Intention was seen traditionally as a philosophical concept, before being debated more recently from psychological and social perspectives. Today the cognitive sciences approach intention empirically, at the level of its underlying mechanisms. This naturalization of intention makes it more concrete and graspable by empirical sciences. This volume offers an interdisciplinary integration of current research on intentional processes naturalized through action, drawing on the theoretical and empirical approaches of cognitive neuroscience, psychology, philosophy, and sociology. Each chapter integrates several disciplinary perspectives. Taken (...) together, the chapters show that the reunification of the different dimensions of intentional processes may constitute an adequate basis for a general model of intentional processes and their links to action. This can be applied at various levels, from neuronal activity to self-constitution, from the expression of intentional actions at the individual level to their expression in social contexts, and to the recognition of intention in actions executed by others.ContributorsColin Allen, Mireille Bonnard, Vittorio Gallese, Jozina B. de Graaf, Franck Grammont, Patrick Haggard, Marco Iacoboni, Dorothée Legrand, Pierre Livet, Albert Ogien, Jean Pailhous, Jean-Luc Petit, Jean-Michel Roy, Jessica A. Sommerville, Manos Tsakiris, Amanda L. Woodward. (shrink)

Dans un monde global accéléré et violent, l’anthropologie du contemporain se donne les avenirs pour objet : pour tâcher de rendre ce monde plus intelligible, en tant que les avenirs – socialement situés, pluriels, conflictuels – font pleinement partie de ce qui le compose et de ce avec quoi nous le fabriquons. Il s’agit de regarder, dans le cadre d’une anthropologie politique pragmatique des espaces, comment les gens fabriquent ou contestent des espaces – pour faire des choses ensemble ou guerroyer. (...) Or, pour fabriquer des espaces, les gens mobilisent des temporalités qui sont elles-mêmes spatialisées. Pour faire un quartier, un pays, pour annexer une région, les gens mobilisent des passés pas passés ou pleinement disponibles et/ou des avenirs spatialisés, qui souvent se font écho. Les manières d’ancrer spatialement les temporalités sont prises dans des rapports de pouvoir, et sont des prises de position politique.Cet article se consacre donc aux moyens de décrire les politiques des spatialisations des temporalités avec lesquelles les gens fabriquent ou contestent des espaces dans le contexte russe : comment dresser la topographie plurielle, conflictuelle, des temporalités mobilisées dans la fabrique des espaces? Sa politique est de ne pas dessiner de frontières conceptuelles ou analytiques, ni de se contenter du pire-qui-est-toujours-probable, mais de laisser leur place à des descriptions ouvertes, et à des pratiques contre-hégémoniques de spatialisations de l’avenir : à d’autres possibles. (shrink)

We discuss the justification of Bickle's “ruthless” reductionism. Bickle intends to show that we know enough about neurons to draw conclusions about the “whole” brain and about the mind. However, his reductionism does not take into account the complexity of the nervous system and the fact that new properties emerge at each significant level of integration from the coupled functioning of elementary components. From a methodological point of view, we argue that neuronal and cognitive models have to exert a mutual (...) constraint(MC) on each other. This approach would refuse to award any priority of cognitive approaches over neuroscience, and reciprocally, to refuse any priority of neuroscience over cognitive approaches. MC thus argues against radicalreductionism at the methodological level. (shrink)

Franck Grammont, Dorothée Legrand, and Pierre Livet (eds): Naturalizing Intention in Action Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-6 DOI 10.1007/s10746-012-9217-1 Authors Brian W. Dunst, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, USA Journal Human Studies Online ISSN 1572-851X Print ISSN 0163-8548.

Introduction non technique à la Théorie de l'Information Intégrée de la conscience de Giulio Tononi. Traduction française de l'article de Hedda Hassel Mørch.

The new historical inscription from Epidaurus has provided us with a unique piece of documentary evidence on Greek federal constitutions. In this article I propose to study the principal points of constitutional interest contained in it. I have based my text on that of Professor Wilcken and M. Kougeas; and I follow Professor Wilcken and Mr. Tarn in identifying the new document with the constitution which Demetrius Poliorcetes imposed upon his pan-Hellenic League in 303–2 B.C.

Was the above-named bill, which was brought forward in 122 b.c. by the tribune M. Liuius Drusus, and provided that the Latins should under all circumstances be exempt from the penalty of scourging, duly passed by the Roman Assembly and entered upon the statute-book?

Name der Zeitschrift: Der Islam Jahrgang: 93 Heft: 1 Seiten: 254-256.

McNeilly presents an interesting if not altogether convincing analysis of Hobbes' Leviathan. He argues in introductory chapters that the different accounts of human nature given in The Elements of Law, De Corpore, and Leviathan reveal a development parallel to the development in the Hobbesian notion of science. More particularly, he claims that the theory of science presented in Leviathan is a conventionalist one, taking mathematics as its model. This is in contrast to the self-evidence theory of mathematics and the hypothetico-deductive (...) theory of physics found in De Corpore and it is like the conventionalism of Elements. Using the conventionalist model, Hobbes presents in Leviathan, a science of man which is a formal system of moral and political propositions definitionally true and not "purporting to state truths about human nature." The system of propositions remains true whatever the actual nature of human motivation. Applying his thesis to the various parts of the Leviathan, McNeilly finds Hobbes presenting there a generalized theory of the passions from which the egoism of the earlier works cannot be logically deduced, but is merely a "cautious empirical generalization added to the latter," and not necessary to it. He then shows that notions like power, glory, and felicity of the ethics, and the state of nature, natural law, and obligation of the politics, are reformulated in Leviathan as strictly formal concepts and are logically deduced from the theory of the passions. Material concepts, such as self-preservation, are seen to be expressions of Hobbes' private views and not essential to the system. McNeilly's analyses are lucid and perceptive throughout with the exception of his discussion of the nature of science. Here he imposes upon the writings of Hobbes the contemporary meanings and distinctions instead of working within the tradition of the seventeenth century where the distinctions have not yet been made. A good short English bibliography on Hobbes is appended.--M. M. H. (shrink)

A massive series of meticulous clarifications and arguments is marshalled to attempt to refute, first, the doctrine that all relations are "internal", next, the claims that coherence is the sole criterion of the nature of truth, and finally, the theory of degrees of truth and falsity. The author's great familiarity with the literature of the coherence theorists proves almost a drawback: he prefers to cite texts extensively, but must then acknowledge important differences among them. There is little in the way (...) of a constructive alternative theory of truth, but the criticism is formidable.--W. L. M. (shrink)

Time has not worn out the urgency and the novelty of these essays on existentialism published first in 1950 and again in 1959. The nothingness on which Paci writes so poignantly here is being as dealt with in the various historico-philosophical positions of transcendence. This suggestion of Paci is Heideggerian in character: being and nothingness are after all identified. But since Paci has in mind the inevitable destruction of human finitude by philosophical conceptions of transcendence, his words of caution apply (...) to Heidegger's intentions as well. Heidegger in fact destroyed metaphysics, i.e., the possibility of enclosing transcendence within any philosophical system. Yet by making this destruction systematic he opened up a new transcendence which encompasses existence as speech oriented in the philosophical mode. For Paci all of these philosophical positions end up identifying being and nothingness precisely because none of their images of transcendence can be properly superimposed upon the freedom and the finitude of man; thus, they become irrelevant, they lead nowhere. Three philosophical directions in Paci's background lead him away from this irrelevancy: the Augustinian emphasis on the existentiell that leads through Kierkegaard to Jaspers; the immanentistic [[sic]] sense of human development that flows parallel in Marx and Croce; the constitutive role of experience and expression in the late Husserl. Concerning the latter, Paci sees some important connections between constitution and myth in the two central chapters of his work, one of which is about existentialism and neo-Kantianism and the other about myth and existence.--A. M. (shrink)

Though hardly more than blown-up lectures, the three essays contained in this volume show a unity which might be a clue to future, larger scale investigations. Departing from the present confrontation between positive sociometrical and phenomenological definitions of power, Bagolini examines the conditions for objectivity in the determination of power in both schools. He concludes that it is impossible to define power at all without the cohesive element of interaction and dialogue among the various interests, goals, and ideologies in a (...) society. The interference of ideology and myths with this dialogue points to the communication problem as central to the core of power in present social life, and to the need for equality as a condition of communication. The final essay deals with temporality as an ingredient in the definition of liberty, and thereby of responsibility. The common intention of these essays is to find a passage from empirical to eidetic research concerning social facts. The perspicacity of the strategy and the ease in handling of sources of the most diverse extraction exhibits the agility of Bagolini's mind.--A. M. (shrink)

The ontological argument continues to draw the attention of philosophers of different persuasions. This is one of the latest works on the subject. In it the Anselmian proof as developed in the Proslogion is submitted to careful analysis and placed in relation to Anselm’s approach to God in the Monologion. Thus the title of the book seems to be justified, inasmuch as it is Anselm’s notion of God that is investigated from a rational viewpoint rather than the ontological argument alone. (...) Vuillemin divides his work into four parts, which are followed by a conclusion and seven appendices. In the first two parts he contends that the ontological argument as stated in the Proslogion is a rational proof based on rational data, even though faith may support those data, and that the proof therefore involves an illegitimate transition from the concept of God in our mind to his actual existence, a criticism that the author shares with Kant. The third and fourth parts of the book are Vuillemin’s personal contribution to the understanding of the argument and purport to show the epistemological and mathematical antinomies that result from the "negative" concept of a being than which nothing greater can be thought which is at the basis of the Anselmian proof. It is the author’s contention that reason can prove both the impossibility of conceiving the being in question and the inability of the human mind to argue to the existence of a transcendent being from concepts derived by abstraction from the beings of our experience. Thus Vuillemin would rule out not only the so-called argument a priori of the Proslogion but also the arguments a posteriori presented in the Monologion. To understand Anselm’s ontological argument correctly, it is necessary to view it in the light of Anselm’s belief and in the context of the ideological realism which he shared with the entire Augustinian school. By neglecting such considerations, Vuillemin, like many other interpreters before him, does not seem to have done justice to what has been called "one of the boldest creations of man’s reason and a credit not only to his inventor, but to human reason itself.".—B. M. B. (shrink)

A collection of texts, otherwise not easily accessible, indispensable to students of comparative religion and comparative literature, reprinted from the Princeton Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament. Includes hymns, prayers, myths, epics, etc. Each text is provided with a brief introduction; a short bibliography and index to Biblical references is also included.--C. M.

Gabriel Marcel is, deliberately and professedly, the most unsystematic of philosophers. The chemin sinueux of his thought is not an easy one to follow; and the attempt would involve an acquaintance with M Marcel’s considerable literary and artistic output of half a century. As a practical measure some introduction to his thought is necessary; and in the case of this book one is reassured by M Marcel’s blessing on the venture. It is, perhaps, slightly disturbing that Mr Gallagher should, on (...) at least one point, disagree with the interpretation proposed by Père Troisfontaines. But in general one can be confident that, in so far as Marcel’s thought can be summarised at all, the summary here offered is as little misleading as possible. (shrink)

Seven lectures, in which some of the major issues of post-Kantian theology and philosophy of religion are discussed in the course of a critical examination of the contributions of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Buber, and Barth to religious inquiry. The author's choice of the subject-object relation as the "perspective pinhole" through which to look at the modern theological scene is a good one. It is not entirely clear, however, whether "the larger problem of insight into the nature of the truth of the (...) Christian religion is...served" because, although individual critical comments are well taken, the concluding lecture is somewhat inconclusive.--C. M. (shrink)

Barfield considers the light the studies of history, language, and literature shed upon each other. He focuses his attention on the development of a theory of the emergence of individual consciousness. Barfield disputes some prevalent ramifications of evolutionist theories which hold that in language, literature, and history, a period of "active subjectivity" preceded one of "passive subjectivity." This would mean, according to Barfield, that in language, literal meaning preceded figurative meaning, just as imagination was prior to inspiration in the creation (...) of literature, and individual mental activity prior to a period of social consciousness. Barfield is convinced that the opposite is true. Using semantics as a springboard into the study of history and literature, he contends that the basic assumptions of any age are contained in the meaning of its most common words, and that ideas change because "human consciousness itself—the elementary human experience about which the ideas are being formed—the whole relation between man and nature or between conscious man and unconscious man—has been in the process of change." In this sketchy development of his theory of subjectivity as a form of consciousness that has "contracted from the periphery into individual centers," Barfield draws on a wide range of background material to come up with some genuinely fresh insights. But he carries his arguments only so far and leaves the reader with the memory of a few briefly illuminated new paths. In the final analysis, the topic seems just too vast to receive anything but a schematic treatment in even the most distinguished of essays.—C. M. R. (shrink)

In two lively and independent essays, Rosset builds a good case for an appreciation of Schopenhauer's importance in the history of philosophy by treating those aspects of his thought which signal a definitive rupture with classical philosophy and merit his being aligned with the spirit of modern times. These aspects, each the subject of one of the essays, are the genealogical treatment of ideas and the intuition of the absurd. The author establishes Schopenhauer's originality in both of these areas, outlining (...) Schopenhauer's direct influence on Nietzsche, his parallels with Marx, and his possible links with Freud. At no point does he inflate the influence of Schopenhauer's but vaguely formulated ideas which invite comparison with their more developed expressions in other philosophers. Rosset does, however, contend that Schopenhauer was most original in his central intuition of the absurd, being the first to construct a philosophy upon this vision. In this regard, the author's consideration of the Schopenhauerian themes of finality, desire, necessity, and static time is excellent. He maintains convincingly that the usual interpretation of Schopenhauer, which emphasizes the Romantic themes of pessimism, esthetic idealism, and a morality of pity and renouncement, stresses only secondary aspects of his thought. A more balanced picture of Schopenhauer reveals an almost Beckettian tragi-comic [[sic]] view of life.—C. M. R. (shrink)

A skillfully and subtly composed volume containing an immense amount of information. Introductory chapters explain the genesis of the classificatory structure followed throughout the rest of the work and outline the shape of analysis; some three hundred authors are treated in succeeding discussions. The broadest divisions concern: controversies among progress, regress, and cyclical theory authors, and controversies among progress authors themselves. In the first book, the issues center around the fact of progress, the discernibility of a pattern in history, and (...) value judgments about history. Book two treats three main issues: the necessity of progress, its duration, and its applicability to human products and institutions or to human nature; and five subordinate issues: different manifestations of progress in human institutions and products, namely, knowledge, technology, wealth, political institutions, and morality. An appendix on the notion of progress in the fine arts is of particular interest. The major shortcoming of this work is inherent in its topical structure; notions of historical developments of the idea of progress, and of different concepts about progress have difficulty emerging. This could have been remedied somewhat had the authors taken care to erect frequent chronological marking posts, and provided brief historical condensations of the analytical issue in question; unfortunately, an effort to orient the discussions historically is hardly made at all. It is the inexperienced reader who will suffer most from this lack; the reader who is fairly well acquainted with the subject will be able to benefit from the wealth of material provided in the discussion of each author. He will particularly appreciate the precision of finer points in footnote discussions, which are also rich in bibliographical references. The work is indexed and supplemented by a fifteen-page bibliography.--C. M. R. (shrink)

Given the tremendous burst of activity in the philosophy of science during the last quarter century, the number of books by trained philosophers dealing with the logic of biology is surprisingly small. Simon’s book resembles Morton Beckner’s The Biological Way of Thought in its comprehensive ambitions: "trying to discover what, if anything, is distinctive about biological science, its concepts, and its mode of explaining." The most obvious difference of the two books is Simon’s long central chapter on "Theories, Models, and (...) the Concept of the Gene," which deals with the history of genetics from Mendel’s predecessors to the successors of Watson and Crick. Beckner paid little explicit attention to the history of biology. Another difference lies in Beckner’s dogged assessment of all problems in the logic of biology from the perspective of what he called the Humean Pattern of Explanation—a detailed and difficult variant of the approach of Hempel, Oppenheim, and Nagel. Simon’s philosophical position is more flexible than Beckner’s. He provides an acceptable review of the literature of the last decade and a half; some of his conclusions are most interesting—even when incompletely supported by his arguments; and the utility of his book is insured by the fact that it is necessary to go back over twelve years to find another with which it can be compared. The first chapter contains a very effective critique of J. J. C. Smart’s thesis that biology is no more an autonomous science than is electrical engineering, but is merely applied physics and chemistry. Smart had argued from the grounds that all biological generalizations implicitly refer to terrestrial evolution and are not truly universal, and Simon demonstrates the general lack of success of all efforts to demonstrate a difference in kind between so-called laws of nature and empirical generalizations of the sort found in biology. The second chapter continues in this same vein, drawing an interesting contrast between phylogenetic explanation in biology and the explanation of individual events in human history, and claiming that ‘explanatory’ status may be granted to accounts which do not meet the requirements of the deductive-nomological model, as in the case of Darwin’s theories of the geographical distribution of plants and animals and the persistence of rudimentary organs. The author’s negative reaction to much of the recent philosophical literature concerning the role of functional analysis in biology seems particularly well placed. Following Hempel, most philosophers writing in the past ten years have regarded the occurrence of the item whose function is in question as the event to be explained. Simon correctly points out that in the biological literature, statements indicating the presence of this item are part of the explanans, usually one component in an explanation of the normal functioning of the organism. He also insists that functional or teleological statements cannot effectively be replaced by nonteleological ones. A functional account is one that relates an entity to the role it plays in an organized system. In the first of several serene non-sequiturs which mar the latter half of this book, Simon insists that the above account shows that the notion of function is essentially an "extrinsic" one and that teleological principles generally cannot be used to account for experience. No better argument than an appeal to Kant’s authority backs up this conclusion. The third chapter deals with the recent history of genetics; its summary makes the claim that "at no time during this history was it correct to say that one model was replaced by another one; rather, the development appears to have been one involving successive correction and refining of earlier conceptions. There has been no revolution: geneticists have always succeeded in either repelling or accommodating critical attacks on the model." The evidence presented earlier in the chapter confers some plausibility on this conclusion, but no more: Simon takes no notice of the controversy surrounding Kuhn and the notion of scientific revolutions, and provides no criteria by which to distinguish "revolutions" from "accommodations." The precise nature of the methodological continuity to be found in the history of genetics is crucial for the view that "biology, or at least genetics, must be regarded as incapable of yielding a complete explanation of the phenomena that come within its purview; if the ultimate principles appealed to are not those of chemistry and physics and hence essentially nonbiological, the explanation cannot be regarded as complete." The text does not clearly indicate the extent to which the author agrees with the statement just quoted; perhaps he only attributes it to "many biologists" impressed by the successes of molecular genetics. It is clear the Simon regards something he calls the "Cartesian attitude" as pervasive in biology. "Biologists are committed to attempting to explain the phenomena of life in terms of the nonliving... The property of being alive or being associated with a living system is simply not treated as a logical primitive within biological science." But this seems to take us back full circle—to the position of Smart, that biology is no more than applied physics and chemistry. Simon disagrees with Smart. How does he stand vis-a-vis this last statement of the Cartesian spirit he finds so pervasive in biology? I think he disagrees with it, but it is very hard to tell. Perhaps the answer is that the resolution of the issue of the autonomy of biology is a pragmatic matter, relative to a complex set of needs and commitments: the sorts of things that determine life styles, political attitudes, and religious points of view, as well as the growth of scientific understanding. The question of the precise configuration of Simon’s pragmatism remains very vague indeed—a consequence of his over use of the style of impersonal attribution rather than direct assertion. Simon says generally sane and familiar things about Biology and the Idea of Progress and about Biology and Ethics. The really startling assertion of the penultimate chapter, that "consciousness" is neither a biological nor a behavioral predicate, and that its foundations are essentially moral and legal, is unfortunately supported by no argument whatsoever. Instead, the reader is urged to examine two of the author’s previous articles.—E. M. (shrink)

A mimeographed book on the philosophy of "Being" from Thales to Aristotle. The author states that the book has evolved out of his lectures in an introductory course on metaphysics. Almost half the pages are devoted to Platonism. The whole treatment is somewhat repetitious and is more pedagogic than scholarly, making relatively free use of terminology.--M. G.

The author regards faith as a restless quest for that which can save man from his self-destructive tendencies and allow him to actualize most completely his constructive potentialities. Wieman critically examines several answers to this quest of faith, including those of Dewey, Tillich, and Barth. In contrast he develops the view of "liberal religion," which finds the answer in a divine creativity fostered by communication, and is productive of fresh insights which transform human ideals.--J. M. W.

Seeks to show, from the development of Vedantic doctrine, and by comparison of it with Plato, Berkeley, Kant, Hegel, Bradley, and some contemporary western philosophic movements, that Indian idealism has attacked similar basic problems.--J. M.

This is one of a series providing modest introductions to philosophers and their work. There are some two dozen writers treated in the series, from Lucretius to Sartre. Sarocchi gives a brief biography, stressing Camus' early illness and other experiences which are important for the longer evaluative essay which follows. Camus is considered as a philosopher, a moralist, and a lyrical writer. Because of Camus' character, rather than for philosophical reasons, Sarocchi finds nostalgia to be the secret destination of Camus' (...) "orphic itinerary." About 50 pages are given to excerpts. Passages from various works are grouped by subject matter, giving ten pages or so each to the absurd, Hellenism and Christianity, political thought, art, myth and symbol. Most selections are under two pages long. In light of the brevity of Camus' books, and their wide availability in both English and French, readers might receive a better introduction in comparable compass by reading The Myth of Sisyphus or one of the novels.--M. B. M. (shrink)

One of the first volumes to appear in "The Princeton Series--Humanistic Scholarship in America," this book sustains a vigorous defense of religion as a proper field of study within the liberal arts curriculum. A comprehensive description of the present status of religious studies at undergraduate, seminary and graduate levels is combined with the attempt to raise and answer the numerous problems associated therewith. Candid and persuasive answers are given to such concrete questions as departmental vs. diffusionist structures, curriculum balance, and (...) the relation of religion to pre-theological training, but the touchy subjects of indoctrination and sectarian influence suffer from a lapse into generalities.--M. W. (shrink)

An enlargement of the 1950 volume under the same title. Ten new essays are divided under the original sections dealing with operational analysis, specific scientific problems, and social science.--M. F.

The author is one of the greatest contemporary authorities on Classical Jewish philosophy. He applies his vast scholarship to probe into the inter-relationship between medieval Jewish philosophy and the cabala. The profound and daring speculation of the theosophists of the early cabala did not fail to provoke a violent reaction on the part of Jewish scholasticism, and the two long studies in the present volume try to analyze two cases of such antagonistic relationships. The first of the studies is a (...) comparison of the philosophico-theological treatise of Samuel Judah Ibn Tibbon, "The Reconciliation of Philosophy and the Religious Law," with a treatise on the Spanish cabalist Jacob ben Seset. While in this study we see the confrontation of the spirit of Averroes with the cabalistic inspiration, the second essay is devoted to a treatise from the fourteenth century, written by Joseph ben Abraham Ibn Waquar, in which philosophical and cabalistic elements are intimately interwoven in one and the same work. To the two major studies are added ten highly interesting short treatises on cabalistic notions and texts, making the present books together with the writings of Gershon Scholem the most important monument to cabalistic scholarship available in a Western language.—M. J. V. (shrink)

This book is the first volume of a projected three volume work on the philosophy of science. It is devoted to the task of describing the experimental method of discovery as practiced in the physical sciences. In the Introduction, the work is referred to as a handbook and is designed apparently as the first stage in the construction of a theory of scientific investigation. Feibleman breaks down the process of discovery into six more or less distinct stages: observation, induction, hypothesis, (...) experiment, calculation, and prediction and control. Apart from the introduction and a concluding chapter which attempts to classify different kinds of results in the physical sciences, one chapter is devoted to each stage. The contention is that each successive stage, except the last, can be seen to emerge logically from the preceding stage. The book is extremely comprehensive in scope and contains a great deal of information about a wide range of aspects of scientific discovery. This is both a positive and a negative feature. Because of its comprehensiveness, many topics deserving closer examination are passed over quickly, and the various categories and stages which Feibleman employs often seem more or less arbitrary. There are important omissions. Kuhn, Feyerabend and Scheffler receive no mention. One finds oneself asking: what is the point of it all? Feibleman suggests one aim is to synthesize and abstract the method of the physical sciences in order to enhance its deployment in the social sciences. Another aim seems to be to provide some logical or theoretical justification of the procedures of the physical sciences. With respect to this last point, the descriptive classification of this volume is only a beginning. Whether it succeeds or fails must await the subsequent volumes.—M. B. (shrink)

More than six centuries of Christian and non-Christian reflection and admiration of Meister Eckhart are the subject matter of this very scholarly yet very readable work. Philosophers like Nicolas Cusanus and Hegel, great scholars like H. Denifle and a number of lesser men are examined in order to determine what they thought about Eckhart, what they learned from him, how much they knew of him. The medieval condemnations and Cusanus' admiration issued into a period of relative neglect of Eckhart, broken (...) only by the deserving attempts of Daniel Sudermann to collect Eckhart's manuscripts. The great Dominican did not come into his own until the beginning of the last century. Franz von Baader was the one who "discovered" him and who drew Hegel's attention to some of his texts. With the monographs by C. Schmidt and Bishop Martensen, Eckhart had become known to the philosophical public as a forerunner of nineteenth-century speculation and this image had not been shattered until Denifle shifted the focus of attention to the Latin texts with their more orthodox formulations. In this century there has been a renewal of interest in the German writings which continue to have a certain popular appeal, but now, thanks to the monumental edition of the complete works, a more objective and more scholarly atmosphere pervades the literature on Meister Eckhart.--M. J. V. (shrink)

An important addition to logical empiricist literature on the nature of scientific knowledge. It argues for the substitution of the conventional for the a priori, of the changeable truths of evolving rationality for the eternal verities of static reason, maintaining that this substitution enables one to avoid pseudo-problems about the nature of knowledge and science. Includes analyses of the natures of deductive systems, physical theory, language and pseudo-problems, and concludes with a comprehensive history and critique of classical theories of knowledge.--M. (...) F. (shrink)

This volume is the second part of the Gifford Lectures devoted to the topic, "The Phenomenon of Mind." Like the first part, entitled The Nature of Mind, this part consists of two papers by each of the four authors, discussions of each paper by the authors, and answers to questions from the audience. Since frequent references are made to papers published in the first part, this volume is best read after the prior one. The authors begin this part by acknowledging (...) their differing views about the meaning of the term "mind;" these views are that "mind" refers to the ability to speak and understand a natural language, rationality and moral autonomy, the ability to select and modify goals, and the ability to devise plans and carry out certain intellectual procedures. Because of their different views on the nature of mind, the papers in this volume, which are devoted to the development of mind in the individual and the species, tend to lack cohesion. Despite this lack, the papers raise a number of interesting points on such issues as the development of the mind in the process of evolution the significance of Chomsky’s views of language for our concept of mind, the difference between the computer’s capacities and man’s, and the significance of having a mind for certain theological views. The inclusion in the text of the discussion sessions following each paper and the sessions devoted entirely to answering questions from the audience is valuable because it helps the reader to recognize and focus upon those issues on which the authors disagree.—M.G. (shrink)

Most present-day philosophers know William Paley primarily as a defender of the argument from design and the author of the famous watch analogy. Professor LeMahieu argues that Paley’s philosophical and theological writings deserve more than the scant attention they now receive. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Paley’s books were held in such high esteem that several were required reading by students at Oxford and Cambridge; the Evidences of Christianity was kept on the Cambridge University examination list until 1920. His (...) books were deemed important not only because they presented forceful arguments in a lucid style, but also because they presented a unified and comprehensive philosophy that embodied many of the main beliefs of the Enlightenment in England. The cornerstone of Paley’s philosophy was the contention that scientific reasoning, i.e., inductive and analogical arguments, could be used to demonstrate God’s existence and nature. In Natural Theology, Paley offered inductive arguments for God’s existence; and in Evidences of Christianity, arguments of the same type were used to support revealed religion. Paley’s argument in support of Christianity was directed primarily at refuting Hume’s contention that those who claimed to have seen the biblical miracles were unreliable witnesses. In Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, Paley again relied on inductive arguments along with his inductive proofs of God’s existence and nature to support a utilitarian moral position. Although LeMahieu presents a full account of Paley’s philosophy and its influence on subsequent nineteenth century thinkers, he does not neglect to point out some of that philosophy’s questionable arguments and assumptions. Despite many possible deficiencies in his arguments, however, Paley is one of the ablest defenders of religion and, at times, a shrewd philosopher. By presenting a coherent statement of Paley’s philosophy, LeMahieu has performed a worthwhile task. His book should inspire other philosophers to examine carefully Paley’s neglected treatises.—M.G. (shrink)

In his second book on art, Weiss groups the nine basic arts into three triads in accordance with whether their characteristic products are created spaces--architecture, sculpture, painting; created time--musicry, story, poetry; or created movement --music, the theatre, the dance. The approach of any art to its undertaking and the nature of its achievement is distinctive; none duplicates the task, nor borrows the logic, of the others. Weiss also discusses some "compound arts," including photography and the movies. Through the vigor of (...) his language, and the sensitivity of his appraisals, he provokes fresh insight into both the specific arts and the entire artistic enterprise.--S. M. W. (shrink)

Listening to someone from some distance in a crowded room you may experience the following phenomenon: when looking at them speak, you may both hear and see where the source of the sounds is; but when your eyes are turned elsewhere, you may no longer be able to detect exactly where the voice must be coming from. With your eyes again fixed on the speaker, and the movement of her lips a clear sense of the source of the sound will (...) return. This ‘ventriloquist’ effect reflects the ways in which visual cognition can dominate auditory perception. And this phenomenological observation is one what you can verify or disconfirm in your own case just by the slightest reflection on what it is like for you to listen to someone with or without visual contact with them. (shrink)

This volume offers the first-ever complete English translation of Leibniz’s Dissertatio De Arte Combinatoria together with a critical edition of the original Latin text on fa...

Our research is based on a rather large "library" of various works by M. Drahomanov, which contains his views on religion. Among them: Paradise and Progress, From the History of Relations Between Church and State in Western Europe, Faith and Public Affairs, Fight for Spiritual Power and Freedom of Conscience in the 16th - 17th Centuries,, "Church and State in the Roman Empire", "The Status and Tasks of the Science of Ancient History," "Evangelical Faith in Old England," "Populism and Popular (...) Progress in Austrian Rus, Austrian-Russian Remembrance," "Pious The Legend of the Bulgarians "," The Issues of Religious Freedom in Russia, "" On the Brotherhood of the Baptist or the Baptist in Ukraine, "" The Foreword, " Shevchenko, Ukrainianophiles and Socialism "," Wonderful thoughts about the Ukrainian national affair "," Zazdri gods "," Slavic variants of one Gospel legend "," Resurrection of Christ ", etc. (shrink)