A significant goal of neuroethics is to offer neuroscientists, health care providers, law- and policy-makers and others, ways of thinking and acting on matters relevant to brain health and conditions that affect the central nervous system. This goal and related calls to action have been derived from theory or empirical work and bring different levels of normative force. To bring the latter in particular to the foreground of discussion, we explored for this Policy Forum different calls to action as they (...) are associated with chosen terminology, the definitions of terms, origins to which they are benchmarked, locations in text, and targeted audiences. We find variability on all of these factors as they appear in the original foundational journals for neuroethics: AJOB Neuroscience and Neuroethics. We recommend that for a field whose very existence relies on uptake of advice, better consistency of language will improve credibility, acceptance, and implementation. (shrink)

While it is widely acknowledged that psychology is in the throes of a replication ‘crisis’, relatively little attention has been paid to the role theory plays in our evaluation of replications as ‘failed’ or ‘successful’. This paper applies well-known arguments in philosophy of science about the interplay between theory and experiment to a contemporary case study of infants’ understanding of false belief (Onishi and Baillargeon [2005]), and attempts to replicate it. It argues that the lack of consensus about over-arching theories (...) informing both the concepts under study and the methodologies used to track them means that researchers disagree over which experiments constitute replications of the original. The second part of the paper places this specific debate within a broader discussion of the replication crisis as a crisis of ‘theory’, developing work by Muthukrishna and Henrich ([2018]) and Bird ([2018]). Bird argues that the lack of agreed over-arching theories in psychology means that a high rate of replication failure is to be expected; this paper agrees with his diagnosis but challenges his proposal that more replication will resolve the problem. (shrink)

The role of culture in shaping folk psychology and mindreading has been neglected in the philosophical literature. This paper shows that there are significant cultural differences in how psychological states are understood and used by drawing on Spaulding’s recent distinction between the ‘goals’ and ‘methods’ of mindreading to argue that the relations between these methods vary across cultures; and arguing that differences in folk psychology cannot be dismissed as irrelevant to the cognitive architecture that facilitates our understanding of psychological states. (...) The paper concludes that any good account of social cognition must have the conceptual resources to explain how culture affects our understanding of psychological states, and that this explanandum should not be an after-thought but instead a guiding feature for those accounts. (shrink)

We spend a lot of time thinking about other people: their motivations, what they are thinking, why they want particular things. Sometimes we are aware of it, but it often occurs without conscious thought, and we can respond appropriately to other people's thoughts in a diverse range of situations. The Social Mind: A Philosophical Introduction examines the cognitive capacities that facilitate this amazing ability. It explains and critiques key philosophical theories about how we think about other people's minds, measuring them (...) against empirical findings from neuroscience, anthropology, developmental psychology and cognitive ethology. Some of the fascinating questions addressed include: How do we think about other people's minds? Do we put ourselves in another's shoes to work out what they think? When do we need to think about another person's thoughts? What kinds of thoughts do we attribute to others? Are they propositional attitudes like beliefs and desires as analytic philosophers have often assumed, or could they be something else? What sorts of neural mechanisms underlie our ability to think about other people's thoughts? How is the ability to think about other minds different for individuals on the autism Spectrum? Is a preoccupation with other people's thoughts a Western phenomenon or is it found in all cultures? How do children learn to think about other minds? Can non-human animals think about other minds? These questions are applied to case studies throughout the book, including mirror neurons, recent research on infant social cognition, false belief tasks, and cross-cultural studies. Covering complex interdisciplinary debates in an accessible and clear way, with chapter summaries, annotated further reading, and a glossary, The Social Mind: A Philosophical Introduction is an ideal entry point into this fast-moving and exciting field. It is essential reading for students of philosophy of mind and psychology, and also of interest to those in related subjects such as cognitive science, social and developmental psychology, and anthropology. (shrink)

" Pourquoi y a-t-il quelque chose et non pas plutôt rien? " Telle est sans doute la question la plus célèbre à laquelle l'ontologie, qui se veut précisément la science de l'être en tant qu'être, est censée répondre. Néanmoins cette question est-elle légitime? Nous faisons tous une expérience de l'être, à la fois externe et interne, sous la forme du monde et sous la forme du sujet. En lieu et place du rien nous trouvons toujours quelque chose. Aussi Lavelle, (...) après Bergson, conteste-t-il la présence contradictoire du néant au sein de l'être : ce dernier est partout présent, et c'est pourquoi l'ontologie lavellienne est résolument optimiste. Dans cet exposé dense et clair, le philosophe dessine le cercle qui lie d'une manière indestructible le renouvellement et la manifestation de chaque chose au moyen de trois concepts : l'être, l'existence et la réalité. Bien qu'univoque, l'être se décline en effet selon un mouvement de donation qui a pour fil conducteur la catégorie charnière de l'existence. Mais la démarche de Lavelle ne s'arrête pas là, elle tend à nous montrer que l'articulation des trois notions précédentes doit être elle-même comprise en relation avec les catégories axiologiques que sont le bien, la valeur et l'idéal. L'être est pour Lavelle la source de toute positivité, et c'est pourquoi son ontologie, qui comble en même temps notre intellect et notre volonté, renoue par-delà le christianisme avec la grande tradition grecque, en nous proposant les principes d'une sagesse possible ici et maintenant. (shrink)

Philosophers and psychologists have often maintained that in order to attribute mental states to other people one must have a ‘theory of mind’. This theory facilitates our grasp of other people’s mental states. Debate has then focussed on the form this theory should take. Recently a new approach has been suggested, which I call the ‘Direct Perception approach to social cognition’. This approach maintains that we can directly perceive other people’s mental states. It opposes traditional views on two counts: by (...) claiming that mental states are observable and by claiming that we can attribute them to others without the need for a theory of mind. This paper argues that there are two readings of the direct perception claims: a strong and a weak one. The Theory-theory is compatible with the weak version but not the strong one. The paper argues that the strong version of direct perception is untenable, drawing on evidence from the mirror neuron literature and arguments from the philosophy of science and perception to support this claim. It suggests that one traditional ‘theory of mind’ view, the ‘Theory-theory’ view, is compatible with the claim that mental states are observable, and concludes that direct perception views do not offer a viable alternative to theory of mind approaches to social cognition. (shrink)

A profound reading of the Narcissus tale and of the recovery of one's own soul.

Le grand oeuvre de Louis Lavelle, La dialectique de l'eternel present, devait se conclure par un volume sur la sagesse. Si sa disparition en 1951 ne lui a pas permis d'ecrire ce volume, on trouve dans les livres qu'il a publies des textes sur la sagesse et il a laisse par ailleurs des notes inedites consacrees a ce theme. En regroupant ces differents fragments, on voit se dessiner les contours essentiels que revetait aux yeux de Lavelle la notion (...) de sagesse. Un tel ensemble permet d'identifier les lignes de force du volume De la sagesse qui n'a pu voir le jour, et ce tant sur le plan metaphysique que sur le plan ethique. Selon le philosophe, la vraie sagesse ne se limite ni a l'ideal grec de mesure, ni a l'ideal cartesien de rationalite, mais s'ouvre a l'experience spirituelle interiorisee. A une epoque ou la recherche de la serenite, trop souvent oubliee par la philosophie, revet une importance cruciale, vitale, les textes de Chemins de sagesse ont l'insigne merite de poser les jalons d'une vie en harmonie avec le monde, autrui et l'absolu. (shrink)

The cognitive ability to think about other people's psychological states is known as `mindreading'. This Element critiques assumptions that have been formative in shaping philosophical theories of mindreading: that mindreading is ubiquitous, underpinning the vast majority of our social interactions; and that its primary goal is to provide predictions and explanations of other people's behaviour. It begins with an overview of key positions and empirical literature in the debate. It then introduces and motivates the pluralist turn in this literature, which (...) challenges the core assumptions of the traditional views. The second part of the Element uses case studies to further motivate the pluralist framework, and to advocate the pluralist approach as the best way to progress our understanding of social cognitive phenomena. (shrink)

In two essays, first published in book form in 1940, Louis Lavelle delves into Evil and Suffering, tracing their relationships with Good and Happiness, the Body and the Spirit, Matter and Spirit. Evil and Suffering is considered a work of moral philosophy. In it, Lavelle leads us to reflect on suffering and how it is inserted in the inner and outer world of the being. From this experience of living suffering, according to the author, the spirit arises. The (...) marks that pain causes in us allows us to transcend what we are to the external world, after understanding ourselves with suffering in the inner world. If suffering is an inherent condition of human life, it remains for him to do his best, face it and overcome it. According to Lavelle, it is suffering itself that gives meaning to life; but this is only possible if there is awareness that one suffers, because it is this awareness that awakens the spirit. The author also, through antitheses, tells us that it is in the absence that we find the presence, in the darkness we see the light, in loneliness we find community, in an inner deepening, where we perceive reality. Therefore, suffering connects beings. Pain shapes us, awakens us and makes us better beings if we know how to face it. Reading this book, of incredible spiritual richness, generates in us a dialogue about suffering, in order to transcend it. (shrink)

Histories of science in modern China often explore their subjects within global or national frameworks. This essay uses data from gazetteers to address the place-based nature of Chinese agricultural science as it developed at smaller geographical scales. Information contained in gazetteers suggests that regional environmental knowledge and site-specific social networks influenced the construction and communication of scientific ideas about farming at the local level. By highlighting these dimensions of knowledge making, this essay demonstrates the benefits of using gazetteers to grapple (...) with the importance of place in Chinese science. (shrink)

It has been agreed upon, according to critical perspective, to distinguish the problems raised by scientific issues on the one hand and the problems raised by moral issues on the other. This distinction, at the genesis of theoretical ideology, postulates that experimental science is mere knowledge which, since it has nothing to do with action, cannot raise a moral problem. Yet the use of experimental techniques turns out to be a necessary means, although an insufficient one, to put to the (...) test and to confirm the theoretical hypothesis of science. Thus, those techniques produce perceptible effects which can be assimilated to genuine transformation and are consequently capable of raising moral problems. It follows that the technical imperative of science can be conditioned by a moral imperative of technique, which leads to modification of the object of the research and dubs it, a dialectical object. It is, however, advisable to effect a demarcation between that which, within the frame work of research in experimental science, can pose a moral problem and which cannot. The criterion of refusability of practical projects, by analogy with Popper’s criterion of refutability of theoretical conjectures, allows for this demarcation to be implemented. It postulates that only the technical projects of science, apart from scientific theories, can pose a moral problem or can be recognized as moral, providing that the conditions of a possible ethical refusal can be expressed. From the analysis and the synthesis of heterogeneous possibilities, dialectical perspective thus outlined represents an endeavour to go beyond critical perspective, while trying to seek an intermediary channel between the “progressist dogmatism” of science and the “obscurantist scepticism” of morals. (shrink)

L. Lavelle (1883-1951) convie le lecteur à une réflexion sur des expériences qui sont le propre de toute existence : la souffrance du corps et la provocation du mal dans le monde ; la rencontre avec autrui qui est toujours une aventure, échec ou enrichissement, affinement de la personne ou condamnation à un repli sur soi.

In an essayistic and experimental approach, which includes the reconstruction of conceptual contexts and poetic writing, this article interrogates the passages and hybridizations between poetry and philosophy from the point of view of their relation to Eros. Thus, in dialogues with Sappho, Anne Carson, Walter Benjamin and Hans Blumenberg, I present the notion of “eroticization of language” as a point of convergence between poetic production and theoretical impulse.

t. 1. Théorie générale de la valeur.--t. 2. Le système des différentes valeurs.

We often explain by citing an absence or an omission. Apart from the problem of assigning a causal role to such apparently negative factors as absences and omissions, there is a puzzle as to why only some absences and omissions, out of indefinitely many, should figure in explanations. In this paper we solve this ’many absences problem’ by using the contrastive model of explanation. The contrastive model of explanation is developed by adapting Peter Lipton’s account. What initially appears to be (...) only a trivial amendment to Lipton’s Difference Condition enables us both to offer a much more satisfactory solution to the ’many absences problem’ than David Lewis did, and also to explain why explanation in terms of absences and omissions should be so common. (shrink)

RESUMO Este artigo constrói uma afinidade entre a noção benjaminiana de “semelhança não sensível” e o “trabalho da semelhança” do qual fala Ricœur a propósito da metáfora. Para isso pressupõe uma referência comum: o princípio kantiano das afinidades, que corresponde ao poder de produzir e de perceber ao mesmo tempo a diferença na identidade e a identidade na diferença, constituindo o modo de funcionamento do esquematismo em geral. Seguindo caminhos diferentes, Benjamin e Ricœur tematizam essa tensão comparativa que caracteriza a (...) imaginação, examinando sua ação na construção poética e na reflexividade que lhe é inerente. ABSTRACT The present article builds na affinity between the Benjamininan notion of “non-sensitive likeness” and the “work of likeness” talked about by Ricœur, regarding the metaphor. For that purpose he presupposes a common reference: Kant’s principle of affinities, which corresponds power of producing and noticing, at the same time, the difference in identity and the identity in difference, thus building the modus operandi of the schamtism in general. Following diverse paths, Benjamin and Ricœur thematize that comparative tension characteristic of imagination also examining its effect in poetic construction and in its inherent reflectivity. (shrink)