Taking divine omniscience as including temporal omniscience, which means God exists at all times and knows everything, I point out the fallacies in an incompatibilist argument. Syntactically, due to misapplication of the principle of substitutivity, this incompatibilist argument isn’t valid. Semantically, due to cancelation of a supposition on which God’s earlier belief depends, an agent’s alternative action won’t result in falsification of divine belief. Finally, by appealing to an eternalist conception of truth of proposition about the future, I argue that (...) what divine belief entails isn’t the necessity of an agent’s action but the action itself, and put forward a notion of conditional fatalism, which allows for human free will. (shrink)

The conception of possible worlds, as proposed by Plantinga, presents certain issues, notably its dependence on the prior concept of modality. While Plantinga’s strategy for addressing the enigma of transworld identity carries metaphysical significance, it lacks epistemological value. This deficiency emerges because world-indexed properties do not serve as effective tools in epistemic practice compared to their counterparts, space–time-indexed properties. Moreover, Plantinga’s attempt to isolate transworld identification from transworld identity proves unconvincing. This paper contends that the intelligibility of modal discourse and (...) reference forms the crux of transworld identity. It further demonstrates that transworld identification underpins this intelligibility in an epistemological sense. Therefore, the problem of transworld identification is epistemologically foundational to the issue of transworld identity, necessitating a comprehensive solution. (shrink)