Lawrence Johnson advocates a major change in our attitude toward the nonhuman world. He argues that nonhuman animals, and ecosystems themselves, are morally significant beings with interests and rights. The author considers recent work in environmental ethics in the introduction and then presents his case with the utmost precision and clarity. Written in an attractive, nontechnical style, the book will be of particular interest to philosophers, environmentalists and ecologists.

I develop the thesis that species and ecosystems are living entities with morally significant interests in their own right and defend it against leading objections. Contrary to certain claims, it is possible to individuate such entities sufficiently well. Indeed, there is a sense in which such entities define their own nature. I also consider and reject the argument that species and ecosystems cannot have interests or even traits in their own right because evolution does not proceed on that level. Although (...) evolution proceeds on the level of the genotype, those selected are able to cooperate in entities of various higher orders—including species and ecosystems. Having their own nature and interests, species and ecosystems can meaningfully be said to have moral standing. (shrink)

Future generations do not exist, and are not determinate in their make-up. The moral significance of future generations cannot be accounted for on the basis of a purely individualistic ethic. Yet future generations are morally significant. The Person-Affecting Principle, that (roughly) only acts which are likely to affect particular individuals are morally significant, must be augmented in such a way as to take into account the moral significance of Homo sapiens, a holistic entity which certainly does exist. Recent contributions to (...) Environmental Values by Alan Carter and Ernest Partridge are criticised (but not entirely rejected). (shrink)

The human race is an ongoing entity, not just a collection of individuals. It has interests which are not just the aggregated interests of individual humans. These interests are morally significant and have important implications for environmental ethics.

I argue that bioethics needs to focus less exclusively on our character as rational choice-making sentient beings, and take more into account our character and interests as living beings of the sort we are, of which our consciousness is but one aspect I propose that we adopt what I deem a biocentric ethic, centring on our nature and character as living human beings. As I develop them, the central biocentric conceptions are as follows: A living being is best thought of (...) not as a thing but as a living system, an ongoing life-process of a particular sort.Our interests as living beings spring from our particular character and lie in whatever contributes to our coherent effective functioning as ongoing life processes of that character.Our interests encompass our whole being, and not just our character as sentient, conscious, rational, decision-making beings.I argue that such conceptions can help us deal with matters of bioethical concern, including issues of euthanasia, abortion, autonomy, and perhaps genetic engineering. (shrink)

Approaches bioethics on the basis of a conception of life and what is needed for the affirmation of its quality in the most encompassing sense. Johnson applies this conception to discussions of controversial issues in bioethics including euthanasia, abortion, cloning and genetic engineering. His emphasis is not on providing definitive solutions to all bioethical issues but on developing an approach to coping with them that can also help us deal with new issues as they emerge. The foundation of this discussion (...) is an extensive examination of the nature of the self and its good and of various approaches to ethics. His bioethic is integrally related to his well-known work on environmental philosophy. The book also applies these principles on an individual level, offering a user-friendly discussion of how to deal with ethical slippery slopes and how and where to draw the line when dealing with difficult questions of bioethics. (shrink)

In some part, the ideas presented here are anticipated in a paper by Frank Tillman, through I present a broader theory intended to have utility in connection with the theory of truth.

I discuss the Principle of Double Effect (PDE) as a means of exploring aspects of the motivation of active voluntary euthanasia (a.v.e.). It is argued that the objective of a.v.e. is not death but the relief of suffering. Nor is death the means, it is a concomitant I entertain no hope of convincing the typical proponent of PDE that a.v.e. is morally acceptable. However, I point out that a central strength of the PDE is its insistence on due proportionality between (...) outcomes. When a.v.e. is appropriate, as sometimes it is, death is not out of proportion to the relief of suffering. (shrink)