This article introduces the doctrine of the passions in the Hobbesian work, showing its debt with tradition, especially the scholastic Aristotelian one, even if, at the same time, it offers some breach features with this tradition, which are also analysed. In addition, the fundamentals of imagination manifest themselves in the appetitive process, in Hobbes's doctrine as well as in the scholastic Aristotelian tradition, showing their similarities and differences.

Undoubtedly, Ewin's view of Thomas Hobbes's moral philosophy offers a fresh counterpart to most current analytical readings of Hobbes by recent American scholars, such as Gregory Kavka and Jean Hampton. Staying close to Hobbes's text, this Australian professor is continuously in debate with these two authors, criticizing their game theoretic reconstruction of Hobbesian philosophy. Ewin's main purpose seems to be the revival of Hobbes's reputation as a moral philosopher.

Generally, the topic of Hobbes's ethics that has received little attention is the "good"1, probably because the critical viewpoint has almost always been from politics and social philosophy; their focus is the justification of rules, obligation, the relationship between natural law and civil law and so on. This paper intends to consider different approaches to the theme of "good" given in the complete works of Hobbes, and not just the politically focused works, to explain the apparent contradictions.

The primary purpose of this paper is to show the change in the notion of authority as reflected in Leviathan with respect to De Cive on account of the inclusion, in the former, of the concept of authorization. This notion, which had not appeared in either De Cive or Elements of Law, introduces a new way of conceiving of sovereignty, of power and even of the view on the Kingdom of God. In this paper I will also undertake an analysis, (...) both textual and contextual, of these new approaches, which are closely linked to the notion of authority. (shrink)

Zitta once attended a course given by Lukács in Budapest. He has prepared an impressive partial bibliography of Lukács' pre-1958 writings, and he liberally scatters the sometimes erratic, often interesting notes of an undisciplined but voracious reader throughout his text. The book-beautifully printed, promising insight into a great but much-neglected thinker, its title replete with four of the most emotion-charged words in contemporary philosophical vocabularies—appears on the surface to emanate intellectual respectability. In fact, it is a clearer candidate (...) than most of those chosen by Lukacs himself to illustrate "die Zerstörung der Vernunft." Zitta's method takes its cue from an early phase in Harold Lasswell's thought, in which literary psychoanalysis was regarded as the key to scholarship concerning political writers. Zitta concentrates almost exclusively on Lukács' works through 1923, and devotes much of this "analysis" to expressing his profound personal contempt for his subject. In short, this book abounds with bad grammar and worse scholarship.—W. L. M. (shrink)

At the end of his life György Lukács described his intellectual career as ‘my way to Marx’ [mein Weg zu Marx]. By this he meant that his professional life can be interpreted as an attempt to get to the real Marx. In this paper I use this expression in a narrower and more direct meaning: I attempt to present the road at the end of which the young Lukács arrived at a Marxist standpoint.

Since the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the validity of Marxism and Marxist theory has undergone intense scrutiny both within and outside the academy. In _Lukács After Communism_, Eva L. Corredor conducts ten lively and engaging interviews with a diverse group of international scholars to address the continued relevance of György Lukács’s theories to the post-communist era. Corredor challenges these theoreticians, who each have been influenced by the man once considered the foremost theoretician of Marxist aesthetics, to reconsider (...) the Lukácsean legacy and to speculate on Marxist theory’s prospects in the coming decades. The scholars featured in this collection—Etienne Balibar, Peter Bürger, Terry Eagleton, Fredric Jameson, Jacques Leenhardt, Michael Löwy, Roberto Schwarz, George Steiner, Susan Suleiman, and Cornel West—discuss a broad array of literary and political topics and present provocative views on gender, race, and economic relations. Corredor’s introduction provides a biographical synopsis of Lukács and discusses a number of his most important theoretical concepts. Maintaining the ongoing vitality of Lukács’s work, these interviews yield insights into Lukács as a philosopher and theorist, while offering anecdotes that capture him in his role as a teacher-mentor. (shrink)

"Lukács 1933-1942. Irrationalism in the Age of Fascism". This essay reconstructs the philosophical and historiographical premises to Georg Lukács’ research on irrationalism conducted during the period of Nazi rule in Germany. To this end, the Author focuses chiefly on two posthumous works: How Did Fascist Philosophy Arise in Germany? (1933) and How Did Germany Become the Centre of reactionary Ideology? (1941-1942). After a brief historical contextualization, the Author illustrates the main purpose of these texts: to free German philosophy (...) and culture between the XIX and XX century from those irrationalistic elements asserted and nourished by Fascist philosophy. He then analyzes Lukács’ concept of reason in its three fundamental aspects, namely the methodological link with Marx’s historical image of the political development of Europe during the XIX century, the theoretical debt to Hegel’s critique of immediacy and the connection with some ethical points already discussed during the Goethezeit. (shrink)

The “concept of labour” has no bearing on the methodological premises of Marx’s “Critique of political economy.” In The German Ideology there is an attempt to abandon the field of philosophy to become a “real science”, i.e., a science capable of overcoming all the hypostases of “concepts” of “ideology”. From History and Class Consciousness onwards, Lukács continuously tackles the “concept of labour”. The late Lukács interprets the latter as the “Urphänomen” of human praxis. In actual fact this is (...) an element that follows on from the interpretation of Marxism as Weltanschauung initiated by Friedrich Engels. More precisely, the latter [interpretation] is behind the “Materialistic Conception of History” – an expression not used by Marx – and is instead the key concept in Marxism during the Second and the Third International period. Individuo, lavoro e storia. Il concetto di lavoro in Lukács meticulously explores the role played by the “concept of labour” in all of Lukács’ works. During the last fifty years of his life Lukács tries to achieve a dual goal: on the one hand he wants to maintain the Marxian methodological centrality of the category of totality, on the other hand he wants to combine the former with the “concept of labour”, i.e., the traditional basis of the “Materialistic Conception of History”. (shrink)

Cet article porte sur les enjeux de l’émergence de la Révolution française comme moment de rupture fondatrice dans l’œuvre du second Lukács, à partir des années 1930. Ce prisme permet de reconsidérer ce qui est généralement présenté comme le tournant stalinien de l’auteur. Lukács voit dans les prises de position à l’égard de la Révolution française le révélateur de lignes de fracture philosophiques, esthétiques et idéologiques majeures du monde moderne. Sur cette base, il élabore une lecture marxiste hétérodoxe (...) du champ intellectuel comme lieu d’affrontement entre irrationalisme et rationalisme, romantisme et réalisme. Cette réinterprétation n’est pas sans conséquences politiques : elle justifie une ligne qu’on peut qualifier de marxiste humaniste, qui implique une critique des travers du stalinisme. (shrink)

Interessato in esaminare il rapporto tra Lukàcs e la filosofia clàssica, questo saggio vuole mostrare che il filosofo ungherese ha trovato nella categoria del lavoro una sintesi tra soggetto e oggetto, restando cosi in condizioni di riproporre alcune delle questioni fondamentali delia filosofia: il ruolo del filosofo nella società, il rapporto tra filosofia e politica, la definizione di una nuova etica. Dimenticate dalla filosofia contemporânea, queste questioni sono tornate oggi al centro del dibattito filosòfico, spingendo i filosofi a riflettere sul (...) fondamento dello stesso pensiero e della realtà storica che essi vivono. Ed è alia luce di esse che il saggio pretende interpretare la categoria lukàcsiana dei lavoro.Interessado em examinar as relações entre Lukács e a filosofia clàssica, o presente ensaio procura demonstrar que o filósofo húngaro encontrou na categoria do trabalho uma sìntese entre sujeito e objeto, ficando assim em condições de repropor algumas das questões fundamentais da filosofia: o papel do filósofo na sociedade, a relação entre filosofia e política, a definição de uma nova ética. Esquecidas por boa parte da filosofia contemporânea, tais questões retornam hoje ao centro do debate filosófico, impelindo os filósofos a refletir sobre o fundamento do próprio pensamento e da realidade histórica em que vivem. E é a partir delas que o ensaio pretende interpretar a categoria lukacsiana do trabalho. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A History of Modern Criticism: 1750–1950, Volume 7: German, Russian, and Eastern European Criticism, 1900–1950Eva L. CorredorA History of Modern Criticism: 1750–1950, Volume 7: German, Russian, and Eastern European Criticism, 1900–1950, by René Wellek; xvii & 458 pp. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991, $42.50.The seventh volume of René Wellek’s history of modern criticism may well be the most interesting of his eight-volume monumental oeuvre. Devoted to German, (...) Russian, and Eastern European criticism between 1900 and 1950, it exemplifies most strikingly Wellek’s personal battles with critics who were roughly his contemporaries and closest to his own European background. “I should like to think of my History as ‘elucidatory,’ as not ‘argumentative’ or ‘polemical’” (v, xxi), Wellek writes, but he does not shrink from expressing his own critical perspective usually in a gentlemanly humorous or ironical, but occasionally also quite harsh and stubborn fashion. He insists on the importance of individual value judgments in critical analysis, particularly when they are his own: “I do not believe that... my views and those of my contemporaries will be replaced by completely different assumptions” (“Reflections on my History,” The Attack on Literature, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982, p. 145).Since Wellek rejects the idea of a historical determinism and thinks that “an evolutionary history of criticism must fail” (The Attack, p. 144), he provides less a history than a collection of essays in which he offers succinct appraisals of writers, thinkers and critics both as individuals and as participants in the broader literary movements of the century. He presents “portraits” (p. xv), which he also calls “doxographies” (The Attack, p. 143), containing a vast amount of quotations carefully selected to support the authority of his own views or to let them speak for themselves when he would rather not comment.More than any previous work, this volume embodies Wellek’s will and determination to carry on against all odds even when he can no longer do so on his own. An accident in 1986 left him bedridden and dependent on students and secretaries to help him with his research and writing. He was able to draw on a wealth of previously published essays, some of which had been written more than three decades ago. There are some arguable inaccuracies and shortcomings (his canon includes obscure writers but not Adorno and [End Page 259] again no women writers), and problems with his bibliographies and references. Yet Wellek’s unique talent to assemble in one volume half a century of critical commentary on the literatures of half a dozen different cultures appears intact. So do his well-known critical positions.Among his most interesting essays are those on Spitzer, Auerbach, Ingarden, Bakhtin, and Benjamin, highly erudite men in whose company Wellek enjoys moving. On the other hand, some extraordinarily fertile minds and their enormous influence on the post-1950 critical discourse are often quickly dismissed or treated with unnecessary condescension. Young Roman Jakobson “should be forgotten” (p. 372). Freud’s psychoanalysis “seems forced and mistaken” (p. 79). Heidegger “often ascribes a meaning which seems to me absent in the text itself” (p. 89). Wellek’s low tolerance of any but his own interpretation of Dostoevsky appears repeatedly in this volume: Thomas Mann’s views are called “strange” and “distorted” (p. 12), Freud’s “deeply flawed” (p. 79), Bakhtin’s “simply wrong” (p. 357), and Lukács’s “simply... [those] of Communism” (p. 232). Wellek’s anti-historicism is dramatized in essays on Auerbach and his “historical perspectivism” (p. 132), vs. Spitzer who “always saw that there is a point at which historicism must fail” (p. 144). The vacuum of German criticism during the Nazi period is hauntingly demonstrated. The essays on Walter Benjamin, Bertholt Brecht, and in particular György Lukács reveal best Wellek’s notorious feuds with Marxists. Wellek indulges in a sarcastic critique of the Marxist Lukács’s “doctrinaire limitations” (p. 245) and attempts, wrongfully, to “prove” the Hungarian philosopher’s “exaltation of Socialist Realism” (p. 244). When in the mid-eighties and after much encouragement Wellek finally writes an essay on the early Lukács, he... (shrink)

Spätestens mit der Wiener Moderne wurde Wien zu einem wichtigen Kulturzentrum des Aufbruchs. Diese und andere Strömungen des Umbruchs der Kunst seit dem 19. Jahrhundert werden in diesem Band gesichtet, dargestellt und bewertet. Die Reflexion auf die Verschränkung und Konkurrenz von Kunstpraxis, -theorie und -philosophie steht im Fokus der Aufmerksamkeit. Die theoretischen Perspektiven des Ästhetischen werden ebenso beleuchtet wie verschiedene Kunstgattungen. Schließlich werden Konzepte der Synästhesie und des Gesamtkunstwerks vorgestellt und Wittgenstein und die Kunst in verschiedenen Perspektiven untersucht. Der ungarische (...) Philosoph Georg Lukács gibt das Stichwort:”Es gibt Kunstwerke - Wie sind sie möglich?“Eine Ästhetik, die, so Lukács, ohne illegitime Voraussetzungen arbeiten und das Faktum der Kunst in seiner Eigenart begreifen will, sollte das Kunstwerk als ein Gebilde betrachten, das rein durch sich und unabhängig vom Prozess seiner Entstehung begriffen werden muss. Die Gültigkeit dieses Ansatzes ist längst strittig, wie dieser Band zeigt. Kunstpraxis und -worte, künstlerisches Selbstverständnis und ästhetische Reflexion sind synergetisch verbunden. (shrink)

Ce livre s'intéresse à une thématique peu encore explorée par la recherche marxiste et la théorie critique, celle du sens du concept d'aliénation, mais aussi de la notion de réification dans les derniers écrits de Georg Lukács, à savoir dans son Ontologie de l'être social, écrit publié dans son intégralité après sa mort.Tandis qu'on s'interroge le plus souvent sur la réification dans son célèbre livre Histoire et conscience de classe, l'objectif de ce texte est de mettre en lumière la centralité (...) de l'aliénation comme réalité sociale dans l'édification d'une ontologie sociale matérialiste et d'une critique marxiste de la société capitaliste de l'après-guerre."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

The need to anticipate these questions already betrays an abnormal state of affairs. Carl Schmitt is an extremely controversial figure, compromised by his collusion with Nazism at the peak of his career and throughout his life a European conservative whose authoritarian political objectives have never been in doubt. So what is a nice leftist journal like Telos doing in a dieoretical dive like this? Having successfully protected our political virtues from corruption by the totalitarian undercurrents of the various Marxisms and (...) Marxism-Leninisms, have we now succumbed to one of the few alternatives that made the worst Stalinism palatable to a whole generation of odierwise highly sophisticated intellectuals like Bloch and Lukács? (shrink)

A partire dagli anni '60, György Lukács intraprende una ricerca volta a recuperare e sviluppare l'ontologia sociale racchiusa negli scritti di Marx nel tentativo di rinnovare la riflessione marxista dopo l'effetto inibitorio provocato dallo Stalinismo. Lo scopo di questo articolo è di indagare la concezione lukácsiana dell'ideologia come funzione sociale, mettendola in relazione con il regime di complessità descritto da Lukács nella sua ultima opera, Ontologia dell'essere sociale. Recuperando il riferimento goethiano implicito nell'idea di lavoro come “fenomeno originario” (...) dell'azione sociale, tenteremo di riconcettualizzare la teoria del rispecchiamento adottata nell'Ontologia al fine di mostrare il ruolo che viene ad assumere l'ideologia all'interno di una società volta alla produzione del futuro. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A History of Modern Criticism: 1750–1950, Volume 7: German, Russian, and Eastern European Criticism, 1900–1950Eva L. CorredorA History of Modern Criticism: 1750–1950, Volume 7: German, Russian, and Eastern European Criticism, 1900–1950, by René Wellek; xvii & 458 pp. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991, $42.50.The seventh volume of René Wellek’s history of modern criticism may well be the most interesting of his eight-volume monumental oeuvre. Devoted to German, (...) Russian, and Eastern European criticism between 1900 and 1950, it exemplifies most strikingly Wellek’s personal battles with critics who were roughly his contemporaries and closest to his own European background. “I should like to think of my History as ‘elucidatory,’ as not ‘argumentative’ or ‘polemical’” (v, xxi), Wellek writes, but he does not shrink from expressing his own critical perspective usually in a gentlemanly humorous or ironical, but occasionally also quite harsh and stubborn fashion. He insists on the importance of individual value judgments in critical analysis, particularly when they are his own: “I do not believe that... my views and those of my contemporaries will be replaced by completely different assumptions” (“Reflections on my History,” The Attack on Literature, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982, p. 145).Since Wellek rejects the idea of a historical determinism and thinks that “an evolutionary history of criticism must fail” (The Attack, p. 144), he provides less a history than a collection of essays in which he offers succinct appraisals of writers, thinkers and critics both as individuals and as participants in the broader literary movements of the century. He presents “portraits” (p. xv), which he also calls “doxographies” (The Attack, p. 143), containing a vast amount of quotations carefully selected to support the authority of his own views or to let them speak for themselves when he would rather not comment.More than any previous work, this volume embodies Wellek’s will and determination to carry on against all odds even when he can no longer do so on his own. An accident in 1986 left him bedridden and dependent on students and secretaries to help him with his research and writing. He was able to draw on a wealth of previously published essays, some of which had been written more than three decades ago. There are some arguable inaccuracies and shortcomings (his canon includes obscure writers but not Adorno and [End Page 259] again no women writers), and problems with his bibliographies and references. Yet Wellek’s unique talent to assemble in one volume half a century of critical commentary on the literatures of half a dozen different cultures appears intact. So do his well-known critical positions.Among his most interesting essays are those on Spitzer, Auerbach, Ingarden, Bakhtin, and Benjamin, highly erudite men in whose company Wellek enjoys moving. On the other hand, some extraordinarily fertile minds and their enormous influence on the post-1950 critical discourse are often quickly dismissed or treated with unnecessary condescension. Young Roman Jakobson “should be forgotten” (p. 372). Freud’s psychoanalysis “seems forced and mistaken” (p. 79). Heidegger “often ascribes a meaning which seems to me absent in the text itself” (p. 89). Wellek’s low tolerance of any but his own interpretation of Dostoevsky appears repeatedly in this volume: Thomas Mann’s views are called “strange” and “distorted” (p. 12), Freud’s “deeply flawed” (p. 79), Bakhtin’s “simply wrong” (p. 357), and Lukács’s “simply... [those] of Communism” (p. 232). Wellek’s anti-historicism is dramatized in essays on Auerbach and his “historical perspectivism” (p. 132), vs. Spitzer who “always saw that there is a point at which historicism must fail” (p. 144). The vacuum of German criticism during the Nazi period is hauntingly demonstrated. The essays on Walter Benjamin, Bertholt Brecht, and in particular György Lukács reveal best Wellek’s notorious feuds with Marxists. Wellek indulges in a sarcastic critique of the Marxist Lukács’s “doctrinaire limitations” (p. 245) and attempts, wrongfully, to “prove” the Hungarian philosopher’s “exaltation of Socialist Realism” (p. 244). When in the mid-eighties and after much encouragement Wellek finally writes an essay on the early Lukács, he... (shrink)

This book, which is thematically linked with Humanism and Terror, marks another of Merleau-Ponty’s attempts to come to grips with Marxism. Adventures presents reflections on the struggle between the proletariat and the Party for a valid revolutionary praxis. The question for Merleau-Ponty is, are we to conceive the revolution as a spontaneous, necessary uprising of the proletariat, in which case the Party is superfluous; or is the proletariat the tool of the Party, in which case the Party is superior and (...) the proletariat is reduced to an instrument which does not know its own purpose. The first half of the book is Merleau-Ponty’s reading of classic Marxist attempts to come to grips with this question, including discussions of the early Lukács, Lenin, and Trotsky. The reading is not intended to be a rigorous historical account but rather a philosophical interpretation culminating in the recognition that if either the Party or the proletariat become supreme then the dialectic, which is so central to all Marxist thought, is lost. (shrink)