' Here is Tolstoy's religion; and non-violence is at its heart. Simon Parke, author of The Beautiful Life.

On Tyranny is Leo Strauss's classic reading of Xenophon's dialogue, Hiero or Tyrannicus, in which the tyrant Hiero and the poet Simonides discuss the advantages and disadvantages of exercising tyranny. This edition includes a translation of the dialogue, a critique of the commentary by the French philosopher Alexandre Kojève, Strauss's restatement of his position in light of Kojève's comments, and finally, the complete Strauss-Kojève correspondence. "Through [Strauss's] interpretation Xenophon appears to us as no longer the somewhat dull and flat author (...) we know, but as a brilliant and subtle writer, an original and profound thinker. What is more, in interpreting this forgotten dialogue, Strauss lays bare great moral and political problems that are still ours." —Alexandre Kojève, Critique "On Tyranny is a complex and stimulating book with its 'parallel dialogue' made all the more striking since both participants take such unusual, highly provocative positions, and so force readers to face substantial problems in what are often wholly unfamiliar, even shocking ways." —Robert Pippin, History and Theory "Every political scientist who tries to disentangle himself from the contemporary confusion over the problems of tyranny will be much indebted to this study and inevitably use it as a starting point."—Eric Voegelin, The Review of Politics Leo Strauss (1899-1973) was the Robert Maynard Hutchins Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. (shrink)

In summary, then, this discussion indicates one of the ways in which Simpson participated in the “modern evolutionary synthesis” by focusing on his developing concept of the species. In particular, we see him moving from species-as-types to species-as-populations, and next to how those populations, through organism-environment interactions, might give rise to new species, some of which rapidly lead to higher taxa.Simpson's participation in the creation of the modern synthesis is more generally evident here by his contribution to what V. B. (...) Smocovitis has recently termed the “quantification of evolution — the attachment of numbers to ‘nature.’” Smocovitis rightly views such quantification as an essential ingredient for the formulation of the evolutionary synthesis; however, she neglects Simpson's role in this regard. As suggested here and demonstrated more fully elsewhere, Simpson's commitment to a positivistic philosophy often found expression in quantitative argumentation, even if the paleontological data upon which such arguments were based were limited in number and precision. (shrink)

The paper illustrates how organic chemists dramatically altered their practices in the middle part of the twentieth century through the adoption of analytical instrumentation — such as ultraviolet and infrared absorption spectroscopy and nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy — through which the difficult process of structure determination for small molecules became routine. Changes in practice were manifested in two ways: in the use of these instruments in the development of ‘rule-based’ theories; and in an increased focus on synthesis, at the expense (...) of chemical analysis. These rule-based theories took the form of generalizations relating structure to chemical and physical properties, as measured by instrumentation. This ‘Instrumental Revolution’ in organic chemistry was two-fold: encompassing an embrace of new tools that provided unprecedented access to structures, and a new way of thinking about molecules and their reactivity in terms of shape and structure. These practices suggest the possibility of a change in the ontological status of chemical structures, brought about by the regular use of instruments. The career of Robert Burns Woodward provides the central historical examples for the paper. Woodward was an organic chemist at Harvard from 1937 until the time of his death. In 1965, he won the Nobel Prize in Chemistry. (shrink)

I explore the possibility and rationality of interpersonal mechanisms of doxastic self-control, that is, ways in which individuals can make use of other people in order to get themselves to stick to their beliefs. I look, in particular, at two ways in which people can make interpersonal epistemic commitments, and thereby willingly undertake accountability to others, in order to get themselves to maintain their beliefs in the face of anticipated “epistemic temptations”. The first way is through the avowal of belief, (...) and the second is through the establishment of collective belief. I argue that both of these forms of interpersonal epistemic commitment can function as effective tools for doxastic self-control, and, moreover, that the control they facilitate should not be dismissed as irrational from an epistemic perspective. (shrink)

Cahier 1 : « Merleau-Ponty. Philosophie et non-philosophie ».E. de Saint-Aubert, La « promiscuité ». Merleau-Ponty à la recherche d’une psychanalyse ontologique ; P. Maniglier, De Mauss à Claude Lévi-Strauss : cinquante ans après. Pour une ontologie Maori ; E. Bimbenet, Sens pratique et pratiques réflexives. Quelques développements sociologiques de l’ontologie..

[Philosophy of Nature of St. Thomas Aquinas:. Nature, the Universe, Man].

Selon une accusation lancée par Mendelssohn en 1785, Kant est souvent considéré comme le brise-tout (Alleszermalmer) de la métaphysique. Les textes permettent de montrer qu'une telle attitude était étrangère à Kant, et qu'il projetait en réalité une réforme et une renaissance de la métaphysique. A cet effet, il s'est servi d'une argumentation qui, outre ses aspects originaux, plonge aussi ses racines dans une stratégie que Baumgarten, puis son disciple Georg Friedrich Meier, avaient déjà déployée contre l'attitude antimétaphysique. Gemäss Mendelssohns Anklage (...) von 1785 wird Kant oft als ein Alleszermalmer, als der Zermalmer der Metaphysik, betrachtet. Die Texte belegen jedoch, dass Kant keine derartige Absicht hegte, und dass er in Wirklichkeit die Metaphysik einer Reform unterziehen wollte. Dazu bediente er sich einer Argumentation, die ausser ihren originellen Aspekten auch in einer Strategie wurzelt, die schon von Baumgarten und seinem Schüler Georg Friedrich Meier gegen die antimetaphysische Haltung durchgeführt wurde. (shrink)