ObjectiveThe objective of this study was to explore Swedish managers’ and HR-officers’ experiences and perceptions of skills training including a development and implementation of an alcohol policy.MethodsSemi-structured interviews were conducted with Swedish managers and HR-officers from nine different organizations whom had received skills training and an organizational policy implementation. The interviews were analyzed using thematic analyses.ResultsIn total, nine themes were identified as: The prevalence of alcohol problems: a wake-up call; a reminder to intervene immediately; an altered view of the responsibility (...) of the employer; initiating conversations about alcohol: a useful toolbox; an imprecise, yet positive, memory; increased awareness of issues related to alcohol culture; I have not heard a word about a new alcohol policy; the alcohol policy: a mere piece of paper; and alcohol problem prevention: hardly a low-hanging fruit. Participants’ experiences of the skills training were positive overall.ConclusionVarious aspects of the skills training were appreciated by managers and HR-officers, including insight of prevalence statistics and employer responsibilities. Participants emphasized the value of repeated skills training occasions for retaining knowledge. Future research may investigate further in what way skills training may affect managers’ willingness to engage in workplace alcohol prevention. Since the implementation of any policy had gone unnoticed to participants, a reason for which could be related to the notion of the existing policy as “good enough” in its current condition, implementation and organizational issues, or a reluctance to address alcohol-related matters unless necessary; future research may focus on investigating in what manner alcohol policies are in fact utilized within organizations. (shrink)

Attitudinal propositionalism is the view that all mental attitude content is truth-evaluable. While attitudinal propositionalism is still silently assumed in large parts of analytic philosophy, recent work on objectual attitudes (i.e. attitudes like ‘fearing Moriarty’ and ‘imagining a unicorn’ that are reported through intensional transitive verbs with a direct object) has put attitudinal propositionalism under explanatory pressure. This paper defends propositionalism for a special subclass of objectual attitudes, viz. experiential attitudes. The latter are attitudes like seeing, remembering, and imagining whose (...) grammatical objects intuitively denote (events or) scenes. I provide a propositional analysis of experiential attitudes that preserves the merits of propositionalism. This analysis uses the possibility of representing the target-scenes of experiential attitudes by the intersection of all propositions that are true in these scenes. I show that this analysis makes available the usual (Russellian) account of intensionality and the common (Boolean) logic for entailments. (shrink)

Computational complexity has often been ignored in the philosophy of mind, in philosophical artificial intelligence studies. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First and foremost, to show the importance of complexity rather than computability in philosophical and AI problems. Second, to rephrase the notion of computability in terms of solvability, i.e., treating computability as non-sufficient for establishing intelligence. The Church-Turing thesis is therefore revisited and rephrased in order to capture the ontological background of spatial and temporal complexity. Third, to (...) emphasize ontological differences between different time complexities, which seem to provide a solid base for a better understanding of artificial intelligence in general. (shrink)

Sandra Harding's feminist standpoint epistemology makes two claims. The thesis of epistemic privilege claims that unprivileged social positions are likely to generate perspectives that are “less partial and less distorted” than perspectives generated by other social positions. The situated knowledge thesis claims that all scientific knowledge is socially situated. The bias paradox is the tension between these two claims. Whereas the thesis of epistemic privilege relies on the assumption that a standard of impartiality enables one to judge some perspectives as (...) better than others, the situated knowledge thesis seems to undermine this assumption by suggesting that all knowledge is partial. I argue that a contextualist theory of epistemic justification provides a solution to the bias paradox. Moreover, contextualism enables me to give empirical content to the thesis of epistemic privilege, thereby making it into a testable hypothesis. (shrink)

In this book, Kristina Musholt offers a novel theory of self-consciousness, understood as the ability to think about oneself. Traditionally, self-consciousness has been central to many philosophical theories. More recently, it has become the focus of empirical investigation in psychology and neuroscience. Musholt draws both on philosophical considerations and on insights from the empirical sciences to offer a new account of self-consciousness—the ability to think about ourselves that is at the core of what makes us human. -/- Examining theories (...) of nonconceptual content developed in recent work in the philosophy of cognition, Musholt proposes a model for the gradual transition from self-related information implicit in the nonconceptual content of perception and other forms of experience to the explicit representation of the self in conceptual thought. A crucial part of this model is an analysis of the relationship between self-consciousness and intersubjectivity. Self-consciousness and awareness of others, Musholt argues, are two sides of the same coin. -/- After surveying the philosophical problem of self-consciousness, the notion of nonconceptual content, and various proposals for the existence of nonconceptual self-consciousness, Musholt argues for a non-self-representationalist theory, according to which the self is not part of the representational content of perception and bodily awareness but part of the mode of presentation. She distinguishes between implicitly self-related information and explicit self-representation, and describes the transitions from the former to the latter as arising from a complex process of self–other differentiation. By this account, both self-consciousness and intersubjectivity develop in parallel. (shrink)

In recent years there has been increasing evidence that an area in the brain called the cortical midline structures is implicated in what has been termed self-related processing. This article will discuss recent evidence for the relation between CMS and self-consciousness in light of several important philosophical distinctions. First, we should distinguish between being a self and being aware of being a self. While the former consists in having a first-person perspective on the world, the latter requires the ability to (...) explicitly represent one's own perspective as such. Further, we should distinguish between being aware of oneself "as subject" and being aware of oneself "as object." The focus of existing studies investigating the relation between CMS and self has been predominantly on the ability to think about oneself, while the more basic aspects involved in being a self have been neglected. However, it is important to widen the scope of the cognitive neuroscience to include the latter, not least because this might have important implications for a better understanding of disorders of the self, such as those involved in schizophrenia. In order to do so, cognitive neuroscience should work together with philosophy, including phenomenology. Second, we need to distinguish between personal and subpersonal level explanations. It will be argued that although it is important to respect this distinction, in principle, some subpersonal facts can enter into constitutive conditions of personal-level phenomena. However, in order for this to be possible, one needs both careful conceptual analysis and knowledge about relevant cognitive mechanisms. (shrink)

An analysis of group justification enables us to understand what it means to say that a research group is justified in making a claim on the basis of evidence. I defend Frederick Schmitt's (1994) joint account of group justification by arguing against a simple summative account of group justification. Also, I respond to two objections to the joint account, one claiming that social epistemologists should always prefer the epistemic value of making true judgments to the epistemic value of maintaining consistency, (...) and another one claiming that the notion of joint commitment implicit in the joint account is epistemically unacceptable. (shrink)

Orthodox Christianity has often been understood as not pertaining to Modernity due to its different historical and theological trajectory. This essay disputes such a view with regard to 20th century Orthodox thought, which it examines from the point of view of a sociology of Modernity in order to identify where Orthodox thinkers of the Russian Diaspora and in Russia today position themselves in relation to modern society and philosophy. Two essentially modern positions within Orthodoxy are singled out: an institutional and (...) an ontological response to the modernist paradigm. (shrink)

It is a widely accepted assumption within the philosophy of mind and psychology that our ability for complex social interaction is based on the mastery of a common folk psychology, that is to say that social cognition consists in reasoning about the mental states of others in order to predict and explain their behavior. This, in turn, requires the possession of mental-state concepts, such as the concepts belief and desire. In recent years, this standard conception of social cognition has been (...) called into question by proponents of so-called ‘direct-perception’ approaches to social cognition and by those who argue that the ‘received view’ implies a degree of computational complexity that is implausible. In response, it has been argued that these attacks on the classical view of social cognition have no bite at the subpersonal level of explanation, and that it is the latter which is at issue in the debate in question. In this paper, I critically examine this response by considering in more detail the distinction between personal and subpersonal level explanations. There are two main ways in which the distinction has been developed. I will argue that on either of these, the response proposed by defenders of the received view is unconvincing. This shows that the dispute between the standard conception and alternative approaches to mindreading is a dispute concerning personal-level explanations - what is at stake in the debate between proponents of the classical view of social cognition and their critics is how we, as persons, navigate our social world. I will conclude by proposing a pluralistic approach to social cognition, which is better able to do justice to the multi-faceted nature of our social interactions as well as being able to account for recent empirical findings regarding the social cognitive abilities of young infants. (shrink)

In this review ofThe Limits to Capital in Spainby Greig Charnock, Thomas Purcell and Ramon Ribera-Fumaz andFin de Cicloby Isidro López and Emmanuel Rodríguez, I discuss how the two books advance our understanding of the Spanish crisis and the forms of resistance that have arisen since it began in 2008.

Ethics for Health Care considers ethics in the context of routine health care. It follows a sequence that is familiar in health care education and practice: training, adopting a profession, becoming a team member in a health care setting, beginning to see clients, and working with clients as their treatment progresses. While the theory of health care ethics is a central feature of the discussion, the book moves beyond the traditional theory-oriented organisation of most ethics texts to a structure that (...) is generated by practical, professional, and client needs. Focusing on the interaction between health care provider and client, it draws on practical experience and contemporary issues in its exploration of the ethical choices that must be made in health care. Readers are encouraged to relate the ideas presented to their own views and experiences, and to answer questions as they read. Ethical issues are a feature of the everyday work of health professionals. This book is designed to equip health care students and health professionals with the skills and knowledge to deal with these concerns. (shrink)

Streaming services for audiobooks and ebooks have grown rapidly in recent years. The shift in consumption patterns has transformed both reading and publishing. One visible change is the attraction and importance of backlist titles. The article investigates how the relationship between frontlist and backlist in the bestseller segment has developed, and discusses the shift in the power balance between the two. By examining large-scale consumer behaviour data from one of the key players in subscription-based digital bookselling – Storytel – we (...) track book consumption both in detail and at a structural level. Our results show that backlist titles are increasingly important for bestselling authors who continue to publish frontlist titles, especially for fiction written in series. Streaming services foster new types of book consumption behaviour thanks to a combination of technology, media, reading habits, and social change. (shrink)

ILaw, Regulation and Ethics introduces students to the responsibilities and standards in health care derived from legal, ethical and regulatory frameworks. The text approaches ethics and law for health care in an integrated and accessible way, covering governance, professional identity, and professional responsibility whereby accountability plays an important role. The text combines examples of legal and administrative decisions with the reasoning behind decisions, to introduce students to societal expectations of institutions and persons engaged in health care. Sourced from a variety (...) of regulatory, ethics, and policy arenas, the examples equip students with the ability to identify and understand appropriate standards in order to practice safely and competently, and to recognize when a situation is problematic and deserving of greater reflection or expert advice. Practice-oriented case examples and critical-reflection questions enhance the text and encourage students to develop effective practice habits, whereby active reflection, reasoning, problem solving and mindfulness become essential components of working in the health care sector. (shrink)

A general practice research project on ethics is underway at the University of New South Wales, funded by GPEP. Ethical issues, as defined and explored by general practitioners and consumers, are being examined across four areas of Sydney.So far, telephone interviews have been conducted with a random sample of general practitioners. Face-to-face interviews have been conducted with 107 consumers, randomly sampled using ABS collection district information. Focus groups have been formed to discuss acceptable solutions to GP and consumer identified ethical (...) issues. This report will report on some preliminary findings to date and will explore professional and consumer roles in the formation of ethical solutions. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 62 Heft: 2 Seiten: 231-238.

In recent years, feminist philosophy of science has been subjected to criticism. The debate has focused on the implications of the underdetermination thesis for accounts of the role of social values in scientific reasoning. My aim here is to offer a different approach. I suggest that feminist philosophers of science contribute to our understanding of science by (1) producing gender‐sensitive analyses of the social dimensions of scientific inquiry and (2) examining the relevance of these analyses for normative issues in philosophy (...) of science. (shrink)

Self-consciousness can be defined as the ability to think 'I'-thoughts. Recently, it has been suggested that self-consciousness in this sense can (and should) be accounted for in terms of nonconceptual forms of self-representation. Here, I will argue that while theories of nonconceptual self-consciousness do provide us with important insights regarding the essential genetic and epistemic features of self-conscious thought, they can only deliver part of the full story that is required to understand the phenomenon of self-consciousness. I will provide two (...) arguments to this effect, drawing on insights from the philosophy of language and on structural differences between conceptual and nonconceptual forms of representation. Both arguments rest on the intuition that while self-consciousness requires explicit self-representation, nonconceptual content can at best provide implicit self-related information. I will conclude that in order to explain the emergence of self-conscious thought out of more basic forms of representations one has to explain the transition between implicit self-related information and explicit self-representation. (shrink)

For millennia, human beings have believed that it is morally wrong to judge others by the fortuitous or unfortunate events that befall them or by the actions of another person. Rather, an individual’s own intended, deliberate actions should be the basis of his or her evaluation, reward, and punishment. In a series of studies, the authors investigated whether such rules guide the judgments of children. The first 3 studies demonstrated that children view lucky others as more likely than unlucky others (...) to perform intentional good actions. Children similarly assess the siblings of lucky others as more likely to perform intentional good actions than the siblings of unlucky others. The next 3 studies demonstrated that children as young as 3 years believe that lucky people are nicer than unlucky people. The final 2 studies found that Japanese children also demonstrate a robust preference for the lucky and their associates. These findings are discussed in relation to M. J. Lerner’s (1980) just-world theory and J. Piaget’s (1932/1965) immanent-justice research and in relation to the development of intergroup attitudes. (shrink)

In recent years, phenomenologically informed philosophers, psychologists and psychiatrists have attempted to import philosophical notions associated with the self into the empirical study of pathological experience. In particular, so-called ipseity disturbances have been put forward as generative of symptoms of schizophrenia, and several attempts have been made to operationalize and measure kinds and degrees of ipseity disturbances in schizophrenia. However, we find that this work faces challenges caused by the fact that the notion of ipseity is used ambiguously, both in (...) the philosophical and in the empirical discussion, and the methods employed to operationalize ipseity often portray a rather different understanding of the notion from that found in the literature that is cited as providing the philosophical foundation for the studies in question. In particular, according to the definitions found in the philosophical literature, while being phenomenologically available, the self is not represented in ipseity. However, when it comes to the empirical study of ipseity and its disturbances, the object of investigation is often a kind of explicit self-representation. As a result, it is unclear whether different researchers are really talking about the same thing. Future progress in this area will require more careful conceptual distinctions; the present article aims to contribute to this task. (shrink)

This paper examines parents experiences of medical decision-making and coping with having a critically ill baby in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU) from a cross-cultural perspective (France vs. U.S.A.). Though parents experiences in the NICU were very similar despite cultural and institutional differences, each system addresses their needs in a different way. Interviews with parents show that French parents expressed overall higher satisfaction with the care of their babies and were better able to cope with the loss of their (...) child than American parents. Central to the French parents perception of autonomy and their sense of satisfaction were the strong doctor–patient relationship, the emphasis on medical certainty in prognosis versus uncertainty in the American context, and the sentimental work" provided by the team. The American setting, characterized by respect for parental autonomy, did not necessarily translate into full parental involvement in decision-making, and it limited the rapport between doctors and parents to the extent of parental isolation. This empirical comparative approach fosters a much-needed critique of philosophical principles by underscoring, from the parents perspective, the lack of emotional work" involved in the practice of autonomy in the American unit compared to the paternalistic European context. Beyond theoretical and ethical arguments, we must reconsider the practice of autonomy in particularly stressful situations by providing more specific means to cope, translating the impersonal language of rights" and decision-making into trusting, caring relationships, and sharing the responsibility for making tragic choices. (shrink)

Why should we think that there is such a thing as pre-reflective self-awareness? And how is this kind of self-awareness to be characterized? This paper traces a theoretical and a phenomenological line of argument in favor of the notion of pre-reflective self-consciousness and explores how this notion can be further illuminated by appealing to recent work in the analytical philosophy of language and mind. In particular, it argues that the self is not represented in the (nonconceptual) content of experience, but (...) is rather implicit in the mode. Further, it argues that pre-reflective self-consciousness is best understood as a form of knowledge-how. Finally, it will be argued that our sense of self is thoroughly social, even at the basic, pre-reflective level. (shrink)

Ives et al claim to have identified a paradox within patient and public involvement in research1—that is, that the benefits of PPI can never be fully realised because when a lay person is trained to a level at which they can make a useful contribution to research, they lose their unique ‘lay’ perspective. They conclude that we should not train lay people in research before involvement. Ives et al also conclude that we should not develop a collaborative approach to PPI (...) in conducting research. Both these conclusions are flawed. PPI does not always involve the lay person acquiring the same skills as a researcher, and even when it does, that person never loses their unique ‘lay’ perspective.PPI is a complex activity that is highly context dependent. There are many different kinds of involvement requiring different kinds of lay expertise. In many cases the lay person does not need to acquire research skills in order to be effective. They can make useful contributions without being ‘turned into a researcher’. The views of the lay person are complementary to those of the technical experts. PPI provides an insight into the interests and concerns of the participants and …. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

I argue that in epistemically well-designed scientific communities, scientists are united by mutual epistemic responsibilities, and epistemic responsibilities are understood not merely as epistemic but also as moral duties. Epistemic responsibilities can be understood as moral duties because they contribute to the well-being of other human beings by showing respect for them, especially in their capacity as knowers. A moral account of epistemically responsible behaviour is needed to supplement accounts that appeal to scientists’ self-interests or personal epistemic goals. This is (...) because neither the self-interest nor the epistemic account can always explain why it is rational for an individual scientist to be epistemically responsible. (shrink)

This article gives an overview of 4 important lacunae in political liberalism and identifies, in a preliminary fashion, some trends in the literature that can come in for support in filling these blind spots, which prevent political liberalism from a correct assessment of the diverse nature of religious claims. Political liberalism operates with implicit assumptions about religious actors being either ‘liberal’ or ‘fundamentalist’ and ignores a third, in-between group, namely traditionalist religious actors and their claims. After having explained what makes (...) traditionalist religious actors different from liberal and fundamentalist religious actors, the author develops 4 areas in which political liberalism should be pushed further theoretically in order to correctly theorize the challenge which traditional religious actors pose to liberal democracy. These 4 areas are: the context of translation; the politics of exemptions; the multivocality of theology; and the transnational nature of norm-contestation. (shrink)

While triage protocols share a common goal—maximizing life by selecting patients who would most benefit from critical care—there are many variations in the selection of criterion to respond to situ...

: This essay is a collection of my experiences of and reflections on being pregnant and choosing to place the child for open adoption. The piece was started late in the term of my pregnancy and completed about a week before the birth.

Two experiments investigated subliminal semantic and form priming in a word-completion task. Visual gap-words with a dominant and a subordinate solution were preceded by form-related or by semantically related words, which were briefly presented and sandwich-masked. Priming of the subordinate solution was assessed in Experiment 1, relative to a neutral condition. Both solutions were primed in Experiment 2. In the absence of conscious prime recognition, both semantic and form primes reliably increased the probability with which the primed solution was given. (...) With our variant of fragment-completion, response priming can be ruled out as explanation. Moreover, effects were already present at first presentation, excluding an interpretation in terms of partial awareness due to massive repetition. The data demonstrate automatic activation at both form and semantic levels in the absence of conscious awareness. (shrink)