Text John Toland a jeho Křesťanství bez mystérií sestává ze dvou provázaných částí. První část představuje stručné biografické pojednání o Johnu Tolandovi (1670–1722), v němž se mimo jiné snažíme předložit obecný úvod do jeho myšlení. Druhá část pak nabízí první český překlad předmluvy k Tolandovu nejznámějšímu spisu Christianity not Mysterious (1696), který je považován za základní impulz deistické diskuze na Britských ostrovech.

Knihu Kritika depolitizovaného rozumu (podtitul Úvahy (nejen) o nové normalizaci, Václav Bělohradský a kol., Grimmus, Všeň 2010) jsem si kupoval s vědomím, že s její- mi autory se asi nebudu ve všem shodovat, nicméně také s přesvědčením, že problém, na který poukazuje její název, je skutečně závažný, a s nadějí, že se o něm třeba dozvím něco z úhlu pohledu, který mi není vlastní, a tak se mi podaří ho nahlédnout plastičtěji. Bohužel jsem zjistil, že název knihy je pouze krycí; (...) že nejde o boj s depolitizací rozumu, ale naopak o zčásti otevřený a zčásti partyzánský boj proti skutečné politizaci, tj. proti demokratické- mu prostředí, ve kterém se otázky zá- kladního směřování společnosti mohly stát předmětem politických diskuzí a politických střetů, ve jménu absolutizace určitých velice konkrétních, pokud ne pří- mo politických, pak ideologických názorů. Jak říkám, jsem přesvědčený, že problém depolitizace rozumu tu skutečně je. Lidé, zdá se mi, skutečně mají čím dál více pocit, že všechna rozhodnutí jsou na nějakých těch odbornících, jimž do toho nejenom není potřeba mluvit, ale ani by se jim do toho mluvit nemělo. Máme stát zadlužovat? To přece musejí říci ekonomové. Mají se zakazovat politické strany? To my nevíme, ale vědět to musejí politologové či sociologové. Je potrat vražda, nebo medicínský zákrok? To by nám měli říci biologové, filozofové nebo bůhvíkdo, ale hlavně někdo, kdo to dokáže vyčíst z příslušných faktů. (shrink)

Straipsnyje aiškinamasi, kokiu mastu gando prigimties specifika nulemia jo tyrimo teo­rinių prieigų galimybes. Parodoma, kad gando kaip kultūros reiškinio tyrimo galimybes apsunkina jo rekonstravimas – autentiško gando ir jo turinio (pagrindinės minties) atkūrimas. Gando informacija apie asmenį, įvykį tampa socialiai pastebima (reikšminga) tik tarpasmeninio bendravimo kontekste. Tačiau kol ši informacija neperduota, tol ji nėra reikšminga kaip socialiai pastebimas įvykis. Gando informacijos perdavimas galimas tik esant, viena vertus, ypatingam kontaktui tarp informacijos perdavėjo ir priėmėjo, pasižyminčiam priimamumu ir atlaidumu dėl jos nepakankamo (...) pagrįstumo, kita vertus, ir atitinkamoms perdavimo procedūroms, kurios leistų transformuoti gautą informaciją į atitinkamas žinojimo formas, universalias ir suprantamas įvairiems sluoksniams ir socialinėms grupėms. Būtent tai ir sudaro prielaidas gando kaip kultūrinio reiškinio tyrinėjimo daugiaaspektiškumui, o patį gandą daro tarpdalykinio tyrimo (filosofinio, sociologinio psichologinio ir komunikacinio) objektu. (shrink)

The problem of the place and significance of the phenomena of fear and horror in the world-view of man has a long but unexplored history in science. Since ancient philosophy, these phenomena have been regarded as feelings that depend on the object-subjective perception of the phenomena of the socio-cultural life of society. However, none of the ancient authors put forward the original scientific hypothesis of the phenomenon and its justification. In modern times, fear in scientific circulation and everyday outlook has (...) become purely natural-physiological reaction of the nervous system of man to external danger. From the period of separation of psychology into a separate science and under the influence of the achievements of experimental psychophysiology of the early twentieth century. such a dominant awareness of fear has finally established itself and dominates the contemporary Western European outlook. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS The Logic of God Incarnate. By THOMAS V. MORRIS. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986. Pp. 220. $19.95. Thomas V. Morris, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, has written a technical yet provocative study on the Incarnation. As a faithful Christian he believes in and desires to defend the traditional Christian doctrine of the Incarnation proclaimed in the New Testament and defined by the (...) early councils of the Church, especially Chalcedon, that is, that Jesus is the One eternal Son existing in two natures. He also holds that, while the truth of the Incarnation is revealed, it must nonetheless stand the test of logic and reason. The Incarnation cannot be illogicaJ or meaningless. " If the church has been guided by God in such matters as the formulation of its creeds, conciliar decrees, and catechisms,.... we would not expect glaring logical flaws in its central doctrinal affirmations" (p. 46). The stated purpose of Morris's study is to defend the traditional doctrine against those who would hold it to be logically incoherent and meaningless. "In the course of thinking about the Incarnation for some years now, I have come to see that a few simple metaphysical distinctions and a solid dose of logical care will suffice to explicate and defend the doctrine against all extant criticisms of a philosophical nature" (p. 9). Morris meticulously analyzes and critiques a number of arguments that oppose the possibility of coherence of the Incarnation by attempting to demonstrate that such arguments are.either false and illogical themselves, or that they do not apply to a true understanding of the Incarnation. Moreover, Morris proposes a novel understanding of the Incarnation which he believes is both logical and intelligible, and which conforms to the Christian tradition. This goal of upholding the intelligibility of the Incarnate leads Morris to a three-fold task. He first of all must refute his chief adversaries, those who would deny the sensibleness of saying God became man in Jesus. Such critics deny the validity of the Incarnation on the ground..'! that it is meaning·less, and the'l'efore impossible to juxtapose the incommensurable. attributes of divinity and humanity, e.g., perfection/imperfection, immutability/corruptibility. They hold that Jesus could not have had both these sets of properties at once (cf. p. 20). Morris refuses to capitulate to such arguments. He nevertheless insists that any solution to the issue which would undermine human logic or which would fail to uphold the Christian's belief is no solution at all (cf. p. 32). 367 368 BOOK REVIEWS Secondly, Morris's task leads him to refute any attempts at a " OneNature " solution, which would "squash" together the human and divine natures in Jesus to form a single nature. Such proposals jeopardize either the integrity of Jesus's divinity (Arianism) or his humanity (Docetism, Monophysitism), inevitably composing a mythical tertium quid (cf. pp. 33-38). Morris presents a clear case against such corruptions of the Incarnation. Thirdly, Morris's task brings him to analyze contemporary kenotic Christology. He thoroughly discusses this approach, for the reason that it is directly involved in the issue at hand, namely, the incompatibility between divine and human properties in Christ. Secondarily, however, Morris's interest in kenoticism reflects his own hope that some variation of the approach might posibly arrive at a Christological solution (cf. p. 92). While he ultimately rejects kenoticism, Morris flirts with the various alternatives, and, as we shall see, his own perception of the Incarnation remains tinged with a kenotic flavor. How then is it possible to predicate of one and the same individual divine and human attributes intelligibly and coherentlyT To use contemporary computer jargon, the question might be phrased: is it possible that God and man can he "incarnation-friendly¥" Morris believes so. Morris first of all sets out to define the terms-divine nature and human nature. He believes part of the incompatibility problem lies in attributing to Jesus's humanity unnecessarily hostile aspects. He distinguishes between being "merely human" and being "fully human"· To be " merely human " is to possess not only those properties that narrowly define one's nature or kind, such as rationality, but... (shrink)

I agree with Richard Vallée that predicates like ‘big’, ‘tall’, etc., are comparatives, and that there are no properties of being big, or tall, etc., simpliciter. I also agree that sentence-types are not the primary carriers of truth, and, with one qualification, I too reject the three main assumptions - critically examined by him.Concordo com Richard Vallée que predicados como ‘grande’, ‘alto’, etc., são comparativos, e que não há propriedades de ser simplesmente grande, ou alto, etc. Concordo também que sentenças-tipo (...) não são os portadores de verdade primários e, com uma qualificação, também rejeito as três suposições principais - examinadas criticamente por ele. (shrink)

In §1 I discuss the pragmatic and semantic objections that Dirk raises against the claim that sentences refer to states of affairs. In §2 I explain in which sense I maintain that true sentences identify states of affairs.

It is well known that the medieval scholastics did not begin their philosophy systematically with an explicit theory of knowledge. Unfortunately many people have concluded from that fact that the very idea of an epistemology, and especially the idea of a critique of knowledge, was completely foreign to them. Within recent years authors such as Professor Van Steenberghen and Father Copleston have done a great deal to spread a correct understanding of St. Thomas’s views on this matter. Much evidence might (...) be adduced from the principal work of John Duns Scotus to show that he also took steps to justify man’s spontaneous conviction that some natural knowledge of truth with certainty can be attained. In this article we will consider some of these elements of Scotus’s philosophy as they are found in the volumes that have so far appeared in the critical edition of his works. (shrink)

O'Collins, Gerald Different templates are available for assessing where Pope Francis has been leading the church since his election on 13 March 2013. The fiftieth anniversary of the closing of the Second Vatican Council on 8 December 1965 suggests one broad template for interpreting and evaluating the Pope's continuing contribution. It is not that Francis has been beating the drum about the teaching of Vatican II and how he wants to put it into practice. Yet much of what he has (...) already taught and done shows him picking up themes of the council's teaching and taking them further. He is faithful to Vatican II, with a fidelity that is properly creative. (shrink)

The contents of the sixth book of Ennius' Annals have recently become a matter of dispute. Ever since Columna's edition it had been assumed that the book was entirely given over to the story of the war against king Pyrrhus . That view was based on the anecdote told by Quintilian 6.3.6, that Cicero, asked to say something de Sexto Annali, a witness in a law case, replied: ‘Quis potis ingentis oras euoluere belli’. It seems as good as certain that (...) this was the first line of Book VI, and belli was taken by all as referring to the Pyrrhus war. According to Dr T. Cornell, however, ‘unrolling the mighty scroll of war’ means that the poet is now going to describe warfare on the grand scale, thus setting the sequence of the third Samnite War, the Pyrrhus War, and the second Punic War against the minor wars described in the first five books. I doubt if Ennius would have felt that the early Latin war with the story of Lake Regillus, the capture of Veii, the Allia, the fall of Rome to the Gauls, and the second Samnite war were minor wars; but I am certain that bellum in the singular, except in contrast to the notion of pax, cannot refer to war in a general sense, covering a plurality of wars. (shrink)

This paper discusses the development of self-consciousness in the history of philosophy of the 20th century compared with the same development in the natural sciences. The author characterizes this stage of philosophical historiography as the “revolution of relativity.” This movement of self-consciousness was apparent in not only the humanities but also the natural sciences at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. Awareness of probability is a fundamental achievement of non-classic physics, which has since reversed its paradigm. In contrast (...) to the Newtonian scheme, quantum theory introduces the category of probability and insists that we can talk about certain physical phenomena only in a probabilistic mode and that the method of observation affects the phenomena observed. Consequently, any “object-subject” and “subject-subject” interaction involves the experience of the researcher, which thereby affects the results. The same model of interpretation lies at the basis of the turn toward self-consciousness in the history of philosophy of the 20th century. The classical history of philosophy is built on idealization and gives an objective description of the philosophical process. Following the other sciences, the philosophy of the 20th century understood that historical and philosophical reality largely depends on the historians of philosophy; that such reality is constructed by certain means; that there is a certain kind of historical and philosophical work; and that, with different strategies, methods and approaches, we obtain different results that are complementary to each other. The 20th century was a time of competing interpretations rather than gradually progressing historical and philosophical systems. This stimulated the search for own ideal of objectivity. For philosophical historiography, this is the hermeneutic ideal of the structural analysis of text or architectonic reconstruction. The historicalphilosophical revolution of relativity promotes the development of critical historiography and revises the foundations of its classical tradition. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Exploration of the Functional Properties of Interaction: Computer Models and Pointers for Theory” by Etienne B. Roesch, Matthew Spencer, Slawomir J. Nasuto, Thomas Tanay & J. Mark Bishop. Upshot: We support Roesch and his co-authors’ theoretical stance on constructivist artificial agents, and wish to enrich their “exploration of the functional properties of interaction” with complementary results. By revisiting their experiments with an agent that we developed previously, we explore two issues that they deliberately left (...) aside: autonomous intentionality and dynamic reutilization of knowledge by the agent. Our results reveal an alternative pathway to constructivism that addresses the central question of intentionality in a single agent from the very beginning of its design, suggesting that the property of distributed processing proposed by Roesch et al. is not essential to constructivism. (shrink)

The twentieth century was a period of prolonged crisis of spirituality in the Soviet Union. The atheist state used all possible and impossible levers of various influences on religious associations and ordinary believers. Since the assertion of the Soviet authorities, an open war has been declared against any manifestation of religion. There were real battles: with their ideological fronts, offensives and retreats, the whole system of operations developed and the tactical plan in line with the party-approved strategy. The result of (...) such disputes between the state and its believing citizens has been the church crises, schisms, and even the elimination of entire denominations. The most violent was the struggle against religious organizations disloyal to the Soviet authorities. It should be noted that even external loyalty did not save religious associations from the onslaught of anti-Sovietism. (shrink)