Cicero's essay On Friendship (Laelius de amicitia) is of interest as much for the light it sheds on Roman society as for its embodiment of ancient philosophical views on the subjects of friendship. The Dream of Scipio was excerpted in late antiquity from Cicero's De Republica, a dialogue in six books which now only survives in fragmentary form. In the excerpt, which probably formed the conclusion to the dialogue, Cicero describes his vision of the cosmos and the rewards of (...) immortality that the good statesman can expect after death. This work is particularly important for its influence on later literature in the Middle Ages and Renaissance.Both dialogues are examples of the best Ciceronian prose. They are presented in this volume in the context of Cicero's philosophical writing. Their place in ancient thought and their literary characteristics are discussed fully in the introduction, while individual points of interpretation are dealt with in the commentary. The text of both works is new and will also be published in a forthcoming volume in the Oxford Classical Texts series. There is a separate appendix of notes on textual points. Text with translation and commentary. (Aris and Phillips 1991). (shrink)

Als Gegner der Politik Caesars ausgeschlossen vom politischen Tagesgeschaft, schreibt Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 43 v. Chr.) sich selbst und seinem Freund Atticus zum Trost diese beiden Dialoge uber Alter (Cato maior de senectute) und Freundschaft (Laelius de amicitia). Er legt die Gedanken, die ihn selbst bewegen, in den Mund bewunderter Personlichkeiten Roms. Die Texte gelten als Hohepunkte seines philosophischen Gesamtwerks nicht zuletzt ihrer vollendeten Sprache wegen.".

Much recent work on the masculinities enacted by early Christians has focused upon Christian texts and claims about their heroes and practices among elite Christians. Lucian’s Passing of Peregrinus offers another avenue for thinking about early Christian masculinity. Lucian denies Peregrinus’ claim to masculinity on the basis of his over-concern for honour, especially from the masses, his inability to control his appetites regarding food and sex, his being a parricide, his enacting ‘strange’ ascetic practices and his lack of (...) courage in the face of death. By tying Peregrinus to a Christian community in Judea, Lucian both demonstrates the lack of manliness in the Christian movement, which he suggests is populated mostly by gullible women and children, and further ‘unmans’ Peregrinus by linking him to a community of easily duped people whose praise is not worthy of a philosopher. By presenting this Christian community as a group that not only accepts Peregrinus as a member but also quickly establishes him as their leader, almost at par with Jesus himself, according to Lucian’s account, these early Christians show their lack of self-control by being deceived by a charlatan. Early Christian writers who claimed that their heroes were manly, even more manly than the Greek or Roman heroes, were writing in part to rebut the types of claims made by writers like Lucian. (shrink)

Als Gegner der Politik Caesars ausgeschlossen vom politischen Tagesgeschaft, schreibt Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 43 v. Chr.) sich selbst und seinem Freund Atticus zum Trost diese beiden Dialoge uber Alter (Cato maior de senectute) und Freundschaft (Laelius de amicitia). Er legt die Gedanken, die ihn selbst bewegen, in den Mund bewunderter Personlichkeiten Roms. Die Texte gelten als Hohepunkte seines philosophischen Gesamtwerks nicht zuletzt ihrer vollendeten Sprache wegen.".

This volume presents new texts of Cicero's dialogues on political philosophy, De Re Publica and De Legibus, together with corrected versions of the editor's previously published editions of Cato Maior de Senectute and Laelius de Amicitia. The texts are based on a full reconsideration of the manuscript evidence and are presented in a clear and readable form.

우리는 외로움의 시대 속에 살고 있고, 특별히 노년에 가장 필요한 것은 친구이다. 키케로는 『라일리우스 우정론』에서 노년의 우정에 대해 설명하면서, 참된 우정과 실제적인 우정을 비교하고 있다. 진정한 우정은 소수 사이에 성립하며, 모든 신적인 것과 인간적인 것을 두고 호의와 애정으로 서로 합의하는 것(benivolentia et caritate consensio)이다. 우정이야말로 신의 선물이자, 크나큰 이득을 제공하는 것으로, 인간 본성에 속하는 것이다. 우정은 덕에 근거하고 우정이 없다면 행복도 없을 것이다. 키케로는 이상적인 우정을 검토하면서, 일반인들의 실질적 우정에 대해서도 조언을 준다. 친구의 요구를 어디까지 들어줘야 하는지, 절교할 때 어떻게 (...) 해야 할지, 솔직한 충고와 감정을 어떻게 표현해야 할지, 그리고 정치적 상황에서 친구를 어디까지 도와줘야 하는지에 대해 논의한다. 키케로에게 노년의 우정이란 극한 우울함과 외로움 속에서도 서로 농담을 주고받고 대화하면서 슬픔에서 헤어나와 잠시 웃음 짓게 만들며, 감정적 지지와 위안을 주는 것이다. 우리는 노년에도 계속 친구를 만들어야 하는데, 특별히 젊은이와의 우정을 통해 세대 간의 화합도 이룰 수 있다. 노년의 친구란 없어도 있는 것이고, 가난해도 풍요로운 것이고, 병약해도 강건한 것이고, 죽어도 사는 것이다. 따라서 우정이야말로 노년을 행복하게 만드는 희망이자 진정한 우정은 노년에 완성된다고 할 수 있다. (shrink)

I begin by listing those manuscripts older than 1100 that have hitherto been known to editors.

Im Gesamtschaffen des Staatsmannes Marcus Tulius Cicero spielen nicht nur seine rhetorischen, sondern auch seine philosophischen Abhandlungen eine groie Rolle. Im Rahmen dieser Philosophica ist u.a. die Schrift Cato Maior ein häufig genutzter Lektürestoff für Seminare.

Several versions of Diogenes of Sinope’s death are reported in Book VI of the Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers. The heirs of Diogenes have transmitted to posterity that of suicide by self-asphyxiation, a death they deem worthy of his philosophy. This study aims to identify the Cynic foundation of Diogenes’ suicide by reconstructing the Cynic outlook on voluntary death. Several fragments and testimonies show that the Cynics consider life and death indifferent: what matters above all is to lead a (...) good life. Suicide is only justified when the philosopher’s body suffers from extreme and lasting weakness. To reach and maintain his ideal of freedom, the Cynic must submit his body to a training that requires some physical strength. Therefore, as soon as he loses the capacity to practise the Cynic askesis because of the physical limitations brought on by old age or illness, the philosopher does not hesitate commit suicide. This justification is attested in the exhortations to suicide formulated by the Cynics and in the accounts of the self-inflicted deaths of Metrocles, Heracles, Demonax and Peregrinus. (shrink)

Seneca in his Moral Epistles to Lucilium ridicules Protagoras’ claim that both sides of any position can be equally well argued. Cicero, on the contrary, in the surviving fragments of his dialogue, the Republic, maintains in the person of Laelius that the thorough exploration of the strengths and weaknesses of any position pro and con is the best and often the only dialectical avenue to the discovery of difficult truths. There are therefore at least two sides to the issue (...) of whether philosophers ought to address their arguments to the two sides of any issue. This paper examines the epistemic advantages and disadvantages of the same reasoning agent playing both roles of advocate and critic, as opposed to encouraging only distinct independently minded reasoning agents each to consider any of the opposing sides of an issue in dispute. The question in argumentation theory posed by this inquiry in simplest terms is whether a single thinker considering both sides of an issue is more able to arrive at truth, or whether, as the popular adage has it, two minds are inherently dialectically better than one. The answer proposed here is that it does not matter provided that the conflict of opposing views are in some manner resolved with the sincere intention of arriving at the truth. (shrink)

Scholars have disagreed on whether Cicero’s De Amicitia is a philosophically serious or even coherent work. Such criticisms, I believe, can be met by an examination of the successive accounts of friendship that the character of Gaius Laelius provides in the dialogue. I argue that the dialogue offers three such accounts of friendship which taken together provide a comprehensive and coherent account of friendship. Further, I defend Cicero’s account against criticisms that Aulus Gellius had raised in the 2nd century (...) CE (criticisms that have been repeated to the modern day). The problem of defining friendship is a thread that brings unity to the entire dialogue and shows Cicero philosophizing about both the origins of friendship and its dissolution, especially when the bonds of friendship are in tension with obligations to the political community. (shrink)

Parmi les versets du Pentateuque qui régissent la conduite à l’égard des étrangers, on étudie les commentaires médiévaux d’Ex 22, 21 et 23, 9, Lv 19, 33-34 et 25, 23, Dt 10, 19. Les lexiques (Papias, Huguccio de Pise, Jean de Gênes) permettent de préciser le sens des mots qui désignent l’étranger dans la Vulgate, advena et peregrinus. Les commentateurs (de Raban Maur à Dominique Grima) développent les raisons de cette exigence d’hospitalité : la compassion, l’amour du prochain, le (...) fait que les Hébreux aient été eux-mêmes étrangers en Égypte, la terre appartient au Seigneur. L’exégèse spirituelle assimile les étrangers aux pécheurs qui se repentent. (shrink)

As Fragment 46 of the first book of Sallust's Histories Maurenbrecher prints: Magnis operibus perfectis obsidium cepit per L. Catilinam legatum. This he takes in effect to mean that Lucretius Ofella after the completion of great siege works received reinforcements brought by L. Catiline legate of Sulla. The interpretation depends largely upon his contention that the phrase obsidium cepit is to be taken as equivalent to subsidium cepit, for which he claims the authority, ultimately, of Verrius Flaccus as represented by (...) Festus p. 193M s.v. obsidium. Though opinions may occasionally have differed as to the precise event documented by the fragment, this central assumption seems to have gone unchallenged by historians. Yet it rests upon remarkably insecure foundations. The reading cepit has scant authority and the interpretation of obsidium as subsidium none at all. It is in fact the result of misunderstanding the passage of Festus in which the text is embedded. In Lindsay's edition the Festus entry which is here quoted in full runs as follows: Obsidium tamquam praesidium, subsidium recte dicitur, cuius etiam auctor C. Laelius pro se apud populum : ‘Ut in nobis terra marique simul obsidium facerent.’ Et Sallustius historiarum I : ‘Magnis operibus perfectis obsidium coepit per L. Catilinam legatum.’ Coepit is the reading of the manuscript F, which has been generally accepted, while cepit appears only in the Aldine edition where it may well be an emendation or even an error, there being no obvious independent source which might have provided it. For Maurenbrecher it was merely the ‘correction’ of Corte who produced the earliest roughly chronological arrangement of the fragments of Sallust's Histories. (shrink)

This dissertation explores fundamental ethical questions through an examination of the key classical discussions of friendship: Plato's Lysis, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Cicero's Laelius, and Montaigne's and Bacon's essays on friendship. ;Should and can people act selflessly for one another's good? Is our concern for friendship and love rooted in neediness or in strength? Is it possible to love another simply for his own sake, or only because of the benefits that we seek for ourselves? Are the best friendships found (...) between the best individuals, or does the need for friendship wane with increased strength of soul and understanding? ;The author argues that, according to the Lysis, friendship is rooted chiefly in need but also involves a non-utilitarian sympathy for those who are akin. ;Analyzing Aristotle's treatment of the three kinds of friendship in the Ethics, she finds pleasure and utility to be major ingredients in the highest "friendship of virtue," and the affinity of kindred spirits to be a major, neglected theme. Aristotle's exposition of the relationship between friendship and justice reveals the pervasiveness of individuals' concerns with their own good, and the moral confusions that characterize most friendships and that come to light when friends quarrel. Aristotle's comparison between friendship in the various regimes and in the family shows both the injustice of the traditional family and its true source of strength. Love of "being" or of one's own life animates benefactors' love of their beneficiaries and friends' desire to lose themselves in one another's concerns. The theme of friendship is for Aristotle a transition to the philosophic life, in which friendship wanes in importance but does not disappear. Although we are not free to choose anything other than what appears to us to be best, we can include the good of others as a subordinate part of the good that reason seeks. ;The author also provides a critical analysis of Montaigne's claim that friendship is the greatest good in life, and an exposition of Cicero's sympathetic but critical portrayal of a great political friendship and of the deficiencies of both Epicurean and Stoic ideals of self-sufficiency. (shrink)

M. Tulli Ciceronis libri qui ad rem publicam et ad philosophiam spectant; vol. ix. Cato Maior de Senectute, Laelius de Amicitia; 50 Pf. vol. x. De Officiis; 80 Pf. ed. Th. Schiche, Leipzig, Freytag.M. Tulli Ciceronis Orationes Selectae; vol. i. Oratio pro Sex. Roscio Arnerino; 30 Pf. vol. ii. In Q. Caecilium Diuinatio, in C. Verrem Accusationis, Lib. iv. v.; ed. H. Nohl; 80 Pf. Leipzig, Freytag.M. Tulli Ciceronis Scripta quae remanserunt omnia. Recognovit C. F. W. Mueller. Partis ii. (...) vol. iii. Leipzig, Teubner, 1886. 2 Mk. 10. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient RomePeter TooheyRobert A. Kaster. Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome. Classical Culture and Society. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. xii + 245 pp. Cloth, $45.Emotion, Restraint, and Community has much in common with William Miller's well-known The Anatomy of Disgust (1997). There is their interest in disgust, their focus on the social and literary life of the emotions, and, best (...) of all, their tone. The ironic, fresh, often funny, and personal tone of Kaster's book is very like that of Miller's. The tone is utterly unlike anything one normally expects from a learned classical volume from a learned press. Similarities end there. While [End Page 137] Miller focuses on the modern world, Kaster's book on the social life of the emotions takes as its research object Roman literature up until Christianity becomes the religion of the Roman Empire. In five chapters, Kaster looks at five emotions (verecundia, pudor, paenitentia, invidia, and fastidium) and offers, as a conclusion, a vision of what it must have been like for a Roman male to have control over the workings of these five emotions. That person, he suggests, is what would have been termed integer—upright, honest, and undamaged.Based on word searches and contextual analyses for each of the terms, Kaster's discussion provides an engaging way of describing the life of these emotions. Rather than relying on dictionary definitions, he briefly analyzes and illustrates his terms in their literary contexts. Then he produces scripts, which consist not just of the things you think, feel, and do as they relate to these five emotions, but which also show how they are played out in a social context. What does it feel like to be the object of fastidium, for example, or to direct it at another? Kaster's analysis, therefore, concerns itself more with the cognitive dimension of these emotions rather than the affective. Or, to adapt his own terminology, the analysis is on the occurrent (situational) rather than dispositional (psychological).How does Kaster understand the basis of each of these terms and how it is that they are defined socially? Verecundia ("respect" or "shame"—the subject of chapter 1) "animates the art of knowing your proper place in every social transaction and basing your behavior on that knowledge; by guiding behavior in this way, verecundia establishes or affirms the social bond between you and others, all of whom (ideally) play complementary roles" (15). Kaster makes his understanding even more clear when he states that "verecundia is what might be called 'ignorability': not being invisible, quite, but being seen to claim the minimum amount of social space needed to carry out a given line of action" (17). Pudor ("decency," "shame," "embarrassment"), the subject of the second and longest chapter, can be paraphrased as "being aware of others being aware of you" (28–29). He expands on this to add that "while it was understandably your goal to receive the largest possible share of creditable attention ('honor') and experience the least possible discomfort from discrediting attention ('shame'), honor and shame were experienced as complementary, rather than opposed" (29).Kaster is not, therefore, interested in the modes by which verecundia and pudor can become internalized. He does not believe that a Roman's valuation of what action could or could not be judged as invoking verecundia or pudor can be made without immediate recourse to others (cf. 59). He is not interested, for example, in the way that Seneca, with his recommendation for daily (Epistles 83) self-scrutiny (so, for example, Epistles 16.2: excute te et varie scrutare et observa) might have evaluated an action. Seneca, as we know, suggested that you judge an action, hence its capacity to evoke an emotion such as verecundia, by checking it against a judge internal to your mind, such as an imagined Scipio, Cato, or Laelius (Epistles 25.5–6; see Edwards, G&R 54, 1997). The point is an important one. Kaster sees little shift in the way verecundia and pudor, or indeed his five emotions generally, are understood throughout the period he covers (roughly [End Page 138] 200... (shrink)