Let κ be a regular cardinal, and let B be a subalgebra of an interval algebra of size κ. The existence of a chain or an antichain of size κ in B is due to M. Rubin (see [7]). We show that if the density of B is countable, then the same conclusion holds without this assumption on κ. Next we also show that this is the best possible result by showing that it is consistent with 2 ℵ 0 = (...) ℵ ω 1 that there is a boolean algebra B of size ℵ ω 1 such that length(B) = ℵ ω 1 is not attained and the incomparability of B is less than ℵ ω 1 . Notice that B is a subalgebra of an interval algebra. For more on chains and antichains in boolean algebras see, e.g. [1] and [2]. (shrink)

t. 1. A-D -- t. 2. E-M -- t. 3. N-S -- t.4. T-I︠A︡.

This book presents a collection of essays on institutional theory written by the German sociologist and Weber-expert M. Rainer Lepsius. Based on Weber's work, the author develops concepts of institutional theory, which he subsequently applies to topics such as National Socialism, democratization processes, German unification, and the institutionalization of the European Union. By showing how charismatic leadership can under certain circumstances threaten democratic structures and curtail individual freedoms, and by analyzing the structural and cultural conditions under which people develop trust (...) in political and social structures and ultimately come to support and comply with them, the author provides a sound analytical understanding of the development of democratic institutions and a democratic political culture. This collection of essays was edited, translated and commented on by Claus Wendt. (shrink)

In a recently-published work of much learning and great interest, La Frontière de l'Euphrate de Pompée à la Conquète Arabe , M. Victor Chapot has dealt at some length with the history of the eastern legions. But neither he, nor, so far as I can find, any other writer, has attempted to fix their camps with full regard to chronology, and many points have been left uncertain. Although there is little direct evidence—less than for any other part of the Roman (...) Empire—it may be possible to construct with reasonable probability a more exact military map of the eastern frontier. (shrink)

Philosophie et sciences: voila un theme difficile, central, de notre temps, ou il est necessairement question de son sens. C'est ce sens qu'interrogent, d'une facon a la fois historique et problematique, les essais du present volume. J. Merleau-Ponty questionne les rapports entre sciences et vulgarisation scientifique. J. Ladriere pose le probleme de La normativite de la pensee scientifique. J. Lambert met en evidence le probleme du Livre de la Nature chez Galilee et Kepler. P. Kerszberg confronte les structures internes de (...) la philosophie critique kantienne et de la theorie de la relativite sur la question cosmologique. M. Richir analyse L'illusion transcendantale dans la theorie cantorienne des ensembles. B. d'Espagnat et G. Hottois evoquent le problemes des rapports difficiles, aujourd'hui, entre science et philosophie. (shrink)

This paper builds on previous work by Sirgy, M. J., Journal of Business Ethics 19, 193–206, dealing with issues of code of conduct of marketing educators. Sirgy developed a discussion document outlining a semblance of what might be construed as a code of ethics for marketing educators. The discussion document was debated and accompanied by three commentaries. One conclusion derived from the discussion document and the commentaries is the need to develop a code of ethics involving behaviors that most marketing (...) educators find morally unacceptable. The current paper reports on a descriptive study involving a survey of marketing educators in which survey respondents were asked to rate the extent to which certain behaviors are deemed acceptable or unacceptable. The results of the survey identified certain behaviors deemed unacceptable by the vast majority of survey respondents. This evidence of hypernorms within the community of marketing educators was used to propose an initial code of ethics. (shrink)

An excellent introduction to communication theory, this book is a comprehensive study of its subject; fields such as linguistics, logic, mathematics, and psychology are considered in terms of their relevance for communication theory. No material that appeared in the first edition has been deleted from this second edition, but some comments have been added, some figures updated, and the bibliography extended to include the new publications in the field. Cherry begins with an examination of the concept of "communication"; he also (...) discusses social structures, considering the pattern of communication within a social group. After this introductory chapter, Cherry presents an historical review of the evolution of communication theory; he discusses codes, signs, brains, and machines, mentioning the work of such scientists as Shannon, Zipf, and Wiener. Topics such as phonetics, phonemics, object language and metalanguage, Zipf's Law, and semantics are also considered, as well as the role of the telecommunication engineer, who describes and analyzes the physical signals themselves without reference to their meanings. In the concluding chapter, psychological considerations concerning the reception of information are presented: recognition, for example, of universals, of geometric figures, of speech sounds, of distorted speech, the relevance of past experience, and the intake of information by the senses. Although technical material is presented, the book is very readable; jargon is kept at a minimum. The result is an exceedingly interesting and stimulating book.—E. M. (shrink)

Time has not worn out the urgency and the novelty of these essays on existentialism published first in 1950 and again in 1959. The nothingness on which Paci writes so poignantly here is being as dealt with in the various historico-philosophical positions of transcendence. This suggestion of Paci is Heideggerian in character: being and nothingness are after all identified. But since Paci has in mind the inevitable destruction of human finitude by philosophical conceptions of transcendence, his words of caution apply (...) to Heidegger's intentions as well. Heidegger in fact destroyed metaphysics, i.e., the possibility of enclosing transcendence within any philosophical system. Yet by making this destruction systematic he opened up a new transcendence which encompasses existence as speech oriented in the philosophical mode. For Paci all of these philosophical positions end up identifying being and nothingness precisely because none of their images of transcendence can be properly superimposed upon the freedom and the finitude of man; thus, they become irrelevant, they lead nowhere. Three philosophical directions in Paci's background lead him away from this irrelevancy: the Augustinian emphasis on the existentiell that leads through Kierkegaard to Jaspers; the immanentistic [[sic]] sense of human development that flows parallel in Marx and Croce; the constitutive role of experience and expression in the late Husserl. Concerning the latter, Paci sees some important connections between constitution and myth in the two central chapters of his work, one of which is about existentialism and neo-Kantianism and the other about myth and existence.--A. M. (shrink)

The inevitable illusion referred to in this title is the result of the mixture of the logical effort, which produces forms, and the critical effort, which destroys them. Such antagonism of logic and criticism is most acute in aesthetics. The produced forms, when taken as concepts, become illusory forms, predominantly poetic. While the idea is worth pursuing, the work is marred by an overly rhetorical mode of expression, reflecting a precipitous dialectical démarche and an indiscriminate accumulation of sources from all (...) quarters of the history of philosophy.--A. M. (shrink)

Current philosophy of science seems to be giving an increasingly historical emphasis to the hypothetical character of its theoretical constructs and to the consequent penetration of facts by theory. This tendency has not been fostered by the influence of Whewell. He remains isolated in his historical period, a figure left behind by the progress of philosophy and science. Yet there are two important lines of thought that have considered themselves in continuity with Whewell. One runs through French positivistic neo-Kantianism to (...) Emile Meyerson, the other derives from Mach's studies in the history of science and has some important repercussions in the Vienna Circle, particularly in the work of Otto Neurath. Marcucci seems to be more aware of the former line of thought than of the latter. However this circumstance does not affect the excellent quality of this historical exposition since its author is not aiming at a rational reconstruction of Whewell's philosophy that might be marred by a distortion in perspective. The need for such a serious reconstruction is however urgent; this study, with its emphasis on the problems of induction and idealization and on the mathematics of teleology, will certainly stimulate the present demand for further work on Whewell.--A. M. (shrink)

In this source study of the hermetic and prophetic poetry of William Blake, Kathleen Raine adds strength to the theory that it takes a poet to explain one. The present volumes, expanded from the 1962 Mellon Lectures in the Fine Arts, are the result of twenty years' research; in scholarship and in style, they well might serve as a model for all source studies to come. Raine traces Blake's borrowings from Neoplatonism, from alchemy, from classical and hermetic sources, from gnosticism (...) and Christianity. Her development avoids the rigid chronological installment method so often used and moves along lyrically in chapter divisions sometimes source inspired, more often determined by particular characters created by Blake himself. Two very complete indexes, both of Blake's works and of general subjects, allow for immediate reference within the author's rather fluid organization. Mention must be made also of the beautiful plate reproductions which encourage a more integrated appreciation of Blake's two media of expression. Raine communicates the universal nature of visionary poetry, the basic sources of which have not changed significantly throughout the centuries. She thus opens up for the reader the possibility of understanding a whole tradition of the most awesome and most inaccessible literature.--C. M. R. (shrink)

Consists largely of fragments from the works of poets, prophets, and philosophers, particularly the author's teacher, Charles E. Garman, all expressive of a kind of anti-dogmatic theism.--C. M.

In this revised and expanded edition of his well-known study of Denis Diderot's life and works, Crocker combines solid scholarship with a vivid portrayal of his subjects. Leaving firm ground only occasionally, Crocker masterfully reconstructs Diderot's life by weaving into his narrative the testimony of Diderot's contemporaries and the philosopher's own anecdotes of the more picturesque episodes of his life. The author never departs from firm ground, however, in his presentation of Diderot's works. With a rare blend of erudition and (...) a lively critical sense, he sets them forth in the light of eighteenth-century currents of thought, highlighting Diderot's most significant contributions to materialism, sensualism, and experimentalism, while at the same time preserving, in quite readable summaries, the integrity of individual writings. His extensive consideration of the twenty years Diderot devoted to the Encyclopedia is particularly stimulating. By contrast, his summary presentation of Diderot's novels is somewhat disappointing, especially since he gives all too brief mention to Diderot's innovations in that genre. A needed index is lacking, but in spite of this and other minor shortcomings, Crocker's efforts have resulted in what is clearly the best complete English biography of one of the eighteenth century's most colorful geniuses.—C. M. M. (shrink)

In this exposition of Boehme's key conceptions, the author tries to show that the seventeenth-century Silesian mystic's work can and should be viewed as an original, coherent philosophic system. Includes detailed biographical sketch, bibliography, indexes, illustrations and diagrams.--C. M.

In his preface, Hunter explains that this volume is intended to provide for non-mathematicians an introduction to the most important results of modern mathematical logic. The reader will find here the work of Post, Skolem, Gödel, Church, Henkin, and others, presented in a terse and closely-knit style. Though acknowledging the trend toward natural deduction systems, Hunter sticks to more classical axiomatic systems on the grounds that the proofs of metatheorems are simplified by that choice. He begins with a formal system (...) of propositional logic, for which he develops proofs of completeness, consistency, and decidability. Systems of first order predicate logic are then dealt with, and Church's and Gödel's results on undecidability and incompleteness are presented. There is a brief, useful discussion indicating what parts of first order predicate logic are decidable. It is assumed that the reader has some familiarity with elementary formal logic: Hunter develops the set-theoretical results he requires. The compactness of the presentation is facilitated by the use of earlier results for propositional logic to obtain certain results for predicate logic. Especially helpful is Hunter's technique of prefacing each of the longer and more difficult proofs with a section explaining the key ideas and the general method of proof; summaries are also often provided in conclusion. Because of the orientation of the book, a more extensive discussion of the significance of the results obtained and the philosophical issues which have been raised concerning some of them, would have been welcome. Nonetheless, this is a good, concise introduction for those who are not yet prepared to tackle the more technical literature. A bibliography is provided for those interested in pursuing the subject in greater detail.--E. M. F. (shrink)

The present work, the proceedings of a workshop conducted at Catholic University in the summer of 1962, presupposes an acceptance of Thomism as a philosophical synthesis. The series of papers presented consider Thomism as a system and its relation to other forms of scholasticism, contemporary problems and philosophical trends, and the methodological problems involved in teaching Thomism. While this study should be of value to the limited group for which it was intended, those teaching undergraduate philosophy courses in Catholic colleges, (...) its generally closed and conservative tone will limit its utility for a wider audience.—E. M. M. (shrink)

A richly detailed history of French secular thought in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. A wealth of material is introduced from unpublished manuscripts. Spink's stress on the clandestine spread of the enlightenment, in spite of official suppression, is interesting and sobering.--J. M. W.

This book attempts to prepare the non-philosopher for the study of contemporary philosophical works. After a discussion of the course of science after Copernicus, Mr. Prosch turns to an exposition of, first, the metaphysical and epistemological positions of the British empiricists and Kant and, second, the ethical and political positions of Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Adam Smith, Kant, Rousseau, and Hegel. His discussion of Marxism, pragmatism, analytical philosophy and existentialism is written from a neutral position. The book may be too technical (...) to serve its purpose, but it is a well-organized and clear attempt.—J. M. B. (shrink)

The editors purport to provide the student with an overview of the recent work done on one particular dogma of empiricism. They have collected eight articles uniformly of high quality and added their own excellent elementary historical interpretative introduction. At the beginning of each selection, the editors have also appended a one or two page summary and interpretation which will be a great aid to the student. Although the book is supposedly designed to present the current state of discussion, only (...) one appeared as late as 1958. The others date from the early and mid-fifties. At least three of the selections have been anthologized so frequently that anyone considering the book for his own use will probably already have them in other volumes.--M. S. (shrink)

Herder spent two years studying at the University of Königsberg and attended four courses taught by Kant, who at the time had just published his first really important philosophical writing on the "Only Possible Proof of the Demonstration of God's Existence." Herder's notes are probably the only ones preserved from any lecture by Kant in that decade. The texts on logic and mathematics are short and insignificant. The pages on metaphysics are devoted to mostly psychological inquiries. Herder's notes are most (...) complete on "Practical Philosophy after Hutcheson and Baumgarten" where Kant analyzes not only purely ethical questions, but treats at some length religious issues as well. Even though these notes do not revolutionize our understanding of the genesis of Kant's philosophy, they do help us to retrace in more detail his road to the Dissertation of 1770 and to the critical writings. The editor's introduction is brief but good, and the bibliographical notes are abundant and excellent.—M. J. V. (shrink)

There has been a most deserving movement in the last years to unite in one volume the most important scholarly articles written on the same topic yet published in different learned journals. The present volume is devoted to the problems of medieval German and Dutch mysticism from its beginnings to The Imitation of Christ. The selection is interesting and varied yet a certain technical narrowness pervades the whole volume. Instead of sharing the pages somewhat equally between philological and philosophico-theological articles, (...) there is a heavy preponderance of the purely philological and of the strictly historical. Moreover, the papers of a more philosophical character talk less to the philosophically interested reader than to the specialist in the history of medieval philosophy. Of course, there are welcome exceptions like the fine study of Joseph Koch on Eckhart's doctrine of analogy or A. Ampe's article on the "essential return of the soul to God according to Jan Van Ruysbroeck"--but the general tone of the volume is such that the non-specialist would have difficulty to be interested in many of its chapters.--M. J. V. (shrink)

As the subtitle indicates, this book intends to discuss Descartes’ attempt of laying a new foundation of knowledge. In a lively and critical interpretation of Descartes’ writings, especially of his Discours de la Méthode and of his Meditationes, and a competent use of the corresponding philosophical literature the success of this attempt of enlightenment and its shortcomings, identified with the Cartesian re-introduction of the traditional metaphysics, are explained in order to allow the author in a concluding discussion to present his (...) ideas of the necessary revision of Descartes philosophy. Presenting the I as the subject not only for the first time but in an unique way, and concentrating upon the problem of the self-originating human knowledge in an exemplary manner, Descartes is found to have become the founder of subjective philosophy. As knowledge of knowledge, philosophy is not concerned primarily with objects, but with knowledge and has self-foundation as its main task. So it has to start with human knowledge and to place the self as the fountain from which all knowledge proceeds. The demands of subjective philosophy dictate its method described in the Discours. The foundation of knowledge, which as such can only be true and certain knowledge, leads to enlightenment, i.e., to the rebellion against and to the great confrontation with the culture of the time, that is, with the guiding principles of understanding and evaluating the world of his society, and to the introduction of self-experience as the primary source of knowledge. Appointing human reason as the only leader of his intellectual life, Descartes determines the program and future order of his thoughts; the method, in the form of the four rules, has "correctly to direct his reason and to seek the truth in the sciences." It brings Descartes over the methodical doubt to the unquestionable and unsurpassed foundation of human knowledge, the absolute certitude of the self in the Cogito. His analysis of the poor, unprotected I, related to itself knowingly, is unique and of priceless philosophical value. However, the further stations of the philosophical way of Descartes who, unable to stand the ontological loneliness of this philosophically determined self-awareness, sacrificed the idea of scientific progress to a rational theology, cannot be followed. The claim of the metaphysician to be able to discover or, at least, to test every humanly possible knowledge in terms of the absolute knowledge, disintegrates in view of the progress of the new sciences. Not eternal, necessary truth, but the finite human I is the origin of subjective philosophy. The stability of rational relations does not lie in these relations themselves as if they were existing for themselves, but in the strict consequence of logical reason. "'God’ is... the title for the transcendental-philosophical background of consciousness, for the conditions to which the I-think is always already subjected." All contents which allegedly are already given in the infinite knowledge and can always be deduced from it, have to be produced and developed out of the first human knowledge by way of scientific research. Science which received its new foundation in subjective philosophy and is sought in the efforts of communication of the scientists, is not characterized by truth, but by certitude. "'Truth’ is the concern of metaphysics or better of religion. It is of the essence of such truth, not to be capable of demonstration. The absolutely true has no need to prove itself; it is entitled to faith." Differences between metaphysics and religion, and the nature and possible justification of such metaphysical and religious faith are regrettably not discussed.—M. S. (shrink)

Sellars offers a twentieth-century American Hylas as the adversary to Philonous, the spokesman of the idealist position in Berkeley's Three Dialogues. Hylas is still a materialist, but espouses an evolutionary or "emergent" materialism. He challenges Philonous' assumption that matter is inert, and incapable of giving rise to novelties such as consciousness or life itself. Since Sellars finds Berkeley to be entirely logical in his argument, he tends his hand to the theory of perception. Sellars' Hylas finds Berkeley's analysis of mediate (...) and immediate perception to be inadequate with respect to the complex operation of perceiving. He suggests "direct perception which is mediated by information." Although mediated, direct perception differs from Berkeley's 'mediate perception', as it is not inferred from sensations which were perceived first. It differs from Berkeley's 'immediate perception' in not identifying perceiving with awareness of sensation. In a short epilogue the author looks back on sixty years of American philosophy, concluding that it deviates from the European in having "a certain explanatory openness."--M. B. M. (shrink)

This anthology is designed for teachers who wish a text that deals with practical, normative issues of popular interest. The selected readings, nearly all of which were first published in the last ten years, are grouped under the following seven headings: Sex, Abortion, Prejudice and Discrimination, Civil Disobedience, Punishment, War, and Suicide and Death. The selections include such popular pieces as Judith Jarvis Thomson’s "A Defense of Abortion," John Rawls’ "The Justification of Civil Disobedience," and Elizabeth Anscombe’s "War and Murder," (...) and such fresh, provocative essays as Peter Singer’s "Animal Liberation," and Richard Brandt’s "The Morality and Rationality of Suicide." Since the readings, which are philosophically interesting and, with effort, understandable by most undergraduates, present opposing views within each section, the text is not biased in favor of any particular viewpoint. One minor complaint is that some of the sections do not present sufficient material to allow for an adequate presentation of the topic; for example, the section on sex contains just two essays. A second complaint is the omission of any introductions; a clear discussion of the issues dealt with in each section might ease the problem undergraduates have in following the subtle argumentation contained in some of the papers. Despite these minor complaints, the book is one of the best of its type available.—M.G. (shrink)

A collection of articles centering around the analysis of the category of possibility. Most have been previously published; an English translation of one, "Scienza e Liberta," appeared in this Review V, p. 361. The treatment is in the contemporary existentialist manner, freedom being presented as based upon possibility, as existentially relevant, as finite and conditioned, yet effective in human affairs. Possibility and freedom, and their interrelation, are discussed from the point of view of their function and value within the philosophical, (...) scientific, artistic, historical and linguistic disciplines. The last three articles deal with the problem in relation to Dewey, Wittgenstein and Croce respectively. --M. B. (shrink)

Once more these annals offer the reader a substantial collection of varied articles and studies, mostly pertaining to issues of medieval philosophy and metaphysics. The contributors are from Austria, West Germany, and South Korea. Especially interesting are: the study on Kant's early writing, "The Only Possible Proof of God," by J. Bauer; a very strict analysis of the thirteenth chapter of Cusanus' book, De Visione Dei, by the Proclus specialist W. Beierwaltes; and an attempt at the "reconciliation" of metaphysics and (...) positivism by R. Wohlgenannt. There are a number of shorter book reviews and a lengthy instructive review article on R. Berlinger's recent book on Augustine's dialectical metaphysics. This review article is at least as interesting and inspiring as the major articles making up the bulk of the book.--M. J. V. (shrink)

Most present-day philosophers know William Paley primarily as a defender of the argument from design and the author of the famous watch analogy. Professor LeMahieu argues that Paley’s philosophical and theological writings deserve more than the scant attention they now receive. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Paley’s books were held in such high esteem that several were required reading by students at Oxford and Cambridge; the Evidences of Christianity was kept on the Cambridge University examination list until 1920. His (...) books were deemed important not only because they presented forceful arguments in a lucid style, but also because they presented a unified and comprehensive philosophy that embodied many of the main beliefs of the Enlightenment in England. The cornerstone of Paley’s philosophy was the contention that scientific reasoning, i.e., inductive and analogical arguments, could be used to demonstrate God’s existence and nature. In Natural Theology, Paley offered inductive arguments for God’s existence; and in Evidences of Christianity, arguments of the same type were used to support revealed religion. Paley’s argument in support of Christianity was directed primarily at refuting Hume’s contention that those who claimed to have seen the biblical miracles were unreliable witnesses. In Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, Paley again relied on inductive arguments along with his inductive proofs of God’s existence and nature to support a utilitarian moral position. Although LeMahieu presents a full account of Paley’s philosophy and its influence on subsequent nineteenth century thinkers, he does not neglect to point out some of that philosophy’s questionable arguments and assumptions. Despite many possible deficiencies in his arguments, however, Paley is one of the ablest defenders of religion and, at times, a shrewd philosopher. By presenting a coherent statement of Paley’s philosophy, LeMahieu has performed a worthwhile task. His book should inspire other philosophers to examine carefully Paley’s neglected treatises.—M.G. (shrink)

This book by an economist might seem to claim the attention of philosophers, as its chapters include "The subject and methods of inquiry," and "The problem of induction"; important topics in the philosophy of science. In fact, it is a superficial and pretentious essay on science as a social system. Few facts are offered. The generalizations distort. Probably due to the imprecision of their statement, the premisses often contradict one another. A disproportionate percentage of the book's length consists of various (...) forms of the first person pronoun. The chapter on induction, which Mr. Tullock calls a digression, characterizes induction, also called Hume's problem, twice; once in terms of the popular misconception, as a process of going from the particular to the general, second, as the process whereby "a pattern of the whole problem appears in the mind and is then tested by working out.... The patterns must be directly perceived by the mind, since no 'intellectual' explanation is available." The author seems unaware that Hume's problem, and the justification of induction, are never mentioned.—M. B. M. (shrink)

Salutary reading for all philosophers, and not only for inductive logicians, philosophers of science and law, this important book presents an elaborate theory of inductive reasoning whose substantive features are as strikingly original as the approach is rare. First, the theory is based on concrete, real, actual, and significant instances of inductive reasoning, e.g., Karl von Frisch’s work on bees; that is, though its aim is genuinely theoretical in the sense that it engages in the proper amounts of idealization, abstraction, (...) systematization, precision, and rigor, it never loses sight of the fact that "theories in the philosophy of science, like theories in science itself, have to face up to the challenge of appropriately accredited experience within their appointed domains". Second, a central subject matter being analyzed is legal reasoning, that is, the types of proofs and arguments used by juries, judges, and lawyers in the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, where criminal charges have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and civil cases have to be argued on the balance of probability. Thus, in effect, Cohen’s synthesis of juridical and of scientific reasoning is an admirable example of the bridging of two "cultures." Third, and most importantly, the concept of "inductive probability," in terms of which Cohen makes sense out of his subject matter, is incommensurable with that of "mathematical probability," namely the classical calculus of chance according to which probability is measurable, additive, transitive, and obeys a multiplicational principle for conjunction and a complementational one for negation. This is not to say that "inductive probability" is a hazy, mysterious, or unstructured concept, and Cohen goes to great lengths to show that it is ordinal, modal, and formally analyzable; what it does mean is that essential types of reasoning in science and in law involve probable inferences whose probabilities are nonquantitative. Hence, though Cohen does not stress the qualitative nature of inductive probability, his book will be welcome by those who conceive of philosophy as scientia qualitatum. Specific conclusions reached by Cohen are that, in general, probability may be conceived as degree of provability, that differences in proof-rules generate different special cases of probability, that inductive probability may be viewed as the special case where the proof-rules are incomplete, that inductive probability is to inductive support as deducibility is to logical truth, and that some recent epistemological scepticism may be refuted by Cohen’s inductive logic. Finally, he sees himself in the British inductivist tradition, interpreting his predecessors as groping toward a logic of inductive support and probability rather than a methodology of discovery: from Bacon he develops the notion of eliminative induction but rejects that of induction by enumeration; Mill’s canons are analyzed as special cases of Cohen’s own "method of relevant variables," except for the method of residues, which is rejected as invalid ; he takes his critique of mathematical probability as a vindication of Hume’s thesis that "probability or reasoning from conjecture may be divided into two kinds, viz., that which is founded on chance and that which arises from causes" ; Whewell’s consilience of induction is justified ; and from Keynes, he develops the notion of the "weight" of evidence but rejects his mathematicist approach.—M. A. F. (shrink)

Histories of philosophy generally jump from Kant directly to Fichte without mentioning Salomon Maimon; yet even Fichte wrote about his "unbounded admiration" toward the Jewish thinker. The present volume is a most welcome reprint of Maimon's principal work, out of print for over a century and a half, in which he tries to refute the very idea of a Ding-an-sich. It can be claimed that this same enterprise had been carried out more spectacularly and with greater originality and depth by (...) Fichte; but it remains Maimon's great merit to have exorcised the spectre of the noumena operating from within the very framework of the Critique.—M. J. V. (shrink)

One of the forgotten "small masters" of German Romanticism is the aesthetician Solger. Besides his famous Erwin, his only major writing is the Lectures on Aesthetics. It displays a coherent and original theory of the beautiful and of art, even though a continuous polemical relationship to Schelling, Fichte and Hegel is ever present in its pages. Solger's sensitive theorizing reconciles the norms of classicism with the aims of romanticism and at the same time points beyond them towards the fundamental principles (...) and attitudes of the coming realistic aesthetic. This book is a posthumous one, based upon lectures which Solger never intended to publish. As a matter of fact, he strongly opposed the practice of printing university courses as such. Yet, these texts are perhaps most representative of the subtle and harmonious thought of this man who died at the height of his creative life. Their reprinting is an important literary event.—M. J. V. (shrink)

This seems destined, quite naturally and justly, to become a standard group of selections. Included are Chappell's meaty Introduction, My Own Life, Of the Standard of Taste, the Dialogues, and large portions of the Treatise and the two Inquiry's. Where Chappell feels that the Treatise and especially the first Inquiry overlap, he favors the passages from the Treatise. Among the notable exclusions from the latter are most of the discussion of space and time and the better part of Book II, (...) Part II. What is probably most controversial and unfortunate is the editor's omission of all but three sections in "Of Justice and Injustice".--W. L. M. (shrink)

Professor Lanczos combines an introduction to the special and general theories of relativity, geared to the layman's understanding, with an eulogy of Einstein and an appeal for a return to the speculative rather than the positivistic approach to physics. This layman found the theoretical explanations simple and clear, which, no doubt, makes them inappropriate for the advanced student.—P. M.

Although ostensibly defending speculative philosophy, Reck is doubtful that any unprejudiced speculative philosophy can exist: "No matter how much a philosopher may strive for neutrality, his test for the true philosophy is always predicated on the assumptions that his conception of being presents being as it is and that the conceptions of being his rivals uphold are partial or false." In the pursuit of neutrality, Reck attempts a mere chronicle of the distinctive conceptions of being which he feels have animated (...) the various metaphysical traditions: "Realism holds that whatever is in any sense is real; idealism that mind and its content alone are real; materialism that matter and its patterns alone are real; and process philosophy that process and the factors in process are real." The historical development of each of the four types is presented in masterly fashion. This book truly stands head and shoulders over its nearest rival in the Metaphilosophical literature for the depth of historical comprehension, the brilliant but controlled use made of a wealth of scholarship. A graduate student reviewing for comprehensive exams could do worse than to use Reck’s book. Those systems motivated at least in part by the drive-to-synthesis are disqualified a priori of being viable alternatives, motivated by distinctive intuitions. Realism, further, is found to have an inherent difficulty: "The task for the realist is to explain how the different levels or kinds of being can be related in a hierarchically ordered cosmos. The task is nothing short of explicating the bond of being." When Leibniz tries to relate finite particulars through a "Supreme Monad," he is faulted for "veering dangerously" close to Monism. Sympathetic toward Realism, Reck suggests a modification of Leibniz’s theory: not a rendering of the relations between man and God less mechanical, but a reduction of the "first Monad" from being supreme to a finite particular, struggling, like us, to overcome the hindrances posed by his environment. Reck concedes that the cognitive use of speculative philosophy, even when it redefines its project as Metaphilosophy, may be "futile"; however, he underscores the aesthetic value of the various systems, as Santayana would, when we can "bracket" the question of existence or truth and simply contemplate these cultural masterpieces as pure "essences." "Happy are those students who can suspend their critical search for truth sufficiently to savor the aesthetic values the systems of philosophy contain!" Reck refrains from judging between rival theories because such a judgment is always delivered from a view of what one takes to exist; and the impulse to go beyond "essence" to "existence" is, as Santayana teaches, prompted by fear, pain, instinct, or necessity. Rather than being a disinterested wonder at what "is," this passion is an "irrational agency of animal faith." "Needless to add," writes Reck, "animal faith is no more trustworthy than God’s existence to guarantee the truth of knowledge." This view can raise problems for Reck’s "finite" god. The finite god he prefers is perhaps "strong" enough to provide enough interconnection between existing particulars to justify a "Metaphilosophical" science, if not a properly "Philosophical" one, in the traditional sense; Reck could point to his own successful Metaphilosophy as evidence that his "god" is at least this strong. But isn't even this finite god an existential belief which, as the basis for a criticism, compromises one’s neutrality and thus constitutes a flaw in one’s Metaphilosophical theory? Is it possible that a totally adequate Metaphilosophical theory, on Reck’s canons, could not save enough interconnection between particulars to justify even a Metaphilosophy, as well as a Philosophy?—P. M. (shrink)

Listening to someone from some distance in a crowded room you may experience the following phenomenon: when looking at them speak, you may both hear and see where the source of the sounds is; but when your eyes are turned elsewhere, you may no longer be able to detect exactly where the voice must be coming from. With your eyes again fixed on the speaker, and the movement of her lips a clear sense of the source of the sound will (...) return. This ‘ventriloquist’ effect reflects the ways in which visual cognition can dominate auditory perception. And this phenomenological observation is one what you can verify or disconfirm in your own case just by the slightest reflection on what it is like for you to listen to someone with or without visual contact with them. (shrink)

This volume offers the first-ever complete English translation of Leibniz’s Dissertatio De Arte Combinatoria together with a critical edition of the original Latin text on fa...

Our research is based on a rather large "library" of various works by M. Drahomanov, which contains his views on religion. Among them: Paradise and Progress, From the History of Relations Between Church and State in Western Europe, Faith and Public Affairs, Fight for Spiritual Power and Freedom of Conscience in the 16th - 17th Centuries,, "Church and State in the Roman Empire", "The Status and Tasks of the Science of Ancient History," "Evangelical Faith in Old England," "Populism and Popular (...) Progress in Austrian Rus, Austrian-Russian Remembrance," "Pious The Legend of the Bulgarians "," The Issues of Religious Freedom in Russia, "" On the Brotherhood of the Baptist or the Baptist in Ukraine, "" The Foreword, " Shevchenko, Ukrainianophiles and Socialism "," Wonderful thoughts about the Ukrainian national affair "," Zazdri gods "," Slavic variants of one Gospel legend "," Resurrection of Christ ", etc. (shrink)

Dünyada müxtəlif dillər mövcuddur. Hal-hazırda əlavə xarici dil öyrənməyə maraq artmaqdadır. Təbii ki bu hər bir şəxsin öz istəyinə və seçiminə bağlıdır. Yəni hər kəs, hər hansı bir dili öyrəndiyi zaman, qarşısında iki məqsəd dayanır; ya o dili sevir, ya da o dili öyrənmək onun üçün lazımdır. Hər bir vətəndaşın borcudur ki, əvvəlcə öz ana dilini mükəmməl şəkildə öyrənsin. Lakin elm və texnologiyanın yüksək inkişaf etdiyi bir zamanda yalnız ana dilini bilmək kifayət etmir. İnsanın hər bir sahədə inkişafı üçün bacardığı (...) qədər başqa dillərə də yiyələnməsi artıq zəruridir. Yeni dil öyrənmənin faydaları çoxdur, yaddaşın güclənməsinə, söz ehtiyatının artmasına, nitqin gözəlləşməsinə səbəb olur. Həmçinin yeni dil öyrənməklə, insanın özünə güvəni artır, ünsiyyət dairəsi genişlənir. Bununla insan yalnız yeni sözlər deyil, yeni mədəniyyətlərlə də tanış olur və nəticədə dünyagörüşü artır. (shrink)