In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:IMMEDIACY AND MEDIATION IN AQUINAS: Introduction "IN I SENT.," Q. 1, A. 5 DOUGLAS c. HALI, Louvain Universtiy Belgium ] ] HE PURPOSE of the present essay is to provide an nalysis of the dialectically related notions of " immediacy " and "med:ia1tion" in Question I, Art~cle 5 of Aquinas' Commentary on the Sentences. "Immediacy" here refers to the non-mediated " light of inspiration " which Aquinas proposes as (...) a principle for theology; while " mediation " refers to the problem of interpretation via,sensible signs in an historical community. It is proposed that there are dialectical tensions unresolved by Aquinas, and usually overlooked by commentators and interpreters.1 1 The most extensive analysis published to date of the theological methodology of Aquinas in this Commentary is by M. Corbin, Le chemin de la theologie chez Thomas d'Aquin (Paris: Beauchesne, 1974). For his analysis of the text in question see pp. 273-290. The present essay seeks precisely to be even more "hegelian" and more "barthian" than Corbin, and to provide some documentation for the validity of,such an interpretation of Aquinas. For a further methodological discussion, see my "Participated Trinitarian Relations : Dialectics of Method, Understanding, and Mystery in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas" (Leuven: S.T.D. dissertation, the Faculty of Theology, 1987). For basic points in the literature see P. Mandonnet, "Chronologie sommaire de la vie et des ecrits de saint Thomas," Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques 9 (1920), 142·152; G. Rossi, "L'autografo di S. Tommaso del Commento al III libro delle Sentenze," Divus Thomas Oommentarium de philosophia et theologia 35 (1932), 532-585; A. Hayen, "S. Thomas a-t-il edite deux fois son Commentaire sure le livre des Sentences," Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale 9 (1937), 219-236. See also the review of this by A. Donclaine, in Bulletin thomiste 6 (1940), 100-108. P. Vanier, "Theologie trinitaire chez S. Thomas d'Aquin. Evolution du concept d'action notionelle," Publications de l'Institut d'etudes medievales 13 (1953), p. 124. 31 DOUGLAS C. BALL The "Prologue" to the Commentary The " Prologue " of Aquinas' Commentary consists of two parts, as did that of Albert the Great, and as was the custom of the time. The first part takes its point of departure from a biblical text, which is then interpreted in accord with the na- >bure of theology and the project of commentary on the four hooks of the Sentences. The theme of Aquinas' biblical meditation is not scientia hut sapientia. The second part of Aquinas' "Pmlogue " consists, as did Albert's, of a question on the status and method of theology. This Question 1 is of particular importance in that it clearly states that sacred doctrine is not principally to he considered soientia. After the biblical reflection-mediation, Aquinas presents an introductory question on the status and method of sacra doctrina in a more "scholastic" manner, specifying five articles that will be addressed: 1) its necessity; 9l) supposing that it exists, whether it is one or many; 3) if it is one, whether it is practical or speculative, and if it is speculative, whether it is wisdom, science, or understanding; 4) its subject; 5) its mode.2 For a critique of this position see the review of Vanier by J. Hamer in Bulletin thomiste 9 (1954-1956), 596-601. See also E. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas.Aquinas (New York, 1956); M. D. Chenu, Toward Understanding St. Thomas (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1964); J. Weisheipl, "The Meaning of 'Sacra Doctrina'," The Thomist 38 (1974), 64-67; B. Mondin, St. Thomas.Aquinas' Philosophy in the Oommentary to the Sentences (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975). Good arguments on the dating and circumstances of the work are to be found in J. Weishepil, Friar Thomas d'.A.quino: His Life, Thought, and Work (Garden City: Doubleday, 1974). 2Aquinas, Soriptum Super Libros Sententiarum, vol. 1, ed. Mandonnet (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929), q. 1 (p. 6). [It should be noted that there is as yet no critical edition of this work. All references here will be to this edition, which at least provides a basic text, which is fundamentally a reprint of the Vives edition, and thus differs at times... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE START OF METAPHYSICS* THEODORE J. KoNDOLEON Villanova University Villanova, Pennsylvania I N HIS RECENTLY published book, John F. X. Knasas seeks to answer this twofold inter-related question: What, according to Saint Thomas's expressed teaching, is the subject of metaphysics and how does the human mind proceed to attain it for the purpose of study? While he acknowledges a debt to Joseph Owens for certain of his basic positions, (...) Knasas will claim that the book's argument is original in the way in which it opposes what he takes as realistically the subject of metaphysics at its initial stage (or with the only understanding of beingens -metaphysics requires to begin) to what will become this science 's subject at its later, more mature stage. Moreover, although he may contradict himself on this point, he will reject, as Saint Thomas's view, the position that a physical demonstration can establish the existence of immaterial being, be it God or angels. He will also argue at some length what he evidently considers a crucial epistemic procedure for the start of metaphysics, viz., that a series of judgments relating individuals back to their acts of existence (from whence they were originally abstracted) is required for the "judgmentally constituted multitude" from which the mind attains common being. Finally, since he will insist that abstraction must be controlled by the data, he will allow no room in Thomistic metaphysics for a beginning metaphysical intuition in which being is seen as not necessarily linked to matter and motion, nor for an a priori approach to its subject which would start *John F. X. Knasas, The Preface to Metaphysics: A Contribution to the N eo-Thomist Debate on the Start of Metaphysics. New York: Peter Lang, 1990. Pp. 193. 121 122 THEODORE J. KONDOLEON from the nature of the knowing subject, viz., the human intellect, as open to and directed toward infinite being and intelligibility. In what follows I will discuss (and critically assess) each of these features of this book as well as address myself briefly to certain things the author has to say about the Thomistic " five ways." In the first three chapters Knasas is primarily concerned with showing that metaphysics cannot begin with a notion of being understood in the sense of ens commune. This sense of the notion traditionally includes both material and immaterial being. However, he argues, since (according to his reading of Aquinas) only metaphysics can demonstrate the existence of immaterial being, its subject cannot, at least at its outset, encompass such being, not even as something conceivable. He therefore opposes the view of Neo-Thomists who, basing themselve? on the now famous and frequently cited text from Saint Thomas's Expositio on Boethius's De Trinitate (Question 5, article 3), insist that metaphysics begins with the recognition that being is something separate from matter and motion (and not merely so in the mind's consideration by abstraction). This separation is understood in the so-called negative judgment of separation: " it is not of the nature of being to be in matter and motion (even though it is sometimes found therein)." On this point Knasas finds fault with " Natural Philosophy" Thomists, among whom he includes the Dominicans L.-B. Geiger (although this writer is barely mentioned and only in a footnote discussion) and James Weisheipl, both of whom have argued that the subject of metaphysics presupposes a demonstration from natural philosophy that immaterial, unchanging being exists (otherwise, they maintain, the separation of which Saint Thomas speaks in the De Trinitate Commentary would have no fundamentum in re). Again, his main argument with these Thomists is that no textual justification can be found for their view-indeed there is counter-textual evidence against it-that physical philosophy proves the existence of immaterial being and that, in the eyes of Aquinas, metaphysics awaits such a demonstration in order to begin. He equally rejects the position, one which he at- THE START OF METAPHYSICS 123 tributes above all to Maritain, that, prior to any argument that would establish the actual existence of God, being can be understood -and this thanks to an existential judgment in which existence is restored to the essence... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:MIND FORMING AND MANUDUCTIO IN AQUINAS* MARIE I. GEORGE St. John's University Jamaica, New York QUINAS'S CONCERN for pedagogy is plain from his explicit discussions of the subject, the most noteworthy of which is found in the preface to the Summa Theologiae. His qualities as a teacher of beginning students have been brought out by numerous modern authors, among whom are Josef Pieper,1 who underlines both Thomas's ability to (...) arouse wonder and his use of ordinary language intelligible to all, and James Weisheipl,2 who points out that Aquinas's commentaries on Aristotle reveal a concern for the neophyte who is trying to comprehend the relation between faith and reason. One important aspect of Aquinas's teaching on pedagogy generally does not get the attention it merits, however, and this is the need for ' manuductio.' 3 ' Manuductio ', or ' xeipaywv£a ' (literally, 'leading by the hand') is an expression which Aquinas *This paper was read at the Sixteenth International Conference on Patristic, Mediaeval, and Renaissance Studies, Villanova University, Pennsylvania, September 1991. 1 Cf. Josef Pieper, Guide to Thomas Aquinas (New York: Pantheon Books, 1962)' c. 8. 2 Cf. James Weisheipl, O.P., Friar Thomas d'Aquino (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1974), 281. 3 This article drew much of its inspiration from the works of Msgr. Maurice Dionne, a thinker who both elaborated upon and consciously implemented Aquinas's teachings on this subject. Cf. especially: Initation a la logique, ed. Yvan Pelletier (Ste-Foy, Quebec: L'Institut Apostolique Renaissance inc., 1976), and La N ecessite de la logique en regard de chacune des vertus intellectuelles, ed. Louis Brunet, vol. 1 (Quebec: Societe d'Etudes Aristoteliciennes 1980), hereafter cited as La N ec. 201 202 MARIE I. GEORGE adopts from Dionysius.4 It is a word that has different but related meanings in the moral, intellectual, and spiritual orders. Our intention is to elucidate the thomistic doctrine of ' leadingby -the-hand ' in the context of intellectual education, or ' mind forming,' discussing its nature, its necessity, and its place in the global picture of human knowing as outlined by Aquinas. We will begin by delineating in general what manuductio is by comparing two key passages, the first of which is to be found in the Summa Theologiae: The teacher leads the students from what is already known to knowledge of things unknown in two ways. First, by putting before him certain aids or instruments which his intellect uses in order to acquire science ; for example, when he presents him with some less universal proposition which nevertheless the student is able to judge from things already known; or when he proposes to him some sensible examples, or similitudes, or opposites, or some other things of this sort, from which the intellect of the learner is ' led by the hand ' (manuducitur) to the knowledge of a truth previously unknown to him. The other way [the teacher leads the student] is when he strengthens the intellect of the learner... inasmuch as he proposes the order of principles to conclusions to the student, who perhaps by himself would not have so much ability to put things together (virtutem collativam) that from the principles he could deduce the conclusions. And therefore it is said in Posterior Analytics. Bk. I, that 'demonstration is a syllogism making one know '. And through this mode the one who demonstrates makes the listener know.5 4 Cf. In Librum Beati Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus Ezpositio (Turin: Marietti, 1950), where St. Thomas comments on the following phrase from Dionysius (p. 14) : "E1r ailT7]11 a11a"Yoµe110J11 a11aTaTtX7/ xe1pa"YOJ1lla" ("ad ipsam sursum actorum suscitative manuductio "). The commentary reads (p. 17, # 48) : "Further, it is necessary that man progress to better things; and as to this, he says fifthly ' suscitative manuductio sursum actorum ' i.e., those things which go up, that is, make progre"ss, 'ad Ipsam ', namely to the Divinity. [The expression] 'suscitative' manuductio, however, is used because not only can one give a helping hand to those wanting to make progress, but one can even stimulate or urge [people] to progress." All translations are my own. Cf. also Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 27, art... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AQUINAS ON THE IMMATERIALITY OF THE INTELLECT DAVID RUEL FOSTER Seton Hall University South Orange, New Jersey I. A Controversial Question? HE QUESTION of the immateriailiity of the intelloot s,an important part of the wider question about the nau11e of the soul. The axgiumen'ts for the immaiteriality of rthe intellect a11e particularly important to Thomas's thought because they undergil1d his argument for the incorruptibility of the soul; the incorruptibiility (...) of the soul, in turn, leads towards the dootrine of the immortaility of the soruJ, a tenet of faith which Thoma.s wants to explain and deifend.1 This article will present Thomas's two most prominent arguments for the immateriality of the intieliteot and critique the first iin light of rthe seoond.2 Whether,the principle of int~Uectual ilife must, by the very 1.Arguments for the immateriality of the intellect do not necessarily appear in articles on the incorruptibility of the soul but are always presupposed by them in Thomas. For example, in Summa theologiae I, q. 75, a. 6, "Whether the human soul is incorruptible?" (" Utrum anima humana sit corruptibilis "), Thomas supports the crucial premise in his argument by referring to the,arguments for the immateriality of the intellect in articles 2 and 5 (" Utrum anima humana sit aliquid subsistens? "; "Utrum anima sit composita ex materia et forma?" Summa theologiae I, q. 75, aa. 2 and 5). 2 Five important instances of the arguments are as follows: In Sententias II, d. 19, q. 1, a. l; Summa contra gentiles II, chapters 49-50; Summa theologiae I, q. 75, aa. 2 and 5; Quaestiones Dis-putatae De anima a. 14; Oompendium theologiae, De fide, chapters 79 and 84. This chronological ordering is based on Weisheipl's catalogue in Friar Thomas D'A.quino, pp. 355-406; and Eschmann's, A Catalogue of St. Thomas's Work, in Gilson's, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, pp. 381-439. The dating of the Compendium theologiae is the most problematic. 415 416 DAVID RUEL FOSTER natUJ.1e of its.act, be immaterial is a particularly controrverted question today. Many corutempo~ary thinkers helie¥e that human understanding can be ex:pfained in strictly physical terms. ':Chis was not the case in Thomas's day, and it is important to takie notre of this. Thomas W1as noit foroed by any opponent to sharpen his arguments for the imma.teriality of the inteHect. The major Islamic philosophers, ailithough they disagreed among themselves about aspects of the inbe1iJiect's nature (e.g., the plaice and ro[e of the agent intellect)' md agree thait the intellectual soul was immaterial. Plato and Aristotle, according.to Thomas, agreed on this f.undamental point. In fact, although there were post-Socratic materialists,3 Thoma;s usuru1Jy goes ha;ek to the Pre-Socratics in order rto give an example of someone who taJUght that the inte!IJiectual :act. depends entirely on physicrul principles. Perhaps it is better to s1ay that, because the doctrine of runiversal hylomorphism was so widely accepted in his time, Thomas was not challenged regarding the incorporeality of the intellect. Many of Thoma:s's contemporaries, foililowing the tewching of Awoobroin, held that the intellectuaJ. souil was composed of spiritua.l matter.and the appropriate form,4 hut this was not in opposition to Thomas's arguments for the immateriality of the intellect. II. The Two Most Prominent Arguments A. Type I The first argument (hereaf·ter caUed Type 1) proceeds from the intellect's potential to know all corporeal things. It is justifiably described as Thomas's preferred argument,5 for s For example, the Epicureans. 4 J. Weisheipl, "Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism: Avicebron," in Albert the priam rationem formalem, which is :to grasp the essence of the obj,oot. Then Thom!lis draws his conclusion " therefore,... the inte!llecrbuaJ soul itse[f is an absolute form." The conclusion that the irntellect's mode of being is immaterial, a " form without matter," follows from the premises: majorr premise, the objeclt is,in the knower in an ahso1uite way, i.e., without matter; minor premise, the object is received in the knower.ruooording to rthe mode of he... (shrink)

This volume completes the critical edition of the theological and philosophical works of the Venerable Inceptor. The introduction and critical apparatus are in Latin. The editors reverse the judgment of the late Philotheus Boehner and E. M. Buytaert by considering the Tractatus Minor and Elementarium Logicae to be of dubious authenticity on the basis of doctrinal and stylistic criteria. The Tractatus de Praedicamentis is also judged dubious for doctrinal reasons. This particular Tractatus and a late fourteenth/early fifteenth-century manuscript which contains (...) it have been studied in the literature by G. Etzkorn, J. Weisheipl, and L. M. de Rijk. The Tractatus de Relatione deviates doctrinally from Ockham. The authenticity of the Centiloquium was apparently doubted already in the fifteenth century. Finally, the Tractatus de Principiis Theologiae, though long considered authentic, is judged to be the work of a compiler summarizing Ockham's doctrines: it always uses the third person, dicit. (shrink)

We show that the first order theory of the lattice $\mathscr{L}^{ (S) of finite dimensional closed subsets of any nontrivial infinite dimensional Steinitz Exhange System S has logical complexity at least that of first order number theory and that the first order theory of the lattice L(S ∞ ) of computably enumerable closed subsets of any nontrivial infinite dimensional computable Steinitz Exchange System S ∞ has logical complexity exactly that of first order number theory. Thus, for example, the lattice of (...) finite dimensional subspaces of a standard copy of $\bigoplus_\omega$ Q interprets first order arithmetic and is therefore as complicated as possible. In particular, our results show that the first order theories of the lattice L(V ∞ ) of c.e. subspaces of a fully effective ℵ 0 -dimensional vector space V∞ and the lattice of c.e. algebraically closed subfields of a fully effective algebraically closed field F ∞ of countably infinite transcendence degree each have logical complexity that of first order number theory. (shrink)

Lives and work of Veṅkaṭanātha (Vedantadesika), 1268-1369, and Maṇavāḷa Māmun̲i, 1370-1444, Vaishnavite leaders and exponents of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school in Hindu philosophy from Tamil Nadu.

We show that linear Regge trajectories for mesons and glueballs, and the cubic mass spectrum associated with them, determine a relation between the masses of the ρ meson and the scalar glueball, $M(0^{ + + } ) = 3/\sqrt 2 M(\rho )$ , which implies $M(0^{ + + } ) = 1650_ \pm 10$ MeV. We also discuss relations between the masses of the scalar, tensor and 3-- glueballs, $M(2^{ + + } ) = \sqrt 2 M(0^{ + + } (...) ),{\text{ }}M(3^{ - - } ) = 2M(0^{ + + } )$ , which imply $M(2^{ + + } ) = 2290_ \pm {\text{ }}15{\text{ MeV, }}M(3^{ - - } ) = 3240_ \pm {\text{ }}20$ MeV. (shrink)

Here are the answers to questions Man has sought through the ages; here are practical answers you hoped could be found somewhere; here are answers that work. ...

The basic structural units of society, as a highly organized social system, are social institutions, which allow to create a strong and stable system of relations between people, to form a social order. Leadership is one of the main elements that ensures the functioning of a social institute. The specific traits and particular attributes of political leadership are actively explored by scholars, while spiritual leadership with its particular characteristics remains unaddressed. In the modern world, the institute of leadership in Judaism (...) has a significant impact on its followers, and therefore it is important to study the historical roots of this phenomenon, the mechanisms of influence of the leader on the followers of the current and directly determine the role of the spiritual leader in the preserved national traditions of Judaism. (shrink)

The word ‘existentialism’ has become something of a catchword in religious circles today, and one suspects that it is sometimes a substitute rather than a medium for thought. Most theological teachers must from time to time have received from a pupil an essay in which the words ‘existential’, ‘existentially’ and ‘existentialism’ appear to have been sprinkled from a pepper-pot over an exposition whose meaning would remain unchanged if these words were excised altogether. Nevertheless, usum non tollit abusus, and the following (...) rather unsystematic remarks may perhaps be of some help in elucidating and evaluating a mode of thought and expression which has attracted the interest of some of the more profound, as well as of some of the more superficial, theological and philosophical writers of the present day. (shrink)

Purpose: My goals in this paper are to comment on some of the roles that Ernst von Glasersfeld played in our work in IRON (Interdisciplinary Research on Number) from circa 1975 up until the time of his death, and to relate certain events that revealed his character in very human terms. Method: Among my recollections of Ernst, I have chosen those that I felt would most adequately portray his impact on the field of mathematics education and his ethics in the (...) field of human affairs. Findings: It has not often been said but, in his work in IRON, it was Ernst’s explicit intention to start a conceptual revolution in mathematics education and beyond. Other than serving as a revolutionary, Ernst also served as a mentor for many investigators in mathematics education, including myself. He excelled as a scientist as well an epistemologist, and his scientific work fueled his epistemological work. Ernst was a very ethical and wonderful human being who was dedicated to the betterment of humankind by means of his revolutionary ideas. (shrink)

Philosophical Studies Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 163, l. 24 for ‘Pocreon’ read “Creon’ and p. 165, l.4 for “Nereus” read “Nessus”, l. 16 for “Corrolate” read “Correlate” and l. 27 for “ Trachinae ” read “ Trachiniae ”. Proffessor Mackinnon should also have been described as Norris-Hulse Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge and Fellow of Corpus Christi College.

L. R. Reinhardt; III—Dualism and Categories, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 66, Issue 1, 1 June 1966, Pages 71–92, https://doi.org/10.1093/aris.

Stephen Hagiochristophorites a été haut fonctionnaire des finances dans le gouvernement d'Andronikos I Komnenos. Ses opposants l'ont appelé antichristophorites car pour eux, il s'est éloigné des voies tracées par Dieu. Il est devenu un des acolytes les plus loyaux d'Andronikos Komnenos. Son efficacité dans son poste de haut fonctionnaire l'a fait aimé par l'empereur et de l'autre côté a contribué à son impopularité.