The question of whether God exists has long preoccupied philosophers. Many accounts of God have been proposed, and many arguments for and against God’s existence have been offered and discussed. But while philosophers have been busy trying to determine whether or not God exists, they have generally neglected to ask this question: "Does it _matter _whether God exists?" _Does God Matter?_ features ten original essays written by prominent philosophers of religion that address this very important, yet surprisingly neglected, question. One (...) natural way to approach this question is to seek to understand what difference God’s existence would—or does—make to the value of the world and the well-being of its inhabitants. The three essays in Section I defend versions of _pro-theism_: the view that God’s existence would, or does, make things better than they would otherwise be. The three subsequent essays in Section II defend _anti-theism_: the view that God’s existence would, or does, make things worse than they would otherwise be. The final four essays in Section III consider the interplay between the existential and axiological debates concerning the existence of God. This book presents important research on a growing topic in philosophy of religion that will also be of keen interest to scholars working in other areas of philosophy, and in other disciplines. (shrink)

God is traditionally taken to be a necessarily existing being who is unsurpassably powerful, knowledgeable, and good. The familiar problem of actual evil claims that the presence of gratuitous suffering in the actual world constitutes evidence against the existence of such a being. In contrast, the problem of possible evil claims that the possibility of bad worlds constitutes evidence against theism. How? It seems plausible to suppose that there are very bad possible worlds. But if God exists in every world, (...) then God exists in those, too. And if God exists in very bad worlds, some say, God is culpable for not ensuring that they are better. In what follows, I consider this argument, survey some responses, and offer a novel solution. Along the way, I argue that theists should maintain that the actual world is a multiverse featuring all and only universes worthy of being created and sustained by God, and – more controversially – I suggest that theists should embrace modal collapse: the claim that this multiverse is the only possible world. (shrink)

God is traditionally taken to be a perfect being, and the creator and sustainer of all that is. So, if theism is true, what sort of world should we expect? To answer this question, we need an account of the array of possible worlds from which God is said to choose. It seems that either there is (a) exactly one best possible world; or (b) more than one unsurpassable world; or (c) an infinite hierarchy of increasingly better worlds. Influential arguments (...) for atheism have been advanced on each hierarchy, and these jointly comprise a daunting trilemma for theism. In this paper, I argue that if theism is true, we should expect the actual world to be a multiverse comprised of all and only those universes which are worthy of creation and sustenance. I further argue that this multiverse is the unique best of all possible worlds. Finally, I explain how his unconventional view bears on the trilemma for theism. (shrink)

For many centuries, philosophers have debated this question: “Does God exist?” Surprisingly, they have paid rather less attention to this distinct – but also very important – question: “Would God’s existence be a good thing?” The latter is an axiological question about the difference in value that God’s existence would make (or does make) in the actual world. Perhaps the most natural position to take, whether or not one believes in God, is to hold that it would be a very (...) good thing if such a being were to exist. After all, God is traditionally thought to be perfectly powerful and good, and it might seem obvious that such a being’s existence would make things better than they would otherwise be. But this judgment has been contested: some philosophers have held that God’s existence would make things worse, and that, on this basis, one can reasonably prefer God’s non-existence. We first distinguish a wide array of axiological positions concerning the value of God’s existence which might be held by theists, atheists, and agnostics alike. We next construe these positions as comparative judgments about the axiological status of various possible worlds. We then criticize an important recent attempt to show that God’s existence would make things worse, in various ways, than they would otherwise be. (shrink)

In recent decades, scientific theories have postulated the existence of many universes beyond our own. The details and implications of these theories are hotly contested. Some philosophers argue that these scientific models count against the existence of God. Others, however, argue that if God exists, a multiverse is precisely what we should expect to find. Moreover, these philosophers claim that the idea of a divinely created multiverse can help believers in God respond to certain arguments for atheism. These proposals are, (...) of course, also extremely controversial. This volume collects together twelve newly published essays – two by physicists, and ten by philosophers – that discuss various aspects of this issue. Some of the essays support the idea of a divinely created multiverse; others oppose it. Scientific, philosophical, and theological issues are considered. (shrink)

On what basis does God choose a possible world to make actual? Theists typically claim that God freely selects exactly one world on the basis of its axiological characteristics. But suppose that there are infinitely many unsurpassable worlds from which to choose; or else that there are no unsurpassable worlds, but instead an infinite hierarchy of increasingly better worlds. On each of these scenarios, philosophers have alleged that God is unable rationally to choose a world for actualization. In the former (...) case, God lacks sufficient reason to select any particular world, since there are infinitely many other equally good candidates. In the latter case, God lacks sufficient reason to select any particular world, since for any world there are infinitely many better candidates. These considerations generate arguments for atheism, as follows. On theism, God is supposed to be the explanation for this world ’s being actual, and God requires sufficient reasons for action. So on either scenario or, since there is an actual world, and since God could not have had a sufficient reason for selecting it, this world was not actualized by God. In response, defenders of theism have urged that God need not have sufficient reason for choosing a world on or : God may defensibly choose a world at random. In what follows, I evaluate this reply. I conclude that it succeeds only on the enormously implausible assumption that there is exactly one randomizer available to God. (shrink)

Mr. Klaas is one of the best friends of the SCHOOLMAN. His contributions have always been worth while. In "The Assault on Mysticism," he undertakes to point out the fallacy in the reasoning of the "religious psychologists" who are giving so much attention to mysticism today.

This is a review of the issue of randomness in quantum mechanics, with special emphasis on its ambiguity; for example, randomness has different antipodal relationships to determinism, computability, and compressibility. Following a philosophical discussion of randomness in general, I argue that deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics are strictly speaking incompatible with the Born rule. I also stress the role of outliers, i.e. measurement outcomes that are not 1-random. Although these occur with low probability, their very existence implies that the no-signaling (...) principle used in proofs of randomness of outcomes of quantum-mechanical measurements should be reinterpreted statistically, like the second law of thermodynamics. In three appendices I discuss the Born rule and its status in both single and repeated experiments, review the notion of 1-randomness that in various guises was investigated by Kolmogorov and others and treat Bell’s Theorem and the Free Will Theorem with their implications for randomness. (shrink)

God is traditionally understood to be a perfect being who is the creator and sustainer of all that is. God's creative and sustaining activity is often thought to involve choosing a possible world for actualization. It is generally said that either there is (a) exactly one best of all possible worlds, or there are (b) infinitely many increasingly better worlds, or else there are (c) infinitely many unsurpassable worlds within God's power to actualize. On each view, critics have offered arguments (...) for atheism that turn on God's choice of a world. In what follows, I first discuss some background issues, and I then survey the contemporary literature on these arguments. (shrink)

Much attention has been paid to ‘deictic shifts’ in Ancient Greek literary texts. In this article I show that similar phenomena can be found in documentary texts. Contracts in particular display unexpected shifts from the first to the third person or vice versa. Rather than constituting a narrative technique, I argue that such shifts should be related to the existence of two major types of stylization, called the ‘objective’ and the ‘subjective’ style. In objectively styled contracts, subjective intrusions may occur (...) as a result of the scribe temporarily assuming himself to be the deictic center, whereas in subjectively styled contracts objective intrusions may occur as a result of the contracting parties dictating to the scribe, and the scribe not modifying the personal references. There are also a couple of texts which display more extensive deictic alter­nations, which suggests that generic confusion between the two major types of stylization may have played a role. (shrink)

Journal Name: Philologus Issue: Ahead of print.

English summary: German linguistics, formerly internationally inspiring, fell into a deep crisis at the beginning of the twentieth century. Since the First World War, those in the field have been looking for ways to regain its lost scientific and social recognition. This desire for relevance was particularly clear when practitioners of the different approaches to linguistic innovation competed for the scarce resources of public research funding. The remaining funding documents of the German Research Foundation demonstrate which specific linguistic approaches were (...) proclaimed as critical by researchers, and which were honored by outside funders during changing political contexts. Thus, the history of German philology and the development of its dynamics is here - for the first time - traced from the perspective of public support for research, from the time of the Weimar Republic until the first decades of the Federal Republic. German text. German description: Die ehemals international impulsgebende deutsche Sprachwissenschaft geriet am Anfang des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts in eine tiefe Krise. Seit dem Ersten Weltkrieg suchte das Fach nach Wegen, die verlorene wissenschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Anerkennung wieder zu erlangen.Dieser Wille zur Relevanz zeigte sich besonders deutlich, wo die verschiedenen Neuerungsansatze der Sprachforschung um die knappen Mittel der staatlichen Forschungsforderung konkurrierten. An den erhaltenen Forderakten der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft ist abzulesen, welche spezifischen Aufgabenstellungen die Sprachwissenschaft in wechselnden politischen Kontexten jeweils 'nach aussen' proklamierte und 'von aussen' honoriert bekam.So wird hier aus der Perspektive der staatlichen Forschungsforderung die Geschichte der deutschen Sprachforschung in ihrer Entwicklungsdynamik erstmals von der Weimarer Republik bis in die ersten Jahrzehnte der Bundesrepublik nachgezeichnet. (shrink)

Using side-by-side Sacks forcing, it is shown that it is consistent that 2 ω be large and that there be many types of ultrafilters of character ω 1.

This essay discusses two issues. The first concerns whether the “insider’s” or “outsider’s” perspective is more truth-conducive in the study of religion. I do not attempt to settle this very thorny question: I merely attempt to identify some aspects of what it might mean to be an insider with respect to one kind of investigation – the investigation into whether God exists. The second issue concerns how best to characterize certain philosophical positions on the axiology of ultimate reality. Here I (...) argue that it can be useful to group together certain axiological positions under one heading, while leaving their details open to interpretation. For example, two philosophers might agree that God’s existence would – or does – make the world far better than it would otherwise be, even though they have incompatible notions of what constitutes ‘far’ and ‘better’. In my view, it makes sense to call both thinkers pro-theists, despite their differences. In discussing these issues, I engage the work of Myron A. Penner and Paul Moser, both of whom published replies to a paper of mine in the most recent issue of the Toronto Journal of Theology. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDieser Beitrag konzentriert sich auf eine starke und auf eine schwache Seite von Bayers Zugang zu Luthers Theologie. So wird als Stärke angesehen, dass das Thema der Rechtfertigung in Luthers Theologie als allumfassend angesetzt wird. Dagegen besteht eine Schwäche in der Art und Weise, wie Bayer durch Luthers Dialektik der zwei Arten, in denen Gott sich verbirgt – also verborgen »unter dem Gegenteil« und absolut verborgen – hindurch bricht, indem er die beiden trennt und diese Aufteilung als Kriterium verwendet, um (...) zwischen einer Periode, in der Luther die reformatorische Einsicht vollständig ausarbeitet, und einem vor-reformatorischen Luther zu unterscheiden. Diese Luther-Interpretation sollte nochmals überdacht werden, denn sie verneint die Entsprechung und die kontrapunktisch zu verstehende Beziehung zwischen dieser doppelten Verborgenheit im Lichte des »offenbaren Gottes«. Ein ähnliches Problem taucht dann auf, wenn Bayer die Rede vom dreieinigen Gott, die ausschließlich am Evangelium orientiert ist, unterscheidet von einer allgemeinen Art und Weise, von Gott zu reden, die allein auf dem Gesetz basiert. Luthers Vorstellung, dass die Unterscheidung zwischen Gesetz und Evangelium vollständig in Gottes Offenbarung des Evangeliums integriert ist, widerspricht einer solchen Unterscheidung. Dieser Beitrag betrachtet nicht nur die Unterscheidung zwischen einem unreifen und einem reifen Luther, der alle Implikationen der reformatorischen Einsicht ausgearbeitet hat, als unnötig, sondern er würdigt den jungen Luther als einen Theologen, der in der Lage ist, dasjenige zusammen zu halten, was beim späten Luther auseinander zu fallen droht. Glücklicherweise beinhaltet Bayers Studie auch Anknüpfungsmöglichkeiten für eine solche Interpretation Luthers, die die positiven ebenso wie die negativen Aspekte beider Arten der Verborgenheit ebenso wie Gesetz und Evangelium in einem einzigen kontinuierlichen Prozess integriert.SummaryThis contribution concentrates on one strong and one weak side of Bayer's approach to Luther's theology. It finds a strength in the universally implemented theme of justification in Luther's theological thought. A weakness is however found in the way Bayer breaks through Luther's dialectics concerning the dual way God hides himself – i. e. hidden ‘under the opposite’ and absolutely hidden – by separating them and using this division as a criterion to distinguish between the period where Luther had fully worked out the insight of the Reformation and the pre-Reformation Luther. Such an interpretation of Luther needs to be reconsidered because it neglects the correspondence and the contrapuntal relation between this double hiddeness in the light of the ‘revealed God’.A similar problem arises when Bayer divides speaking about the triune God, which is exclusively orientated towards the Gospel, from a general way of speaking about God, which is only based on the Law. Luther's idea that the distinction between Law and Gospel is fully integrated into God's revelation of the Gospel contradicts such a division.This contribution considers not only a distinction between an immature and a mature Luther who has worked out all the implications of the reformation insight unnecessary, but appreciates the young Luther as a theologian who is capable of holding together what the later Luther is in danger of letting fall apart. Fortunately, in Bayer's study there are also openings for a Luther interpretation that includes the positive as well as the negative aspect of both kinds of hiddeness and of Law and Gospel in a single continuous process. (shrink)

In a recent article (Kraay 2013), I argued that some prominent responses to two important arguments for atheism invoke divine satisficing – and that the coherence and propriety of this notion have not been established. Chris Tucker (2016) agrees with my evaluation of divine satisficing, but disagrees with my exegesis of these responses. He argues that they should be understood as invoking motivated submaximization instead. After reviewing the dialectical situation to date, I assess whether motivated submaximization can be deployed in (...) such a way as to defeat these argument for atheism. I argue that it’s far from clear that it can. (shrink)

I argue that Bohmian mechanics cannot reasonably be claimed to be a deterministic theory. If one assumes the “quantum equilibrium distribution” provided by the wave function of the universe, Bohmian mechanics requires an external random oracle in order to describe the algorithmic randomness properties of typical outcome sequences of long runs of repeated identical experiments. This oracle lies beyond the scope of Bohmian mechanics, including the impossibility of explaining the randomness property in question from “random” initial conditions. Thus the advantages (...) of Bohmian mechanics over other interpretations of quantum mechanics, if any, must lie at an ontological level, and in its potential to derive the quantum equilibrium distribution and hence the Born rule. (shrink)

Theism is the view that God exists; naturalism is the view that there are no supernatural beings, processes, mechanisms, or forces. This Element explores whether things are better, worse, or neither on theism relative to naturalism. It introduces readers to the central philosophical issues that bear on this question, and it distinguishes a wide range of ways it can be answered. It critically examines four views, three of which hold that things are better on theism than on naturalism, and one (...) of which holds just the opposite. (shrink)

This book studies the foundations of quantum theory through its relationship to classical physics. This idea goes back to the Copenhagen Interpretation (in the original version due to Bohr and Heisenberg), which the author relates to the mathematical formalism of operator algebras originally created by von Neumann. The book therefore includes comprehensive appendices on functional analysis and C*-algebras, as well as a briefer one on logic, category theory, and topos theory. Matters of foundational as well as mathematical interest that are (...) covered in detail include symmetry (and its "spontaneous" breaking), the measurement problem, the Kochen-Specker, Free Will, and Bell Theorems, the Kadison-Singer conjecture, quantization, indistinguishable particles, the quantum theory of large systems, and quantum logic, the latter in connection with the topos approach to quantum theory. This book is Open Access under a CC BY licence. (shrink)

The hypothesis of no prime worlds (NPW) holds that for any possible world x that an omnipotent being has the power to actualize, there is a better world, y , that the omnipotent being could have actualized instead of x . NPW is generally deployed to defend theism against the charge that God failed to do his best in actualizing this world. Sometimes this view is deployed to defend theism against the charge that God failed to do better in actualizing (...) this world. These defences are compelling, and, accordingly, critics of theism have developed new anti-theistic arguments on NPW. Most anti-theistic arguments on this view are a posteriori : they typically hold that a God-actualized world would exhibit (or lack) certain features, and that, since the actual world fails (or seemingly fails) to conform to these expectations, it is reasonable to believe that God does not exist. Since most of these arguments appeal to certain claims about evil, they may be treated as versions of the problem of evil. Such arguments are controversial, and the literature surrounding them is vast. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Background The Problem of No Best World Theistic Responses: Four Categories Works cited.

In recent decades, there has been astonishing growth in scientific theorizing about multiverses. Once considered outré or absurd, multiple universe theories appear to be gaining considerable scientific respectability. There are, of course, many such theories, including (i) Everett’s (1957) many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, defended by Deutsch (1997) and others; (ii) Linde’s (1986) eternal inflation view, which suggests that universes form like bubbles in a chaotically inflating sea; (iii) Smolin’s (1997) fecund universe theory, which proposes that universes are generated (...) through black holes; (iv) the cyclic model, recently defended using string/M theory by Steinhardt and Turok (2007), which holds that distinct universes are formed in a never-ending sequence of Big Bangs and Big Crunches; and (v) Tegmark’s (2007) “Level IV” multiverse, which contains many universes governed by distinct mathematical and scientific laws. While not all of these preclude each other, the details and implications of each one are hotly contested. In one area within the philosophy of religion (the debate concerning the “fine-tuning” argument), scientific multiverse theories are widely held to be hostile to theism. This is because such theories appear to account for the relevant data – the biophilic parameters of the universe we inhabit – without appeal to an intelligent designer. Yet, in recent years, several philosophers and one physicist have offered reasons for thinking that if theism is true, the actual world comprises (or probably comprises) many universes. I first set out some requirements – both scientific and otherwise – for such a theory. I then survey some problems such theories are held to face, and some prospects they are thought to have. Finally, I examine arguments both for and against the claim that multiverse theories can help theists respond to the problem of evil. I conclude that such theories advantage neither the theist or the atheist in the debate about evil: they merely require reframing arguments from evil. (shrink)

The article offers an edition, translation and commentary of eight so-called book epigrams. They all stem from eleventh-century manuscripts containing the New Testament or commentaries on it, more specifically the Paris. Coisl. 199, the Vindobon. Theol. Gr. 302, the Paris. Coisl. 26, and the Vatic. Gr. 363. While most of them are unedited, the second one is a conflation of known epigrams, and the third an unknown version of a previously edited epigram. Although book epigrams are frequently encountered in Byzantine (...) manuscripts, the genre has not received much attention. In the track of the recently increasing interest in manuscripts as cultural artifacts in their own right, our commentary focuses on the relationship between epigram and manuscript, and the process of copying. It also discusses textual problems, structure, content, function, vocabulary, and metrical features of the poems. The analysis is enriched by parallels from other, mostly contemporary, book epigrams, which were collected during an ongoing database project at Ghent University. The comparison shows, among other things, that the material belonging to this genre is ‘recyclable’: it is constantly re-used, sometimes with slight but meaningful modifications. (shrink)

Based on his earlier research the author submits the thesis that Pascal’s theological thinking is focussed on the goodness of God. After a short introduction about the historical background of the debate on grace in the seventeenth century in the western church, merely based on the interpretation of H. de Lubac, three arguments are presented to support this thesis. These can be found in Pascal’s Écrits sur la grâce and the Lettres Provinciales , Pascal's most explicit contributions on the theological (...) debate. The first indication is Pascal’s vigorous rejection of the Calvinist theology, by labelling it blasphemous. According to Pascal, the Calvinist point of view is violating the goodness and justice of God. A second indication is derived from Pascal’s adapted use of scolastic instruments. The way he is using first and second cause, for example, makes clear that only God can be the origin of good deeds. Finally, Pascal’s conception of grace, where anthropology and doctrine of God meet, explains in what sense human being is focused on the goodness of God. In this article, the central thesis about Pascal’s theological thinking is tested by investigating some of Pascal's personal letters on their theological content. In these letters the theological polemic is absent and the selected correspondence concentrates on the daily Christian life. Is Pascal confirming the thesis about his theology in this very different genre of writings? And if so, what do these letters explain about the further development of Pascal’s theology? (shrink)

ZUSAMMENFASSUNGDer vorliegende Beitrag beschreibt das Gefühl der Gier als die misslungene Antwort auf die existenzielle Grundangst und Grundsorge des Menschen. Literatur deutet der Autor als Archiv der Gefühle, hier der Gier. Im zweiten Teil diskutiert der Essay die Deutung von Goethes Faust durch den Wirtschaftswissenschaftler Hans Christoph Binswanger, der die magische Struktur des Wirtschaftens und damit die Habgier als Motor einer auf Wachstum ausgerichteten Wirtschaft entdeckt. Über das Gleichnis vom reichen Kornbauern erschließt der Autor den biblischen Phänomenbestand der Gier: Die (...) Gier dokumentiert ein falsches Selbstverständnis. Ziel kann heute nur ein Selbstverständnis sein, das dem magischen Kern des Wirtschaftens entkommt.SUMMARYThis article describes the feeling of greed as an unsuccessful response to the existential fear and worry inherent to human existence. The author interprets literature as an archive of emotions, including that of greed. The second part of the essay discusses the economist Christoph Binswanger's interpretation of Goethe's ‘Faust’. He discovers the magical structure of the economy and thus describes greed as the impetus for a growth-directed economy. Interacting with the Parable of the Rich Fool , the author deduces the biblical understanding of the phenomenon of greed: greed documents a false understanding of the self. Our contemporary aim, then, should be reaching a conception of the self which escapes the magical core of the economy. (shrink)

Aumann and Serrano :810–836, 2008) introduce the axiom of duality, which ensures that risk measures respect comparative risk aversion. This paper characterizes all dual risk measures by a simple equivalent condition. This equivalence provides a decomposition result and a construction method, which is used to analyze concrete dual measures. Moreover, this paper aims to extend this characterization to the most general setting. Compared with Aumann and Serrano, it, therefore, relaxes the axiom of positive homogeneity, and allows for risk-neutral and risk-seeking (...) agents, as well as for all integrable gambles. (shrink)

When Georg von der Gabelentz’s book Die Sprachwissenschaft was published, the historical-comparative paradigm was the dominant perspective in empirical linguistic enquiry, and the then current theory of language was fijirmly rooted in language psychology. While itself based in this tradition, Gabelentz’s Sprachwissenschaft nevertheless strikes another chord, which sets it apart from contemporary sources. This chapter argues that the book is particularly noteworthy for its wide-ranging bottom-up approach to linguistic phenomena and its propensity to conceive of language both as object and (...) instrument of enquiry in a sense akin to the ‘reflexive’ stance that later would become a hallmark of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. The ‘phenomenological mindset’ can in particular be retraced in the way a diffferent philosophy of the language sciences and theory of meaning take shape in Die Sprachwissenschaft. (shrink)

The volume is published on the occasion of the birth centennial of Eugenio Coseriu (1921–2002). It is the first collective volume to appear in English in which various scholars present a variety of perspectives on Coseriu’s scholarly work and discuss its continuing relevance for the language sciences. Coseriu’s international reputation has suffered from his commitment to publish in languages such as Spanish, German, French, Italian, Romanian and Portuguese, to the detriment of English. As a consequence, his work is less well-known (...) outside Romance and German linguistics. The volume aims to raise the general awareness of Coseriu’s work among linguists around the world, in accordance with Coseriu’s own adage that it takes a constructive mindset (acknowledging "accomplishments and limitations") to do justice to all scholarly work in the humanities. The articles are organized into three major thematic clusters: 1) philosophy of language, 2) history of the language sciences and 3) theory and practice of "Integral Linguistics". The volume is essential reading for anyone working in these fields and for those seeking to gain deeper understanding of Coseriu’s goal to develop a unitary approach to language which takes as its point of departure the "activity of speaking". (shrink)