An outline of the life of Heraclides and his fragmentary writings (on the theory of matter, astronomy, ethical and religious topics) is followed by an attempt to reconstruct his thought. He emerges as not so much a profound thinker as a many-sided writer of considerable literary gifts and occasional flashes of brilliance.

The book discusses recent developments in Discourse Ethics and argues for a new proposal of how to spell out its core ideas. It finds that its basic principles ("D" and "U") are too specific: they focus on norms, identify those affected with those participating in discourse and use the narrow vocabulary of interests and consequences. It proposes instead: (D1) Only those claims are valid that can be defended against any objection of any possible agent. Discourse Ethics should be understood as (...) a normative framework for ethical argumentation that allows for a plurality of moral principles and for reflections on their suitability for specific contexts. It demands that one acts according to one's best reasons. (shrink)

Philip Gottschalk carries this discussion one step further, engaging similar authors, but adding the dimension of Desmond’s ‘clash’ with other, slightly more pious, Hegelians.

More than 20 years ago, Jürgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel started the philosophical research program of Discourse Ethics. This led to a broad discussion about the correct justification and application of basic principles of Discourse Ethics, from which several comprehensive new conceptions emerged in recent years. The authors of this anthology discuss central problems of the previous designs in a constructive way, they carry out alternative designs and thus open up new perspectives for discourse ethics. Niels Gottschalk-Mazouz: Einleitung - (...) William Rehg: Discourse Ethics and Individual Conscience - Thomas Webler und Seth Tuler: Fairness an Competence in Citizen Participation: Theoretical Reflections from a Case Study - Nadia Mazouz: Das Gute Leben in der Diskursethik - Adela Cortina: Virtualitäten in einer erneuerten Diskursethik für die Bioethik - Micha H. Werner: Kants pflichtenethischer Rigorismus und die Diskursethik: Eine maximenethische Deutung des Anwendungsproblems - Niels Gottschalk-Mazouz: Diskursethik als kognitivistisches Rahmenkonzept - Konrad Ott: Noch einmal: Diskursethik - Hans Schelkshorn: Dialogische Vernunft und die Grundlagen interkultureller Ethik; Thesen zu einer Revision der Diskursethik - Matthias Kettner: Diskursethik: Moralische Verantwortung für diskursive Macht. (shrink)

The paper discusses recent developments in Discourse Ethics and argues for a new proposal of how to spell out its core ideas. It finds that its basic principles ("D" and "U") are too specific: they focus on norms, identify those affected with those participating in discourse and use the narrow vocabulary of interests and consequences. It proposes instead: (D1) Only those claims are valid that can be defended against any objection of any possible agent. Discourse Ethics should be understood as (...) a normative framework for ethical argumentation that allows for a plurality of moral principles and for reflections on their suitability for specific contexts. It demands that one acts according to one's best reasons. (shrink)

The so-called fourth book of Aristotle's Meteorologica is not about meteorological phenomena at all. It describes the formation out of the four elements of ‘homoeomerous’ substances, by which are meant minerals such as stones and metals, and organic substances like flesh, skin, and hair, and the changes they can undergo under the influence of heat, cold, and moisture. Most commentators, ancient and modern, have seen that it has very little to do with the first three books of the Meteorologica to (...) which it is attached, and Alexander suggested that it should be placed after the second book de Generation et Corruptione. (shrink)

›Autonomie‹ ist ein mehrdeutiger Begriff. Er bezeichnet Eigenschaften wie Unabhängigkeit, Selbständigkeit und Selbstbestimmtheit. Während bei technischer Autonomie meist die ersten beiden Bedeutungen im Vordergrund stehen, sind es bei menschlicher Autonomie die letzten beiden.

There are a number of fragments attributed to Theophrastus, as well as titles in Diogenes Laertius' catalogue of his writings , of which it is uncertain whether they should be placed among his logical or rhetorical works. In this note I want to give my reasons for excluding one of them from my forthcoming edition of his logical fragments. It is not my intention here to discuss all the questions it raises; I hope to come back to them in a (...) later volume of my commentary. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell’s eminence of intellect and person has long been unassailable. Besides his distinction as mathematician and philosopher, and a vast output of books, articles, lectures and talks on most aspects of the human condition, there is his continuing concern for day-to-day political issues, his championing of individual freedom and his readiness to stand for a cause to the point of imprisonment. To have distilled the essence of his ninety-odd years into this little book is itself quite an achievement. Originally (...) published in 1962, it has been called a ‘pocket guide to greatness’ and forms a useful complement to the longer and slightly earlier study by Alan Wood’s _The Passionate Sceptic. _. (shrink)

From a Wittgensteinian point of view, my goal is to argue against the idea that teaching critical thinking should have as one of its aims the possibility of changing or adapting our deeply held beliefs. As pointed out by the Austrian philosopher in On Certainty, we have a world-picture which is neither true nor false, but above all, ‘it is the substratum of all my enquiring and asserting’. Besides that, in his remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, Wittgenstein insists on the (...) idea that different communities have their own rituals that express ways of acting, which become crystallized in their customs and institutions, similar to the magical rituals described by Frazer. The degree of similarity among them is greater than we suspect, and what interested Wittgenstein was to understand how we see things by looking for the links between the various ritualistic events. Based on these remarks, I argue that, if our deeply held beliefs are a source of necessity, instead of aiming to change/adapt them, teaching critical thinking should—by showing the links between diverse cultures—essentially avoid employing them in a dogmatic way, since our own deeply held beliefs could have been different ones. (shrink)