Published in 1967, when Derrida is 37 years old, Voice and Phenomenon appears at the same moment as Of Grammatology and Writing and Difference. All three books announce the new philosophical project called “deconstruction.” Although Derrida will later regret the fate of the term “deconstruction,” he will use it throughout his career to define his own thinking. While Writing and Difference collects essays written over a 10 year period on diverse figures and topics, and Of Grammatology aims its deconstruction at (...) “the age of Rousseau,” Voice and Phenomenon shows deconstruction engaged with the most important philosophical movement of the last hundred years: phenomenology. Only in relation to phenomenology is it possible to measure the importance of deconstruction. Only in relation to Husserl’s philosophy is it possible to understand the novelty of Derrida’s thinking. Voice and Phenomenon therefore may be the best introduction to Derrida’s thought in general. To adapt Derrida’s comment on Husserl’s Logical Investigations, it contains “the germinal structure” of Derrida’s entire thought. Lawlor’s fresh translation of Voice and Phenomenon brings new life to Derrida’s most seminal work. (shrink)

In diesen Vorlesungen behandelt Nelson den Abschnitt in der Geschichte der Philosophie, in dem, angeregt durch die Entwicklung der klassischen Physik, die Frage nach der Begründung philosophischer Lehren die Forscher mehr und mehr zu beschäftigen beginnt. Er verfolgt kritisch die Bemühungen, diese Frage zu klären und Ansätze für ihre Lösung zu gewinnen, deckt alte Vorurteile auf, die diesen Versuchen entgegenstehen und sie immer wieder zurückwerfen und verdunkeln, kurz, er hat – auch darin ein Schüler seines Lehrers Fries – den Mut (...) zur eigenen Stellungnahme, zum Urteil darüber, wo in diesem Ringen um gesicherte Grundlagen philosophischen Denkens Fortschritte erzielt und wo Rückschritte getan wurden. (shrink)

In this paper, I present and defend a novel version of the Reactive Attitude account of moral blameworthiness. In Section 1, I introduce the Reactive Attitude account and outline Allan Gibbard's version of it. In Section 2, I present the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem, which has been at the heart of much recent discussion about the nature of value, and explain why a reformulation of it causes serious problems for versions of the Reactive Attitude account such as Gibbard's. In (...) Section 3, I consider some ways in which Gibbard might attempt to avoid the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem. I argue that all of these ways fail to achieve their aim and further contend that the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem cannot be solved in a sufficiently convincing manner by the widely used method of making ad hoc distinctions among kinds of properties, kinds of attitudes, and kinds of reasons. In Section 4, I sketch my own version of the Reactive Attitude account of moral blameworthiness and show that it simply avoids the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem rather than attempting to solve the problem on a piecemeal basis. (shrink)

Cet article cherche à travers une étude des textes, et en suivant l'évolution de la pensée de Frege, à dégager le rôle prédominant - à la fois positif et regrettable - qu'a joué la philosophie dans la construction du système fondationnel des Grundgesetze. En premier lieu, sa conception exhaltante de la logique, qui fonde son logicisme est exposée; ensuite, il apparaît que le concept "autonome” d'ensemble n'entrant pas, selon Frege, dans ce domaine pur, ne peut pas fonder l'arithmétique; ensuite, on (...) voit que les types violent à la fois la simplicité privilégiée de la logique et la nature métaphysique des fonctions et en dernier lieu, les raisons philosophiques de la théorie des entités incomplètes sont développées. Il apparaît qu'une vision philosophique empêche de sauver le système des Grundgesetze à moins de le détruire. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Second-Order Cybernetics as a Fundamental Revolution in Science” by Stuart A. Umpleby. Upshot: This commentary looks at the parallel developments in contiguous fields that include and encourage multiple viewpoints and the validity of multiple positions. I contend that necessity will overcome the resistance to disturbing the status quo of power structures when the stakes become high enough.

Ethics, Policy & Environment, Volume 15, Issue 2, Page 241-243, June 2012.

This essay attempts to answer three types of question concerning the images of violence found in deconstructive discourse. First, there is the question of confusion between real violence and transcendental violence. Second, there is the question of a lack of vigilance in regard to real violence. And finally, third, there is the question of the need for a moral principle of non-violence. The response to the first type of question lies in the recognition that the violence Derrida attributes to the (...) transcendental level of experience lies in the openness of experience. This openness amounts only to the potential for real or factual violence. The response to the second type of question lies in the recognition that more vigilance is needed since the transcendental level cannot be characterized in mundane terms, and that resistance to the mundane means no images of factual violence. Finally, the response to the third and most difficult question lies in an examination of Derrida’s statement that “tout autre est tout autre.” Through this statement we approach something like a principle, even a moral principle. The statement presents us with an imperative to respect every single other as if he, she, or it were absolutely other. (shrink)