the groups explored how the research could solve problems within the workplace (social construction of knowledge). The workplace context offered multiple opportunities that helped and hindered the flow of research. Nevertheless, this intense, sustained, knowledge-transfer intervention noted conceptual, structural, and political knowledge use. (shrink)

Hume and contemporary Humeans contend that moral sentiments form the sole and sufficient basis of moral judgments. This thesis is criticised by appeal to Hume’s theory of justice, which shows that basic principles of justice are required to form and to maintain society, which is indispensable to human life, and that acting according to, or violating, these principles is right, or wrong, regardless of anyone’s sentiments, motives or character. Furthermore, Hume’s theory of justice shows how the principles of justice are (...) artificial without being arbitrary. In this regard, Hume’s theory belongs to the unjustly neglected modern natural law tradition. Some key merits of this strand in Hume’s theory are explicated by linking it to Kant’s constructivist method of identifying and justifying practical principles (à la O’Neill), and by showing how and why Hegel adopted and further developed Kant’s constructivism by re-integrating it with Hume’s central natural law concern with our actual social practices. (Slightly revised English translation by the author of „Von der Konvention zur Sittlichkeit. Humes Begründung einer Rechtsethik aus nach-Kantischer Perspektive“, on which see below.). (shrink)

Michelle Garcia Winner’s Social Thinking Curriculum is widely used by schools across the USA and has garnered attention internationally. The curriculum addresses social language and behavior deficits among those on the autism spectrum. Although many embrace this curriculum without reservation, the emphasis on social conformity, including avoiding behaviors that make others uncomfortable, merits scrutiny. Individuals who have difficulty understanding social cues and conventions can derive tremendous benefit from learning to fit in, for example, or learning what is likely to make (...) others uncomfortable and why. However, too much emphasis on pleasing others can reinforce undesirable tendencies. For example, autism is already linked to avoidant personality disorder. An emphasis on avoiding making others uncomfortable may also inhibit the development of principled ethical thinking and action. Reframing social thinking to treat it not (or not only) as an end in itself, but as a way to achieve a variety of social and personal goals would go a long way toward addressing the weaknesses of the Social Thinking Curriculum. (shrink)

Booth says, "Burke seems to be claiming to know better than Keats himself some of what the poem 'means', and the meaning he finds is antithetical not just to the poet's intentions but to any intentions he might conceivably have entertained!" The notion underlying my analysis is this: Formal social norms of "propriety" are related to poetic "propriety" as Emily Post's Book of Etiquette is to the depths of what goes on in the poet's search "for what feels just right." (...) Wellek stops with Emily Post. The official aesthetic isn't likely to cover the ground. If I may offer a perhaps "outrageously" honorific example, on pages 329-30 of my Language as Symbolic Action, when discussing a sonnet of mine, "Atlantis," I indicate how one can both know and not know when one's imagination is working at a level of "propriety" not reducible to the official code. My lines had a Swiftian, Aristophanic dimension; and though they were not "programmatically" so designed, my experience with them both ab intra and ab extra indicates how such things can operate.Kenneth Burke's numerous writings include The Complete White Oxen , Towards a Better Life , Collected Poems, and among his critical works, A Grammar of Motives, A Rhetoric of Motives, Language as Symbolic Action, and The Philosophy of Literary Form. His contributions to Critical Inquiry are "ARTISTS ON ART: Post-Poesque Derivation of a Terministic Cluster" , " Motion/ Action" , "CRITICAL RESPONSE: A Critical Load, Beyond that Door; or, Before the Ultimate Confrontation; or, When Thinking of Deconstructionist Structuralists; or, A Hermeneutic Fantasy", and "CRITICAL RESPONSE: Methodological Repression and/or Strategies of Containment". (shrink)

The U.S. Supreme Court's seminal 1978 Bakke decision, now 25 years old, has an ambiguous and endangered legacy. Justice Lewis Powell's opinion provided a justification that allowed leaders in medical education to pursue some affirmative action policies while at the same time undermining many other potential defenses. Powell asserted that medical schools might have a "compelling interest" in the creation of a diverse student body. But Powell's compromise jeopardized affirmative action since it blocked many justifications for responding to increases in (...) political opposition and legal challenges. The Bakke decision and itsmoral background and legal legacy are traced and analyzed. Despite recent legal setbacks, the framework sketched by Powell can be used to defend diversity inmedical education bothmorally and legally as a "compelling state interest." Because trust is a central component of the physician-patient relationship and a prerequisite to the profession's ability to provide effectivemedical care, the state has a compelling interest in training physicians with whom patients can feel comfortable and safe if the population is distrustful; underserved; faces significant discrimination in the allocation of benefits, goods and services and affirmative action programs would be likely to promote their trust in the system. Similar narrowly-tailored arguments could be used in other professions and for other groups. Bakke is an important background for the pending Grutter case. (shrink)

Nussbaum argues for welcoming life's messy conflicts rather than placing some values above others. Aristotle and plato are the respective champions of these alternatives: plato lovelessly advocates inflexible utilitarian rules, while aristotle champions pluralism and humanism. But nussbaum approaches these philosophers in precisely the manner that she rejects for life itself, reducing each to a one-dimensional principle and ignoring the "messy conflicts" that other parts of their texts create for her principle. She completely ignores the humane side of plato's thought (...) in order to paint him as cold and controlling, and either ignores or dismisses the transcendent side of aristotle's thought in order to paint him as humanistic and pluralistic in a sartrean sense. (shrink)