A detailed attempt to ground the topological properties of time in the laws of micro- and macro-physical processes. The reversible processes of mechanics are used to define an order among temporally separated events, which is invariant under reversals of time direction. So long as consideration is limited to a single isolated system, a time ensemble, the transfer of the reversibility of the constituent processes of such a system to the system as a whole makes it impossible to define time direction (...) by means of the entropy curve. The directionality of time, accordingly, can only be defined as the direction of the entropy increase of multiple systems, of a space ensemble. A macrostatistical definition of time direction is then based upon the causal relation. The author's view of causation is non-deterministic: the conjunction of two events is caused if they occur together more frequently than can be expected from their chance coincidence. Reichenbach's analyses and arguments are careful and thorough; the book as a whole is a solid achievement. -- M. F. (shrink)

In retrospect, I think I was right to compose Natural Supernaturalism by relying on taste, tact, and intuition rather than on a controlling method. A book of this kind, which deals with the history of human intellection, feeling, and imagination, employs special vocabularies, procedures, and modes of demonstration which, over many centuries of development, have shown their profitability when applied to matters of this sort. I agree with Booth that these procedures, when valid, are in a broad sense rational, and (...) subject to analysis and some degree of definition. But the rules underlying such a discourse are complex, elusive, unsystematic, and subject to innovative modification; they manifest themselves in the intuitive expertise of the historian; and the specification of these rules should not precede, but follow practice. . . . After the fact, nevertheless, a book like Natural Supernaturalism is subject to close critical inquiry about its methods and rationale. I am grateful to Booth for opening up such an inquiry, and for doing so in a way that is not only disarming, but seems to me to be the most promising of useful results. That is, instead of adopting a prosecutorial stance, demanding: "Justify the rationality and probative force of what you have done; it looks dammed suspicious to me," he has adopted the friendly tactic of saying: "Your book, in my experience of it, has yielded discoveries that I want to call knowledge, by methods, however deviant from standard rubrics of valid reasoning, that it seems irrational to call non-rational. Let's set out to clarify what these methods are, and to see what grounds we can find for the claim that they provide warranted knowledge." M.H. Abrams' contributions to Critical Inquiry are "The Deconstructive Angel" and "Behaviorism and Deconstruction: A Comment on Morse Peckham's 'The Infinitude of Pluralism'". (shrink)

The new historical inscription from Epidaurus has provided us with a unique piece of documentary evidence on Greek federal constitutions. In this article I propose to study the principal points of constitutional interest contained in it. I have based my text on that of Professor Wilcken and M. Kougeas; and I follow Professor Wilcken and Mr. Tarn in identifying the new document with the constitution which Demetrius Poliorcetes imposed upon his pan-Hellenic League in 303–2 B.C.

t. 1. A-D -- t. 2. E-M -- t. 3. N-S -- t.4. T-I︠A︡.

This book is a specialized monograph on interpolation and definability, a notion central in pure logic and with significant meaning and applicability in all areas where logic is applied, especially computer science, artificial intelligence, logic programming, philosophy of science and natural language. Suitable for researchers and graduate students in mathematics, computer science and philosophy, this is the latest in the prestigous world-renowned Oxford Logic Guides, which contains Michael Dummet's Elements of intuitionism, J. M. Dunn and G. Hardegree's Algebraic Methods in (...) Philosophical Logic, H. Rott's Change, Choice and Inference: A Study of Belief Revision and Nonmonotonic Reasoning, P. T. Johnstone's Sketches of an Elephant: A Topos Theory Compendium: Volumes 1 and 2, and David J. Pym and Eike Ritter's Reductive Logic and Proof Search: Proof theory, semantics and control. (shrink)

In his report to the Twenty-seventh Congress of the CPSU, M.S. Gorbachev noted that "our philosophical and economic front, indeed the social sciences in general, find themselves in a state … somewhat removed from the demands of life."1 He further pointed out that "the times demand that the social sciences address the concrete needs of practical activity on a broad front, that social scientists respond keenly and deftly to the changes taking place in life, that they not lose sight of (...) new phenomena and draw conclusions capable of truly guiding practical activity". (shrink)

Listening to someone from some distance in a crowded room you may experience the following phenomenon: when looking at them speak, you may both hear and see where the source of the sounds is; but when your eyes are turned elsewhere, you may no longer be able to detect exactly where the voice must be coming from. With your eyes again fixed on the speaker, and the movement of her lips a clear sense of the source of the sound will (...) return. This ‘ventriloquist’ effect reflects the ways in which visual cognition can dominate auditory perception. And this phenomenological observation is one what you can verify or disconfirm in your own case just by the slightest reflection on what it is like for you to listen to someone with or without visual contact with them. (shrink)

This volume offers the first-ever complete English translation of Leibniz’s Dissertatio De Arte Combinatoria together with a critical edition of the original Latin text on fa...

Our research is based on a rather large "library" of various works by M. Drahomanov, which contains his views on religion. Among them: Paradise and Progress, From the History of Relations Between Church and State in Western Europe, Faith and Public Affairs, Fight for Spiritual Power and Freedom of Conscience in the 16th - 17th Centuries,, "Church and State in the Roman Empire", "The Status and Tasks of the Science of Ancient History," "Evangelical Faith in Old England," "Populism and Popular (...) Progress in Austrian Rus, Austrian-Russian Remembrance," "Pious The Legend of the Bulgarians "," The Issues of Religious Freedom in Russia, "" On the Brotherhood of the Baptist or the Baptist in Ukraine, "" The Foreword, " Shevchenko, Ukrainianophiles and Socialism "," Wonderful thoughts about the Ukrainian national affair "," Zazdri gods "," Slavic variants of one Gospel legend "," Resurrection of Christ ", etc. (shrink)

The author's previous works on Descartes, Malebranche, and other rationalists, as well as her critical editions of the Méditations and De la Recherche de la Vérité have insured the rich documentation and the interpretative density of this little treatise. However, its main feature is not historical erudition because for this author, as for most contemporary first rank French commentators, Descartes is living still in contemporary work through the freshness and renewed relevance of many of his themes. The part of this (...) study devoted to Descartes is centered upon the Méditations though it offers frequent excursions into the methodical works. In many ways it is a scale model of the Méditations, showing the philosophical scope of this inexhaustible metaphysical masterpiece. The second part has chapters on Reason and Method, God, Man and World, and Human Freedom, with an enlightening parallel treatment of these topics in Spinoza, Malebranche, and Leibniz. A useful bibliography and a chronology of the principal works studied complete this compact volume.--A. M. (shrink)

In contrast to the systematic development of the previously published La Estructura del Valor, this new work by Hartman proceeds by critical examination of ethical theory from G. E. Moore to the present. If the first work was an attempt to establish on an axiomatic basis a new axiological science, the second intends to confront the paralogisms contained in preceding philosophical discussions of the moral field. Hartman accepts Moore's Principia Ethica as a critique of axiological reason. He also feels that (...) new fallacies other than the naturalistic one have crept into the treatment of morality since Moore. These fallacies affect noncognitivist as well as semi-cognitivist and cognitivist attitudes. In all of these there are dichotomies of the formal/material type which create an impasse in the formation of a scientific, synthetic a priori body of moral propositions. Hartman's critique is better than his own solutions. The most interesting part of this work is that devoted to the measurement of value.--A. M. (shrink)

This collection of articles, essays, monographs, and books written over a period of thirty years is a delight. It is very useful for consultation purposes for issues in ontology and contemporary philosophy. The development of thought reflected in these writings constitutes a perfect guide to what is living and what is dead in present philosophical practice. What is unique in Ferrater is the amplitude of the circumstance. Only an extreme methodological flexibility allows him to assimilate such a wide world without (...) abstracting from it. Thus we find in these pages journalism, history of ideas, philosophy of history, science, and ontology. When abstraction is intensified--and this seems to be the inevitable trend as the work progresses--the multiplicity of approach and method remains somehow present; for example, in "Man at the Crossroads," the wealth of historical and cultural data is dominated by a rigorous ontology of historical process and crisis. Conversely, in Being and Death, the already powerful and abstract ontological scheme is enriched by a swarm of data from the sciences and from general and personal experience.--A. M. (shrink)

This is a complex work by the author of The Moral Nature of Man. First, it is an inventory of the perceptual world using as a tool an original distinction between noticing and observing. This leads to the establishment of a continuity between the conscious and the subconscious, and to the discernment of various meaning-giving levels of attention. Secondly, it is a review of opinion on sensation and perception in recent Anglo-American thought. Particular attention is given to the ideas of (...) Price, Ayer, and Austin. Thirdly, and most importantly, it contains a full theory of reality based on: 1) the resistance or centered action of dynamic systems; 2) the purposive action that meets this resistance; and 3) the emergence of qualia from the encounter of 1 and 2. The method is that of description of ordinary language conceptions of sensation and sensa, "things," interaction and causation, and symbol. From this analysis Garnett obtains some original conclusions about sense qualia and brain processes, body and mind, and, in general, about the physical and mental elements of the universe.—A. M. (shrink)

A sensitive, carefully demonstrated interpretation of Nietzsche's entire philosophy as culminating in, unified by, and also self-directed through the theory of eternal recurrence. The doctrine of the superman is shown to be the presupposition of the doctrine of eternal recurrence, for only the man who has surpassed himself can will the eternal recurrence of all being. The author also shows that, for Nietzsche, eternal recurrence is both "the way of the world" and moral task, and that, though Nietzsche struggled in (...) all his works to make these two "interpretations" of eternal recurrence coincide, in fact the notion of eternal recurrence remains ambiguous, revealing through its ambiguity that Nietzsche failed to reconcile man with the cosmos. --C. M. (shrink)

A rather elementary survey of the tasks of the philosopher in the modern world. American philosophers, the authors claim, by withdrawing from the social and moral concerns of our age, have failed to exert their influence where it is most required, in education.--C. M.

Inspired by Martin Buber's I and Thou, the author holds that the self is neither mind nor body, but rather the "I" which engages in dialogues with itself, with its fellows, and with God. Philosophers and scientists are criticized for their "reductionism" with regard to the self, and the Hellenic tendency to view history and the self as "structured artifacts" is rejected. The author calls for renewed allegiance to the Hebraic heritage of Western culture, and for a more religious view (...) of the self and its role in history. He is perhaps less explicit than one might wish concerning the positive contributions which such a view could make.--C. M. (shrink)

Burnshaw treats virtually every aspect of poetry, but devotes a major theoretical effort to developing a biologically grounded explanation of both creation and the esthetic experience. He extends his theory of creation to every art form, including the fabrication of scientific theories; the rest of the study is devoted exclusively to poetry. Burnshaw claims to be following the lead of John Keble, who described poetry as that which "acts as a safety valve to a full mind." He supports his homeostatic (...) theory with numerous statements by creative persons about their psycho-physiological state at the time of inspiration. Burnshaw wisely limits his theory of creation to those works which seem to be truly inspired, which "demand" to be born; nevertheless, his method tends toward the pseudo-scientific. He too facilely converts the terms of the poet's auto-description into supposed physicalist counterparts. In like manner, the esthetic experience is reduced to the communication of an internal metaphor which constitutes the "true" poem, where this internal metaphor is the expression, through the affective structures of the poem, of the poet's inner bodily movements at the time of creation. The reader, because of changes in his muscular, circulatory, and respiratory systems, comes to "reverberate" with the internal metaphor. Fortunately, Burnshaw doesn't get too caught up in such theories. In the second section of the book, for example, he goes beyond reductionistic explanations and discusses the act of creation in teleological terms; poetry becomes a primal language, which, in symbolically restoring the true sensuality of all things, overcomes alienation and reunites both poet and reader in themselves, with each other, and with the rest of the universe. The book contains a wealth of biological, anthropological, zoological, and psychological information and ideas, plus some very penetrating analyses of different poems in an explicitly rhetorical and implicitly metaphysical framework.--C. M. R. (shrink)

The first six chapters of this book present and criticize six views of the nature of proper names, among which are theories that proper names have no meaning or connotation, that proper names have more meaning than other signs or that their meaning is infinite, that ordinary proper names should be analysed into "logically" proper names, etc. This part of the book is the best. One may find in these chapters several well-reasoned arguments which seem to totally demolish the theories (...) under investigation. Chapters seven to nine present the author's own solution to the problem. Sørensen holds that a proper name does have a meaning—otherwise it would not have been a part of language at all. The meaning of a linguistic sign, he argues, is a set of conditions to be satisfied by an extra-linguistic entity, such that this entity may be identified as denoted by the said sign. A proper name is an individual name, and its meaning is a series of necessary and sufficient conditions for the identification of the individual entity which this name is intended to denote. It is Sørensen's view that this series consists of a definite description of final length including space and time indicators. The definiens formula for proper names is thus 'P' = 'the x that... t... p....' The discussion of this proposal is, however, greatly impaired by Sørensen's utter disregard for the rich philosophical literature existing on the subject: no attempt is made to confront his view with the now standard arguments against theories of that type. Even many inner difficulties of the proposed solution are ignored. E.g., one may ask what values do 't' and 'p' take in the definition of 'Zeus'. Or take the following puzzle: are 'The x that taught Aristotle in p at t' and 'The x that studied with Socrates in p at t' both the meaning of 'Plato'? Sørensen's view that "A national register may be looked upon as a dictionary of proper names" suggests a positive answer, but surely R and S cannot be the same meaning. Many similar problems bother the reader of Sørensen's book, but, unfortunately, they are nowhere discussed.—E. M. Z. (shrink)

Given the tremendous burst of activity in the philosophy of science during the last quarter century, the number of books by trained philosophers dealing with the logic of biology is surprisingly small. Simon’s book resembles Morton Beckner’s The Biological Way of Thought in its comprehensive ambitions: "trying to discover what, if anything, is distinctive about biological science, its concepts, and its mode of explaining." The most obvious difference of the two books is Simon’s long central chapter on "Theories, Models, and (...) the Concept of the Gene," which deals with the history of genetics from Mendel’s predecessors to the successors of Watson and Crick. Beckner paid little explicit attention to the history of biology. Another difference lies in Beckner’s dogged assessment of all problems in the logic of biology from the perspective of what he called the Humean Pattern of Explanation—a detailed and difficult variant of the approach of Hempel, Oppenheim, and Nagel. Simon’s philosophical position is more flexible than Beckner’s. He provides an acceptable review of the literature of the last decade and a half; some of his conclusions are most interesting—even when incompletely supported by his arguments; and the utility of his book is insured by the fact that it is necessary to go back over twelve years to find another with which it can be compared. The first chapter contains a very effective critique of J. J. C. Smart’s thesis that biology is no more an autonomous science than is electrical engineering, but is merely applied physics and chemistry. Smart had argued from the grounds that all biological generalizations implicitly refer to terrestrial evolution and are not truly universal, and Simon demonstrates the general lack of success of all efforts to demonstrate a difference in kind between so-called laws of nature and empirical generalizations of the sort found in biology. The second chapter continues in this same vein, drawing an interesting contrast between phylogenetic explanation in biology and the explanation of individual events in human history, and claiming that ‘explanatory’ status may be granted to accounts which do not meet the requirements of the deductive-nomological model, as in the case of Darwin’s theories of the geographical distribution of plants and animals and the persistence of rudimentary organs. The author’s negative reaction to much of the recent philosophical literature concerning the role of functional analysis in biology seems particularly well placed. Following Hempel, most philosophers writing in the past ten years have regarded the occurrence of the item whose function is in question as the event to be explained. Simon correctly points out that in the biological literature, statements indicating the presence of this item are part of the explanans, usually one component in an explanation of the normal functioning of the organism. He also insists that functional or teleological statements cannot effectively be replaced by nonteleological ones. A functional account is one that relates an entity to the role it plays in an organized system. In the first of several serene non-sequiturs which mar the latter half of this book, Simon insists that the above account shows that the notion of function is essentially an "extrinsic" one and that teleological principles generally cannot be used to account for experience. No better argument than an appeal to Kant’s authority backs up this conclusion. The third chapter deals with the recent history of genetics; its summary makes the claim that "at no time during this history was it correct to say that one model was replaced by another one; rather, the development appears to have been one involving successive correction and refining of earlier conceptions. There has been no revolution: geneticists have always succeeded in either repelling or accommodating critical attacks on the model." The evidence presented earlier in the chapter confers some plausibility on this conclusion, but no more: Simon takes no notice of the controversy surrounding Kuhn and the notion of scientific revolutions, and provides no criteria by which to distinguish "revolutions" from "accommodations." The precise nature of the methodological continuity to be found in the history of genetics is crucial for the view that "biology, or at least genetics, must be regarded as incapable of yielding a complete explanation of the phenomena that come within its purview; if the ultimate principles appealed to are not those of chemistry and physics and hence essentially nonbiological, the explanation cannot be regarded as complete." The text does not clearly indicate the extent to which the author agrees with the statement just quoted; perhaps he only attributes it to "many biologists" impressed by the successes of molecular genetics. It is clear the Simon regards something he calls the "Cartesian attitude" as pervasive in biology. "Biologists are committed to attempting to explain the phenomena of life in terms of the nonliving... The property of being alive or being associated with a living system is simply not treated as a logical primitive within biological science." But this seems to take us back full circle—to the position of Smart, that biology is no more than applied physics and chemistry. Simon disagrees with Smart. How does he stand vis-a-vis this last statement of the Cartesian spirit he finds so pervasive in biology? I think he disagrees with it, but it is very hard to tell. Perhaps the answer is that the resolution of the issue of the autonomy of biology is a pragmatic matter, relative to a complex set of needs and commitments: the sorts of things that determine life styles, political attitudes, and religious points of view, as well as the growth of scientific understanding. The question of the precise configuration of Simon’s pragmatism remains very vague indeed—a consequence of his over use of the style of impersonal attribution rather than direct assertion. Simon says generally sane and familiar things about Biology and the Idea of Progress and about Biology and Ethics. The really startling assertion of the penultimate chapter, that "consciousness" is neither a biological nor a behavioral predicate, and that its foundations are essentially moral and legal, is unfortunately supported by no argument whatsoever. Instead, the reader is urged to examine two of the author’s previous articles.—E. M. (shrink)

Volumes two and three of this six-volume work together deal with Greek culture from its pre-hellenic origins to the period of the Skeptics. It is philosophy of history in the grand style. Though the language is diffuse and metaphorical, the work is learned and has a certain precision. Voegelin's thesis is that the creation of order is a constant of human nature. A concrete society, besides being an organization for pragmatic survival, is also an attunement with the order of being (...) and an attempt to bring the two realms into harmony. The Greek pragmatic order took the form of polis, and its conception of the order of being reached its highest form in the overcoming of the cosmological myth in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle.--F. M. S. (shrink)

A sympathetic study of the Anabaptist-Mennonite tradition which attempts to clarify the nature of the Free Church heritage and show its contributions to religious and political freedom. Though well-documented and competent, it is episodic and somewhat disorganized; it dwells less on history than on the relevance of Free Church ideas to contemporary problems of religion and society.--F. M. S.

A mimeographed book on the philosophy of "Being" from Thales to Aristotle. The author states that the book has evolved out of his lectures in an introductory course on metaphysics. Almost half the pages are devoted to Platonism. The whole treatment is somewhat repetitious and is more pedagogic than scholarly, making relatively free use of terminology.--M. G.

A simple exposition of Wittgenstein's two main works together with a brief discussion of Ryle, Strawson, Hart, and Urmson. This work does not enter into philosophically deep enough waters to interest the advanced student.--J. M.

This book consists of two essays of equal length. The first is a revised edition of Smart’s An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics while the second, by Williams, is a general critique of utilitarianism with pointed reference to Smart. Combining the normative utilitarianism of Henry Sidgwick with the non-cognitivist metaethics of R. M. Hare, Smart outlines a version of act utilitarianism. In the course of doing this, he tackles the traditional problems of utilitarianism. He rejects rule utilitarianism because (...) it is "rule worship." He defends a middle ground between hedonistic and idealistic utilitarianism by admitting that happiness is in part an evaluative and not entirely a descriptive concept. Finally, he defends utilitarianism against deontic and common sense ethical theories by remarking about those cases in which utilitarianism seems to produce jarring results, "so much the worse for common sense ethics." Once one commits oneself to the principle of benevolence, it is the yardstick against which the value of acts is to be measured. Furthermore, this principle leads to the traditional utilitarian distinction between the value of an action and the value of praising or blaming the action. (shrink)

Although important philosophers have questioned the moral defensibility of our treatment of animals, the topic has never had a significant place in ethical theory. By bringing together papers by authors with diverse views, this anthology focuses attention on the topic which, primarily due to the writings of Peter Singer, has received increasing study in recent years. According to Singer, the major moral theories offer arbitrary bases for giving preference to humans, and so they cannot be used to justify the widespread (...) beliefs that eating and experimenting upon animals are morally acceptable practices. Insofar as humans, regardless of rational or physical capacity, are deemed worthy of equal consideration, there is no good reason to withhold such consideration from animals. The first of the four sections into which the readings are divided describes the brutal treatment animals often receive from people. The second section provides a variety of opinions on the difference between men and animals ranging from Descartes’ claim that animals are mere automatons to Darwin’s claim that there is no fundamental difference between the mental faculties of men and higher mammals. The third section considers whether any of the supposed differences between men and animals can justify different treatment. The main conflict here is between those who contend that we have duties only to free or rational beings and those who, like Singer, contend that we have the duty to heed the interests of all sentient beings. The fourth section examines the nature of rights and whether animals have them. Some writers contend that animals have the right not only to life and happiness but also to liberty and property. Those unfamiliar with the heretofore neglected problem of our treatment of animals will find the readings in this collection valuable and provocative.—M.G. (shrink)

Even though the last decade has seen more original and significant work on Fichte, the flow of studies on his rival and "successor," Schelling, seems to continue uninterrupted. Beyond so many short and often quite modest writings, Kasper's huge book is towering, and not only because of its size. Kasper, like Horst Fuhrmans to whom he seems to be the most indebted and who is not in Schelling studies, is a Roman Catholic theologian who commands an immense and impressive knowledge (...) of the history of theological speculation from the Greek Fathers to the nineteenth century school of Tübingen. Like most major studies on Schelling, the present one must struggle its way through the evolution of the many phases of his thought before getting down to the more systematic investigation. Such an endeavor must express a "preference" for one of those phases, and, as is usually the case today, the greatest appreciation is directed towards the Spätphilosophie. The core and kernel of the book is the beautiful and highly concentrated exposition on "God as the ground and the Lord of history" where historicity itself receives its ontological deduction from the premisses of theism. The book concludes with the concrete modalities of the divine mediation of history through the great issues of the fall, mythology, and revelation. For more than a decade Walter Schulz's interpretation of Schelling's late philosophy has seemed to overshadow, and to dismiss, all more Weltanschauung-orientated research. It has long been time for a study focusing on Schelling, the philosopher of Christianity, which is what Schelling considered himself to be for the last forty-five years of his life.--M. J. V. (shrink)

This excellent short book has come only belatedly to our attention. Unlike the more recent work of J. Schlanger, Meier's aim is not to revise, even less to revolutionize, our understanding of the young Schelling. He is following the classical interpretation--from Hegel to Kroner--that already the early Schelling displayed unmistakable signs of an ontological dogmatism. Indeed, with the exception of the ethical inspiration of the celebrated Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism and the gnoseological investigations of the Treatises, the early Schelling (...) is concerned with the issues of ontology--this is at least the author's thesis. The hollow majesty of the System of 1801 is foreshadowed by innumerable passages in the writings on the philosophy of nature. It is true that the System of Transcendental Idealism does display a certain parallelism between the gnoseological and ontological elements--but the balance is quickly broken. Under the appearance of the reconciliation of dogmatism and criticism in the doctrine of absolute knowledge via intellectual intuition, Schelling completes the restoration of ontology in the Bruno, in the Lectures on Academical Studies, and in the System of Würzburg. All this is expounded in clear, precise, well articulated chapters which enable the reader to attain a unified view of the central themes and inspirations of the immense literary production of the early Schelling.--M. J. V. (shrink)

This volume is the reprint of perhaps the best study of Goethe's philosophy. Its importance lies in its method. Instead of trying only to collect material pertaining to traditional, philosophical problems, it makes a deep-reaching attempt to grasp and to extricate the metaphysical foundations and basic themes of Goethe's Weltanschauung. There is a thoroughgoing analysis of his "morphological" method and excellent, long passages on his magnificent studies of the life and the structure of plants. The culmination of the whole work (...) is its third part: on the symbol considered what it truly is, not a merely esthetical [[sic]], but an essentially metaphysical notion. The book is not easy to read and it does presuppose a certain familiarity with Goethe's whole oeuvre. Those interested in the history of German idealism will certainly appreciate the parallels with Kant, but unfortunately Weinhandl omits the important parallels with Schelling.—M. J. V. (shrink)

This collection contains such a wealth of topics that it deserves the attention of anyone seriously interested in what its title denotes, namely the philosophy of the history of philosophy. The content of the various essays, along with their translated titles, can be described as follows. "The New Aspects of the Philosophy of the History of Philosophy" claims to be, but is not, an introduction to the other essays; it abounds in obscurities and does not even make the effort of (...) integrating the various contributions into some common themes. "Meta-philosophy and History of Philosophy" is partly a methodological discussion of the connections among philosophy, metaphilosophy, and history of philosophy, and partly a discussion from a psychological-psychoanalytical and cultural anthropological point of view of questions like the following: whether anything like progress exists in the history of philosophy, what is the meaning of the whole philosophical history, and what are its prospects for the future. "Heidegger, Schelling, and German Idealism" discusses the relations between the history of philosophy and the philosophy of existence, using primarily Heidegger’s lectures on Schelling as a case study. "Hermeneutic Experience and Philosophical Historiography" is a discussion primarily of the theory of historical interpretation in Gadamer’s Wahrheit und Methode, and secondarily of some of its consequences for the study of the history of philosophy; it is highly informative, but one cannot fail to lament the fact that the author reports Gadamer’s critiques of historicism without any explicit indication that, besides Dilthey’s version, there exists Croce’s brand of historicism, which in my judgment is very similar to Gadamer’s hermeneutics as reported in this essay. "History of Art as History of Philosophy?" is a thoughtful and provocative brief discussion of the divergence between the histories of art and of philosophy; it also suggests that, nevertheless, data and facts from art-history can be used by the historian of philosophy for the reconstruction of the philosophical concepts of epochs and cultures whose available historical records abound in the field of art but are lacking in the area of philosophy. "The Hegelian Left and the History of Philosophy" is an analysis of some of the historiography of the 19th century Hegelian Left. "-Philosophy and the Theology of Secularization discusses the interconnections among philosophy, history of philosophy, the contemporary historical situation, and political philosophy, developing a Gentilean critique of the theology of secularization; it argues that Gentile’s critique refutes some presuppositions of this theology, namely, the idea of the progressive character of contemporary history and that of the irreversible process of secularization. "Philosophy of Religion and History of Philosophy," though terminologically and stylistically obscure, is a very stimulating justification of the thesis that an adequate philosophy of religion is to be grounded on a philosophy of history, which in turn is to be grounded on an all-encompassing history of philosophy; independently of the adequacy of this justification, the author makes a number of very suggestive comparisons between the history and historiography of philosophy and the history and historiography of the Church, such as the following: the analogy of the relationships between theology and Church history and between philosophy and philosophical history, the analogy between the "history of ideas" and ecumenical Church history, the analogy between the position of Hegel in philosophical history and that of Jesus in Church history, and the analogy between the visible/ invisible Church distinction in religious studies and the history/theory distinction in philosophical inquiry. "Beyond the Historical Disease" discusses to what extent philosophical hermeneutics solves Nietzsche’s problem that there is a conflict between historiographical awareness and the capacity to make history; it answers that, in spite of its insights, hermeneutics fails, and that the solution lies in the direction of certain suggestions found in Sartre’s Question of Méthode. "Interpretation and Translatability of Philosophical Texts" discusses certain problems in the theory of meaning from the point of view of analytical philosophy, and in relation to the meaning of philosophical passages. "Epistemology, Hermeneutics, and Analytical-Philosophical Historiography" is an interesting mixture of a critique of the view that contemporary analytical philosophy is ahistorical, a discussion of the similarities between Popper’s epistemology and Gadamer’s hermeneutics, and a study of the interplay between Popper’s epistemology and his interpretation of Plato in The Open Society and its Enemies. "Information Theory and Philosophy" studies the relation between science and the history of philosophy by comparing and contrasting certain philosophical ideas of Leibniz and Kant with recent results in information theory. A final essay deals with "The Myth of Faust in Kierkegaard."—M.A.F. (shrink)

Souriau is known in France chiefly as a philosopher of art. However, most of his works—he published 11 books between 1925 and 1970—treat also of being, knowledge, and meaningful existence. The present study, interpretive rather than critical, immerses the reader in Souriau’s profound and poetic views on these themes. Souriau’s thought is often difficult. One finds in him links with phenomenology, process philosophy, Plato, Spinoza, Schelling, and Hegel. But he builds in his own way his high vision of man. As (...) presented by Maubrey, Souriau starts with the immediately given, whose uninventable evidence, antedating the cogito, indicates to us an ontic reality beyond both the sensible and the intelligible. We can establish more spiritualized and meaningful examples of this ontic reality as we develop our own highest capacities. Souriau cites here the creation of a work of art and other examples as well. In developing his central vision, Souriau discusses forms of knowledge, cosmological realms, modes and degrees of existence, creation and the ontology of a work of art, the "shadow of God," and other topics. Maubrey describes Souriau’s "new optics" as an empiricism of the transcendental, a "via media between the irrational and ultra-rational tendencies of contemporary philosophical thought." This book is a comprehensive rendering of his rich and stimulating thought.—M.M. (shrink)

As the crime rate rises and attempts to rehabilitate criminals prove unsuccessful, attacks upon recent reforms in our handling of crime increase. In this book van den Haag offers both a theory of punishment which supports traditional penal policies and factual data which show the failure of recent reforms. van den Haag claims that the main purpose of a legal system is to preserve order but that not every system that does this is acceptable. Along with preserving order, a legal (...) system should also be retributively just, i.e., punish those and only those who deserve it, because only such a system will gain public support. Although van den Haag does not present an original thesis on the moral justification of punishment, he covers many important issues in a lucid fashion, argues forcefully for his views, and presents some new arguments. In his discussion of our legal system’s exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, he argues that such evidence should be admissible in court since the misconduct of the police is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the police obtain evidence illegally, then they should be punished rather than society harmed by allowing the guilty to go free. In defending the death penalty, van den Haag contends that it is the opponents of the penalty’s effectiveness as a deterrent who have the burden of proof. Since, other things being equal, increasing the severity of the penalty decreases the incidence of various crimes, it must be assumed that the incidence of any crime can be decreased by increasing the severity of the punishment. Thus, without clear evidence to the contrary, the death penalty would have to be deemed likely to have a deterrent effect. The factual data presented by van den Haag is interesting and one recent experiment he discusses has produced particularly surprising results. This experiment on student cheating showed that the threat of punishment was effective in producing the desired behavior, but that exhortations to be honest were counterproductive.—M.G. (shrink)

This recent monograph on the famous head of the Protestant theological school of Tübingen is a mature and well-documented writing, despite a certain circularity and many repetitions in its argument. What Geiger tries to expound above all is Baur's speculative basis—or bias. Baur began with Schleiermacher, but the major and striking influence on Baur's thinking was exerted by Hegel. His books on the history of dogma are a theological counterpart of Hegel's phenomenology. But in his last writings, the speculative schemas (...) are quietly effaced, and we read suddenly that the essence of Christianity is the "pure moral conscience and the autonomy of the subject."—M. J. V. (shrink)

In this important work, Professor Walter M. Elsasser attempts to evaluate the status of one of the most puzzling scientific and philosophic problems of our time: How the basic ideas or categories of biology relate to the fundamental concepts of physics. In particular: "Is biology reducible to physics?" In turn: "Are social and mental phenomena reducible to biology?," as some of the new school of sociobiologists contend.

Most present-day philosophers know William Paley primarily as a defender of the argument from design and the author of the famous watch analogy. Professor LeMahieu argues that Paley’s philosophical and theological writings deserve more than the scant attention they now receive. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Paley’s books were held in such high esteem that several were required reading by students at Oxford and Cambridge; the Evidences of Christianity was kept on the Cambridge University examination list until 1920. His (...) books were deemed important not only because they presented forceful arguments in a lucid style, but also because they presented a unified and comprehensive philosophy that embodied many of the main beliefs of the Enlightenment in England. The cornerstone of Paley’s philosophy was the contention that scientific reasoning, i.e., inductive and analogical arguments, could be used to demonstrate God’s existence and nature. In Natural Theology, Paley offered inductive arguments for God’s existence; and in Evidences of Christianity, arguments of the same type were used to support revealed religion. Paley’s argument in support of Christianity was directed primarily at refuting Hume’s contention that those who claimed to have seen the biblical miracles were unreliable witnesses. In Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, Paley again relied on inductive arguments along with his inductive proofs of God’s existence and nature to support a utilitarian moral position. Although LeMahieu presents a full account of Paley’s philosophy and its influence on subsequent nineteenth century thinkers, he does not neglect to point out some of that philosophy’s questionable arguments and assumptions. Despite many possible deficiencies in his arguments, however, Paley is one of the ablest defenders of religion and, at times, a shrewd philosopher. By presenting a coherent statement of Paley’s philosophy, LeMahieu has performed a worthwhile task. His book should inspire other philosophers to examine carefully Paley’s neglected treatises.—M.G. (shrink)

The thesis of this book is that moral evil is for Kant an ineradicable aspect of human existence; moreover the author argues that moral evil is a datum of experience which none of the rationalist systems which preceded Kant's, nor Hegel's system which came after, could assimilate, a rock upon which they all shattered. Reboul's concern is to investigate the "insondable profondeur du mal radical" as this theme appears in the forty years of Kant's active philosophic production; his interest reflects (...) the influence of his mentor, Karl Barth. Reboul is at his best in his clear depiction of Kant's ingenuity at reconciling the optimism of the Enlightenment with the Reformation's conviction of sin. For example, the very insufficiency of Leibniz' attempt to supply a ground for every decision of the will, his inability to explain the reality of willful evil, is used by Kant as an excuse for not going beyond Leibniz' theory. "Expliquer la liberté serait la détruire," writes Reboul. Kant assimilates the idea of progress by assigning it to the level of phenomenal or technical improvements. Moral value resides only in those acts by which we loosen the ties of sensible determination upon the will and render ourselves autonomous. The struggle for autonomy must be fought by each man for himself; there is a decisive limit to the help we can derive from "progress." For Kant man is bent towards evil not only by reason of his spontaneous attraction to sensible objects, but also in virtue of a basic perversion of his faculty of judgment, a perversion which comes close to being identified with liberty itself. It is significant, as Reboul notes, that all of Kant's examples of free will are also examples of moral evil. This low estimate of man's spontaneous faculties is at the basis of Kant's suspicion of all eudaimonistic ethics, his demand that every moral decision be "disinterested," that the moral law be the sole determinant of the will. Just as in the first Critique Kant insists on finding an adequate cause to ground the universality which attaches to the laws of science and mathematics, so in ethics he demands an adequate explanation of the radical character of evil present in the world; this he finds in a perversion of the human faculty of judgment, whereby a contingent element of experience is illegitimately raised to the status of a universal maxim by the will. The moral decision must be disinterested because every attraction by a sensible object threatens to become the occasion for such a definitive fixation of our moral character. But Kant's deeper originality lies in a view which bridges the Enlightenment and later periods. Kant breaks with a convention of systematic philosophical activity which had held sway from the Greeks through Leibniz, the view that reality must be consistent. For Kant, the principle of non-contradiction does not apply to the phenomenal world but only to the noumenal. For Kant, human existence can harbor contradictions; consequently man lives perpetually in tension. As a citizen of two worlds, he is committed to achieving a moral ideal which the basic perversion of his will renders unrealizable. This tension can be viewed optimistically, as with Hegel ; then the "positivity" of evil is interpreted as a necessary step, a " felix culpa," by which God rouses man to greater efforts and brings him to maturity, autonomy, and a vision of the real. The other alternative is the Schopenhauerian interpretation, wherein the tensions in the absurdity of the human condition are taken as too extreme to warrant further participation. Reboul is excellent in showing the form these tensions take in Kant's system: the mystery of how a basically perverted will can be converted into a "good faith," although this is the ethical command; the command never to feel oneself "justified" through having done one's duty, even though the moral command obligates us to strive perpetually for this condition. However, in stressing the harsh import of sin for Kant, and thus saving Kant from Hegel, has Reboul not placed Kant in the company of Schopenhauer, Sartre, and Camus?--P. M. (shrink)

Is it a mistake to use "true" or "false" in certain contexts? White sets the stage for dealing with this issue by laying out a field of usages. He develops his position by characterizing and criticizing contemporary treatments of these data, moving rapidly from case to case. His numerous summaries and conclusions, obviously based on a wider view of the material than is presented in the text, may leave the uninitiated alternately puzzled, bristling, or suspicious. While White's data are expressed (...) clearly, the goal of his arguments and his organizational principles are frequently less apparent. White's discussions of fiction and modality are of particular historic interest. Here we find Frege and Russell arguing about whether they can argue about the King of France. We meet with Aristotle's ancient problem of the future naval battle, witness latter-day skirmishes over the nature of moral language, and find Leibniz, Hume, and Kant debating the logic of necessity and contingency. Are there really different types of truth which correspond with different modalities and existence presuppositions, as White seems to assume? This question, harking back to books 5 and 6 of Plato's Republic, is passed over by White in his usage-oriented quest for the sense of "truth." Truth will suit both student and researcher alike and is to be recommended for its breadth of concern and for its 18 pages of bibliography.--M. D. P. [[sic]]. (shrink)