O presente trabalho é a versão, ligeiramente modificada, em língua portuguesa, de um original alemão redigido em meados de 1979. O texto original contou a colaboração, e a crítica de Ulf Wolfgramm, então meu colega no Curso de Filosofia da Freie Universitaet-Berlin. O artigo é uma abordagem crítica à obra de kurt Huebner intitulada Kritik der wissenschaftlichen Vemunft (Crítica da razão científica). Mais precisamente, ao décimo primeiro capítulo desta obra, por sua vez intitulado Kritik am Wahrheitsbegriff in der (...) Popperschen Philosophie und der Wahrheitsbegriff der historistischen Theric der empirischen wissenschaften (Crítica ao conceito de verdade na filosofia de Popper e o conceito de verdade da teoria historística das ciências empíricas). Neste capítulo, de significado central para a obra, o autor, inicialmente, critica a versão poperiana da teoria da verdade de Tarski. A seguir, ele contrapõe sua própria concepção da verdade à de Popper. Estabelecer critérios, destinados a permitir uma avaliação da crítica de Huebner, é o primeiro passo dado neste trabalho. [...] Palavras-chave: Crítica; Kurt Huebner; Razão Científica; Avaliação crítica; Teoria Crítica. (shrink)

Contributions de: Préface de Sava Ganovski - Alfred Cyril Ewing, My philosophical Attitude/Mon attitude philosophique - Marvin Farber, On the Philosopher's Individual Testimony as the Authentic Form of Thought/Connaissance de la pensée par le témoignage personnel - Kurt Huebner, Von der Geschichtlichkeit der empirischen Wissenschaften/ L'historicité des sciences empiriques - Richard McKeon, The Circumstances and Functions of Philosophy/Les conditions d'exercice et les fonctions de la philosophie - John Passmore, The Making of an Australian Philosopher/La réalisation d'un philosophe australien (...) - Chaim Perelman, Philosophie, rhétorique, lieux communs/Philosophy, Rhetoric, Common Places - Ioannis N. Theodoracopoulos, La philosophie comme témoignage de l'expérience intérieure/Die Philosophie als Zeugnis der inneren Erfahrung. (shrink)

The uncanny valley—the unnerving nature of humanlike robots—is an intriguing idea, but both its existence and its underlying cause are debated. We propose that humanlike robots are not only unnerving, but are so because their appearance prompts attributions of mind. In particular, we suggest that machines become unnerving when people ascribe to them experience, rather than agency. Experiment 1 examined whether a machine’s humanlike appearance prompts both ascriptions of experience and feelings of unease. Experiment 2 tested whether a machine capable (...) of experience remains unnerving, even without a humanlike appearance. Experiment 3 investigated whether the perceived lack of experience can also help explain the creepiness of unfeeling humans and philosophical zombies. These experiments demonstrate that feelings of uncanniness are tied to perceptions of experience, and also suggest that experience—but not agency—is seen as fundamental to humans, and fundamentally lacking in machines. (shrink)

Concepts from functional theories of emotions are integrated with principles of skill development to produce a theory of emotional development. The theory provides tools for predicting both the sequences of emotional development and the ways emotions shape development. Emotions are characterised in terms of three component models: (a) the process of emotion generation from event appraisal, (b) a hierarchy of emotion categories organised around a handful of basic-emotion families, and (c) a characterisation of emotions in terms of prototypic event scripts. (...) The basic emotions and the positive vs. negative hedonic components of emotions function as constraints or organisers that shape behaviour whenever an emotion is activated. Through these patterning effects, emotions shape both short-term behavioural organisation and long-term development. The skill-development component of the theory explains how, as children grow, they construct and control increasingly complex skills—which affect many aspects of emotion, from appraisal to emotional self-control. These skills can be characterised in terms of a series of developmental tiers and levels; they are not fixed traits of the child but instead are affected by assessment conditions and emotional action tendencies. The developmental process gradually moves from basic, species-specific emotions to culture-specific, subordinate-category emotions and the complexities of adult emotional experiences. The theory provides a set of conceptual and methodological tools to predict and assess emotional development. It also indicates how emotional development fits with other aspects of systematic change in the organisation of behaviour. (shrink)

M̀atter Matters is a work of genius. The work exhibits a breathtaking spread of erudition from antiquity to the present, mobilized to elucidate the early modern significance of the concept of matter. The slight play of words in the title expresses the principal thesis of the work, that mathematics is intelligible for Descartes if and only if matter exists as its object. Smith understands, better than anyone, how Descartes could claim, literally, that "my physics is nothing but geometry." Many will (...) be convinced, some dismayed, and all will be dazzled by this book.'---Thomas M. Lennon, The University of Western Ontario". (shrink)

Bioethical debate in Europe is partly a reaction to political endeavors and events. In line with the political goal of a united Europe, a European regulation is being sought for medical research and medical ethics ('Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine'). A certain degree of ambivalence has come to the fore: whilst it does seem possible to reach a consensus (albeit a merely 'diplomatic' consensus) about complicated bioethical issues at an international level when certain controversial matters are excluded or a (...) certain vagueness maintained, new principles are also required at a national level, for example when the medical profession of one state feels obliged to assume a 'local' stance, such as in the sensitive issue of termination of treatment. The individual contributions to this publication, together with various other current fields of bioethical conflict in Europe - especially Germany - are introduced below against a common background, namely that the original dividing line between the concealed and the revealed has shifted. (shrink)

Abstract“Victories of Freedom which Humans Achieved by Research in the Foundation of Things”. ‐ This article analyzes the political self‐conception of leading representatives of the natural sciences in 19th century Germany. It is argued that the main feature of this self‐conception which remained constant over the time consisted in a strong “rationalization‐imperative”, i.e. the postulate that state and society have to be reshaped on the basis of natural science. On the other hand, this imperative was put forward in very different (...) forms and with different political content: it shifted from revolutionary aspirations in the period of 1848 to moderate and sometimes even reactionary positions in the last decades of the century. (shrink)

From its very beginnings Darwinian theory of Evolution has had a strong appeal for philosophers; attempts have been made, among others, to base a philosophical understanding of the nature of scientific change on the Darwinian principle of natural selection. In its first section the present paper gives a sketch of the conceptions of Ernst Mach, Karl Popper and Stephen Toulmin, which converge on the claim that scientific change not only can be seen in analogy to organismic evolution, but has to (...) be conceived of as evolutionary in a strict sense of the term. In the second section this claim is analyzed critically; it is asked, whether these conceptions are based on a correct understanding of Darwinian theory and whether they succesfully translate its basic assumptions to philosophy of science. In the final section some of the main philosophical implications of the evolutionary perspective on scientific change are discussed, especially its tendency to interpret this change as a natural process. (shrink)

George Herbert Mead is widely considered one of the most influential American philosophers of the twentieth century, and his work remains vibrant and relevant to many areas of scholarly inquiry today. The Timeliness of George Herbert Mead brings together a range of scholars who provide detailed analyses of Mead’s importance to innovative fields of scholarship, including cognitive science, environmental studies, democratic epistemology, and social ethics, non-teleological historiography, and the history of the natural and social sciences. Edited by well-respected Mead scholars (...) Hans Joas and Daniel R. Huebner, the volume as a whole makes a coherent statement that places Mead in dialogue with current research, pushing these domains of scholarship forward while also revitalizing the growing literature on an author who has an ongoing and major influence on sociology, psychology, and philosophy. (shrink)

The global array may be a useful concept in studying behavior in a complex environment, especially in the context of dynamical systems theory. However, Stoffregen & Bardy's arguments are weakened by the conflation of sensation and perception, and by the lack of evidence for synergy between stimulus energy arrays; strong evidence places the convergence of sensory stimuli inside the head.

Mathematics -- Experimental physics -- Chemistry -- Natural history -- Medicine.

In William Angoff's recent article in Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, he presented several thought-provoking philosophical issues of concern to measurement-oriented psychologists. The first of these issues, the notion of test and item bias, is the topic of the present paper. In his article, he reports that average score differences in the performance on many cognitive tests have appeared among racial or ethnic groups. Twenty to thirty years ago, differential psychologists, summarizing and critically evaluating studies demonstrating performance differences on tests and (...) in other behavior among cultural, ethnic and racial groups, agreed that such group differences indeed existed, but that causal interpretations differed markedly among the investigators at the time. More recently, the focus has shifted to what has been termed test fairness, with the focus falling more upon tests and their inadequacies than the behavior which underlies the tests. Similar findings and conclusions were frequently advanced in physiological tests of strength and endurance which are often used for civil service positions such as those in the fire fighting service and which frequently disadvantage women. The question raised is simply whether the discrimination is fair or not; that is, do given test score differences reflect variation in performance between groups which are reflective of true behavioral differences or are these differences artifactual and embedded in the assessment device itself, whether intentional or not. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Summary For Imre Lakatos hismethodology of scientific research programmes was not only a philosophical theory of science and scientific change but also the conceptual foundation of empirical and historical studies of science. At least terminologically this view is today widely accepted: The concept of aresearch programme is used in all sorts of literature on science. In the present paper I argue that this concept can lead to serious distortions of empirical and historical studies of science if it is not detached (...) from the Lakatosian philosophical framework. Themethodology of scientific research programmes has three main pitfalls, which may lead to disorientations of empirical and historical studies of science: (1) Contrary to what the term research programme may suggest, it offers no perspective on scientific research as an object of analysissui generis; (2) its concept of science is too narrow and covers only minor parts of what counts as science in the real world; (3) it reduces history of science to a mere sequence of research programmes and thereby eliminates the fact that there is an evolution of the structure of research programmes, too. (shrink)